# 1NC

#### Obama’s rising popularity ensures Clinton wins in 2016 – attempts to distance from plan or stick obama with the blame only undermine her coattails strategy

Stanage 16 --- Niall, Contributor @ The Hill, "Clinton's ace in the hole: Obama," 5/29, http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/281575-hillary-clintons-ace-in-the-hole-obama)

Hillary Clinton will have a not-so-secret weapon in her quest for the White House: President Obama. Obama’s approval ratings have been marching upward since the start of the year. He retains immense popularity with the Democratic base, including vital groups such as young people, with whom Clinton has struggled. And experts also say that there is no one better positioned to unify the party behind the former secretary of State as her long and sometimes bitter struggle with primary rival Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) draws to a close. If Obama could run for a third-term, “he’d be reelected in a walk,” said New York-based Democratic strategist Jonathan Rosen. “He can play a huge role in bringing the Democratic base and independents, together to unite behind her candidacy.” That could be particularly important given evidence from the primary season that suggests Clinton has failed to thrill some parts of the Obama coalition, even while she has drawn strong support from other blocs. She has struggled mightily among younger voters, for example, even while beating Sanders by huge margins among African-American Democrats. The political relationship between Obama and Clinton is a long and knotty one. Distrust still festers among some of the aides who worked for each candidate during their titanic 2008 primary struggle. On the other hand, Hillary Clinton rallied support for Obama in the general election that year, even coming to the Democratic National Convention floor to move a motion for the then-Illinois senator to become the nominee. In 2012, former President Bill Clinton — whose role in the 2008 primary was contentious — gave a famously effective speech lauding Obama’s economic record. Before Hillary Clinton began her quest for the presidency this time around, she seemed to distance herself from the man whom she served as secretary of State. Back in August 2014, she critiqued a foreign-policy view synonymous with Obama saying, “Great nations need organizing principles and ‘Don’t do stupid stuff’ is not an organizing principle.” That attitude carried through into the early months of the campaign. Last fall, according to NPR, she told voters in Davenport, Iowa, “I am not running for my husband’s third term of President Obama’s third term. I am running for my first term.” Clinton’s rhetoric shifted as the challenge from Sanders became more serious, however. On healthcare, she cast herself as the protector of Obama’s signature domestic achievement, the Affordable Care Act. A Clinton ad on gun control featured the candidate saying, of the president, “I’m with him.” Part of Clinton’s pivot was clearly aimed at stopping the Sanders insurgency in its tracks. But Clinton’s political proximity to Obama could pay dividends in the general election, too. Gallup’s daily tracking poll at the end of last week showed 52 percent of adults approving of Obama’s job performance and 44 percent disapproving. At the beginning of the year, Obama won approval from just 45 percent of adults in the equivalent poll, while 51 percent disapproved. Some independent experts believe that the feverish tone of the primary season in both parties has fueled Obama’s climb. “As the conflicts got more into the gutter during the primary season, President Obama looks much better by comparison,” said Grant Reeher, a professor of political science at Syracuse University. “I think that he personally has been helped by what has happened in both primaries — but particularly the Republican one — which reminded people why they liked the guy eight years ago.” Experts like Reeher noted that traditionally it has been difficult for a candidate to win the White House after his or her party has held the presidency for the preceding eight years. Only once since 1948 has someone pulled off that feat. President George H.W. Bush succeeded his fellow Republican President Reagan by winning the 1988 election. But 2016 could be exceptional. The polarizing nature of the presumptive Republican nominee could leave some voters seeking a “safe haven” with a known quantity such as Clinton, experts say. That dynamic could be enough to counteract Clinton’s own lowly favorability numbers, as well as the traditional reluctance to give a party three successive White House terms. “It is obviously a challenge to win the White House for three straight elections and as a candidate, as a front-runner, everyone takes shots at you. But that challenge can be overcome when you have a popular sitting president,” said Democratic strategist Evan Stavisky.

#### It’s not a rational issue - Plan has unique symbolic importance in voters psyche – inevitably gets tied to deep seated sense of overall frustration and anxiety felt on all issues – now is key and link alone turns case

He, 16 --- He Yafei is former vice minister of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, and former vice minister at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China US Focus, “U.S. Election and Its Impact on China”, 1/25, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/u-s-election-and-its-impact-on-china/

U.S. Election and Its Impact on China The United States presidential election is now in full swing, with both parties going all out in a feverish effort to gain the upper hand. The 2016 vote is watched very closely all over the world, because whoever occupies the White House next January is going to face a fast-changing world with multiple challenges crying out for active American involvement and a more isolationist and inward-looking America unwilling to take on the role of “world policeman”. Before we delve deeper into the impact of the election on China and US-China relations for the coming years, there is a need to offer a brief analysis of what insight this election process has brought us into the American phyche. First and foremost, it has laid bare the rising populist sentiments that are oozing out every pore of American politics both domestic and international. One example is the Republican candidate Donald Trump whose fiery words on immigration and Muslims has won him high approval ratings even though those words are obviously on the extreme end of populism. Three Republican candidates, Trump, Cruz and Carlson, are considered politically extreme but have consistently won as a group over 50% support among Republican voters based on recent polls. It shows that voters are rejecting traditional candidates. What it reveals is that men-on-the-street in America are simply tired of traditional politics and politicians. The fact that Jeb Bush falls behind Trump therefore comes as no surprise. Populist sentiments reflect the unhappiness ordinary people have harbored against status quo where American economy is still under the shadow of financial crisis and slow recovery as well as enfeebled responses of the American government in the face of global challenges. To put it in perspective, they represent the frustration and anxiety of American people feel about the changed and still fast changing world they live in. The American supremacy and sense of safety both physical and economic is threatened. That’s the essence of what people fear. Here comes China, whose economic growth and military modernization in recent years represents, to American people, a world that undergoes rapid changes and evolves to a multipolar one where the US is no longer being able to call shot on everything. The resentment against globalization is on the rise. Overall strategic retrenchment and an emphatic shift to focus more on China are taking place simultaneously. “Scapegoating” China is inevitable. “China has taken jobs away from American workers”. “China is manipulating its currency to gain advantage in trade”. “China is being aggressive in the South China Sea and trying to drive the US out of the Western Pacific”. The list of complaints can go on and on. It doesn’t matter whether those accusations and complaints are true or not to American politicians and voters as long as they have “election value”. For instance, the renminbi has appreciated against the US dollar to the tune of 30% since 2008, but voices are still strong in America calling for the RMB to appreciate further. We all know from experience that China-bashing is common and “cost-free” in US elections. This time around is no different. What is different is that while without agreeing to the concept of “G2”, there is a broad recognition that the US and China are the two major powers in today’s world. It is no hyperbole to say that nothing gets done without close cooperation between the two nations, be it climate change, energy security, non-proliferation of WMD, etc. In this connection the US election does have an impact on China and US-China relations as noted by Robert Manning, who said the US-China relationship enters “dangerous waters” in 2016.

#### That flips the election for the GOP – our link prices in other factors and we don’t need to win that Hillary gets the blame

Needham 16 (Vicki, The Hill, 1/21, “Moody’s model gives Dem candidate advantage in 2016,” <http://thehill.com/policy/finance/266668-moodys-model-gives-dem-candidate-advantage-in-2016>)

The Democratic presidential nominee will win the race for the presidency, but the election is shaping up as historically tight, according to a political model. Less than 11 months from Election Day, Moody’s Analytics is predicting that whomever lands the Democratic nomination will capture the White House with 326 electoral votes to the Republican nominee’s 212. Those results are heavily dependent on how swing states vote. The latest model from Moody’s reflects razor-thin margins in the five most important swing states — Florida, Ohio, Colorado, New Hampshire and Virginia. In each of those states, the Democratic advantage is less than 1 percentage point, well within the margin of error. The election model weighs political and economic strength in each state and determines the share of the vote that the incumbent party will win. The most important economic variable in the model is the growth in incomes in the two years leading up to the election. That factor captures the strength of the job market in each state, including job growth, hours worked, wage growth and the quality of the jobs being created. The model also factors in home and gasoline prices. So far, the strength of the economy has kept the model on track for the Democratic nominee. But the trajectory of the president’s approval rating also makes a difference in who could win the White House. If President Obama’s approval rating shifts only a little more than 4 percentage points, a bit more than the margin of error for many presidential opinion polls, the move could further cut into Democratic hopes to retain the White House. Growing concern about terrorism and other issues could dent Obama’s approval rating further.Usually, if the sitting president’s approval rating is improving in the year leading up the election, the incumbent party receives a boost. But in most elections, the president’s rating has declined in the lead-up to the election, favoring the challenger party.

#### extinction – climate change, global wars, and turns case

Nisbet 16 (Matthew, Associate Professor of Communication Studies and Affiliate Associate Professor of Public Policy and Urban Affairs at Northeastern University who studies the role of communication, media, and public opinion in debates over science, technology, and the environment, New Scientist, 5/27, "Trump would deliver fatal blow to fight against climate change," http://www.northeastern.edu/camd/commstudies/people/matthew-nisbet/#sthash.Zoq2zrjr.dpuf)

Trump would deliver fatal blow to fight against climate change A Donald Trump presidency would disrupt the fight against climate change in a way that threatens to snuff out all hope, warns Matthew Nisbet Trump on a podium, with his hilarious hair Bad for the environment Robyn Beck/AFP/Getty Images By Matthew Nisbet Donald Trump has just promised to “cancel the Paris climate agreement“, end US funding for United Nations climate change programmes, and roll back the “stupid” Obama administration regulations to cut power plant emissions. The Republican presidential candidate has often defied party orthodoxy on major issues, shocking conservatives with his off-the-cuff remarks. But his scripted speech yesterday to an oil industry meeting directly echoed the party’s line on climate change and energy. Trump trails Hillary Clinton, the likely Democratic rival for the White House, in fundraising, and his speech was a clear sign that he seeks to capitalise on financial support from the powerful fossil fuel industry. His call to roll back industry regulations also deepens his appeal to voters in oil, gas and coal-producing states. “Obama has done everything he can to get in the way of American energy, for whatever reason,” Trump said, in an attack sure to be a centrepiece of his campaign. “If ‘crooked’ Hillary Clinton is in charge, things will get much worse, believe me.” Climate incoherence Yet a Trump presidency poses an existential threat qualitatively different from past Republican candidates who have doubted climate change. It could set in motion a wave of political and economic crises, creating global turmoil that would fatally disrupt efforts to tackle this issue in the US and abroad. Alarmed by the possibility of a Trump victory in November, international negotiators are urgently working to finalise the UN Paris agreement, in the hope that it can become legally binding before President Obama leaves office. Yet even if the gambit is successful, a Trump victory could cripple international progress in other ways. To meet the aggressive targets set at Paris, countries will have to substantially ratchet up efforts to end reliance on fossil fuels over the next few years. At the very moment when the world needs American leadership on this, Trump’s incoherence on climate and energy policy and his outright disgust for global collaboration would have a severe chilling effect on progress. In past comments, he has said he is “not a believer in man-made global warming“, declaring that climate change is a “total hoax” and “bullshit“, “created by and for the Chinese” to hurt US manufacturing. On energy policy, he has appeared befuddled when asked about specifics, even fumbling the name of the Environmental Protection Agency, which he has promised to abolish. Civil unrest The broader disruption of a Trump presidency would do even greater damage, weakening efforts to create a sense of urgency over climate change. Trump’s candidacy has brought public discourse in the US to its ugliest level, as he trades in trash talk and outrageous insults, spreading falsehood and innuendo, fomenting bigotry and prejudice. He has threatened the censure of critics in the media, even condoning violence against protesters, calling them “thugs” and “criminals”. His success emboldens far right and ultra-nationalist movements in the US and across Europe, risking further destabilisation. At home, Trump’s promise to ban Muslims from entering the US, to erect a wall at the Mexican border, and to deport millions of immigrants will provoke widespread protest and civil unrest. Abroad, Trump’s bravado and reckless unpredictability, his vow to renegotiate trade deals and to walk away from security alliances will generate deep tensions with China, Russia and Europe, risking financial collapse and military conflict. In the midst of such dysfunction and upheaval, the glimmer of hope offered by the historic climate change pact agreed to in Paris last year may forever fade. The stakes riding on a US presidential election have never been higher.

# \*\*\*Uniqueness\*\*\*

### Yes Clinton – Polls

#### Newest polls.

Times of Israel 6-4-16. ["Clinton regains double-digit lead over Trump in new poll" -- www.timesofisrael.com/clinton-renews-double-digit-lead-over-trump-in-new-poll/]

A new poll once again gives Hillary Clinton a double-digit lead over Donald Trump in a likely general election contest between the two, after weeks in which the presumptive Republican nominee appeared to have closed the gap entirely. A Reuters/Ipsos survey of 1,421 people on Friday showed 46 percent of voters planned to support Clinton, while 35% said they would back Trump in a presidential vote. Nineteen percent said they would not vote for either candidate. Polls published in mid-May had shown the two candidates to be virtually tied among registered voters. One Fox News poll even had Trump leading the likely Democratic nominee by 3 points. The renewed gap between the candidates comes as Clinton has stepped up her attacks on Trump, questioning his temperament, stability and responsibility. Trump, meanwhile, has battled growing criticism over his business dealings — particularly Trump University — as well as his supporters’ often-violent behavior, including anti-Semitic rhetoric by certain fans.

#### Clinton will win – newest polls and laundry list of advantages.

Dann 5-28-16. [Carrie, Political editor at NBC News, "Six Numbers That Show Why Clinton Is Still the Favorite in 2016" NBC News -- www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/six-numbers-show-why-clinton-still-favorite-2016-n581691]

The 2016 general election race is now a virtual tie. Hillary Clinton is reeling from more negative headlines about her use of a private email server, while Donald Trump careens from news cycle to news cycle as fact-checkers scramble to sift through his claims. And the big question on everyone's lips for the next 160-some days will be: So, who's gonna win? The most recent NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll shows Clinton clinging to a narrow lead. But a deep analysis of data from the poll shows that Clinton is still currently the more likely of the two candidates to emerge as the winner when the voting's all over on Nov. 8, 2016. First, the requisite caveats: Clinton is deeply unpopular, she has a persistent and severe problem on issues of trustworthiness, she faces possible defections from Bernie Sanders supporters, she's getting absolutely demolished in the white male vote and she's (self-admittedly) a less intuitive politician than her husband, which means that an onslaught of Trump attacks are likely to change some of the dynamics of the race going forward. But with all that on the table, here are six numbers that show why — right now — Hillary Clinton is better positioned to win the presidency than her GOP rival. The advantage for a generic Democratic candidate over a generic Republican is 4 percentage points One of the most basic questions we ask in every NBC/WSJ poll is whether or not voters want to see a Republican or a Democrat elected president, no matter who the nominees of each party may be. And as recently as last fall, the generic Republican option edged out the Democratic one. Not so anymore, with 47 percent of voters favoring a Democratic president and 43 percent choosing a Republican one. If the advantage holds, it would defy the notion that Americans are reluctant to grant a party the presidency after it's held the White House for eight years. (The last time that happened? George H.W. Bush in 1988.) Nothing about the unpopular Clinton or the even-less-popular Trump is "generic," but Dems have the advantage on this fundamental measure of party strength. The Democratic Party is nearly breaking even on favorability, while the GOP is under water. Let's be real: It isn't a fun time to be a party establishment type, no matter what side of the aisle you're on. Both parties are pretty unpopular, but Democrats are doing a lot better than their GOP rivals. On the popularity scale, Democrats are just barely underwater, at a net negative three point favorability rating. Republicans? They can at least say they're doing better than their nominee (who's at a net negative 29 point rating) but they're not far behind, with only 24 percent of voters giving the party a thumbs up, compared to 49 percent giving it a thumbs down. Barack Obama's approval rating is 51 percent. Hillary Clinton is adamant that she's running for her own first term, not Barack Obama's third term. But as the Democratic Party nominee, a key part of her message is building on Obama's vision and the "progress" his administration has promoted. Even as majority of the electorate — 53 percent — say they're interested in a change candidate, the man currently steering the ship has hit his highest approval rating since his second inauguration. Obama's high rating — which includes support from a majority of independents and women as well as 82 percent of Sanders voters — means that he'll be a powerful surrogate for Clinton once the Democratic primary is in the history books. Trump is under-performing with white women by 10 points. It's no secret that Trump has a problem with female voters. But he \*does\* enjoy a slight advantage over Hillary Clinton when it comes to only white women, leading with 46 percent to Clinton's 42 percent. That might look like a boon for Trump until you compare his share of the white female vote by the margin won by Mitt Romney four years ago. Romney beat Barack Obama by 14 points with white women, winning them 56 percent to 42 percent. Trump is under-performing badly with a part of the electorate that makes up almost four in 10 voters, and it's definitely no certainty that there are enough white men out there to cut his losses. Trump's showing a nine-point drop in the suburbs. Plenty of experts argue that the rural-urban cultural divide is so deeply entrenched that the suburbs are where the election will be won and lost. And, as he is with white women, Donald Trump is showing significant weakness with this slice of electorate. In 2012, Obama won urban suburbs 57 percent to 41 percent, according to NBC's Dante Chinni. Clinton is matching Obama's performance at 57 percent now, but Trump has slid to 32 percent. Swing suburban areas of the battleground states — places like Fairfax County, Virginia or Bucks County, Pennsylvania — are almost sure to help determine the general election winner. Right now, Clinton is enjoying a big head start.

### Yes Clinton – Models

#### Moody's predicts Clinton will win - historically the MOST accurate

Long 5/26/16 (Heather, Columnist @ CNN Money, "Clinton predicted to beat Trump...due to economics," http://money.cnn.com/2016/05/26/news/economy/hillary-clinton-beat-donald-trump-moodys/)

Donald Trump is in trouble, according to a model that has correctly predicted the winner of every presidential race since Ronald Reagan in 1980. This time around the model -- run by Moody's Analytics -- says a Democrat will win the White House. Hillary Clinton is widely expected to be the Democratic nominee. It's a bad sign for Trump. Moody's has been predicting a Democratic triumph since last August, but the margin of victory is getting bigger for the left as the economy has stayed relatively strong and President Obama's approval rating has risen.The reason a Democrat will win isn't about polling or personalities, it's about economics, says Moody's. The economy is the top issue in just about every election. When the economy is doing well, the party currently in office usually wins again. When the economy is tanking, Americans vote for change. So far, the U.S. economy is chugging along. It's growing. Millions of people are getting jobs, home prices are rising and gas is cheap. All of this favors Democrats.

#### Prefer our model.

White 16. [Dan, senior economist at MOody's Analytics, Ryan Sweet, "Democrats to Win in a Landslide in 2016, According to Moody's Election Model" The Street – August 31 -- www.thestreet.com/story/13271435/1/democrats-to-win-in-a-landslide-in-2016-according-to-moody-s-election-model.html]

The Moody's Analytics Presidential Election model forecasts whether or not the incumbent party will maintain control over the White House using a mixture of economic, demographic and political data. The model successfully predicts every election back to 1980, including a perfect electoral vote prediction in the 2012 election. Read More: Moody's on Volatility.

#### Iowa Electronic Market predicts Clinton win – it’s the most accurate

Versace 5/25/16 (Chris, Contributor @ InvestorPlace, "President Donald Trump: The U.S. Economy’s Winners and Losers," http://investorplace.com/investorpolitics/president-donald-trump-us-economy/#.V0w5ZPkrLIV)

As improbable as it might have seemed even a few months ago, the prospects of a “President Donald Trump” are very much on the table. One of the most accurate predictors of presidential elections over the years has been the University of Iowa’s Presidential Election Electronic Market, which is currently predicting a win for the democratic nominee, Hillary Clinton, by a significant margin. Between now and then however, there’s high potential for game-changing events between Clinton’s email server to Benghazi woes and Donald Trump’s occasional foot-in-mouth/that’s-not-what-I-meant moments. Others polls suggest a tighter race, which means the election as well as the “will they or won’t they boost rates?” question at the Federal Reserve will no doubt make us all feel like we are in a drawn-out tennis match during a long, hot summer, begging for it to be over.

### Yes Clinton – Prediction Markets

#### Prediction markets favor Clinton – they should be preferred over fundamentals or polls

Bernstein 5/27/16 (Jonathan, Political Commentator @ Bloomberg News, "Presidential race gets harder to predict," <http://www.myajc.com/news/news/presidential-race-gets-harder-predict/nrTnT/>)

A different way of forecasting election results is to follow the wisdom of crowds, found in election betting markets (such as those aggregated by PredictWise). Some critics of these tools believe they only quantify conventional wisdom, which is as likely to be wrong as right. But prediction markets have the advantage that the participants, and therefore the results, can take into consideration any relevant information -- as opposed to the "fundamentals" analysis, which excludes anything specific to this election cycle, and polling, which only looks at current public opinion and therefore ignores predictable changes. So far this year, Clinton has been the solid favorite. Predictwise currently gives the Democrats a 67 percent chance of winning in November.

### Yes Clinton– Demographics

#### Hillary will win – demographics and electoral college.

Cassidy 5-25-16. [John, staff writer, "THE CHALLENGES FACING HILLARY CLINTON" The New Yorker -- www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/the-challenges-facing-hillary-clinton]

With some people I know in panic mode about the latest opinion polls showing Donald Trump performing well in a prospective fall campaign against Hillary Clinton, I thought it might be worth stepping back a bit and looking at the prospects for such a race in November. For Democrats and others alarmed by Trump’s advance, the outlook is reassuring, but not entirely so. Assuming that Hillary Clinton wraps up the Democratic nomination pretty soon, she will be the firm favorite to win the general election. But she faces some significant challenges, not least of which is confronting a demagogue who daily traduces her and her husband. Arguably, the biggest factor in Clinton’s favor is demography. The Obama coalition of minority voters, young people, single women, and highly educated white voters of both sexes, which has seen the Democrats to victories in 2008 and 2012, remains intact. Indeed, it is growing. Meanwhile, the Republican base of older, whiter, and less educated voters continues to shrink. Back in March, I spoke with the political scientist Ruy Teixeira, who has written widely on the Obama coalition, and he pointed out that the minority share of the electorate will likely increase by another two percentage points this year, to twenty-eight per cent. Clinton, as she has demonstrated during the Democratic primary campaign, has strong support among minority voters, and she also scores well with other elements of the Obama coalition, such as working women and the highly educated. Unless Trump can attract more minority voters, which seems unlikely, he will need to rack up huge majorities among white voters. To carry Ohio, for example, Teixeira reckons that Trump would have to win the white working-class vote by twenty-two or twenty-three percentage points, and hold on to, or even expand, Mitt Romney’s double-digit margin of victory among college-educated white voters, who might be put off by Trump’s extremism. The political map should also be friendly to Clinton. In every election since 1992, the Democrats have carried eighteen states that have a combined total of two hundred and forty-two votes in the Electoral College—just twenty-eight short of the two hundred and seventy needed to assure victory. The Republicans’ base in the Electoral College is smaller: twenty-three states with a hundred and ninety-one electoral votes. As usual, this year’s contest is likely to come down to a dozen or so battleground states. But Clinton, if she holds onto the core Democratic states, will have many more ways to get to two hundred and seventy. Figures like these—together with the fact that Democratic candidates have won the popular vote in five out of the past six Presidential elections—help to explain why Clinton remains the bettors’ choice to win. At the British online bookmakers, the odds of her being the next President are about 1:2, which means that you have to wager a hundred dollars to win fifty. Trump’s odds are about 2:1. (You bet fifty dollars to win a hundred.) These odds imply that the probability of Clinton winning is 66.7 per cent, and the probability of Trump winning is 33.3 per cent.

#### Gender gap.

Kondik and Skelley 5-8-16. [Kyle, managing editor of Sabato’s Crystal Ball, a nonpartisan political newsletter produced by the University of Virginia Center for Politics Read more: http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/05/2016-donald-trump-hillary-clinton-election-things-you-should-know-213875#ixzz4AeVp8Bsw Follow us: @politico on Twitter | Politico on Facebook, Geoffrey, associate editor @ Sabato's Crystal Ball, "5 Things You Need to Know About the Coming Trump vs. Clinton Showdown" Politico -- www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/05/2016-donald-trump-hillary-clinton-election-things-you-should-know-213875]

2. In a Clinton vs. Trump race, Clinton begins as the favorite. One would not expect a candidate with a -12 net favorability rating to enter a general election campaign as the favored competitor. But Hillary Clinton will indeed begin the long march toward November as the favorite. What Clinton needed is an opponent who is even more disliked by the public than she is, and Donald Trump is just what her doctor ordered: Trump’s net favorability is currently -24 according to HuffPost Pollster’s polling average. We appear to be headed for a matchup between perhaps the two most loathed general election candidates in modern U.S. political history. Yes, it’s true that Trump is an unprecedented political figure who has been consistently underestimated, only to remarkably end up in his current position as the presumptive GOP presidential nominee. But, in reaching that elevated standing Trump has also alienated large swaths of key constituencies, including many Republicans. His unprecedented unpopularity will likely have serious, negative consequences for his electoral chances. The worst number for Trump may be his rating among women. At the start of April, Gallup found that 70 percent of women held an unfavorable view of the real estate mogul, compared to 58 percent of men. While more women vote Democratic than Republican—a partisan gender gap that has existed in every presidential election dating back to 1980—women will likely form a slight majority of the electorate in November, just as they have for decades, so they are still a constituency that Trump should worry about—a lot. And, considering Trump’s hits on Clinton for “playing the woman’s card”—which Clinton happily embraced in a fundraising appeal—his gendered language and attacks probably aren’t going away. While Trump’s campaign believes this will help him improve his support among white women, who have backed all GOP nominees since 1996, that strategy is a bit of a gamble, and could well backfire.

#### Hispanic voters and party unity.

Kondik and Skelley 5-8-16. [Kyle, managing editor of Sabato’s Crystal Ball, a nonpartisan political newsletter produced by the University of Virginia Center for Politics Read more: http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/05/2016-donald-trump-hillary-clinton-election-things-you-should-know-213875#ixzz4AeVp8Bsw Follow us: @politico on Twitter | Politico on Facebook, Geoffrey, associate editor @ Sabato's Crystal Ball, "5 Things You Need to Know About the Coming Trump vs. Clinton Showdown" Politico -- www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/05/2016-donald-trump-hillary-clinton-election-things-you-should-know-213875]

And then there are Hispanic voters, who appear to abhor Trump. The research firm Latino Decisions recently found Trump’s net favorability among Latinos to be -78 percent, while Hillary Clinton’s is +29 percent. To put Trump’s numbers into perspective within his party, Ted Cruz’s net favorability was -16 percent, and John Kasich’s was -10 percent. Although Hispanic voters will be heavily concentrated in uncompetitive California and Texas, they will be very important in at least three swing states: Colorado (where Hispanics made up 14 percent of the state’s 2012 electorate), Florida (17 percent) and Nevada (19 percent). In light of how Trump is viewed by this demographic group, it’s not difficult to imagine Clinton winning 80 percent of Latinos after Obama won 71 percent in 2012. And, most projections expect Latinos to make up more of the electorate than they did in 2012, when they comprised 10 percent of all voters. That assumption is based partly on the growing Latino population, but also on the fact that hatred of Trump may motivate more Hispanics to register to vote and turn out to the polls. Lastly, party unity is likely to be a bigger problem for Trump than Clinton. There’s little question that #NeverTrump is a larger force within the GOP than the anti-Clinton contingent is within the Democratic Party. Take the April 26 Pennsylvania primary as an example. Based on the exit poll, 84 percent of Democrats said they would definitely or probably vote for Clinton if she won the Democratic nomination, and 11 percent said they would be “scared” if Clinton became president. Overall, 69 percent of Democrats felt the Clinton-Sanders contest had energized the party while 26 percent felt it had divided Democrats. Contrast those numbers to views of Republicans in the Keystone State: Only 39 percent felt the GOP campaign had energized the party while 58 percent felt it had divided Republicans. In total, 77 percent said they would definitely or probably vote for Trump in the general election, and 22 percent said they would be “scared” if he became president. Of course, there is ample time for Trump to bring anti-Trump Republicans back into the fold, and his favorability numbers among party members have improved in recent weeks. Still, via Gallup, his net favorable rating among Republicans was +29 as of May 5 versus +44 for Clinton among Democrats. These factors, coupled with Clinton’s healthy lead over Trump in early horserace polling, led the Crystal Ball to make Clinton a large favorite in our first Clinton-Trump Electoral College map, in which we give Clinton a 347 to 191 edge in the electoral vote. (Many people, including some Republicans, have told us they believe this projection is actually too kind to Trump.)

# \*\*\*Links\*\*\*

### Link – China – General – 2NC

#### national political psyche, gut voter reaction and critics spin ties the plan to full scope of ALL economic and security fears about China – it’s a key issue for voters

Gross, 13 --- Donald, Donald Gross is a lawyer, business strategist and policy expert who also serves as an adjunct fellow of Pacific Forum CSIS, a non-profit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies. A former State Department official, he developed and implemented U.S. policy on strategic trade, national security and foreign relations. Earlier, he was Director of Legislative Affairs at the National Security Council in the White House and Counselor of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, “The China Fallacy”, http://www.donaldgross.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/The-China-Fallacy-Excerpts.pdf

Following the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989, Americans began to worry deeply about another threat to the well-being of their country: the People’s Republic of China. Though the United States became the world’s only superpower at the end of the Cold War, strategists and analysts continued to search for dangers that might arise in the future. Among states that could potentially become big-power adversaries, China led the pack. Without doubt, the “China threat” today resonates deeply in the national political psyche, as Americans worry about China displacing the U.S. in Asia, taking U.S. manufacturing jobs, carrying out industrial espionage, modernizing its military forces, hacking into computers, and causing a multitude of other problems. Not so long ago, Americans considered another country to be the United States’ most dangerous adversary. During the Cold War, only the Soviet Union seemed to have the power and desire to unleash a devastating nuclear attack on cities and strategic targets across the U.S. Few seriously questioned the U.S.S.R. was masterminding an international communist conspiracy that threatened the “American way of life.” Though anticommunist fears peaked during the McCarthy period of the early 1950s, the ideological struggle continued through the Cuban missile crisis, the Vietnam War, the era of Glasnost, the break-up of the Soviet Union and beyond. While most Americans would admit that China does not possess the military prowess of Russia and is not actively seeking to export its ideological views around the world, many believe the U.S. should do all it can to prepare for an “inevitable” military conflict with China. They think it is only prudent to build up U.S. military bases and forces in the Pacific, in the face of China’s continuing military modernization. They are inclined to support U.S. trade policies imposing tariffs, quotas and other protectionist measures on Chinese imports that enter the country “illegally.” While they cannot help buying low-cost Chinese goods and enjoying low interest rates resulting from China’s large holdings of U.S. Treasury securities, they condemn policies that led the American government to borrow billions of dollars from China. On a gut level, many people fear “cheap Chinese labor” will cause the decline of the United States economy and that U.S. industry will continue to suffer from China’s “unfair trade practices.” From a values standpoint, Americans feel most comfortable when their leaders strongly criticize China for violating human rights and restricting political freedoms. Most believe in their hearts that China’s Communist Party still reverberates with the thoughts of Chairman Mao and that the Party is only willing to incrementally cede political controls through force or necessity. With so many reasons to fear, despise and worry about China, Americans nevertheless cannot help admiring China’s accomplishments and being intrigued with this emerging power. Many watched the opening and closing ceremonies for the 2008 Olympic Games and came away deeply impressed by the brilliant spectacle. Most cannot help but admire and be inspired by China’s achievement of raising more than 400 million people out of poverty, virtually wiping out widespread illiteracy, developing a large middle class and creating a dynamic, consumer society. Many realized that China was a different place altogether from the impoverished, dispirited and totalitarian country they had heard about for years. Nevertheless, most Americans shook their heads knowingly when television commentators dutifully noted that Chinese authorities sharply limited demonstrations and dissent in Beijing during the Olympics. They could not help but feel sympathy for Tibetans whose protests were violently suppressed only weeks earlier by the Chinese military (just as most Americans felt compassion for blind dissident Chen Guangcheng, who sought refuge and protection at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing in late April 2012). Looking back, the drumbeat of critical views about China among American academics, policy experts and journalists gathered strength during the Clinton administration and has continued to the present day. The “China threat” has many security, economic and political dimensions that experts frequently cite to justify their fears. On security matters, some critics assert, as an article of faith, that China is bent on pushing the U.S. out of Asia and eventually dominating the world. These “China hawks” argue that China could move at any time to forcibly occupy Taiwan and reunify the island with the mainland. Such a successful attack on Taiwan, bolstered by explicit and implied military threats against other countries in East Asia, would enable China to dominate the region as a whole. China would then double down on its ultimate goal, this reasoning goes: replacing the United States as the world’s only superpower. From the standpoint of the China hawks, a war between the United States and China is inevitable, since the U.S. stands in the way of China achieving its strategic objectives. Regarding China’s threat to U.S. jobs and economic growth, critics with strong protectionist views argue that the sharp increase in the United States trade deficit with China has had a devastating impact on American workers, causing the loss of nearly 2.8 million jobs between 2001 and 2010.1 They claim that China has unfairly achieved its large bilateral trade surplus with the United States, which reached approximately $295 billion in 2011, because in their view, China couples its aggressive export strategy with measures to manipulate and artificially undervalue its currency, giving Chinese products an unfair advantage in foreign markets.2 While both China hawks and protectionists condemn China for its one-party communist regime, lack of democracy and poor human rights record, they largely accept the country’s domestic political situation as an inalterable fact. Though they may hope for China’s eventual transition to full democracy and high human rights standards, their primary concern is protecting the United States against the threat that China poses to America’s security and economic well-being. shaping u.s. policy In many respects, it is the views of the China hawks that have informed ongoing American security policy toward China over the last decade. During the George W. Bush administration, the U.S. initiated a major buildup of forces in the Pacific as part of what it officially termed to be “hedging” against a potential Chinese military threat. Under the rubric of preparing for the “contingency” of a war with China, U.S. hedging has effectively amounted to a containment strategy. Beyond significantly increasing the number of naval, air and land forces at U.S. bases in the Pacific, the buildup strengthened close-in naval intelligence gathering along China’s coast as well as extensive air force surveillance and reconnaissance of the country as a whole. The Obama Administration hardened this policy through measures it announced in November 2011 that accelerate the strategic encirclement of China, including deploying U.S. marines to Australia’s northern territory and adopting a new “Air Sea Battle Concept” to carry out long-range strikes deep inside China in the event of war. Though the Bush administration, by encouraging market reform and promoting U.S. investment, pursued “engagement” with China on economic matters, it increasingly adopted restrictive trade measures such as imposing extensive import duties on Chinese products. Under pressure from protectionists in Congress, Bush officials moved to this more combative posture in their second term in the belief that China was benefiting unfairly from liberalized trade.3 The Obama Administration supported and magnified this approach. Preeminently, U.S. policy relies on trade measures called “anti-dumping” actions that penalize Chinese companies for allegedly selling their products in the U.S. market at below the cost of production. The Obama Administration also imposed high punitive tariffs on some Chinese products and created a new “enforcement unit” to ramp up U.S. investigations of Chinese trade practices. While critics often lament internal political conditions in China, they are far more focused on security and economic issues. The broad lack of interest in strengthening China’s democracy and human rights practices had a definitive policy impact during the Bush administration and remains in place during the Obama Administration: aside from cataloging political abuses and shortcomings in an annual State Department report, addressing individual cases of concern and making periodic official statements that emphasize American political values, the U.S. government does little that will effectively promote democracy and human rights in China.4 The views of critics who deeply fear a “China threat” have unduly shaped U.S. government policy and anaesthetized Americans to its weaknesses. To many people, United States security policy toward China seems prudently designed to prepare for an uncertain future. Given widespread fear of the threat China might someday pose, many Americans see strengthening defenses in the Asia Pacific as a matter of common sense. On economic issues, many believe it is only fair for the U.S. government to protect American jobs and manufacturers against purportedly nefarious Chinese commercial practices. If this policy sometimes requires confronting China over trade issues, they are willing to live with the consequences. Finally, while most Americans broadly dislike China’s authoritarian political system, they show little overall interest in adopting policies to help move it toward greater democracy and protection of human rights.

#### voters PERCEIVE plan as appeasement, weak on china, and ineffective – inevitably gets tied to ALL china related fears, regardless of specifics – critics control spin and perception

Gross, 13 --- Donald, Donald Gross is a lawyer, business strategist and policy expert who also serves as an adjunct fellow of Pacific Forum CSIS, a non-profit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies. A former State Department official, he developed and implemented U.S. policy on strategic trade, national security and foreign relations. Earlier, he was Director of Legislative Affairs at the National Security Council in the White House and Counselor of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, “The China Fallacy”, http://www.donaldgross.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/The-China-Fallacy-Excerpts.pdf

The difficulty of moving beyond current policy Despite the questionable premises underlying much of prevailing U.S. policy toward China, policymakers and commentators find it difficult to move beyond existing views. There are several reasons why this is so. To begin with, current policy is complex. It stresses preparation for a security threat from China at the same time as it promotes U.S. business interests there. It protects uncompetitive American companies from the adverse effects of China’s rapidly growing economy (unintentionally creating a nationalist backlash in Beijing) while largely ignoring China’s domestic political system. The seemingly contradictory elements of U.S. policy—in the face of real uncertainty about the direction of China’s military, economic and political development—mask the true dangers and weaknesses of the overall U.S. approach. A second reason why policymakers and commentators find it difficult to move beyond existing China policy is that groups with vested interests have a stake in its various components. These groups attempt to mold public opinion by defining “acceptable” and “mainstream” views of China, which provide strong support for the existing policy framework. This is especially true of security policy, where hawks who believe in a coming military clash with China also argue that the U.S. should pursue a military buildup to prepare for it. Not surprisingly, the military services and defense contractors in the United States are important members of the political constituency that favors an aggressive security strategy toward China. The specter of a large and amorphous “China threat” has proved useful as a replacement for the “Soviet threat” to spur the Pentagon’s acquisition of advanced weapons systems, especially at a time of overall defense budget cuts. Another group with a vested interest in a hard line security policy is the traditional “China lobby” (originally strong supporters of the anticommunist regime that led Taiwan after the Chinese revolution in 1949) which has concentrated in recent years on ensuring the U.S. supplies large quantities of high-quality weapons and military equipment to Taiwan to deter and defend against a possible Chinese attack. Perhaps the overriding reason why many policymakers and commentators cannot easily move beyond existing views of China is that they do not sufficiently factor into their analysis the major security, political and economic benefits that the United States and its Asian allies could achieve through improved U.S.-China relations. Many commentators tend to emphasize worst-case scenarios and pessimistic assessments which are seen by the media as “sober-minded” and “realistic.” It seems fruitless to these analysts to describe future benefits from a state of affairs that they believe will likely never come to pass. Influenced by the “tyranny of the status quo,” policymakers and commentators often feel the best they can do is to propose incremental changes that could achieve small policy improvements over time. U.S. politicians who attack Beijing for economic practices that lead to “shipping American jobs to China” also discourage policymakers and experts from highlighting the benefits of improved relations between the two countries. When these politicians exploit patriotic feelings and engage in demagogic “China bashing” to attract votes, they have a chilling effect on policy analysts. In this atmosphere, proposals that could significantly improve relations become vulnerable to political attacks as “appeasement,” “un-American” or “weak on China.” Conversely, highly questionable protectionist measures to help uncompetitive companies are seen as “tough” and “pro-American.” The upshot is that the acceptable bounds of the policy debate on China are far narrower than they ought or need to be.

#### Any change in China policy exposes Clinton to political risk – its PERCEIVED as soft on china stance

Rong 15 (Xiaoqing, New york based contributor @ Global Times, "Clinton may find it best to be quiet on China," 4/16, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/917207.shtml)

China has become a fixed topic in US elections at state and federal level in recent years. Most of the sound bites are negative. And in many elections, candidates blame each other for being too soft on China. A Washington Post editorial during the 2012 presidential election explained the reason wittily: "It's an iron law of US politics: You can't go wrong bashing China. Polls show the public believes that the US is losing jobs due to unfair economic competition from abroad, especially from China. And so, every four years, presidential candidates fall all over themselves promising to get tough on imports." Sometimes the Sinophobia can be stretched to an insane level. In 2013, when the now Senate Majority leader Mitch McConnell was campaigning for re-election in Kentucky, his wife Elaine Chao, the Taiwan-born former secretary of labor in George W. Bush's administration, was attacked by supporters of his rival for being a "Chinese wife" who prompted her husband to "create jobs for China." Clinton doesn't want to be seen as "soft" on China. In her 2014 memoir Hard Choices, she called on other Asian countries to form an alliance so they could collectively stand up to China. She also criticized China's censorship. She mentioned a confrontation with a Chinese leader about Tibet. And she devoted a whole chapter to how the Americans helped Chen Guangcheng, the blind activist who went to the US Embassy in Beijing and then was allowed to leave China for asylum in the US. The attacks have continued. Clinton recently used her Twitter account to criticize China for detaining five feminist activists. But even this "tough on China" tone doesn't seem to have convinced her political opponents or even some of the people on her side. The alliance among smaller Asian countries she hoped to see is at best weak. And now it could be further dissolved with the establishment of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. The "James Bond-style activity" of Chen's American saviors described in her book doesn't fit entirely with Chen's own account in his newly published autobiography in which he blamed the US for not fulfilling its promises to him. And the thorniest issue Clinton faces might be money. According to joint research of the Washington Examiner and watchdog Judicial Watch, during Clinton's tenure as secretary of state, her husband, former president Bill Clinton, made $48 million from foreign countries for giving 215 speeches, including $1.7 million for giving four speeches in China or to Chinese-sponsored entities in the US. In addition, entities that have close ties to China donated between $750,000 to $1.75 million and the Clinton Foundation, the family's charitable organization. Clinton resigned from the board of the family foundation right after Sunday's announcement to avoid conflicts of interest. Still, her opponents will not easily let go of the opportunity to question her ethics. What may also be brought up in the process is Clinton's once close relationship to Chinese-American fundraiser Norman Hsu whose 2007 arrest for illegal fundraising prompted her to return $850,000 in campaign donations he helped to raise. Hsu was later indicted for fundraising fraud. In 1996, the Democratic National Committee also returned $360,000 in donations raised by questionable Taiwan-born fundraiser Johnny Chung for Bill Clinton's reelection campaign. Chung said he got some money from the mainland, which denied the connection. Clinton's campaign will reportedly cost $2.5 billion. The figure has already raised many eyebrows. There is no doubt Clinton has the ability to raise whatever she needs without crossing the line. But the astronomical spending will likely bring up all the money-related questions and memories and mean that Clinton has an incentive to keep her distance from China. Maybe. Clinton should keep in mind a warning from Henry Paulson. When asked at an event at the Asian Society on Monday what he'd like to hear the presidential candidates say about China, the former US treasury secretary quipped: "I'd like them to say as little as possible."

### Link – China - Softline Policies – 2NC

#### Soft line china policies are a vital election issue – uniquely key this cycle

Sevastopulo and Donnan 15 (Demetri and Shawn, Washington Correspondents @ Financial Times, 8/26, "Republicans line up for potshots at China," http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/ced1bce8-4baa-11e5-a089-1a3e2cd1819b.html#axzz49gbNsW5i)

China has long served as a bogeyman in US presidential elections. Whether Bill Clinton referring to the “butchers of Beijing” in reference to the Tiananmen Square massacre, George W Bush attacking Mr Clinton for being soft on China or Mr Obama touting the need for alliances to challenge Beijing, US presidential contenders have long lambasted China while vowing to take a tougher stance than the White House incumbent if elected president. But some analysts say China is sparking a different degree of anger now for several reasons: its growth as an economic power, its assertive actions in the South China Sea, rampant cyber attacks, theft of intellectual property rights and the creation of a climate that is less welcoming to foreign business. Frank Jannuzi, president of the Mansfield Foundation, which promotes US-Asia relations, said there had been a bipartisan consensus since Richard Nixon went to China in 1972 that the US would profit by engaging the country. But he said the consensus had almost unravelled because companies had become “increasingly disenchanted” with China. Trump throws out reporter and the rule book Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump gestures during the first Republican presidential debate at the Quicken Loans Arena Thursday, Aug. 6, 2015, in Cleveland. (AP Photo/John Minchillo) When Donald Trump evicted an influential Latino reporter from a press conference on the campaign trail in Iowa, it fuelled concerns that his perceived war on Hispanics is damaging the Republican party’s chances of reclaiming the White House in 2016. Continue reading “In Washington there has always been a debate between the China hawks and the Panda-huggers. The balance keepers used to be business,” said Mr Jannuzi, who advised Joe Biden in his 2008 run to be the Democrats’ nominee for president. “You are going to see many presidential candidates view China’s moment of economic turmoil as an opportunity to push them . . . because they can combine the anxiety of the American people about the way China’s economy could hit their retirement accounts with the anxiety that has long been there in elite policy circles about China’s international policy behaviour.” Chris Johnson, a former top China analyst at the CIA, said the rhetoric on China was “different from the standard stuff” because Beijing refused to address US concerns on issues such as cyber security. “The comments from Walker and the others are irresponsible,” said Mr Johnson. “But it does put the administration on the defensive . . . because they will have to go hard on these issues.” Mr Johnson added that China had become a victim of its own success and could not rely on the “hide your strength, bide your time” strategy promoted by Deng Xiaoping. “Suddenly these guys who were doing well, but doing well invisibly, are out there in a way that they weren’t before. They’re an easy target.” The China-bashing has implications for Mr Obama, who spent much of this year deflecting demands from Capitol Hill to include binding provisions to prevent currency manipulation in a Pacific Rim trade deal known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

#### Soft-line policies on China alienate the public and become election-year fodder for Republicans

Glaser 15 (Bonnie, Senior Adviser for Asia in the Freeman Chair in China Studies, where she works on issues related to Chinese foreign and security policy. She is concomitantly a senior associate with CSIS Pacific Forum and a consultant for the US government on East Asia, "China bashing: American campaign ritual or harbinger of tougher policy?," http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/08/25/China-bashing-American-campaign-ritual-or-harbinger-of-tougher-policy.aspx)

China-bashing in the 2016 presidential election has begun in earnest. In past campaigns, many of the attacks on China were forgotten as candidates dropped out of the race or were defeated. In 2012, for example, Mitt Romney pledged to declare China a currency manipulator on his first day in office. He never got the chance, of course, and Obama's policies were unaffected by Romney's campaign rhetoric. Sometimes, promises to 'get tough' with China during the campaign simply became irrelevant as presidents, once in power, confront the demands of real-world policy challenges. When George W Bush ran for president in 2000, he criticised his predecessor Bill Clinton for calling China a strategic partner, and instead said China should be viewed as a 'strategic competitor.' After becoming president, however, Bush dropped that label. When a Chinese jet collided with a US surveillance plane over the South China Sea, Bush worked hard to avert a US-China political crisis, and after the September 11 attacks, he welcomed Beijing's proposal to fight together against terrorism. This time may be different, however. China's repressive policies at home, combined with its transgressions in the South China Sea and massive cyber attacks on US companies and the Federal Government, make it an easy target. Moreover, criticism of China likely resonates with most Americans. Republican candidates will accuse Obama of being too soft on China and vow that if elected, they will stand up for American interests. Democrats, including Obama's former secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, are more likely to find fault with than defend the current Administration's approach to managing US-China relations. Regardless of who is elected president in November 2016, he or she is likely to adopt a firmer approach to China on a litany of issues. So what are the candidates saying about China so far? GOP candidate Donald Trump condemned China's recent currency devaluation as 'the greatest theft in the history of the United States.' If elected president, Trump said, 'Oh would China be in trouble!' Carly Fiorina, another GOP contender, criticised China's cyber hacks on federal databases as an 'act of aggression' against America. She also warned against allowing the Chinese to control trade routes in the South China Sea and pledged she would be 'more aggressive in helping our allies...push back against new Chinese aggression.' In a lengthy critique of Obama Administration policies published in Foreign Affairs, GOP candidate Marco Rubio lambasted Obama's 'willingness to ignore human rights violations in the hope of appeasing the Chinese leadership.' He also accused China of pursuing 'increasingly aggressive regional expansionism.' Democratic front-runner Hillary Clinton has joined the fray in an effort to shield herself from the accusation that she was complicit in the implementation of a policy that accommodated China and failed to sufficiently stand up for American interests. Clinton acknowledges that as secretary of state she worked hard to build a better relationship with China and says she would continue to do so as president. But she also warns about the dangers posed by China's militarisation of the South China Sea and condemns China's 'stealing commercial secrets, blueprints from defense contractors' and 'huge amounts of government information' in its quest for an advantage over other nations. The presidential campaign is just starting to heat up. The torrent of China-bashing in the remaining 15 months before the general election is likely to have a profoundly negative effect on China's image in the US, which is already unfavourable. In a 2014 poll by the Pew Research Center, only 35% of Americans had a positive view of China, while 55% had a negative one. China's image in the US has tilted in a more negative direction in recent years – as recently as 2011 half of Americans gave China a positive rating. The negative public mood will likely align with harsher attitudes in Congress, reinforcing the proclivities of the next US president to adopt a tougher stance against Chinese trade policies, human rights violations, cyber intrusions, and assertiveness in the South China Sea. Despite a sincere desire for a positive bilateral relationship with the US, Xi Jinping is likely to prioritise the preservation of domestic stability, defence of sovereignty, and pursuit of the Chinese Dream.

#### Soft on China policies alienate the public, empower Republican attacks, and will be tied to Clinton

Nakamura 15 (David, Staff @ Wash Post, "Anti-China rhetoric in campaign suggests change under a new president," 9/23, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/anti-china-rhetoric-in-campaign-suggests-change-under-a-new-president/2015/09/23/f6bb3066-61ff-11e5-b38e-06883aacba64\_story.html)

A flashpoint every four years in American politics, China again has become a target for Republicans and Democrats alike on the presidential campaign trail. But foreign policy experts said there is mounting evidence that this time it’s more than a rhetorical gambit: Escalating tensions have left officials on both sides of the Pacific preparing for a shift in U.S. policy toward China, no matter which political party wins the 2016 election. As President Obama prepares to welcome Chinese President Xi Jinping to the White House on Thursday, those vying to succeed Obama have begun bashing China over its currency ma­nipu­la­tion, cyberhacking, human rights abuses and aggression in the South China Sea. Although Obama aides and Chinese officials have tried to shrug off the attacks as election-season pandering, analysts said the tough talk reflects souring attitudes toward China on Capitol Hill and in the public. And they suggested that the fear of a less friendly administration to come has contributed to China’s recent provocations. “What I think they’re really concerned about is what comes next,” said Bonnie Glaser, a China expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “And as a result, I think they’re trying to use this one-year-plus period in the Obama administration to get done in some areas as much as they can. In fact, I would argue this is what’s going on in the artificial island building in the South China Sea.” Xi’s two-day state visit to Washington is meant to reassure U.S. political leaders that China will be a reliable global partner and that its economic and territorial ambitions in Asia under his leadership are benign. In an address to business leaders in Seattle on Tuesday, the Chinese leader pledged to fight against cyberattacks and proposed creating a “high-level joint dialogue mechanism” with the United States to establish ground rules in cyberspace and to resolve disputes. But, it is unlikely that Xi and Obama will be able to announce major breakthroughs on the scale of the climate deal they reached last fall in Beijing, and that will make it difficult for the Chinese leader to accomplish those goals. Meantime, public opinion of China has soured as the United States has slowly recovered from the Great Recession. This year, 54 percent of Americans held an unfavorable view of China, compared with 29 percent in 2006, according to the Pew Research Center. “President Obama has hoped that being more open to China would make them a more responsible nation. It has not worked,” Sen. Marco Rubio (Fla.), who is seeking the GOP nomination, said in a speech to business leaders last month in Charleston, S.C. “We can no longer succumb to the illusion that more dialogue with China’s current rulers will narrow the gap in values and interests that separates us. . . . It is up to our next president to correct the errors of our current one.” Officials at the White House and in Beijing have rolled their eyes over much of the campaign-trail rhetoric. It’s easy for Republican front-runner Donald Trump to harangue China for stealing U.S. jobs or for Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), a candidate for the Democratic nomination, to criticize the trade imbalance. Just wait until one of these critics takes office, the White House thinking goes, and realizes just how important China is to the fortunes of the United States. Even Obama talked tough on China while campaigning before moderating his stance once in office. White House deputy national security adviser Ben Rhodes chalked up much of the criticism from GOP candidates to hyperbole that overstates “the degree of Chinese responsibility for certain things.” He emphasized the “bipartisan support” over previous Democratic and Republican administrations for a policy of engagement with China since the opening of relations more than four decades ago. At the same time, Rhodes acknowledged the growing concerns on Capitol Hill and in the business community, warning that “China needs to be mindful that its activities don’t undermine its standing here in the United States.” Part of Obama’s message to Xi, Rhodes added, is that “if you are not taking steps to address some of these concerns as it relates to particular trade irritants or cyber activities, you risk eroding the support for the U.S.-China relationship that comes from the business community; you risk inviting responses from Congress.” The issue is complicated. When the Chinese stock market tumbled in August, leading to fresh concerns over Beijing’s handling of its economy, Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker adopted the strongest stance among the GOP presidential candidates. He suggested Obama cancel Xi’s visit to send a message over the economic issues, as well as the cyber, maritime and currency tensions. But the message landed with a thud in Iowa, whose farmers export millions of dollars of soybeans and other agriculture to China each year. Walker ended his campaign this week amid plummeting poll numbers. Still, China is unlikely to fade as a campaign issue. Organized labor has railed against China’s currency ma­nipu­la­tion, saying it has contributed to trade imbalances. Congressional Democrats, including Sen. Charles E. Schumer (N.Y.), who is slated to take over as party leader in 2017, are pushing for legislation that would punish China over currency ma­nipu­la­tion. And although Hillary Rodham Clinton has not spoken much about China on the campaign trail, her tenures as first lady in the 1990s and as secretary of state during Obama’s first term were marked by memorable moments in confronting Beijing. In 1995, she spoke out forcefully on women’s rights during a speech at the U.N. World Conference on Women in Beijing. And in 2010, her declaration during a security conference in Hanoi that the United States would intervene in growing regional tensions over China’s bid to gain more control in the South China Sea signaled a shift in the Obama administration’s tone. A year later, the administration announced a “pivot to Asia,” a bid to refocus foreign policy attention to the region that Beijing interpreted as an effort to contain China. Beijing has responded by launching several major regional economic initiatives, including an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and by building artificial islands in the South China Sea, which analysts said will probably be used as military outposts.

#### Republicans will spin increased engagement as soft on China

Golan 15 (Shahar, Henry M. Jackson School of Int’l Studies at University of Washington – Chaired by Sorenson - Director Center for Korea Studies, Building a Pragmatic Coalition in American Politics, Rethinking United States Military Bases in East Asia, University of Washington, The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Task Force - Winter 2015, <https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/33275/Task%20Force%20E%202015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>)

Another factor that one cannot dodge when debating American foreign policy or USChina relations in particular is political ideology. Dueck explains that electoral needs caused the Republican Party “by the time of the Korean War to become more hawkish than Democrats—a position they have never relinquished”, and concludes that “today as before, a hawkish American nationalism forms the center of gravity of the Republican Party, especially in its conservative base, when it comes to foreign policy issues” (Dueck, p.307). Focusing specifically on the China debate, Peter Heyes Gries (2014) argues in his book “The Politics of American Foreign Policy: how ideology divides liberals and conservative over foreign affairs” that “Conservatives desire a tougher China Policy than liberals do… because on average they maintain much more negative attitudes towards communist countries in general and the Chinese government in particular” (n.p.). Meanwhile, when regarding the other political opposition, Gries infers that “the anti-China advocacy of Big Labor has likely counteracted the greater liberal warmth towards China within the Democratic Party” (n.p.). It becomes revealed that a clear divergence between general attitudes of Republican and Democrat voters when it comes to China, with the former preferring cooler relations. Therefore the rethink of the military bases is likely to be spun as soft on China, especially in conservative circles, and used to berate Democrats for caving to Chinese aggression.

#### No risk of a link turn – negativity bias means China will always be spun negatively

Golan 15 (Shahar, Henry M. Jackson School of Int’l Studies at University of Washington – Chaired by Sorenson - Director Center for Korea Studies, Building a Pragmatic Coalition in American Politics, Rethinking United States Military Bases in East Asia, University of Washington, The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Task Force - Winter 2015, <https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/33275/Task%20Force%20E%202015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>)

Finally, another constraint regarding the PRC is general American public opinion towards the East Asian country. Sutter explains that “American Public opinion remains more negative than positive regarding the policies and practices of China, but it is not in a position, as it was in the aftermath of the Tiananmen crackdown, to prompt serious negative change in American China policy”( Shambaugh, p.117). While public opinion in the US regarding the PRC has soften since the early 1990’s, the general distaste for Chinese actions lead politicians to pursue populist rhetoric at times in order to appease public sentiment. Sutter points that this can be seen in the media that “reflected trends in American public opinion in demonstrating a continuing tendency to highlight the negative implication of Chinese developments for American interests and values” (Shambaugh, p.118). While American public opinion, as Sutter points out, is not a position to strongly affect American actions towards the PRC, it could provide further motivation for politicians to use harsh rhetoric against the PRC.

#### China policy MATTERS – public cares deeply, empirically sparks huge fights in election years

Golan 15 (Shahar, Henry M. Jackson School of Int’l Studies at University of Washington – Chaired by Sorenson - Director Center for Korea Studies, Building a Pragmatic Coalition in American Politics, Rethinking United States Military Bases in East Asia, University of Washington, The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Task Force - Winter 2015, <https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/33275/Task%20Force%20E%202015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>)

The China Factor In recent times China has become one of the most contentious issues regarding American foreign policy. Out of all issues concerning East Asia, China generates the greatest political attention in the US; American politicians frequently use the China card in foreign policy debate, especially during campaigns. The rethink of the military bases will provide ammunition for critics of the administration who will try to spin the reform as soft on the PRC. In his book US-Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present, Robert Sutter, an acclaimed China expert, describes the political environment of the US regarding China policy as “an atmosphere of suspicion and cynicism in American domestic politics over China policy,” setting the stage “for often bitter and debilitating fights in US domestic politics over China policy in ensuing years that on balance are seen not to serve the overall national interests of the United States” (Sutter, 2013, p.81). Sutter’s observations show that electoral needs in the US often cause candidates to use harsher rhetoric and actions against the PRC than they believe are beneficial for the US. While many scholars have argued that administrations will ultimately favor pragmatic forward-moving relationships with the PRC, aspiring presidents have not been shy of criticism of the PRC leading up to presidential elections. This portrays how political maneuvering is needed to pursue policies that could be perceived as warm towards the PRC. Because of these domestic hurdles, US history has proven a pattern of presidents pursuing forward-moving, pragmatic relations with the PRC after a campaign of harsh rhetoric pointed at the Asian state.

### Link – China – Econ – 2NC

#### Economic engagement and pro globalization china policies are key election issues – plan cause vote switching

#### Triggers mass voter backlash and robs Hillary of vital Dem wedge issue

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How will global trade affect the U.S. elections? In textbook economic models, adjusting to changes in the economy is deceptively simple. If the labor market suffers a "shock" due, for example, to increased globalization, it adjusts quickly to restore full employment. In the real world, it doesn't happen like this. It takes time for workers to find new jobs, if they can find them. New businesses and new job openings at existing businesses aren't created instantaneously. And wage adjustments, which create the incentives for workers to move and new jobs to be created, don't happen as fast as the textbooks generally assume. And now, the effect of international trade and globalization has become a big issue in the presidential campaign. Recent research showing that a large number of manufacturing jobs have been lost to China helps explain why. But what evidence shows that trade with China actually changes voting behavior? A recent paper from the National Bureaus of Economic Research attempts to answer this question. The research compares voting patterns in regions in the U.S. with different degrees of exposure to changes in trade policy. It focused on how voting changed after China was granted "permanent normal trading relations" in October 2000. Granting China this status removed the risk each year that imports from it would be subject to increased tariffs, a risk that discouraged U.S. firms from locating in China with the intent of exporting goods to the U.S. market and discouraged Chinese firms from entering U.S. markets. As the following two figures from the paper show, the result was a large increase in imports from China and a large decline in manufacturing employment. However, these effects did not hit all areas of the U.S. equally, and that allowed the researchers to identify differences in voting patterns due to the granting of permanent normal trading relations with China. The paper analyzed votes at the county level and focused on Congressional elections because of their frequency (every two years) and because Congressional representatives represent smaller geographic regions than senators or presidents and hence are expected to be more responsive to their constituents' desires. Two key findings emerged from this research. First, "U.S. counties more exposed to increased competition from China experience increases in the share of votes cast for Democrats in Congressional elections, along with increases in the probability that a Democrat represents a county and the probability of a county switching from a Republican to a Democrat Representative." Second, the explanation for that voting pattern appears to be that "Democrats are more likely to support policies that limit import competition and that provide economic assistance that may benefit workers adversely affected by trade competition." Specialization and trade give American consumers a much greater variety of goods at a lower cost than if we tried to produce everything we consume ourselves. It has also had a substantial impact on reducing poverty in developing countries. However, international trade also imposes substantial costs on domestic workers and businesses that end up paying the price of greater global trade, and the country hasn't done enough to ensure that social insurance programs are available to ease these costs. In addition, the benefits of increased trade have been concentrated at the top of the income distribution. If they had been more widely shared -- if the income of the working class had not stagnated for decades while income for those at the top soared -- the political backlash might not now be so severe. It will be interesting to see the extent to which votes in the upcoming presidential election, as well as votes for senators and congressional representatives, reflect the dissatisfaction that so many people have with the consequences of globalization. The winds of change are in the air, but are they blowing hard enough to overcome the entrenched political interests that have brought the country to this point? If so, where will they take us? Will we close our doors to further expansion of trade and all the benefits that come with it, or will we find a way to keep expanding trade and share its benefits widely and overcome the stagnation of the middle class that has fueled the rise of populist sentiment? I hope things change and that political institutions are up to the task of expanding trade and serving the needs of the many rather than the few. But it's hard to be optimistic that this type of change is possible. It's very clear, to me at least, that our government institutions have failed to ensure that the promise of globalization is realized -- the idea that we can make everyone better off by distributing the gains from trade broadly and equitably. It will be very difficult to overcome the powerful forces pushing to either retreat from trade or retain the inequitable status quo.

#### Stats and Best studies prove the DA – voter belief and perception mean link is immediate – opponents control the debate

Dizikes, 16 --- Peter Dizikes , MIT News Office, Interview w David Autor, Professor @ MIT, “3 Questions: David Autor on global trade and political polarization”, 4/26, http://news.mit.edu/2016/3-questions-david-autor-globe-trade-political-polarization-0426

Study finds relationship between U.S. job losses due to trade, and political polarization in Congress. In recent years economic studies have illuminated the extent to which global trade agreements, while benefitting many consumers, have also led to significant job losses in the U.S. — particularly due to jobs moving to China after 2001. Now a new study co-authored by MIT economist David Autor (along with non-MIT colleagues David Dorn, Gordon Hanson, and Kaveh Majlesi) identifies a political effect from this economic process. From 2002 through 2010, in U.S. congressional districts particularly affected by job losses due to trade, elected members of the House of Representatives became more ideologically extreme, with moderates consistently losing out in both parties. Autor spoke to MIT News this week about the headline-grabbing results. Q. Your new working paper establishes a strong relationship between job losses in the U.S. due to global trade, and political changes in the U.S. Congress — but the phenomenon at work is not what many people might guess. What did you find? A. There’s been a 30-year trend of rising polarization in the U.S. Congress. A lot of areas economically affected by rising trade exposure, especially in the South, have also been moving politically to the right. We wondered if these economic shocks might be contributing to the political factionalization. There are multiple ways this could work. One would be an anti-incumbent effect: It’s well established that politicians are punished for bad economic outcomes. But we don’t find that. Another possibility might be that the effects of trade shocks would just strongly favor one party over another. But the answer there is also no, not really. However, if you look at ideology rather than party, you do see very sharp movements. But they’re movements across ideological space. So moderate Democrats and moderate Republicans are being voted out of office in trade-exposed areas and being replaced with much more ideologically ardent substitutes. A lot of these gains are on the right. But that’s not entirely the case. If you look at initially Democratic voting districts, you see a very sharp movement to the left — as well as, to some degree, gains for Republicans in some of those districts. So you see this polarization occurring where moderates of both parties are being removed in trade-affected areas, and are being replaced by candidates who win by smaller margins and have more ideological views. Q. Is it fair to say this also corresponds to the ethnic composition of the voters in these congressional districts? And what accounts for this subtle wrinkle in the findings, in which a few of these districts do flip from the Democrats to the Republicans? A. We haven’t done an overwhelming number of ethnic breakdowns, but the one we did that we thought was useful, was that we broke districts into those where the majority of the population was non-Hispanic white, and those where less than half of the population was non-Hispanic white. There are only 66 districts in the study [out of 435 in Congress] which are majority-minority. But in those cases you see very sharp movements to the left. By contrast, in the areas that are majority non-Hispanic white, all the movement is to the right: Moderate Democrats are removed from office, moderate Republicans are removed from office to a lesser extent, and conservative Republicans make enormous gains. And there are no gains for Democrats. Q. In terms of voter beliefs, what is the mechanism here? What explains how such similar types of job losses due to trade lead to such divergent political outcomes? A. Imagine you have two groups of people, liberals and conservatives, and they share the same objective: They want workers to be employed and protected from the shocks of globalization. And then you have a big [trade] shock, and a lot of people lose employment. You might think everyone should converge on what we should do about that. But you can have a setting where beliefs are sufficiently disjointed, such that the same information is interpreted in completely different ways by people observing it. Say I’m a liberal Democrat and I want workers to be protected. A trade shock might lead me to say, “ This confirms what I suspected. We need a broader social safety net to make sure that workers aren’t too adversely affected.” Now suppose you’re a conservative Republican and you see the same thing. You might say, “ This confirms what I suspected, that we need strong nationalistic policies [such as tariffs] to protect our workers.” People are responding in a schismatic sense to the same underlying phenomena. The 2016 presidential election shows the parties are not able to maintain discipline and stop people from moving to populist solutions [on trade] that most politicians don’t like — they’ve lost control of that dialogue. But our paper makes clear that this process was well under way throughout the 2000s. And in some sense what we’re seeing now in the presidential primary isn’t as surprising in retrospect, because so much of it had already occurred, in congressional votes, along the economic fault lines of areas badly impacted by declining manufacturing.

#### Voter opposition to economic globalism is a key election issue – hillary must avoid

Schoen, 16 --- Doug Schoen, longtime political strategist, columnist @ forbes, Fox News contributor and author of several books, including the recently published The End of Authority: How a Loss of Legitimacy and Broken Trust are Endangering our Future“General Election Trade-Offs”, Forbes, 5/13, http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougschoen/2016/05/13/trade-protectionism-and-the-2016-election/#284f747e26bf

Clinton’s gaffe epitomizes broader issues with Clinton’s candidacy and messaging. That said, it also means a lot more. It’s part of the debate over trade and protectionism that has become central to the 2016 election thanks to Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders’ economic populism. With Clinton’s most recent loss to Sanders in West Virginia, a state she carried in the 2008 Democratic primary by over 40 points, significant questions remain about the former Secretary of State’s ability to appeal to Rust Belt Americans. Clinton’s struggles are particularly evident among white Americans without college degrees, many of whom have long worked in manufacturing and coal mining industries. Exit polls from the May 10 Democratic contest in West Virginia demonstrate troubling realities for Clinton: among West Virginia Democratic primary voters, over 30% say they would choose Trump in a general election match-up between the businessman and Clinton. Most intriguingly, 44% of Sanders’ supporters report they would vote for Trump in the general election as well, while only 23% said they would vote Clinton. In fact, these patterns are evident across America’s Rust Belt, especially in states like Michigan. Similar to exit polling from West Virginia, data from the Michigan primary more than two months ago also helps identify the shared base of support between Trump and Sanders. The state-wide results clearly showed Trump’s popularity among blue-collar white voters and Clinton’s vulnerabilities with that same group – a foreboding sign for a general election match-up come November. Exit polls found that a majority of all Michigan voters believe trade with other nations “takes away U.S. jobs,” and among Republicans, Trump won 45% of those respondents. On the Democratic side, Sanders won these voters by a margin of 58% to Clinton’s 41% for Clinton. It follows that while Clinton may seem to be a part of the establishment which supported free trade in the past, the shift in the electorate toward Trump and Sanders’ brand protectionism is clear. On the surface, this makes sense. The economy has been improving, but it’s still a weak recovery. Wages are stagnant and Americans aren’t optimistic. Over 60% don’t believe in the American dream anymore. A candidate like Donald Trump, who believes Americans should “no longer surrender this country, or its people, to the false song of globalism,” would succeed in this political environment. Regardless of whether or not the consequences of globalism are real, Trump’s ability to cultivate voters’ deeply seeded economic concerns has elevated him to the position he enjoys today. As the field narrows to a Trump and Clinton general election match-up, it becomes ever more critical to understand the next president’s role in shaping the United States global economic position. For both Clinton and Trump, trade agreements are possibly the most important aspect of this issue. Voters may presume that as Clinton tacks closer to the middle for the general election, she will come around to the TPP. Trump, however, is a larger question. Based on his rhetoric, Trump is hell bent on bringing manufacturing jobs back to the United States and appears willing to turn his back on international economic partnerships formed over recent decades. To this end, a number of economists have come out against Trump warning that his tariffs would hurt Americans greatly. The National Foundation for American Policy writes, “We find that a Trump tariff proposal against all countries would cost U.S. consumers $459 billion annually and $2.29 trillion over five years. Our analysis finds that the Trump tariffs would manifest themselves as a 30.5 percent increase in the price of competing domestic producer goods and therefore, as a cut in real wages.” Furthermore, exports to Mexico, China and Japan – the targets of Trump’s rhetoric – would fall an astounding 78%. The report concludes, “Then the results would be truly catastrophic for the poor,” the report said. “It would be as if the United States imposed a new tax of 53 percent on the lowest 10 percent income decile and a 20 percent tax on the next lowest decile. It would be the equivalent to an 11 percent flat tax on the after-tax income of U.S. workers.” That doesn’t sound like what Trump is promising Americans. Kenneth Rogoff, the former chief economist for the IMF, offers that even though Sanders is more appealing than Trump, his rhetoric is just as dangerous. Case in point: his rallying against TPP and even forcing Clinton, who was a supporter of the deal, to turn against it. The TPP has its flaws, but it does a lot of good including opening up Asian markets to Latin America. He also regularly points out that Clinton supported NAFTA and blames it for killing thousands of jobs. But he never mentions that it forced Mexico to lower its tariffs. Holding strong to the center on trade will be a central task for Clinton in November. I’m not sure how many Trump supporters will care that economists are telling them his plans will hurt the economy and our global standing because “American first” lines of argumentation are doing so well this cycle. But that doesn’t make it any less critical that we get it right on this issue. Trade and protectionism matters as much as tax and foreign policy.

#### Backlash to pro-globalization China Policies swing election – claim that “other issues are key” is non-responsive

Stokes, 16 --- Bruce, senior fellow @ council foreign relations, director of global economic attitudes at Pew Research Center, where he assesses public views about economic conditions, foreign policy and values, non-resident fellow at the German Marshall Fund and an associate fellow at Chatham House, former international economics correspondent for the National Journal, a former senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund. Stokes is a graduate of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and Johns Hopkins University’s School for Advanced International Studies. He has appeared on numerous television and radio programs including CNN, BBC, NPR, NBC, CBS and ABC and is a frequent speaker at major conferences around the world. “Choices by US Voters Will Influence the World”, YaleGlobal, 3/17, <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/choices-us-voters-will-influence-world>

The US primary season has slowly winnowed down the field of presidential candidates. “To date, the campaign debate has been dominated by multiple themes that could ultimately impact people outside the United States – trade, immigration and terrorism, to name just a few,” explains Bruce Stokes, director of global economic attitudes at the Pew Research Center. Hillary Clinton, former US secretary of state is Democratic Party’s front-runner after winning contests in five states on March 15. Donald Trump, real estate developer and television reality-show celebrity, leads among Republicans. A sharp divide between parties is reflected in public-opinion surveys: 31 percent of those polled cite trade as a top priority while 58 percent regard trade as beneficial for the country; half cite immigration as a priority while majorities of Democrats and Republicans support allowing undocumented immigrants to remain in the country. Terrorism shifted as a top priority, from 1 percent of respondents in 2014 to 75 percent early this year. Republicans and Democrats represent just over half of the US electorate, and independents, about 40 percent, will help decide which candidate has the strength and skills to handle a range of global issues. – YaleGlobal

Choices by US Voters Will Influence the World The US presidential campaign is dominated by global issues including trade, immigration and terrorism – and voters have mixed feelings The US political primary election season is in full swing as Americans choose candidates for the presidency of their nation and, arguably, the job of de facto leader of the world. In the wake of recent primaries in vote-rich states such as Florida and Ohio, Republican candidate Donald Trump has a commanding lead over his rivals Senator Ted Cruz and Governor John Kasich. Democratic front-runner Hillary Clinton has an even larger advantage over her challenger Senator Bernie Sanders. To quote the American baseball player Yogi Berra, “it ain’t over ‘til it’s over,” but the field finally seems to be sorting itself out. To date, the campaign debate has been dominated by multiple themes that could ultimately impact people outside the United States – trade, immigration and terrorism, to name just a few. Americans’ attitudes on these issues could well influence the outcome in November. And the positions the candidates take on these issues may foreshadow, or constrain, what policies the next US president will pursue. Moreover, the mood of the electorate may influence votes in Congressional elections for both the US House of Representatives and Senate, reinforcing foreign-policy choices made by the new president. Trade is a recurrent campaign theme, despite the fact that global trade ranks low overall on the American public’s list of concerns, as registered by a Pew Research Center survey: 31 percent rate it as a top priority. Candidates in both parties have repeatedly tied the issue to jobs and the economy and promised to be tougher on trade, especially with regard to China. Real estate developer and television celebrity Trump has promised to impose a 45 percent tariff on imports from China. Clinton has pledged to crack down on Chinese currency manipulation that gives Chinese products an unfair competitive advantage. Sanders, Trump and Clinton have repeatedly attacked the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement. Such trade criticism strikes a chord with many Americans, despite the fact that they are, in principle, free traders. According to Pew Research Center, Americans suggest that free trade is good for the nation by a margin of 25 percentage points – 58 percent versus 33 percent – a sentiment broadly shared across gender, race, age, income, education and party divisions. But the public is divided on the overall economic impact of Washington signing free trade deals, like the Trans-Pacific Partnership: 31 percent suggest such agreements make the economy grow, 34 percent say they slow the economy down. Moreover, on the politically potent issues of jobs and wages, 46 percent of Americans voice the view that trade deals lead to job losses in the United States, while the same percentage says they lower US wages. Only 11 percent think trade raises wages and just 17 percent suggest it generates jobs. Americans are critical of trade with Beijing: 52 percent describe the US trade deficit with China – the largest U.S. merchandise trade deficit – as a very serious problem. On immigration, roughly half, or 51 percent, of Americans think dealing with immigration should be a top priority for Congress and the White House. That emphasis is up from 41 percent in 2009 at the beginning of the Obama administration. And it’s a highly partisan issue: 66 percent of Republicans give it priority, but only 43 percent of Democrats. Given such partisanship, it may be no surprise that Trump has called for building a wall along the US border with Mexico and deporting the 11 million undocumented immigrants in the country. Clinton, on the other hand, has advocated a path to full and equal citizenship for such immigrants. Partisanship also manifests itself on how to handle illegal immigration. Contrary to what one might assume based on many headlines, less than half, or 46 percent, of Americans favor building a fence along the entire Mexican border. Again, that sentiment is deeply divided along partisan lines: 73 percent of Republicans and 29 percent of Democrats support such a fence. Similarly, and again contrary to what one might conclude from the campaign rhetoric, large majorities in both parties favor allowing undocumented immigrants to stay in the United States legally, if certain requirements are met: 66 percent of Republicans favor such an approach, while 32 percent say undocumented immigrants should not be allowed to stay, and nearly five to one Democrats, 80 percent to 17 percent, say undocumented immigrants should be allowed to stay in the United States. For all of the talk on the campaign trail about trade and immigration, terrorism could prove the political wildcard in the 2016 election. Public opinion data suggest that an October surprise in the form of a terrorist incident before the November 8 election could have a profound effect.. CIA director John Brennan told CBS news program “60 Minutes” in February that attempts by ISIS to attack the United States are “inevitable.” A number of GOP presidential candidates have already staked out “get tough” positions on terrorism and Muslims. Senator Ted Cruz of Texas, for example, has proposed carpet bombing the Islamic State. Trump has advocated temporarily banning all Muslims from entering the country. If another terrorist attack happens ahead of the election, fears of terrorism and what to do about it could frame political discourse and favor the candidate deemed strong. Concern about terrorism is already relatively high and variable. Three-quarters of those surveyed in January 2016 by the Pew Research Center said that defending the nation against terrorism should be the top priority for the Obama administration and Congress – a particular concern among Republicans, 87 percent, but also troubling for Democrats, 73 percent. Such worries are notably unstable. In a December 2014 Pew Research Center survey, just 1 percent of Americans said terrorism was the most important problem facing the country. In December 2015, after the terrorist shooting in San Bernardino, California, 18 percent voiced the view that terrorism was the most serious challenge, briefly outstripping concern about the perennial public worry of the economy. Gallup found a similar spike in apprehension about terrorism, but by January 2016 public anxiety about terrorism had ebbed, suggesting just how sensitive the public mood is to a single terrorist attack in the past and how responsive it might be to one in the future. Fear of a future terrorist incident is high. In December 2015, a month after the Paris terrorist attack, 51 percent of Americans surveyed expressed worry that they or someone in their family would become the victim of terrorism, according to a Gallup survey, and two-thirds of Americans said that further terrorist attacks in the United States were likely – the greatest level of such concern expressed since early 2003. The intensity of public unease about terrorism and the tendency of such fears to spike in the wake of terrorist attacks, suggest that if John Brennan is right and additional terrorist incidents are inevitable, terrorism could become the disruptive political issue on both sides of the Atlantic in 2016. US presidential elections are decided on a number of issues, often the state of the economy. But this year, a number of international concerns about negative consequences of globalization including trade, immigration and terrorism are prominent in the political debate. History suggests that the US election will not turn on any of these issues alone, but they may well influence the outcome. And it is people outside the United States who then must also deal with the consequences.

### Link – China – Econ – Ohio 2NC

#### Primary results prove Anti Trade Sentiment is the key issue – swings election and specifically ohio – plan undermines Hillary’s new distancing strategy

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Election 2016: Voters’ Concerns About U.S. Trade Policy Fueled Michigan Primary Election Results In the lead-up to the Michigan primary, Hillary Clinton’s campaign appeared to sense that the issue of international trade could be a powerful force in the election. In a late February conference call with reporters, the Democrat's campaign deployed a congressman from a nearby industrial state to cast her opponent, Bernie Sanders, as not sufficiently supportive of protecting jobs. Clinton also sought to downplay her support for major trade deals, instead talking up her one vote in the Senate against a relatively small trade pact with Central American nations. But Sanders' stunning upset victory in Michigan seemed to demonstrate that the tactics were not enough — and that Clinton’s past support for a raft of trade pacts could hurt her in other nearby states that have been similarly battered by job losses. According to exit polls, 58 percent of those who voted in Michigan’s Democratic presidential primary said that trade with other countries takes away American jobs — and of those, 58 percent voted for Sanders. A similar trend emerged on the Republican side, where 55 percent of those who voted in Michigan’s Republican primary said trade with other countries reduces American jobs. Donald Trump — who has recently echoed Sanders’ career-long critique of America’s trade policies — won a plurality (45 percent) of those voters in a field of GOP candidates who have not matched his trade criticism. The Democratic contest, though, was the arena where the trade policy debate was most pronounced. Sanders spotlighted Clinton's past comments that seemed to tout job outsourcing, and he pointed out that Clinton has been an outspoken supporter of most of the United States’ biggest free trade agreements. In the years leading up to her election to the senate, she publicly backed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China. Later, she initially opposed free trade agreements with Colombia and South Korea, but then State Department emails revealed that she went on to personally lobby to pass those pacts. She also repeatedly promoted the pending Trans-Pacific Partnership, which she only recently said she now opposes. Over the last three decades, high-profile critics of such trade deals — from Sanders to Pat Buchanan to Ross Perot to now Trump — have argued that by reducing U.S. tariffs on goods from countries that have lower wage, labor, environmental and human rights standards, such trade deals would prompt manufacturers to move production facilities abroad in an effort to cut costs and boost profits. Those critics’ arguments have been buttressed by the export deficits that accompanied the trade agreements — deficits that have together resulted in the loss of roughly 4 million U.S. jobs, according to estimates from the left-leaning Economic Policy Institute. That group notes that in addition to Michigan, some of the states that have been hardest hit by trade-related job losses include Ohio, Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin. Those delegate-rich states are scheduled to soon hold primaries that could tip both parties’ presidential nominating contests. Ohio’s upcoming primary may be the biggest test of whether Sanders and Trump’s trade critiques have electoral resonance beyond Michigan. One of the state’s U.S. senators, Sherrod Brown, is a liberal Democrat who has been able to win two terms in the swing state by forging a profile as one of Congress’s most ardent critics of free trade deals. Its other senator, Republican Rob Portman, had been a consistent supporter of such deals but recently announced his opposition to the TPP — a move that seemed to confirm the growing political power of the trade criticism. Heading into the state’s March 15 election, the Republican contest appears to be a close fight — meaning trade could tip the balance. Polls show that despite being the state’s governor, John Kasich is trailing Trump . Kasich had been a steadfast supporter of trade deals such as NAFTA, but has recently tried to adjust his campaign rhetoric to match Trump’s trade criticism. On the Democratic side, two of the state’s congressional representatives appeared to differ on the significance of the candidates’ past record on trade deals. In February, Ohio Democratic Rep. Marcy Kaptur — who represents Toledo — suggested that Sanders’ unwavering opposition to free trade agreements would appeal to her state’s voters. “First time in my career that I’ve heard a candidate give voice to what we’ve been struggling for and against in this Congress for the last quarter century,” she told the Boston Globe. “Senator Sanders has always been there. He has never been a ‘Johnny-Come-Lately’ and he has never changed positions.” She contrasted that with Clinton by adding: “I must say that when Secretary Clinton was secretary of state, I don’t recall her ever attempting to balance [free-trade agreements] or change them in any way.” The Globe reported that “Kaptur said Clinton had belatedly come to oppose the Trans-Pacific Partnership, noting, ‘Senator Sanders was there from the very beginning.’” A few weeks later, the Clinton campaign organized a conference call for reporters with Ohio Democratic Rep. Tim Ryan, a critic of trade deals who represents Youngstown. During the call, Ryan dismissed Sanders' opposition to free trade agreements, arguing the Vermont lawmaker “doesn’t have a history of manufacturing” and asserting that “he’s been MIA.” He also suggested that what’s more important than Clinton’s past support for trade deals that may have hurt the industrial Midwest is where the former Secretary of State now says she stands on those issues. “There were a lot of people that go back and forth on some of these trade agreements but what I want is someone who is going to look at them as they are written, as they are negotiated, like she has done with TPP and basically said if this is not going to create jobs, if this is not going increase wages, if this is not going to protect our national security then she is not going to support them,” he said. “We need to focus on what’s happening now and what’s going to happen in the future and I’m very secure with the fact that she is going to be with us on these key issues.”

#### Ohio is key – trade issues are vital

Warren, 16 --- James Warren is a contributing editor at U.S. News & World Report and an award winning reporter, columnist and editor. He is chief media writer for the Poynter Institute for Media Studies. He was managing editor of The Chicago Tribune and Washington bureau chief for both The Tribune and New York Daily News. He's been a regular commentator on CNN, MSNBC, Fox News and Al-Jazeera America. He was a Chicago columnist for The New York Times and has written for Vanity Fair, Politico, Washington Monthly, Time, The Atlantic, Daily Beast and Huffington Post, “The Battle in the Buckeye State”, 3/9, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2016-03-09/why-ohio-is-so-key-in-2016

The Battle in the Buckeye State Why Ohio is such a key presidential prize. Donald Trump just "loves Ohio," he told CNN's Chris Cuomo Wednesday in a trademark pre-sunrise phone chat cum infomercial to herald his latest primary triumphs. Yes, there was that big Tuesday win in Michigan that everybody knew about. But, hey, wondered Cuomo, what about that very late-breaking conquest in faraway Hawaii? "I have a great hotel in Hawaii." That's fine. But, ultimately, he'd best turn his adoration of the Buckeye State into another success on Tuesday and, if he's the Republican nominee, in November. [SEE: Editorial Cartoons on the 2016 Presidential Elections] No state can claim to have been as defining in presidential races as Ohio. At minimum, it now looms as especially critical in the GOP race. Either Gov. John Kasich wins, and offers the possibility of a contest and even a contested convention, or the GOP campaign may be done. "Can Kasich make the state's Republican organization work for him?" asks John Green, a political scientist as the University of Akron. If not, he'll probably be a goner. Green is director of the Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics at the university, which is named after a late former chairman of the Republican National Committee credited with helping to revive the GOP after President Lyndon Johnson demolished Barry Goldwater in 1964. Green's a specialist in religion and politics – having adeptly charted the rise of politically potent evangelicals – and, unavoidably, Ohio. He's co-author of "Buckeye Battleground" with Daniel J. Coffey, David B. Cohen and Stephen C. Brooks. So, I asked him a few questions Wednesday as a most improbable of presidential campaigns turned its attention to his state. [READ: Who's Losing Momentum? Mississippi and Michigan Show It's #NeverTrump] Why is Ohio the alleged "cradle of presidents?" Or, well, is it really? The reason Ohio is so important is that it is a very diverse state. It's that traditionally it's been a good microcosm of the country as a whole. No state is a perfect mirror but Ohio comes very close. Religion, race, age, economic diversity, you get a very good mirror. When the U.S. is divided politically, that division tends to run right through Ohio. But it's important to distinguish late 19th century and early 20th century, when most of the presidents from Ohio were elected. Between the Civil War and 1930s, the Republican Party was the dominant party and Ohio was at the center of Republican politics. That gave Ohioans a lot of influence. After Democrats became dominant after the 1930s, it mattered but didn't really produce presidents, even as it caused close elections. It didn't have the same influence among the Democrats. But across all those years, the key feature is its diversity. Whenever elections are competitive, Ohio tends to be very competitive. Ohio also tends to go with landslides, too, so it's a good predicator. Over last 30 years or so, it's always been a battleground state, and both parties can win so they contest it fiercely. It probably matters more to Republicans than Democrats. A Republican president is never elected without carrying Ohio. Two Democrats were elected without it. But one was a special case. In 1944 it went Republican when (U.S. Senator and onetime Ohio Governor) John Bricker was the Republican vice presidential candidate on the ticket against FDR. In 1960, Kennedy was elected but Ohio went Republican by a large amount. [READ: John Kasich Fights Against Fantasy Politics] But that leads to an important question because it spins slightly more Republican over the years. Is that for demographic reasons of late? The answer is no. Ohio is about the same as 30 years ago in partisan terms. But really the difference is that Republicans have been very well organized in Ohio and more often than not can get their voters out. The Democrats, who on paper have at least as many votes, maybe more, have a harder time in getting out their vote. The Republicans have a history of a very good party organization. That may matter on the margins in many elections since if an election is down to two or three points, organizations matter. Obama won twice and the Democrats had a top-notch organization, so they could compete with the traditional Republican organization. So if you're looking forward to November, depending on the nominees, can the Democrats replicate Obama's campaigns? If they can, they can carry Ohio. If they can't, they may lose. Why hasn't the Republican Party won the White House without Ohio? Because of the strong organization of the party, that leads to the state leaning the most Republican among Midwest states even though it's a divided state. Because from 1865 to the present it's been able to get its voters to the polls, there has been an advantage. Republicans have run terrible campaigns, too. But the organizational advantage makes Ohio different than Missouri, Michigan and Pennsylvania. Michigan had an every bit as good Democratic organization, given the union influence there. How are the state's demographics changing? And do they not seem to be trending better for Republicans? Both parties see constituencies they have to mobilize. On the Democratic side there are blue-collar workers, young people and African-Americans. On the Republican side, there are suburban, rural and suburban women voters. The women are thought to trend Democratic but upper status ones may have interests that lean Republican. And there's a vibrant right wing. It's not as pronounced in Ohio as South Carolina or Texas but it's there. The huge fight is over folks in the middle. About a third identify as independents. Political scientists can get into arguments as to how independent those voters are. Most have some partisan leaning but it is still revealing when you call them up and they say they are independent. One needs to mobilize one's base and compete for the independent vote. It's a formula both parties have worked successfully. Republicans have historically have had an advantage because they are better at base mobilization. [SEE: Republican Party Cartoons] Overall, the democratic trends have been similar to the rest of the country. The state is becoming less white, becoming older. Older blue collar industries are declining and replaced with high-tech manufacturing, which is good economically but, from a social point of view, a big problem because a lot of people who had good jobs can't find them anymore. When steel mills employed thousands, there were good jobs for people of modest means and limited education. Now it produces more steel than before but the mills are automated. That is important because those blue-collar workers feel they have been left behind. That is the core of Trump supporters and theoretically it scrambles the deck. But it could also alienate other Republicans who don't like the Trump message because they're part of a sector that's done well. If [you're] a blue-collar worker, trade doesn't look good. But for a farmer, engineer or other white-collar worker, it looks much better. It's a divisive issue in cutting across other divisions and makes it possible to move voters from one party to another. What about the state's seemingly traditional embrace of moderate Republican like George Voinovich and Rob Portman? It has tended to embrace more moderate ones because the state is so competitive, going with a right-wing candidate doesn't work. Democrats have the same tendency, in going for more moderate Democrats. Trump is thus an anomaly. The party leadership in Ohio doesn't really like Trump. One reason is they clearly believe he would be a disaster at the polls in November and might cost a Senate seat, maybe some congressional seats and some positions lower down the ballot. The establishment may back their guy Kasich and see Trump as not doing well in a general election. Lots of Ohio Republicans are scratching their heads. They don't get it. They don't see how he appeals to those voters. I think it's less of a mystery. There's a big vein of anger. Part of it's anger at party leaders. Then there are the underlying economic problems people have. Trump is an effective spokesman for that anger. It's an anti-establishment thing. [READ: Can the Establishments Strike Back?] What else might outsiders miss about Ohio? There are two things to add. First, while trade as an issue is huge, immigration is not. Many Ohioans have the same views as many Americans. But it has a very small Hispanic population, so that's different and a reason the immigration issue plays differently. There are lots of foreign-born people but they tend to either come from Europe or Asia and Africa, with those from Asia and Africa tending to be doctors, lawyer and engineers. Nobody sees them as a problem in the way Arizonans or Californians might see immigrants from Latin America.

### Link – China – Econ – Sanders Voters 2NC

#### Backlash drives voters towards Trump and Sanders, away from Clinton

Schwartz, 16 --- Nelson, Nelson D. Schwartz has covered the economy and economics for the business section of The New York Times since August 2012. He was the 2014 recipient of the Nathaniel Nash Award, given annually by The Times to honor “a correspondent, reporter or columnist who excels in business or economic news, nationally or abroad, “Where Jobs Are Squeezed by Chinese Trade, Voters Seek Extremes”, NYT, 4/26, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/26/business/economy/where-jobs-are-squeezed-by-chinese-trade-voters-seek-extremes.html?\_r=0

Where Jobs Are Squeezed by Chinese Trade, Voters Seek Extremes In this forlorn Southern town whose once-humming factories were battered in recent years by a flood of Asian imports, Rhonda Hughes, 43, is a fervent supporter of Donald Trump. Her 72-year old mother is equally passionate about Senator Bernie Sanders. Disenchantment with the political mainstream is no surprise. But research to be unveiled this week by four leading academic economists suggests that the damage to manufacturing jobs from a sharp acceleration in globalization since the turn of the century has contributed heavily to the nation’s bitter political divide. Ms. Hughes avoids discussing the election with her mother, but their neighbor Benjamin Green, 83, knows just what Washington needs. “It’ll take a junkyard dog to straighten this country out,” he said. Cross-referencing congressional voting records and district-by-district patterns of job losses and other economic trends between 2002 and 2010, the researchers found that areas hardest hit by trade shocks were much more likely to move to the far right or the far left politically. “It’s not about incumbents changing their positions,” said David Autor, an influential scholar of labor economics and trade at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and one of the paper’s authors. “It’s about the replacement of moderates with more ideological successors.” Mr. Autor added: “In retrospect, whether it’s Trump or Sanders, we should have seen in it coming. The China shock isn’t the sole factor, but it is something of a missing link.” In addition to Mr. Autor, the research was conducted by David Dorn of the University of Zurich; Gordon Hanson, a professor at the University of California, San Diego; and Kaveh Majlesi of Lund University in Sweden. “Exposure to import competition is bad for centrists,” Mr. Hanson said. “We’ve known that political polarization and income inequality track each other, but that pattern is simply a correlation. We’ve now found a mechanism for how economic changes create further political divisions.” Parker Griffith experienced the move away from the political middle firsthand. A so-called Blue Dog Democrat who represented Courtland and the rest of Alabama’s Fifth Congressional District, he switched to the Republicans in 2009 and metamorphosed into a moderate Republican. But that wasn’t enough to save his seat. Dr. Griffith was beaten in the Republican primary in 2010 by Morris J. Brooks Jr., who has emerged as one of the most right-wing members of Congress. “If you’re under economic stress and you can’t provide for your family, the easiest answer is to find someone to blame,” said Dr. Griffith. “Mexicans, illegal immigrants, Obama.” Representative Brooks has said that he would consider “anything short of shooting” illegal immigrants to get them out of the country and that he favored imposing heavy tariffs on China to “level the playing field” and punish Beijing for what he sees as currency manipulation. In the case of the Fifth District, which includes Huntsville and its space- and defense-related industries, as well as more industrial Florence along the Tennessee River, the move has been to the right. But Mr. Autor and his colleagues found that in districts with heavy minority representation, similar shocks can push more Democratic districts in the opposite direction. While whites hit hard by trade tend to move right, nonwhite voters move left, eroding support for moderates in both parties, the study concluded. As the South industrialized in the second half of the 20th century, poor Alabamians who once toiled on farms were able to secure a toehold in the middle class. In the shadow of Tennessee Valley Authority dams that supplied cheap power, thousands of workers sewed jeans and T-shirts, and could earn upward of $20 an hour in heavily unionized factories. But the collapse of the apparel industry here in the first decade of the 21st century, following China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, reversed that process. Nearly 10,000 manufacturing jobs disappeared. At 7.4 percent, the regional unemployment rate is well below its peak of 12.8 percent in 2010, but remains far above the national average of 5 percent. The new paper underscores a broader rethinking among economists of the costs and benefits of policies aimed at encouraging industrial competition across borders. “There’s a deeper appreciation for the magnitude of the impact on workers who lose their jobs,” Mr. Hanson said. “But the nature of globalization changed after the end of the Cold War and it took a while for academics to catch up.” Until the Nafta agreement with Canada and Mexico in 1994, and especially the entry of China into the W.T.O., trade deals were mostly multilateral and the rise in manufacturing imports to the United States came primarily from other advanced industrial nations like Germany and Japan. “China and the W.T.O. represented a shock that was way larger,” Mr. Autor said. “We hadn’t seen shocks like this because we were trading with rich countries, not highly productive developing countries with enormous labor reserves.” To understand the connection between imports from China and political polarization, the researchers focused on the fact that manufacturers tend to localize in a specific region. “There are these concentrated pockets of hurt,” Mr. Autor said, “and we’re seeing the political consequences of that.” Mr. Autor and Mr. Hanson emphasize that trade is only one factor among many that have contributed to a polarizing Congress (income inequality is another, as are attitudes toward immigrants). But it has been an important one, particularly over the last decade, when Chinese imports ramped up. This trade-induced polarization has had a significant effect on the overall ideological makeup of Congress. The authors found that voters in congressional districts hardest hit by Chinese imports tended to choose more ideologically extreme lawmakers. Between 2002 and 2010, districts in the top 5th percentile of trade exposure, on average, experienced a 19 percent greater drop in manufacturing employment relative to districts at the other end of the spectrum. Those hard-hit districts became, on average, far more conservative: the ideological equivalent of moving from Marco Rubio to Ted Cruz. Some very conservative members of Congress have been sympathetic to free trade arguments in the past, but Representative Brooks, who has welcomed support from the Tea Party, doesn’t mince words about where he stands. “We’re going to have to do whatever is necessary to ensure that a foreign country isn’t able to successfully attack and destroy significant parts of the economy,” he said. “I was in China two weeks ago and they are going to clean our plow if we don’t act.” Mr. Autor, like most economists, is still persuaded of the long-established benefits that global trade confers on the economy as a whole. But he recognizes that angry voters have valid reasons to be frustrated. “It’s a matter of diffuse benefits and concentrated costs, but our political system hasn’t addressed those costs,” he said.

#### That’s key – further alienating liberal Sanders voters swings the election

Silver, 16 --- Nate, Worlds most badass election politics analyst, “The Hidden Importance Of The Sanders Voter”, 5/19, http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-hidden-importance-of-the-bernie-sanders-voter/

The Hidden Importance Of The Sanders Voter Many of them are independents, and they could be key to Clinton’s general election success. Donald Trump has gained on Hillary Clinton in recent national polls after becoming the presumptive GOP nominee this month. But Trump may also be helped by the ongoing primary battle between Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders. Although Clinton’s substantial lead in pledged delegates (and larger lead in overall delegates) makes her the all-but-certain Democratic nominee, her lack of support from Sanders voters is harming her general election numbers. According to the most recent YouGov poll, 61 percent of Sanders voters have an unfavorable view of Clinton, against just 38 percent with a favorable one. YouGov has been tracking these numbers for several months,1 and they’ve gradually gotten worse for Clinton: The good news for Clinton is that she has the opportunity to gain ground among Sanders voters if and when she officially wraps up the nomination, just as Trump did among Republicans. Although many Sanders supporters will start the general election campaign with a negative view of Clinton, they aren’t necessarily eager to vote for Trump. In the YouGov poll, just 55 percent of Sanders supporters said they’d vote for Clinton over Trump in November. However, only 15 percent said they’d vote for Trump. That leaves 30 percent of Sanders voters who say they are undecided, would vote for a third-party candidate or would sit out the election. There’s a key twist, though, in tracking how Sanders voters are affecting Clinton’s general election prospects. Unless you break out the numbers for Sanders voters specifically, as YouGov does, you may miss their importance. That’s because a lot of Sanders voters don’t identify as Democrats. Exit polls have been conducted in 27 primary and caucus states so far, and Clinton has won among voters who identify as Democrats in all but Vermont, New Hampshire and Wisconsin (where she tied Sanders). But she’s won self-identified independents only in Alabama, Georgia and Mississippi. (I keep using that term “self-identified” because the exit poll asks voters how they “usually think of” themselves — Democrat, Republican or independent. A voter’s self-identification may differ from her party registration, and some states do not have party registration at all.) Overall throughout the primaries and caucuses, I estimate, Clinton is beating Sanders by 27 percentage points among self-identified Democrats but losing to Sanders by 31 points among voters who call themselves independents but voted in the Democratic primaries.2 This might be confusing because we usually think of independent voters as being moderate. Sanders voters, however, are definitely to the left of Clinton, but a lot of them don’t like to call themselves Democrats. (Sanders himself, of course, has repeatedly been elected to Congress as an independent and did not officially declare himself to be a Democrat until November.) As a result, about 40 percent of Sanders’s primary and caucus voters identify as independent, as Republican or with some party other than Democrats, according to my estimates. Thus, citing Clinton’s reasonably strong general election numbers among self-identified Democrats — she had the support of 87 percent of Democrats in a recent NBC News/SurveyMonkey poll in her matchup against Trump, for instance, and 83 percent in a Fox News poll that showed her behind Trump nationally — may miss her problems among liberal-leaning, Sanders-voting independents. In the Fox News poll, only 30 percent of independents went for Clinton, and in the SurveyMonkey poll, just 36 percent did. But both surveys showed a large pool of undecided independents, potentially the Sanders voters that YouGov identified. If Clinton wins over those voters, she’ll gain a few percentage points on Trump in national and swing state polls, and the race will potentially look more like it did in March and April, with Clinton having a fairly comfortable lead over Trump. If not, the general election could come down to the wire.

### Link – China – Econ – A2: Link = Long Term

#### Stats and Best studies prove the DA – voter belief and perception mean link is immediate – opponents control the debate

Dizikes, 16 --- Peter Dizikes , MIT News Office, Interview w David Autor, Professor @ MIT, “3 Questions: David Autor on global trade and political polarization”, 4/26, http://news.mit.edu/2016/3-questions-david-autor-globe-trade-political-polarization-0426

Study finds relationship between U.S. job losses due to trade, and political polarization in Congress. In recent years economic studies have illuminated the extent to which global trade agreements, while benefitting many consumers, have also led to significant job losses in the U.S. — particularly due to jobs moving to China after 2001. Now a new study co-authored by MIT economist David Autor (along with non-MIT colleagues David Dorn, Gordon Hanson, and Kaveh Majlesi) identifies a political effect from this economic process. From 2002 through 2010, in U.S. congressional districts particularly affected by job losses due to trade, elected members of the House of Representatives became more ideologically extreme, with moderates consistently losing out in both parties. Autor spoke to MIT News this week about the headline-grabbing results. Q. Your new working paper establishes a strong relationship between job losses in the U.S. due to global trade, and political changes in the U.S. Congress — but the phenomenon at work is not what many people might guess. What did you find? A. There’s been a 30-year trend of rising polarization in the U.S. Congress. A lot of areas economically affected by rising trade exposure, especially in the South, have also been moving politically to the right. We wondered if these economic shocks might be contributing to the political factionalization. There are multiple ways this could work. One would be an anti-incumbent effect: It’s well established that politicians are punished for bad economic outcomes. But we don’t find that. Another possibility might be that the effects of trade shocks would just strongly favor one party over another. But the answer there is also no, not really. However, if you look at ideology rather than party, you do see very sharp movements. But they’re movements across ideological space. So moderate Democrats and moderate Republicans are being voted out of office in trade-exposed areas and being replaced with much more ideologically ardent substitutes. A lot of these gains are on the right. But that’s not entirely the case. If you look at initially Democratic voting districts, you see a very sharp movement to the left — as well as, to some degree, gains for Republicans in some of those districts. So you see this polarization occurring where moderates of both parties are being removed in trade-affected areas, and are being replaced by candidates who win by smaller margins and have more ideological views. Q. Is it fair to say this also corresponds to the ethnic composition of the voters in these congressional districts? And what accounts for this subtle wrinkle in the findings, in which a few of these districts do flip from the Democrats to the Republicans? A. We haven’t done an overwhelming number of ethnic breakdowns, but the one we did that we thought was useful, was that we broke districts into those where the majority of the population was non-Hispanic white, and those where less than half of the population was non-Hispanic white. There are only 66 districts in the study [out of 435 in Congress] which are majority-minority. But in those cases you see very sharp movements to the left. By contrast, in the areas that are majority non-Hispanic white, all the movement is to the right: Moderate Democrats are removed from office, moderate Republicans are removed from office to a lesser extent, and conservative Republicans make enormous gains. And there are no gains for Democrats. Q. In terms of voter beliefs, what is the mechanism here? What explains how such similar types of job losses due to trade lead to such divergent political outcomes? A. Imagine you have two groups of people, liberals and conservatives, and they share the same objective: They want workers to be employed and protected from the shocks of globalization. And then you have a big [trade] shock, and a lot of people lose employment. You might think everyone should converge on what we should do about that. But you can have a setting where beliefs are sufficiently disjointed, such that the same information is interpreted in completely different ways by people observing it. Say I’m a liberal Democrat and I want workers to be protected. A trade shock might lead me to say, “ This confirms what I suspected. We need a broader social safety net to make sure that workers aren’t too adversely affected.” Now suppose you’re a conservative Republican and you see the same thing. You might say, “ This confirms what I suspected, that we need strong nationalistic policies [such as tariffs] to protect our workers.” People are responding in a schismatic sense to the same underlying phenomena. The 2016 presidential election shows the parties are not able to maintain discipline and stop people from moving to populist solutions [on trade] that most politicians don’t like — they’ve lost control of that dialogue. But our paper makes clear that this process was well under way throughout the 2000s. And in some sense what we’re seeing now in the presidential primary isn’t as surprising in retrospect, because so much of it had already occurred, in congressional votes, along the economic fault lines of areas badly impacted by declining manufacturing.

### Link – China – B.I.T. 2NC

#### Plan triggers a political EXPLOSION of voter backlash – it’s election suicide

Dayen, 16 --- David, contributing writer to Salon.com, and also writes for The New Republic, The American Prospect, The Guardian (UK), Politico, The Huffington Post, Alternet, Democracy Journal, Pacific Standard, and more. He has been a guest on MSNBC, CNN, Al Jazeera, Current TV, Russia Today, NPR, Pacifica Radio and Air America Radio, American Prospect, 3/18, http://prospect.org/article/job-killing-trade-deal-you%E2%80%99ve-never-heard-china-bilateral-investment-treaty

The 2016 election has highlighted growing public opposition in both parties to the status-quo globalization agenda, which both sides blame for outsourcing jobs and privileging corporate profits over ordinary workers. This populist voter backlash puts trade agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) on life support, and is forcing candidates to better explain how they would boost jobs and wages. But what if those voters learned that the Obama administration is in the midst of negotiating yet another corporate-friendly trade deal, one that would facilitate more offshoring, and that could also give China, of all countries, effective veto power over domestic policy? That’s precisely what’s happening in behind-the-scenes negotiations over a little-publicized agreement on the table between the U.S. and China, the world’s two largest economies. Just as the White House is trying to sell TPP as a bulwark against China, the administration is simultaneously seeking an investment treaty with the Chinese that undercuts that argument. “It really calls into question the contention of the Obama administration that they have a coherent strategy to integrate trade and international relations and national security,” says Barry Lynn, a senior fellow at New America. “It shows they have no idea what they’re doing.” The deal is called the China Bilateral Investment Treaty, or BIT. This is a standalone compact which would normally be negotiated as the investment chapter in a broader free trade agreement. Investment treaties provide a framework for foreign investors to pursue direct corporate ownership stakes in a partner country, offering them a series of guarantees of non-discriminatory treatment, limits on the expropriation of capital, and access to extra-judicial tribunals to enforce the agreement. The latter are set up through a system known as the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) process, which has expanded in scope in recent years as a key protection for foreign investors. In fact, ISDS has proven hugely controversial in the TPP debate, with critics charging it would allow corporations to overturn national laws that constrain their profits. The U.S. has implemented 41 BITs over the years, as well as investment chapters in a dozen free-trade agreements. But the U.S. already attracts more foreign direct investment than any country in the world, with $168 billion flowing in just in 2012. That includes investments from countries that until now have lacked the protections of a BIT, like China. “It’s pitched as a way to promote investment,” said Celeste Drake, trade and globalization policy specialist at the AFL-CIO. “We’re one of the top countries for foreign investment anyway. We don’t need to give away rights for foreign investors.” Few investors have the capital to undertake and manage businesses overseas. Invariably, large multinational corporations, or investment vehicles like hedge funds and private equity firms, engage in foreign direct investment. And a BIT offers them the ability to lock in profits while neutralizing the risks that go along with investing abroad. For example, U.S. companies operating in China encounter local corruption, preferential treatment for their domestic producers, intellectual property theft, and ever-changing regulatory demands. The BIT sweeps away such hurdles, and allows foreign investors to use ISDS to recoup lost profits if foreign governments use those maneuvers to hamper their business. It effectively removes American companies’ one big motivation for keeping manufacturing stateside—our relatively stable judicial and regulatory systems and rule of law. If companies can get all that guaranteed in China, there’s nothing keeping their factories here. The BIT, then, is a recipe for more outsourcing. China currently protects many of its industries by excluding foreign investment in certain sectors. The key to the BIT is what’s known in trade deal parlance as the “negative list”—a list of which sectors would stay excluded. U.S. corporations want to whittle down that list and pry open more sectors where they can invest in China, and subsequently move production overseas. On the flip side, there’s already substantial Chinese investment in the U.S.—more than U.S. investment in China, in fact—but we don’t have good information on its impact. Many Chinese companies are state-owned or state-influenced, subsidized from home, and freed from having to run an immediate profit. Michael Wessel, a commissioner on the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, warns that Chinese-subsidized firms could squeeze domestic competitors by undercutting them on price. Despite this uncertainty, Wessel contends that not single case study on Chinese-invested firms has been undertaken by an independent expert. “We have no idea what Chinese companies are doing in the U.S.,” he says. “Not all investment has [the] same impact. Our negotiators are flying blind.” When you contemplate Chinese state-owned enterprises enjoying the same treatment on their investments as domestic producers, and having the ability to use ISDS to maintain those privileges, things get even more alarming. “ISDS puts corporations and sovereign governments on the same plane,” says the AFL-CIO's Drake. “This would be China acting through a corporation to challenge a U.S. law.” Under ISDS, Chinese companies could sue federal, state, or local governments over any laws that force them to alter their production facilities. They could potentially sue the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which approves all foreign investment transactions, even though this panel’s reviews are normally not subject to judicial oversight. The U.S. could try to restrict state-owned enterprises, but without broadly-written language, Chinese companies would be likely to circumvent such constraints. “We’ve talked to U.S. negotiators, they don’t seem disturbed by it,” Drake adds. “I’m disturbed that they’re not disturbed.” While most of these agreements look similar to the “model BIT,” a template treaty available at the State Department website, the administration has been strangely silent when it comes to its China trade negotiations. Administration officials haven’t publicly announced any negotiation sessions, nor have they briefed cleared trade advisers, who are supposed to be able to look at trade deals as they happen. “This is more secretive than the TPP,” says Wessel, who is also a cleared adviser. We do know that both sides are eager to finish the BIT, after 24 rounds of talks. Politico Pro reported this week that the White House expects a new “negative list” offer from China before President Xi Jinping arrives for a summit later this month. The Obama administration called completing the BIT before the president leaves office a “top economic priority” following an Obama-Xi meeting in September. Xi has also expressed interest in accelerating the talks, especially in light of China’s weakening economy and its need for foreign investment. Wrapping up the BIT negotiations, however, would trigger a political explosion. Given that the leading Republican candidate assails trade deals with China in every public address, tossing another U.S./China treaty into the mix would fan an already volatile political fire. Like other treaties, the BIT would require a two-thirds vote for Senate ratification. That would be a difficult lift in a year with a record Chinese trade deficit and high anxiety over the downsides of globalization. The BIT’s presence also undermines the geopolitical case for TPP, since one of the main arguments for that treaty is that it’s needed to “contain” China. “If you’re saying TPP is for strategic reasons and doing this at the same time and not telling us anything about it, what are we to expect?” asks Lynn of New America. “We have to assume it’s a giveaway, and we have to assume your claims about TPP are bogus.” China has ignored many of the commitments imposed on it following its entry into the World Trade Organization, and critics fear the Chinese would not live up to their obligations on the BIT either. And even amid the secrecy surrounding the deal, many question the value of letting China invest more in the United States, or letting U.S. corporations escape domestic laws and regulations, effectively turning capitalism into a heads-I-win, tails-you-lose game. Investment rules acceptable to corporate executives aren’t necessarily good for workers. And pushing another deal that accelerates the hollowing out of the nation’s industrial base, in an election year, borders on political insanity.

#### Trump spins plan as investment offshoring – vital to success of his campaign strategy

Francis, 16 --- David, Foreign Policy, The Cable, 5/5, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/05/china-asks-u-s-voters-to-be-reasonable-and-objective-as-trump-ascends/?wp\_login\_redirect=0

China is Trump’s economic bogeyman. On the campaign trail, he constantly rails against Beijing for stealing American jobs, taking advantage of the U.S.-China trade relationship, and manipulating its currency to make Chinese goods cheaper. (Side note: The International Monetary Fund has determined that this is not the case; according to the bank, the renminbi is fairly valued.) He’s also accused China of militarizing the South China Sea and has pledged to build up U.S. military presence in the region. “We have been too afraid to protect and advance American interests and to challenge China to live up to its obligations,” said a statement on Trump’s campaign website, regarding his plans to deal with Beijing. “We need smart negotiators who will serve the interests of American workers — not Wall Street insiders that want to move U.S. manufacturing and investment offshore.” For a more entertaining look at how important China is to Trump’s campaign, check out the video below: Perhaps China was responding to Trump’s recent comments on trade between Beijing and Washington. “We can’t continue to allow China to rape our country,” Trump said at a campaign rally on Sunday, adding, “and that’s what they’re doing.” At the very least, the comments from leaders of the world’s second-largest economy reveal concerns about their relationship with the world’s largest. It’s just another sign the rest of the world is growing very, very concerned about the possibility of a Trump presidency.

### Link – China – SCS Policies

#### Soft-line policies on China alienate the public and become election-year fodder for Republicans – SCS is a key issue

Glaser 15 (Bonnie, Senior Adviser for Asia in the Freeman Chair in China Studies, where she works on issues related to Chinese foreign and security policy. She is concomitantly a senior associate with CSIS Pacific Forum and a consultant for the US government on East Asia, "China bashing: American campaign ritual or harbinger of tougher policy?," http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/08/25/China-bashing-American-campaign-ritual-or-harbinger-of-tougher-policy.aspx)

China-bashing in the 2016 presidential election has begun in earnest. In past campaigns, many of the attacks on China were forgotten as candidates dropped out of the race or were defeated. In 2012, for example, Mitt Romney pledged to declare China a currency manipulator on his first day in office. He never got the chance, of course, and Obama's policies were unaffected by Romney's campaign rhetoric. Sometimes, promises to 'get tough' with China during the campaign simply became irrelevant as presidents, once in power, confront the demands of real-world policy challenges. When George W Bush ran for president in 2000, he criticised his predecessor Bill Clinton for calling China a strategic partner, and instead said China should be viewed as a 'strategic competitor.' After becoming president, however, Bush dropped that label. When a Chinese jet collided with a US surveillance plane over the South China Sea, Bush worked hard to avert a US-China political crisis, and after the September 11 attacks, he welcomed Beijing's proposal to fight together against terrorism. This time may be different, however. China's repressive policies at home, combined with its transgressions in the South China Sea and massive cyber attacks on US companies and the Federal Government, make it an easy target. Moreover, criticism of China likely resonates with most Americans. Republican candidates will accuse Obama of being too soft on China and vow that if elected, they will stand up for American interests. Democrats, including Obama's former secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, are more likely to find fault with than defend the current Administration's approach to managing US-China relations. Regardless of who is elected president in November 2016, he or she is likely to adopt a firmer approach to China on a litany of issues. So what are the candidates saying about China so far? GOP candidate Donald Trump condemned China's recent currency devaluation as 'the greatest theft in the history of the United States.' If elected president, Trump said, 'Oh would China be in trouble!' Carly Fiorina, another GOP contender, criticised China's cyber hacks on federal databases as an 'act of aggression' against America. She also warned against allowing the Chinese to control trade routes in the South China Sea and pledged she would be 'more aggressive in helping our allies...push back against new Chinese aggression.' In a lengthy critique of Obama Administration policies published in Foreign Affairs, GOP candidate Marco Rubio lambasted Obama's 'willingness to ignore human rights violations in the hope of appeasing the Chinese leadership.' He also accused China of pursuing 'increasingly aggressive regional expansionism.' Democratic front-runner Hillary Clinton has joined the fray in an effort to shield herself from the accusation that she was complicit in the implementation of a policy that accommodated China and failed to sufficiently stand up for American interests. Clinton acknowledges that as secretary of state she worked hard to build a better relationship with China and says she would continue to do so as president. But she also warns about the dangers posed by China's militarisation of the South China Sea and condemns China's 'stealing commercial secrets, blueprints from defense contractors' and 'huge amounts of government information' in its quest for an advantage over other nations. The presidential campaign is just starting to heat up. The torrent of China-bashing in the remaining 15 months before the general election is likely to have a profoundly negative effect on China's image in the US, which is already unfavourable. In a 2014 poll by the Pew Research Center, only 35% of Americans had a positive view of China, while 55% had a negative one. China's image in the US has tilted in a more negative direction in recent years – as recently as 2011 half of Americans gave China a positive rating. The negative public mood will likely align with harsher attitudes in Congress, reinforcing the proclivities of the next US president to adopt a tougher stance against Chinese trade policies, human rights violations, cyber intrusions, and assertiveness in the South China Sea. Despite a sincere desire for a positive bilateral relationship with the US, Xi Jinping is likely to prioritise the preservation of domestic stability, defence of sovereignty, and pursuit of the Chinese Dream.

#### Soft on China policies alienate the public, empower Republican attacks, and SCS policies will be tied to Clinton

Nakamura 15 (David, Staff @ Wash Post, "Anti-China rhetoric in campaign suggests change under a new president," 9/23, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/anti-china-rhetoric-in-campaign-suggests-change-under-a-new-president/2015/09/23/f6bb3066-61ff-11e5-b38e-06883aacba64\_story.html)

A flashpoint every four years in American politics, China again has become a target for Republicans and Democrats alike on the presidential campaign trail. But foreign policy experts said there is mounting evidence that this time it’s more than a rhetorical gambit: Escalating tensions have left officials on both sides of the Pacific preparing for a shift in U.S. policy toward China, no matter which political party wins the 2016 election. As President Obama prepares to welcome Chinese President Xi Jinping to the White House on Thursday, those vying to succeed Obama have begun bashing China over its currency ma­nipu­la­tion, cyberhacking, human rights abuses and aggression in the South China Sea. Although Obama aides and Chinese officials have tried to shrug off the attacks as election-season pandering, analysts said the tough talk reflects souring attitudes toward China on Capitol Hill and in the public. And they suggested that the fear of a less friendly administration to come has contributed to China’s recent provocations. “What I think they’re really concerned about is what comes next,” said Bonnie Glaser, a China expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “And as a result, I think they’re trying to use this one-year-plus period in the Obama administration to get done in some areas as much as they can. In fact, I would argue this is what’s going on in the artificial island building in the South China Sea.” Xi’s two-day state visit to Washington is meant to reassure U.S. political leaders that China will be a reliable global partner and that its economic and territorial ambitions in Asia under his leadership are benign. In an address to business leaders in Seattle on Tuesday, the Chinese leader pledged to fight against cyberattacks and proposed creating a “high-level joint dialogue mechanism” with the United States to establish ground rules in cyberspace and to resolve disputes. But, it is unlikely that Xi and Obama will be able to announce major breakthroughs on the scale of the climate deal they reached last fall in Beijing, and that will make it difficult for the Chinese leader to accomplish those goals. Meantime, public opinion of China has soured as the United States has slowly recovered from the Great Recession. This year, 54 percent of Americans held an unfavorable view of China, compared with 29 percent in 2006, according to the Pew Research Center. “President Obama has hoped that being more open to China would make them a more responsible nation. It has not worked,” Sen. Marco Rubio (Fla.), who is seeking the GOP nomination, said in a speech to business leaders last month in Charleston, S.C. “We can no longer succumb to the illusion that more dialogue with China’s current rulers will narrow the gap in values and interests that separates us. . . . It is up to our next president to correct the errors of our current one.” Officials at the White House and in Beijing have rolled their eyes over much of the campaign-trail rhetoric. It’s easy for Republican front-runner Donald Trump to harangue China for stealing U.S. jobs or for Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), a candidate for the Democratic nomination, to criticize the trade imbalance. Just wait until one of these critics takes office, the White House thinking goes, and realizes just how important China is to the fortunes of the United States. Even Obama talked tough on China while campaigning before moderating his stance once in office. White House deputy national security adviser Ben Rhodes chalked up much of the criticism from GOP candidates to hyperbole that overstates “the degree of Chinese responsibility for certain things.” He emphasized the “bipartisan support” over previous Democratic and Republican administrations for a policy of engagement with China since the opening of relations more than four decades ago. At the same time, Rhodes acknowledged the growing concerns on Capitol Hill and in the business community, warning that “China needs to be mindful that its activities don’t undermine its standing here in the United States.” Part of Obama’s message to Xi, Rhodes added, is that “if you are not taking steps to address some of these concerns as it relates to particular trade irritants or cyber activities, you risk eroding the support for the U.S.-China relationship that comes from the business community; you risk inviting responses from Congress.” The issue is complicated. When the Chinese stock market tumbled in August, leading to fresh concerns over Beijing’s handling of its economy, Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker adopted the strongest stance among the GOP presidential candidates. He suggested Obama cancel Xi’s visit to send a message over the economic issues, as well as the cyber, maritime and currency tensions. But the message landed with a thud in Iowa, whose farmers export millions of dollars of soybeans and other agriculture to China each year. Walker ended his campaign this week amid plummeting poll numbers. Still, China is unlikely to fade as a campaign issue. Organized labor has railed against China’s currency ma­nipu­la­tion, saying it has contributed to trade imbalances. Congressional Democrats, including Sen. Charles E. Schumer (N.Y.), who is slated to take over as party leader in 2017, are pushing for legislation that would punish China over currency ma­nipu­la­tion. And although Hillary Rodham Clinton has not spoken much about China on the campaign trail, her tenures as first lady in the 1990s and as secretary of state during Obama’s first term were marked by memorable moments in confronting Beijing. In 1995, she spoke out forcefully on women’s rights during a speech at the U.N. World Conference on Women in Beijing. And in 2010, her declaration during a security conference in Hanoi that the United States would intervene in growing regional tensions over China’s bid to gain more control in the South China Sea signaled a shift in the Obama administration’s tone. A year later, the administration announced a “pivot to Asia,” a bid to refocus foreign policy attention to the region that Beijing interpreted as an effort to contain China. Beijing has responded by launching several major regional economic initiatives, including an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and by building artificial islands in the South China Sea, which analysts said will probably be used as military outposts.

### Link – China – NoKo Policies

#### Public cares deeply about North Korea and the plan will be spun as “soft” on the DPRK

Golan 15 (Shahar, Henry M. Jackson School of Int’l Studies at University of Washington – Chaired by Sorenson - Director Center for Korea Studies, Building a Pragmatic Coalition in American Politics, Rethinking United States Military Bases in East Asia, University of Washington, The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Task Force - Winter 2015, <https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/33275/Task%20Force%20E%202015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>)

Many de-facto political actors are voicing alternative policy today that is more hawkish towards the DPRK, for the most part from the political right wing. The Heritage Foundation, a conservative think-tank that has strong influence in congress, has repeatedly made the argument that “North Korea is a state sponsor of terrorism: We should designate them accordingly. Obama officials have stated on the record that the DPRK counterfeits US currency: We have never made a formal charge”, such vehement calls to place the DPRK on the list of state sponsors of terrorism are grounded on the belief, stated in this Heritage Foundation policy memo, “if we don’t get back to hurting them, they will keep on hurting us” (Bromund, 2015, n.p.). Similar echoes can be found in the American Enterprise Institute, another conservative think-tank, as it suggests, “The Obama administration must also drop the wishful thinking deriving from the Bush era that China will somehow put pressure on Pyongyang to rein in its destructive behavior…. Recent calls by former chief American negotiator Christopher Hill for a “strategic reengagement” with Beijing over the DPRK thus promise to lead the US down the same path of wishful thinking and being tactically outmaneuvered.” (Austin, 2015). Meanwhile the liberal American Security Project reflects far greater optimism for negotiations and soft power, suggesting “that there is a role that public diplomacy can play in North Korea to catalyze social change and advance US foreign policy objectives… properly directed outreach as a component of a coordinated overall smart power strategy may be able to help catalyze change.”(Mull, 2013, n.p.). Policy circles are proposing alternate options, with a clear divergence based on American political identification. This debate will only increase with the rethink of the military bases, and will highlight the different takes liberals and conservative generally hold towards the DPRK. The administration should expect members of congress to attack the reforms and use think-tank publications to propose alternate policy. Gries eloquently describes the fundamental factor in American attitudes towards the DPRK, he states that “surveys have consistently revealed that Americans feel coolest toward communist countries like North Korea and China” (n.p.). Focusing on divergence of opinion in the US, he claims “conservatives desire a tougher policy toward North Korea than liberals do in large part because they feel cooler towards communist countries and hence North Korea” (Gries, n.p.). This argument, evidenced in different media outlet portrayals of recent events, is crucial to understanding the sources of backlash to the rethink of the bases. These news articles provide an account of how liberals and conservatives in the US feel towards the DPRK specifically and Communism in general. Obama’s ending of the embargo on Cuba provided an interesting case study for Gries’s conclusion that conservatives are cooler towards communist courtiers. Responding to the recent opening to Cuba, Ana Quintana (2015) of the Heritage Foundation voiced her opposition stating that “President Obama’s new Cuba policy has been heavily criticized and rightfully so,” insisting that “Congress must make sure that US policy continues to support civil society groups on the island that uphold US values and are unaffiliated with the Castro regime and its communist ideology” (n.p.). In contrast, there are analysts who argue that complete embargos have not proven successful. Nicholas Kristof (2014) argues for the lifting of the embargo because he believes that people traveling across countries spread ideas that combat leftist sentiment (n.p.). This phenomenon can reform non-inclusive political and economic regimes better than hawkish policies (n.p.). He begins his article with criticism for the hawks in politics, recounting, “When I hear hawks denouncing President Obama for resolving to establish diplomatic relations with Cuba and ease the embargo, I don’t understand the logic. Is their argument that our policy didn’t work for the first half-century but maybe will work after 100 years?;” he proceeds to call for “hordes of them [American tourists in Cuba], giggling at ancient cars held together with duct tape, or comparing salaries with Cubans” (n.p.). The divergence of opinion between Kristof and Quintana regarding policies towards communist Cuba is consistent with the argument that liberals are warmer towards communist states. This assessment can be seen in other recent events as well. On the same day the embargo on Cuba ‘ended,’ another communist regime, the DPRK and the Sony hacking saga, dominated headlines and grabbed US attention. While criticizing the DPRK’s hacking into Sony and calling for a response to it from the Obama administration, Jonathan D. Pollack (2014), writing for the left-of-center Brookings Institute, remarks that “Sony’s decision to produce a film about a US-sponsored scheme to assassinate the DPRK’s leader, Kim Jong-un, was remarkably foolish; President Obama acknowledged as much” (n.p.). Writing for the conservative Weekly Standard Blog, William Kristol (2014) had a drastically different tone in his response to the Sony Affair: The surrender to North Korea is a historical moment. It's far more significant than President Obama's announcement the same day of his opening toward Cuba. That is merely another sign of an administration's strategically weak and morally rudderless foreign policy. The capitulation to North Korea could be—unless we reverse course in a fundamental way—a signpost in a collapse of civilizational courage. (n.p.) Reports following the hacking scandal in the Washington Post quoted a senior American diplomat saying “we want to test if they [North Korean regime] have an interest in resuming negotiations”, and a proposition for Pyongyang to postpone missile tests if the US cancelled joint exercise with the ROK; this prompted varying responses in conservative and liberal media outlets (Fified, 2015, n.p.). An op-ed in the Wall Street Journal claimed that, The last time the Administration made a diplomatic overture… North responded with a ballistic missile launch … That is all the more reason for the … [US to] adopt a policy of regime change through coercive financial sanctions, support for North Korean refugees and dissidents, and enhanced deterrence on the Korean peninsula. (Review & Outlook, 2015) Meanwhile, an editorial in the NYT objected to the rejectionist attitude displayed in the Wall Street Journal, arguing, “It’s hard to understand what America would lose by testing the North’s intentions once again, especially as China may be ready to be a more responsible partner in finding a solution” (The Editorial Board, 2015, n.p.). These varying views and calls to action show that political ideology is a factor in Americans stances towards the DPRK, and portrays that Gries’s assertion is visible in media debates in the most recent of times. From the above analysis regarding Congressional actions, think-tank proposals, and media opinions in the US toward the DPRK, it is clear that it is a topic of controversy in US domestic politics. The analysis leads to the conclusion that Republican policy makers are likely to attack the administration, framing the rethink as not harsh enough on the DPRK.

#### Clinton will take the blame – GOP wants to use North Korea as a referendum on the Dems

Reuters 1/6/16 (James Oliphant & Doina Chiacu, “North Korea bomb claim a new challenge for Clinton campaign,” <http://news.yahoo.com/republicans-blame-obama-urge-china-curb-north-korea-145314298.html>)

To Republican U.S. presidential contenders, North Korea’s claim that it tested a hydrogen bomb may further make the 2016 race what they dearly want it to be: a referendum on President Barack Obama's foreign policy and, by extension, Hillary Clinton’s. For months, these Republicans have liked to say the world is "on fire," pinning the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, the attacks in Paris and San Bernardino, California, and the recent tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia on Obama’s administration and Clinton’s stint as his secretary of state from 2009 to 2013. Now, they can add North Korea to the threats they say face American voters. "When China fell to the communists (in 1949), the question that dogged the Truman administration was: 'Who lost China?'" said John Feehery, a Republican strategist. "The question that will dog the Democrats is: Who lost North Korea?" "They’ve been a headache for every Democrat. They’ve been a headache for every Republican," Michael Rubin, a scholar at the conservative American Enterprise Institute, said of the North Koreans. "North Korea may be the last remaining foreign policy quagmire that hasn't been politicized in a partisan fashion." That does not mean Republican candidates did not try on Wednesday after North Korea's announcement. They said Obama's foreign policy let North Korea bolster its nuclear arms capabilities, and also assigned blame to Clinton. "Three out of the four nuclear detonations that the North Koreans have done have happened on Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton's watch," New Jersey Governor Chris Christie told Fox News, "and they have just not acted strongly at all around the world." Clinton condemned North Korea's move as "dangerous and provocative," and said the United States should respond with more sanctions and stronger missile defenses. She also defended her performance as Obama's top diplomat. "As secretary, I championed the United States' pivot to the Asia Pacific - including shifting additional military assets to the theater - in part to confront threats like North Korea and to support our allies," Clinton said in a statement. "I worked to get not just our allies but also Russia and China on board for the strongest sanctions yet."

#### Interest groups ensure changes in policies towards the DPRK become hot-button issues

Golan 15 (Shahar, Henry M. Jackson School of Int’l Studies at University of Washington – Chaired by Sorenson - Director Center for Korea Studies, Building a Pragmatic Coalition in American Politics, Rethinking United States Military Bases in East Asia, University of Washington, The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Task Force - Winter 2015, <https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/33275/Task%20Force%20E%202015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>)

This chapter will look into the constraints that US domestic politics pose to the proposed policy reforms. A plethora of interest groups including ethnic lobbies and business communities, as well as political ideology and foreign policy outlook, pose constraints to American action in the Asia Pacific. This report will draw on academic work, publications of think tanks, actions of interest groups, public opinion surveys, and statements of influential US foreign policy thinkers to assess and predict how opposition to a policy rethink will manifest. The report concludes that the opponents of the reforms will perceive current legislation as soft on the PRC and not harsh enough on the DPRK. After explaining the complications that US domestic politics pose, the paper will prospect areas of healthy support in the US. It will show how it is possible to create coalitions of support for the proposed reforms by utilizing American domestic preoccupation with the Middle East, the foreign policy outlook of 2016 candidates, interest groups, and existing calls for reforms in the US today.

### Link – Aid

#### Foreign aid spending alienates voters – plays into GOP’s Ghana vs Grandma spin strategy

MCLAUGHLIN 11. [Seth, contributing writer, “Key Foreign Policy Players Try to Master Capitol Hill” The Washington Diplomat – May, <http://www.washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7829:key-foreign-policy-players-try-to-master-capitol-hill&catid=1473:may-2011&Itemid=471>]

The Beltway battle over the federal budget was temporarily interrupted by the real-life fighting in Libya and natural catastrophe in Japan, but the spending debate roared back to life in mid-April, consuming lawmakers on Capitol Hill as they scrambled to avoid a government shutdown, which would have been the first since 1995. The game of chicken came down to the wire, but a shutdown was ultimately averted, although that was just round one of what's set to be a drawn-out tug of war over America's finances. Round two over the 2012 budget and round three, raising the country's debt ceiling — which if left unchecked, could prove even more economically catastrophic than a shutdown — promise to be even more epic. But it's not just politicos in Washington and anxious Americans who are following the partisan showdown. The city's diplomats have been intently watching the congressional sparring as well. After all, strengthening economic ties with the world's largest economy is among every diplomat's top priorities. Whether it's development assistance or trade and investment, the state of the U.S. government checkbook matters not just to Americans, but to the world. However, after a decade of tax cuts coupled with two wars, a housing boom and bust and an economic recession, America's bloated and battered checkbook needs rebalancing. Both Republicans and Democrats agree that with a budget deficit of $1.5 trillion and climbing — along with a national debt of about $14.2 trillion — federal spending must be curbed. But by how much, from where and how fast, especially in the midst of a still fragile recovery and sagging unemployment, will be the talk of the town for months to come. Immediately after the dust settled over the budget for the 2011 fiscal year that ends Sept. 30, both sides set their sights on the 2012 numbers that will also decide the amount of money and manpower the United States releases across the globe. Though the State Department and foreign operations budget represent a sliver of total spending, most peg it at about 1 percent of more than $3.5 trillion federal budget, money spent on diplomacy and development has become a convenient whipping post for voters and lawmakers searching for quick answers to the country's financial mess, but also wary of the fallout from reforming the real drivers of federal spending — popular entitlement programs such as Social Security and Medicare, and spending on defense (also see "America's Foreign Affairs Budget Faces Congressional Chopping Block" in the March 2011 issue of The Washington Diplomat). Even if politicians are more willing to broach so-called third rail subjects like Medicare and Medicaid, the international affairs budget still faces the threat of significant cuts by lawmakers determined to show fiscal restraint across the board. A congressman would be hard pressed to take away grandmother's Medicare and justify giving more assistance to rebel fighters in Libya, for instance, even if the two cases aren't exactly correlated. Explaining fiscal nuance is not an easy sell. Politically speaking, it's simply easier for lawmakers to cut foreign aid than to go after programs that have a more noticeable effect on their constituents back in their home districts. Public misperceptions also drive the political expediency. Americans think that 25 percent of the federal budget goes to foreign assistance, according to a recent poll by the University of Maryland's Program on International Policy Attitudes. The real amount? The total international affairs budget comes in at under 1.5 percent. But you can be sure both sides will be clawing over every scrap of that 1.5 percent. As it stands, the fiscal 2011 budget allocated $48.3 billion for State and foreign operations — an $8.4 billion reduction from the president's requested amount though it was on par with 2010 levels. As part of the $38 billion of cuts in the 2011 budget, about $500 million was carved out of the State Department's budget compared to last year, while U.S. payments to the United Nations will be decreased by $377 million. Pay for Foreign Service officers was also frozen, and USAID operating expenses were trimmed by $39 million. But the GOP is eyeing far bigger cuts in foreign aid for 2012. President Obama has sounded the starting gun on next year's spending battle by rolling out a $3.7 trillion request that included $47 billion for the State Department and USAID — roughly a 1 percent increase compared to 2010 levels. Combined with additional diplomacy and development efforts, including the Peace Corps and the Millennium Challenge Corp., the president is requesting $50.9 billion in foreign assistance. That's $3.7 billion less than what was requested in fiscal 2011. Obama is also requesting $8.7 billion in supplemental funding for the State Department and USAID in fiscal 2012 as they can take on additional responsibilities in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. In general, most (though not all) Republicans have been highly critical of any increase to the international affairs budget in a time of fiscal austerity, arguing that America needs to get its own economic house in order before sending money abroad. Some conservatives also want better vetting of foreign aid programs to make certain they indeed strengthen national security and that federal money isn't being funneled into countries with poor records of democracy and human rights. Others though have suggested the budget line should be zeroed out altogether, or severely gutted.

### A2 China Lobby/Business Lobby

#### No turn – policy changes put the Dems on the defensive and the business lobby HATES China now

Sevastopulo and Donnan 15 (Demetri and Shawn, Washington Correspondents @ Financial Times, 8/26, "Republicans line up for potshots at China," http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/ced1bce8-4baa-11e5-a089-1a3e2cd1819b.html#axzz49gbNsW5i)

China has long served as a bogeyman in US presidential elections. Whether Bill Clinton referring to the “butchers of Beijing” in reference to the Tiananmen Square massacre, George W Bush attacking Mr Clinton for being soft on China or Mr Obama touting the need for alliances to challenge Beijing, US presidential contenders have long lambasted China while vowing to take a tougher stance than the White House incumbent if elected president. But some analysts say China is sparking a different degree of anger now for several reasons: its growth as an economic power, its assertive actions in the South China Sea, rampant cyber attacks, theft of intellectual property rights and the creation of a climate that is less welcoming to foreign business. Frank Jannuzi, president of the Mansfield Foundation, which promotes US-Asia relations, said there had been a bipartisan consensus since Richard Nixon went to China in 1972 that the US would profit by engaging the country. But he said the consensus had almost unravelled because companies had become “increasingly disenchanted” with China. Trump throws out reporter and the rule book Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump gestures during the first Republican presidential debate at the Quicken Loans Arena Thursday, Aug. 6, 2015, in Cleveland. (AP Photo/John Minchillo) When Donald Trump evicted an influential Latino reporter from a press conference on the campaign trail in Iowa, it fuelled concerns that his perceived war on Hispanics is damaging the Republican party’s chances of reclaiming the White House in 2016. Continue reading “In Washington there has always been a debate between the China hawks and the Panda-huggers. The balance keepers used to be business,” said Mr Jannuzi, who advised Joe Biden in his 2008 run to be the Democrats’ nominee for president. “You are going to see many presidential candidates view China’s moment of economic turmoil as an opportunity to push them . . . because they can combine the anxiety of the American people about the way China’s economy could hit their retirement accounts with the anxiety that has long been there in elite policy circles about China’s international policy behaviour.” Chris Johnson, a former top China analyst at the CIA, said the rhetoric on China was “different from the standard stuff” because Beijing refused to address US concerns on issues such as cyber security. “The comments from Walker and the others are irresponsible,” said Mr Johnson. “But it does put the administration on the defensive . . . because they will have to go hard on these issues.” Mr Johnson added that China had become a victim of its own success and could not rely on the “hide your strength, bide your time” strategy promoted by Deng Xiaoping. “Suddenly these guys who were doing well, but doing well invisibly, are out there in a way that they weren’t before. They’re an easy target.” The China-bashing has implications for Mr Obama, who spent much of this year deflecting demands from Capitol Hill to include binding provisions to prevent currency manipulation in a Pacific Rim trade deal known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

#### China lobby is weak and US businesses are anti-China now

Drezner 10 (Daniel, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a senior editor at The National Interest, "The Death of the China Lobby?" 7/20, http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/07/20/the-death-of-the-china-lobby/)

Obama could be right, but on one key dimension his bargaining hand will actually be stronger than those of past presidents. China, by continuing to alienate and frustrate western multinational corporations, is also effectively weakening the strongest pro-China lobbies in both Washington and Brussels. As Rachman notes: Were it not for the power of big business, the relationship between the US and China might have gone sour years ago. There are forces on both sides of the Pacific – Chinese nationalists, American trade unionists, the military establishments of both countries – that would be happy with a more adversarial relationship. For the past generation it has been US multinationals that have made the counter-argument – that a stronger and more prosperous China could be good for America. So it is ominous, not just for business but for international politics, that corporate America is showing increasing signs of disillusionment with China…. In the past, American business has acted as the single biggest constraint on an anti-Chinese backlash in the US. If companies such as GE, Google and Goldman Sachs qualify their support for China or refuse to speak up, the protectionist bandwagon will gather speed. The Chinese government, of course, is not stupid. China’s growing confidence in dealing with the US, and the world in general, is still matched by a cautious desire to avoid conflict. At strategic moments, the Chinese government is likely to make tactical concessions – whether on Google or the currency – in an effort to head off a damaging conflict with the US. But with American business and the American public increasingly restive, the risks of miscalculation are growing. And here I must dissent from Rachman. In some ways, I do think the Chinese government has been pretty stupid over the past year in executing its "Pissing Off As Many Countries As Possible" strategy. China rankled the Europeans over its climate change diplomacy at Copenhagen. For all of Beijing’s bluster, it failed to alter U.S. policies on Tibet and Taiwan. It backed down on the Google controversy. It overestimated the power that comes with holding U.S. debt. It alienated South Korea and Japan over its handling of the Cheonan incident, leading to joint naval exercises with the United States — exactly what China didn’t want. It’s growing more isolated within the G-20. And, increasingly, no one trusts its economic data. This doesn’t sound like a government that has executed a brilliant grand strategy. It sounds like a country that’s benefiting from important structural trends, while frittering away its geopolitical advantages. Alienating key supporters in the country’s primary export markets — and even if Chinese consumption is rising, exports still matter an awful lot to the Chinese economy — seems counterproductive to China’s long-term strategic and economic interests.

# \*\*\*Internals\*\*\*

### Obama Popularity Key

#### Obama popularity means Clinton wins – EXCELLENT predictor of her chances

Goldstein 5/28/16 (Ken, Political Commentator @ Bloomberg News, "Analysis: Recent national polls should worry Clinton - See more at: http://amestrib.com/news/analysis-recent-national-polls-should-worry-clinton#sthash.TAHFC0yQ.dpuf," http://amestrib.com/news/analysis-recent-national-polls-should-worry-clinton)

With that in mind, one data point to pay attention to is President Barack Obama’s job approval number. It is now more than 50 percent, according to Gallup and a variety of other surveys, and that should be good news for Clinton. Even though Obama is not on the ticket, the approval rating of the incumbent president is an excellent predictor of the vote share of his party’s nominee. Clinton’s chances are greatly buoyed by an improving view of Obama’s job performance.

#### Obama’s approval ratings are increasing – that’s a KEY predictor for Dem success in 2016

Klein 16 (Ezra, Political commentator @ Vox, citing Alan Abramowitz, Prof of Poli Sci @ Emory Univ., 3/29, "This presidential campaign is making Americans like Obama — and that's good for Dems in November," http://www.vox.com/latest-news/2016/3/29/11326606/campaign-americans-like-obama)

Political scientist Alan Abramowitz emailed over an interesting insight about the effect the presidential race is having on Barack Obama's numbers — and what that might mean in November: All the noise being made by the presidential campaign, especially by the Republican campaign, has taken attention away from what may turn out to be more significant for the general election — Barack Obama’s rising approval rating. Obama’s weekly approval rating in the Gallup tracking poll (I ignore the daily fluctuations which are largely meaningless) has risen to its highest level in many months — 53 percent approval vs. 44 percent disapproval for the past week. This is potentially very significant for the November election because much research, including my own, has found that the president’s approval rating is a key predictor of the election results even when the president is not on the ballot. Thus a very unpopular George W. Bush probably doomed John McCain to defeat in 2008 no matter what happened during the campaign that year. A 53-44 approval-disapproval balance would give Democrats a good shot at keeping the White House even if they were not running against a badly divided Republican Party led by perhaps the most unpopular nominee in decades. So why has Obama’s approval rating been rising recently? Several factors may be involved including an improving economy but one of the most important [may] well be the GOP presidential campaign. The more voters see of the leading GOP candidates, the better Obama looks. Along these lines, it is probably not a coincidence that there has been an especially large jump in Obama’s approval rating among women which now stands at 58 percent.

#### Obama approval ratings key to Dem chances in 2016

Bernstein 16 (Jonathan, Bloomberg View columnist covering U.S. politics, "Commentary: Obama's rising popularity is good news for Democrats," 3/30, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-barack-obama-approval-rating-hillary-clinton-20160330-story.html)

President Barack Obama's surging approval rating is becoming a major plot line of the 2016 election. Obama has reached 53 percent approval from Gallup, a three-year high, and he's been at or above 50 percent in that survey for four weeks. HuffPollster's aggregate of all current polls gives Obama an average approval rating of 49.2 percent, compared with 47.3 percent disapproval. He bottomed out in the first week of December at 44.1 percent, according to that estimate, so he's gained five percentage points over an almost four-month sustained rally. That should help Hillary Clinton's chances in November. Current presidential approval, along with some measure of economic performance, both have strong effects on general election voting. They aren't perfect predictors, but they seem to make a difference. In the Gallup survey, Obama is now doing a little bit better than Ronald Reagan was in late March 1988. He's well behind Dwight Eisenhower and Bill Clinton during their final years in the White House, and far ahead of George W. Bush.

#### Yes Clinton tied to Obama – she wants to ride his coattails – but NEW political controversies can impact her fortunes

Collinson 16 (Stephen, Political Analyst @ CNN, "Barack Obama's last campaign," 5/7, http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/07/politics/obama-hillary-clinton-last-campaign/)

Washington (CNN) President Barack Obama's popularity is growing just in time for him to wage the final campaign of his political life. A CNN/ORC poll published Friday found Obama's approval rating at 51%. He's now been in positive territory since February -- the longest period since shortly after his re-election in 2012. And 49% of those polled say things in the country are going very or fairly well -- up 7% since January. The late-term boost in popularity is good news for a President whose achievements have often come at a heavy political price in a deeply partisan age. But it could be even better news for Hillary Clinton, who is preparing for a fierce general election clash with Donald Trump and may need to deploy a popular Obama to the campaign trail to drive up Democratic enthusiasm. Though Obama yet hasn't formally endorsed Clinton, who remains in a primary race against Bernie Sanders, he was eager Friday to take on Trump and preview his arguments for the fall. "We are in serious times and this is a really serious job," Obama said in his first news conference since Trump became the presumptive Republican nominee this week. "This is not entertainment. This is not a reality show. This is a contest for the presidency of the United States." His remarks reflect the fact that though many Democrats and Republicans believe Clinton is favored to win given Trump's high negatives with key demographics, lack of political experience and controversial rhetoric, the White House will take nothing for granted. "Our view is that he will campaign and he will be out there like the nominee is having the race of their life," said a senior administration official on condition of anonymity to discuss internal thinking. "That is how you have to run in presidential elections." The GOP resistance to Donald Trump Hitting the stump for his chosen successor -- always a nostalgic moment for a President leaving office -- Obama will draw contrasts with the gains made in his presidency and what he believes Republicans, under Trump, would represent. 'Holes in his shoes' "There is no question that the President will be rolling up his sleeves and be out there quite a bit on the campaign trail in the summer and the fall," said White House Communications Director Jen Psaki. "He has already done quite a bit of fundraising. I think people can expect that he will get some holes in his shoes from the amount of campaigning he will do." Obama will likely spend time courting voters who twice backed his White House campaigns -- millennials, Latinos and African Americans -- all of whom Clinton needs in November. The President and his wife, Michelle, could be powerful advocates for Clinton in big cities in key swing states, like Cleveland, Miami and Denver, where Trump must cut into the Democratic vote to win the election. "President Obama and First Lady Michelle Obama are the two most popular elected and non-elected officials amongst minorities, particularly African Americans," said Tharon Johnson, a Georgia Democratic strategist who ran Obama's southern re-election campaign in 2012 and now backs Clinton. "President Obama will be able to speak to the minority community with not just rhetoric like Trump but with concrete successes like (Obamacare), the growth in the economy etc that will ignite that demographic," Johnson said. Johnson said Obama would also be an asset in uniting Democrats after a primary that Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders plans to pursue until the convention in July. "Mobilizing the Sanders wing of that party is something a sitting president like Obama who is popular with the base can probably do better than anyone," Johnson said. Given his improving approval ratings, Obama also plans to venture into more unexpected territory, White House aides said, including suburban areas and midwestern states. Such an itinerary could draw him into direct conflict with Trump, who will brandish a fiercely protectionist trade agenda in areas that he says have been hurt by economic competitors like China and the economy under Obama. Obama's potential to help There is every sign Clinton understands Obama's potential to help her. Although she has repeatedly said she's not running for Obama's third term -- or that of her husband -- she has praised and defended the President in front of Democratic audiences. And having been on the inside when then-Vice President Al Gore spurned President Bill Clinton's offers of help in 2000, fearing fallout from his boss's personal dramas could be damaging, Clinton has special insight on the president-versus-candidate dynamic. But Obama's gaze is not just on the future that will unfold when he is an ex-politician. He has personal political business to get done as well. In some ways, Obama is a unique lame duck president as he is in significantly better positions than many of the term-limited presidents who preceded him. In 1988, Ronald Reagan was popular, but much of his political energy had been punctured by the Iran-Contra affair. And in his late 70s, he had none of the vigor that the younger Obama still retains -- despite his increasingly snowy hair. Bill Clinton, though personally popular when he left office, was still overshadowed politically by the impeachment drama and President George W. Bush's second term approval sank under the Iraq war, Hurricane Katrina and the economic meltdown and never recovered. Spared such trials, these are heady and poignant times in the White House as the President basks in a political boost in the twilight of his term. "In my final year, my approval ratings keep going up. The last time I was this high, I was trying to decide on my major," Obama joked at the White House Correspondents' Association annual dinner last week. The unexpected Still, if there is one lesson of the Obama presidency, it is that the unexpected is usually just around the corner. A sudden game-changing event -- be it a terror attack, global crisis or an unexpected economic slump -- could change the political weather.

### Clinton = Blamed

#### Any change in China policy exposes Clinton to political risk

Rong 15 (Xiaoqing, New york based contributor @ Global Times, "Clinton may find it best to be quiet on China," 4/16, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/917207.shtml)

China has become a fixed topic in US elections at state and federal level in recent years. Most of the sound bites are negative. And in many elections, candidates blame each other for being too soft on China. A Washington Post editorial during the 2012 presidential election explained the reason wittily: "It's an iron law of US politics: You can't go wrong bashing China. Polls show the public believes that the US is losing jobs due to unfair economic competition from abroad, especially from China. And so, every four years, presidential candidates fall all over themselves promising to get tough on imports." Sometimes the Sinophobia can be stretched to an insane level. In 2013, when the now Senate Majority leader Mitch McConnell was campaigning for re-election in Kentucky, his wife Elaine Chao, the Taiwan-born former secretary of labor in George W. Bush's administration, was attacked by supporters of his rival for being a "Chinese wife" who prompted her husband to "create jobs for China." Clinton doesn't want to be seen as "soft" on China. In her 2014 memoir Hard Choices, she called on other Asian countries to form an alliance so they could collectively stand up to China. She also criticized China's censorship. She mentioned a confrontation with a Chinese leader about Tibet. And she devoted a whole chapter to how the Americans helped Chen Guangcheng, the blind activist who went to the US Embassy in Beijing and then was allowed to leave China for asylum in the US. The attacks have continued. Clinton recently used her Twitter account to criticize China for detaining five feminist activists. But even this "tough on China" tone doesn't seem to have convinced her political opponents or even some of the people on her side. The alliance among smaller Asian countries she hoped to see is at best weak. And now it could be further dissolved with the establishment of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. The "James Bond-style activity" of Chen's American saviors described in her book doesn't fit entirely with Chen's own account in his newly published autobiography in which he blamed the US for not fulfilling its promises to him. And the thorniest issue Clinton faces might be money. According to joint research of the Washington Examiner and watchdog Judicial Watch, during Clinton's tenure as secretary of state, her husband, former president Bill Clinton, made $48 million from foreign countries for giving 215 speeches, including $1.7 million for giving four speeches in China or to Chinese-sponsored entities in the US. In addition, entities that have close ties to China donated between $750,000 to $1.75 million and the Clinton Foundation, the family's charitable organization. Clinton resigned from the board of the family foundation right after Sunday's announcement to avoid conflicts of interest. Still, her opponents will not easily let go of the opportunity to question her ethics. What may also be brought up in the process is Clinton's once close relationship to Chinese-American fundraiser Norman Hsu whose 2007 arrest for illegal fundraising prompted her to return $850,000 in campaign donations he helped to raise. Hsu was later indicted for fundraising fraud. In 1996, the Democratic National Committee also returned $360,000 in donations raised by questionable Taiwan-born fundraiser Johnny Chung for Bill Clinton's reelection campaign. Chung said he got some money from the mainland, which denied the connection. Clinton's campaign will reportedly cost $2.5 billion. The figure has already raised many eyebrows. There is no doubt Clinton has the ability to raise whatever she needs without crossing the line. But the astronomical spending will likely bring up all the money-related questions and memories and mean that Clinton has an incentive to keep her distance from China. Maybe. Clinton should keep in mind a warning from Henry Paulson. When asked at an event at the Asian Society on Monday what he'd like to hear the presidential candidates say about China, the former US treasury secretary quipped: "I'd like them to say as little as possible."

#### The plan creates clear contrast between the parties on national security --- allowing it to swing the election – past empirics don’t apply – claim that Clinton can’t be blamed for China softline is a NEG uniqueness arg

Amble 1/28/16 (John, former U.S. Army intelligence officer and veteran of Iraq and Afghanistan, AND PhD candidate at the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies at King’s College London, “We Still Don’t Know if Foreign Policy Matters in the Presidential Election,” <http://warontherocks.com/2016/01/we-still-dont-know-if-foreign-policy-matters-in-the-presidential-election/>)

So wait, is this a foreign policy election or not? Good question, one that Elizabeth Saunders sought to answer this week in The Washington Post. One reason voters sometimes don’t support candidates based on foreign policy issues, even when they profess to be concerned with them, is because the divides between candidates’ positions can be less stark than on issues like, say, taxes and social welfare policy: “Consider Vietnam and the 1968 election … [when] most individuals’ votes were not based on Vietnam — because there was little difference between the public positions taken by Hubert Humphrey and Richard Nixon. … That’s potentially true in 2016 as well. The most likely Democratic nominee, Hillary Clinton, has taken more hawkish foreign policy positions than many recent Democratic candidates, presumably bringing her positions closer to the more traditionally hawkish Republican side.” Democratic candidates avoiding foreign policy While the GOP field is happy to talk about national security and foreign policy issues, the Democrats (as we’ve noted before) are simply not interested. For Buzzfeed, Zack Beauchamp talked to Democratic foreign policy wonks who aren’t happy about that. Some of the highlights: Heather Hurlburt, New America Foundation: “The discussion of national security in the presidential debate is terrible. You sit around and say, ‘If only they would talk more about our issues in the context of the presidential campaign,’ and then they do. Just be careful what you wish for.” Matt Duss, Foundation for Middle East Peace: “Whenever there’s a crisis, Democratic leaders scramble to make statements about what we should do. But there’s a failure to constantly articulate a progressive vision for foreign policy.” Rachel Kleinfeld, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: “Hillary is probably a little more interventionist than the Democratic base would like. Bernie Sanders is closer to where the Democratic base is … [but] that’s not the message he wants his campaign to be about. Although Clinton is kind of an exception To be fair, in this week’s Democratic town hall hosted by CNN, Clinton did spend a lot of time tackling foreign policy issues, especially compared to her two opponents. She addressed the Iranian nuclear program, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Islamic State, radicalization, and Benghazi. But as Frida Ghitis writes for CNN, “there was, however, a downside for Clinton. … The once seemingly inevitable Democratic nominee opted to tie herself ever more closely to President Barack Obama’s foreign policy. Indeed, come the general election, Clinton’s full-throated defense of the controversial Iran deal and other foreign policy choices will make it that much harder to distance herself from the broader historic catastrophe of the unraveling of the Middle East that has unfolded during Obama’s watch.”

#### Clinton is linked to Obama – she’ll get the blame.

Kilgore 5-25-16. [Ed, political analyst, "How Running for ‘Obama’s 3rd Term’ Became a Political Asset for Hillary Clinton" New York Magazine -- nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/05/obama-turning-into-november-asset-for-clinton.html]

[T]he attack against Clinton that has emerged the earliest is her obvious ties to the president and her tortured attempts to create daylight between herself and her former boss. “There isn’t a dime’s worth of difference between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton. She will continue foursquare … and put forward Barack Obama’s policy in a third and fourth term,” is how Rep. Michele Bachmann (R-Minn.), a 2012 also-ran positioning herself as the Anti-Hillary, put it to Politico in early October. The general-election risk of Clinton being perceived as running for "Barack Obama's third term" rose when she suddenly faced a serious challenge from Bernie Sanders and chose to associate herself closely with the incumbent strictly because it made sense in the dynamics of Democratic primaries where constituencies (e.g., African-Americans) particularly fond of Obama became critical to her ability to win. Much as she'd need to "pivot to the center" after Sanders generated left-bent pressure during the nomination contest, would she also need to pivot away from the controversial incumbent and once again become her "own woman"?

#### Hillary is seen as an Obama third term.

Al-Gharbi 5-29-16. [Musa, Paul F. Lazarsfeld Fellow in Sociology at Columbia University, "We may be just this screwed: Donald Trump has an easier path to victory than you think" Salon -- www.salon.com/2016/05/29/we\_may\_be\_just\_this\_screwed\_donald\_trump\_has\_an\_easier\_path\_to\_victory\_than\_you\_think/]

A Referendum on Obama’s Administration and Bill Clinton’s Historically speaking, it is rare that a party that completed two terms in the Oval Office manages to win a third. Granted, Obama has been a transformational president, and his popularity remains high. However, the problem facing Hillary is that she’s not only going to be held to account for the failures and shortcomings of the Obama administration, but also of her husband’s tenure in office.

#### Hillary linked to Obama – any attempts at distancing will backfire.

Fabian 6-11-16. [Jordan, White House correspondent, "Clinton’s third-term dilemma" The Hill -- thehill.com/homenews/administration/283075-clintons-third-term-dilemma]

Hillary Clinton faces a unique dilemma on the 2016 campaign trail: How much to embrace President Obama, and how much to run away from him. Obama remains a relatively popular figure, with a 51 percent approval rating from Gallup and a 90 percent approval rating among Democrats. Yet public opinion on the Obama economic record is decidedly mixed. Sixty-five percent of Americans think the country is on the wrong track, according to the Real Clear Politics average, while 27 percent say the country is on the right track. The polling and data can sometimes seem contradictory. Only 42 percent in an Associated Press poll last month described the U.S. economy as good, but two-thirds said their own households were doing well. Obama can hardly wait to get on the campaign trail with Clinton, and the presumptive Democratic nominee is happy to have him. The two will campaign together for the first time this Thursday in Wisconsin, a state where Clinton will be favored this fall. Yet Clinton has handled questions about the Obama economy with the care of a politician who can see downsides to fully embracing Obama. In an interview Wednesday with Fox News’s Bret Baier, Clinton initially dodged questions about what she would do differently than Obama on the economy, turning to a well-worn campaign statement about how Obama hasn’t received enough credit for the economic recovery. Pressed further on how a Clinton economic team might tread differently from Obama, Clinton cited infrastructure spending and expanding manufacturing jobs as two issues she’d focus on, while blaming congressional Republicans for holding up Obama’s efforts. Clinton and Obama also have real differences — particularly on foreign policy, where Clinton has criticized the Iran nuclear deal and Obama’s handling of Syria. Republicans believe that labeling Clinton as a third-term for Obama is a winning argument for their side. Trump’s campaign motto of “Make America Great Again” pointedly sets up the Obama years as a disaster. And Republicans point to an excruciatingly slow recovery in arguing that voters hardly want four more years of Obama’s policies. Gallup found that Trump has a ten-percentage-point edge over Clinton on the question of which candidate would do a better job handling the economy — a good sign for the presumptive Republican nominee given the importance of the economy to voters. When Obama endorsed Clinton on Thursday, Trump seized on the connection. “Obama just endorsed Crooked Hillary. He wants four more years of Obama—but nobody else does!” Trump tweeted. Team Clinton’s confidence in allying itself with Obama is just as clear. “Delete your account,” Clinton tweeted back in what became her most retweeteed tweet of the campaign. Obama and Clinton talked frequently during the Democratic primary, and all signs point to a cooperative relationship going forward. The two are trying to make history. No political party has won three consecutive presidential terms since President George H.W. Bush succeeded President Reagan in 1988. Despite the victory, there were tensions between Bush and Reagan, who like Clinton and Obama had been primary rivals eight years earlier. Reagan offered Bush a tepid endorsement after he clinched the GOP nomination in May. And while Bush campaigned to continue Regan’s legacy, his attempt to establish his own identity by calling for a “kinder, gentler nation” in his convention speech irked Reagan loyalists. In 1992, Al Gore refused Bill Clinton’s help until late in the campaign due to the fallout from his sex scandal with Monica Lewinsky. Clinton, who remained popular, desperately wanted to campaign for Gore and his supporters believe the vice president’s effort to distance himself ultimately doomed his campaign. Former Secretary of State Madeline Albright called it “crazy” in a 2014 interview with the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia. Clinton has handled questions about running for a third Obama term with care. “I'm not running for my husband's third term, I'm not running for Obama's third term,” Clinton told late-night comic Stephen Colbert last fall. “I’m running for my first term, but I'm going to do what works.” The White House has also been careful to give Clinton space. While Obama clearly wants a Clinton victory to protect his legacy and bolster his own political standing, they've stressed the Clinton campaign has the ultimate say on when and where the president will campaign. When asked Thursday if Obama wants four more years of his presidency, White House press secretary Josh Earnest replied, “no.” He pointed out Clinton has distanced herself from Obama on some key issues, such as the conflict in Syria and the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement. Donald Zinman, an associate professor of political science at Grand Valley State University who wrote a book titled “The Heir Apparent Presidency,” believes it’s best for Clinton to stick with Obama, even if she has to take her lumps along the way. “It can send a confusing message to voters if a candidate who is closely aligned with the president says they are in fact very different from the president,” he said. “Trying to distance yourself from the current administration — I’m not sure how you would even do that at this point.”

#### Dems HAVE to align with Obama – no distancing.

Hennessey 15. [Kathleen, AP Analyst, “Democrats Embrace Obama Legacy Despite Risks in 2016 Race” ABC News -- October 19 -- http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory/democrats-embrace-obama-legacy-risks-2016-race-34568532)

If the recent Republican presidential debates have revealed hobbling breaks in the party, the Democrats' first political X-ray showed a couple of hairline fractures. The five Democrats on the debate stage last week in Las Vegas offered a relatively — and surprisingly — unified front on the issues at the forefront of the campaign. On solutions, the differences tended to be a matter of degree. On President Barack Obama, at times a source of considerable Democratic discontent, their positions ranged from warm embrace to polite disagreement. The sense of respect and courtesy was in sharp contrast to the public bickering on the other side and the recent history of how parties have dealt with passing control of the White House. Democrats showed they are willing to embrace Obama's legacy, whatever the risks. Republicans continue to struggle with the fallout from George W. Bush's presidency, with years of public soul-searching and animosity toward their leadership. "You would expect in a Democratic primary field when people are crossing a broad ideological spectrum that they might be critical of the incumbent no matter who the incumbent is," Democratic pollster and strategist Celinda Lake said. "But I think Democrats demonstrated that across the spectrum it's good to run with the president rather than against him." Under their first national spotlight, leading Democrats put forward no drastic re-imaging of Obama's signature policies. The candidates largely pledged to build on Obama's health overhaul, preserve or expand his immigration orders and continue global climate change talks. They indirectly criticized his handling of issues that the party considers to be failings of his tenure: comprehensive immigration changes, gun control, spurring middle class wage growth, cracking down on Wall Street. Opposition to a Pacific Rim trade pact was the most prominent area of disagreement. Obama noted the trend Friday, saying he found it "interesting" how few differences emerged. "I think everybody on that stage at the debate affirmed what I have said in the past, which is we agree on 95 percent of stuff and on the basic vision of a country," Obama told reporters. The candidates' cohesion around Obama is as much political calculation as a spontaneous exercise. Obama is popular with Latinos, blacks, young people and unmarried women — the core coalition that any Democrat will need to win the nomination and the White House. His approval rating hovers around 80 percent among Democrats in Gallup's recent tracking surveys. Among liberal Democrats, that number moves toward 90 percent. Democrats alienate these groups at their own peril. Front-runner Hillary Rodham Clinton has started to pull away from Obama, delivering rough comments on his immigration record or deviating from his policy in Syria. But when given the biggest audience of her campaign, she promised to "build on the successes of President Obama" and "go beyond." She not only embraced Obama but also used his endorsement of her to deflect criticism. The two once debated her vote on the Iraq War, she noted, and "after the election, he asked me to become secretary of state. He valued my judgment, and I spent a lot of time with him." Clinton's rivals similarly went easy on the president, even the one whose campaign is built on a harsh critique of his economic policy. "I have a lot of respect for President Obama. I have worked with him time and time again on many, many issues," said Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders. It was a softer introduction to his call for "political revolution" to unlock the government from what he contends is the control of Wall Street and corporate media. Still, the collective appreciation for the president and his policies papered over persistent rifts, particularly between the party's left flank and pragmatic middle.

### AT: Other Issues Key

#### claim that “other issues are key” is non-responsive

Stokes, 16 --- Bruce, senior fellow @ council foreign relations, director of global economic attitudes at Pew Research Center, where he assesses public views about economic conditions, foreign policy and values, non-resident fellow at the German Marshall Fund and an associate fellow at Chatham House, former international economics correspondent for the National Journal, a former senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund. Stokes is a graduate of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and Johns Hopkins University’s School for Advanced International Studies. He has appeared on numerous television and radio programs including CNN, BBC, NPR, NBC, CBS and ABC and is a frequent speaker at major conferences around the world. “Choices by US Voters Will Influence the World”, YaleGlobal, 3/17, <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/choices-us-voters-will-influence-world>

The US primary season has slowly winnowed down the field of presidential candidates. “To date, the campaign debate has been dominated by multiple themes that could ultimately impact people outside the United States – trade, immigration and terrorism, to name just a few,” explains Bruce Stokes, director of global economic attitudes at the Pew Research Center. Hillary Clinton, former US secretary of state is Democratic Party’s front-runner after winning contests in five states on March 15. Donald Trump, real estate developer and television reality-show celebrity, leads among Republicans. A sharp divide between parties is reflected in public-opinion surveys: 31 percent of those polled cite trade as a top priority while 58 percent regard trade as beneficial for the country; half cite immigration as a priority while majorities of Democrats and Republicans support allowing undocumented immigrants to remain in the country. Terrorism shifted as a top priority, from 1 percent of respondents in 2014 to 75 percent early this year. Republicans and Democrats represent just over half of the US electorate, and independents, about 40 percent, will help decide which candidate has the strength and skills to handle a range of global issues. – YaleGlobal

Choices by US Voters Will Influence the World The US presidential campaign is dominated by global issues including trade, immigration and terrorism – and voters have mixed feelings The US political primary election season is in full swing as Americans choose candidates for the presidency of their nation and, arguably, the job of de facto leader of the world. In the wake of recent primaries in vote-rich states such as Florida and Ohio, Republican candidate Donald Trump has a commanding lead over his rivals Senator Ted Cruz and Governor John Kasich. Democratic front-runner Hillary Clinton has an even larger advantage over her challenger Senator Bernie Sanders. To quote the American baseball player Yogi Berra, “it ain’t over ‘til it’s over,” but the field finally seems to be sorting itself out. To date, the campaign debate has been dominated by multiple themes that could ultimately impact people outside the United States – trade, immigration and terrorism, to name just a few. Americans’ attitudes on these issues could well influence the outcome in November. And the positions the candidates take on these issues may foreshadow, or constrain, what policies the next US president will pursue. Moreover, the mood of the electorate may influence votes in Congressional elections for both the US House of Representatives and Senate, reinforcing foreign-policy choices made by the new president. Trade is a recurrent campaign theme, despite the fact that global trade ranks low overall on the American public’s list of concerns, as registered by a Pew Research Center survey: 31 percent rate it as a top priority. Candidates in both parties have repeatedly tied the issue to jobs and the economy and promised to be tougher on trade, especially with regard to China. Real estate developer and television celebrity Trump has promised to impose a 45 percent tariff on imports from China. Clinton has pledged to crack down on Chinese currency manipulation that gives Chinese products an unfair competitive advantage. Sanders, Trump and Clinton have repeatedly attacked the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement. Such trade criticism strikes a chord with many Americans, despite the fact that they are, in principle, free traders. According to Pew Research Center, Americans suggest that free trade is good for the nation by a margin of 25 percentage points – 58 percent versus 33 percent – a sentiment broadly shared across gender, race, age, income, education and party divisions. But the public is divided on the overall economic impact of Washington signing free trade deals, like the Trans-Pacific Partnership: 31 percent suggest such agreements make the economy grow, 34 percent say they slow the economy down. Moreover, on the politically potent issues of jobs and wages, 46 percent of Americans voice the view that trade deals lead to job losses in the United States, while the same percentage says they lower US wages. Only 11 percent think trade raises wages and just 17 percent suggest it generates jobs. Americans are critical of trade with Beijing: 52 percent describe the US trade deficit with China – the largest U.S. merchandise trade deficit – as a very serious problem. On immigration, roughly half, or 51 percent, of Americans think dealing with immigration should be a top priority for Congress and the White House. That emphasis is up from 41 percent in 2009 at the beginning of the Obama administration. And it’s a highly partisan issue: 66 percent of Republicans give it priority, but only 43 percent of Democrats. Given such partisanship, it may be no surprise that Trump has called for building a wall along the US border with Mexico and deporting the 11 million undocumented immigrants in the country. Clinton, on the other hand, has advocated a path to full and equal citizenship for such immigrants. Partisanship also manifests itself on how to handle illegal immigration. Contrary to what one might assume based on many headlines, less than half, or 46 percent, of Americans favor building a fence along the entire Mexican border. Again, that sentiment is deeply divided along partisan lines: 73 percent of Republicans and 29 percent of Democrats support such a fence. Similarly, and again contrary to what one might conclude from the campaign rhetoric, large majorities in both parties favor allowing undocumented immigrants to stay in the United States legally, if certain requirements are met: 66 percent of Republicans favor such an approach, while 32 percent say undocumented immigrants should not be allowed to stay, and nearly five to one Democrats, 80 percent to 17 percent, say undocumented immigrants should be allowed to stay in the United States. For all of the talk on the campaign trail about trade and immigration, terrorism could prove the political wildcard in the 2016 election. Public opinion data suggest that an October surprise in the form of a terrorist incident before the November 8 election could have a profound effect.. CIA director John Brennan told CBS news program “60 Minutes” in February that attempts by ISIS to attack the United States are “inevitable.” A number of GOP presidential candidates have already staked out “get tough” positions on terrorism and Muslims. Senator Ted Cruz of Texas, for example, has proposed carpet bombing the Islamic State. Trump has advocated temporarily banning all Muslims from entering the country. If another terrorist attack happens ahead of the election, fears of terrorism and what to do about it could frame political discourse and favor the candidate deemed strong. Concern about terrorism is already relatively high and variable. Three-quarters of those surveyed in January 2016 by the Pew Research Center said that defending the nation against terrorism should be the top priority for the Obama administration and Congress – a particular concern among Republicans, 87 percent, but also troubling for Democrats, 73 percent. Such worries are notably unstable. In a December 2014 Pew Research Center survey, just 1 percent of Americans said terrorism was the most important problem facing the country. In December 2015, after the terrorist shooting in San Bernardino, California, 18 percent voiced the view that terrorism was the most serious challenge, briefly outstripping concern about the perennial public worry of the economy. Gallup found a similar spike in apprehension about terrorism, but by January 2016 public anxiety about terrorism had ebbed, suggesting just how sensitive the public mood is to a single terrorist attack in the past and how responsive it might be to one in the future. Fear of a future terrorist incident is high. In December 2015, a month after the Paris terrorist attack, 51 percent of Americans surveyed expressed worry that they or someone in their family would become the victim of terrorism, according to a Gallup survey, and two-thirds of Americans said that further terrorist attacks in the United States were likely – the greatest level of such concern expressed since early 2003. The intensity of public unease about terrorism and the tendency of such fears to spike in the wake of terrorist attacks, suggest that if John Brennan is right and additional terrorist incidents are inevitable, terrorism could become the disruptive political issue on both sides of the Atlantic in 2016. US presidential elections are decided on a number of issues, often the state of the economy. But this year, a number of international concerns about negative consequences of globalization including trade, immigration and terrorism are prominent in the political debate. History suggests that the US election will not turn on any of these issues alone, but they may well influence the outcome. And it is people outside the United States who then must also deal with the consequences.

#### China policy MATTERS – public cares deeply, empirically sparks huge fights in election years

Golan 15 (Shahar, Henry M. Jackson School of Int’l Studies at University of Washington – Chaired by Sorenson - Director Center for Korea Studies, Building a Pragmatic Coalition in American Politics, Rethinking United States Military Bases in East Asia, University of Washington, The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Task Force - Winter 2015, <https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/33275/Task%20Force%20E%202015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>)

The China Factor In recent times China has become one of the most contentious issues regarding American foreign policy. Out of all issues concerning East Asia, China generates the greatest political attention in the US; American politicians frequently use the China card in foreign policy debate, especially during campaigns. The rethink of the military bases will provide ammunition for critics of the administration who will try to spin the reform as soft on the PRC. In his book US-Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present, Robert Sutter, an acclaimed China expert, describes the political environment of the US regarding China policy as “an atmosphere of suspicion and cynicism in American domestic politics over China policy,” setting the stage “for often bitter and debilitating fights in US domestic politics over China policy in ensuing years that on balance are seen not to serve the overall national interests of the United States” (Sutter, 2013, p.81). Sutter’s observations show that electoral needs in the US often cause candidates to use harsher rhetoric and actions against the PRC than they believe are beneficial for the US. While many scholars have argued that administrations will ultimately favor pragmatic forward-moving relationships with the PRC, aspiring presidents have not been shy of criticism of the PRC leading up to presidential elections. This portrays how political maneuvering is needed to pursue policies that could be perceived as warm towards the PRC. Because of these domestic hurdles, US history has proven a pattern of presidents pursuing forward-moving, pragmatic relations with the PRC after a campaign of harsh rhetoric pointed at the Asian state.

#### 2016 will be about foreign policy—including China

McPike 6/21 (Erin McPike-Political reporter Huffington Post, “Democrats Are Ceding Foreign Policy Too Early in the 2016 Election”, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/erin-mcpike/democrats-are-ceding-fore_b_7632524.html> ,06/21/2015 4:53 pm EDT, N.G.)

There's a decent chance the 2016 presidential election will be about national security. If that's the case, recent spin by Democratic pundits may undercut former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's campaign before it has much of a chance to establish itself. "I think foreign policy is a Republican base issue, which is why you see Republicans coming out of the gate talking about it," Democratic strategist Stephanie Cutter said on NBC's Meet the Press on June 14. Challenged on that, she said, "It's a Republican establishment issue, and it always has been." Tell that to President Obama, Vice President Biden, Secretary of State John Kerry, former Maine Democratic Sen. George Mitchell, the Democratic members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, all the voters who opposed the Iraq war, all the veterans who support Democrats, the organization known as VoteVets.org, etc. From the rise of ISIS, to Russian President Vladimir Putin's chest-thumping, to Israel's struggles with the Palestinians, to the nuclear negotiations with Iran, to cybersecurity, trade, China's rise and tensions with North Korea, foreign policy has become all-consuming for the executive branch and will take up a huge chunk of the 45th president's time and energy.

#### voter anger on new foreign policy issue turns it into a key election issue

Kraushaar, 14 – Josh, political editor @ National Journal, 3/27, <http://www.defenseone.com/politics/2014/03/foreign-policy-becoming-major-2016-campaign-issue/81412/>

Foreign Policy Is Becoming a Major 2016 Campaign Issue Foreign policy may not be a leading issue with voters right now but if events continue to flare up around the world, bet on it being a hot topic of the 2016 presidential campaign. Take a look at American public opinion on foreign policy, and it’s clear that the American instinct is to avoid involvement in overseas conflicts. A new CBS News poll, conducted last week, showed fewer than one-third of Americans believe the U.S. has a responsibility to “do something” about Russia and Ukraine, barely higher than the 26 percent of Americans who believed the U.S. should involve itself in Syria last September. Only 36 percent said the U.S. should take the lead in solving international conflicts—a far cry from the 48 percent plurality who agreed with the statement in April 2003, during the Iraq War. The numbers are consistent with the tendency for Americans to be much more concerned with domestic issues than those abroad—at least until there’s a crisis point. The growth of al-Qaida attracted little attention from voters during the Clinton administration until 9/11 happened. After that, terrorism and foreign policy landed at the top of the American priority list. But pay closer attention to the changing rhetoric from the leading 2016 presidential contenders from both parties, and it’s clear they’re hedging their bets against the polls, anticipating the U.S. may well be headed into crisis mode. Hillary Clinton, Marco Rubio, and even Rand Paul have all sounded a more hawkish tone in the last month as Russian aggression continues unabated in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the prospects for curtailing Iranian nuclear ambitions aren’t looking promising, the civil war in Syria rages on, and Venezuela is awash in violence within our own hemisphere. President Obama may be responding to public opinion by preferring diplomatic solutions and an international consensus over unilateral American actions, but his approval ratings on handling foreign policy have cratered, regardless. His 36 percent approval rating on foreign policy, according to the CBS News poll, is 7 points lower than his already-weak 43 percent overall approval rating. He receives low scores on his handling of the Ukraine crisis, and a plurality think the United States’ image around the world has gotten worse since he became president. That’s what makes Hillary Clinton’s recent comments about Russia and Iran so telling. At an American Jewish Congress dinner last week, Clinton expressed deep skepticism that Iran was really committed to rolling back its nuclear program, despite the ongoing negotiations. Earlier in the month, she compared Vladimir Putin’s aggression in Ukraine to Adolf Hitler’s territorial advances in the run-up to World War II, even though she led efforts as secretary of State to ”reset” the strained relationship between the two countries. These aren’t the musings of a presidential candidate who believes that voters are satisfied with the president’s approach to foreign policy. She’s trying to create some space between her views and Obama’s, but she’s boxed in by being involved with his administration’s foreign policy for four years. Indeed, her hawkish turn is all the more notable, given that her support of the Iraq War in 2003 led to her political demise five years later. The fact that she’s once again positioning herself as a hawk is a sign she’s concerned that voters may be looking for a tougher commander in chief come 2016—in stark contrast to the political environment of 2008. Even more intriguing is the muscular positioning of Rand Paul, one of the Republican Party’s leading voices against military intervention. At the outset of the crisis in Ukraine, the Kentucky senator sounded a sympathetic note toward Russia, arguing the U.S. should avoid antagonizing their rival. “Some on our side are so stuck in the Cold War era that they want to tweak Russia all the time and I don’t think that is a good idea,” he told TheWashington Post in February. But after taking heat on foreign policy from his tea-party rival, Sen. Ted Cruz of Texas, Paul’s rhetoric changed markedly. He wrote a Time magazine op-ed, calling for the Obama administration to be more aggressive against Putin. “It is our role as a global leader to be the strongest nation in opposing Russia’s latest aggression … and Russia must learn that the U.S. will isolate it if it insists on acting like a rogue nation,” he wrote. If it wasn’t a total flip-flop, it was an acknowledgement that being seen as too soft on Russian aggression carries a cost with Republican primary voters. Meanwhile, Marco Rubio has seen his stature rise as he’s called for a more muscular foreign policy and critiqued the Obama administration’s handling of events overseas. The senator from Florida wrote a Washington Post op-ed last week, headlined “Making Putin Pay,” recommending steps the president could take to counter Russian aggression. At the Conservative Political Action Conference, Rubio was one of the few speakers to focus on foreign policy, calling for active American engagement across the world. His Senate floor rebuttal to Sen. Tom Harkin of Iowa over Cuba’s and Venezuela’s dismal human-rights records became a YouTube sensation among conservative hawks. If foreign policy reemerges as an important issue, Rubio is better-positioned to capitalize than any of his prospective Republican challengers. Events can quickly overtake public opinion, as President George W. Bush quickly learned. The candidate who promised a humble foreign policy during the 2000 campaign ended up declaring in his 2004 inaugural speech that U.S. policy was to “seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture.” Foreign policy may not register as a leading issue with voters right now, but if Russia continues to redraw Europe’s borders, Iran successfully builds a nuclear weapon, and al-Qaida-affiliated terrorist groups establish themselves in Syria and Libya, bet on it being a major theme of the 2016 presidential campaign. Prospective presidential candidates may not believe the worst is yet to come, but they’re certainly preparing for that possibility

### AT: U Overwhelms

#### Clinton will win but Trump is a realistic threat – 2016 is weird.

Lee 6-1-16. [MJ, CNN National Politics Reporter, "How Donald Trump could win" CNN -- www.cnn.com/2016/05/31/politics/donald-trump-general-election/]

Most said Trump faces an uphill battle in a race that promises to be one of the most divisive and vitriolic in recent memory, one in which both Trump and Clinton have historically high unfavorable ratings. Yet all agreed on one thing after a primary season that shattered conventional wisdom: Don't underestimate Trump. A recent Quinnipiac poll found Trump and Clinton in an extremely tight race in several vital swing states. "Everything that so many of us have learned by observing politics for the last 30, 40 years is going to be challenged this cycle," said Ari Fleischer, former press secretary to George W. Bush. "Don't be surprised if Donald Trump is sitting in the Oval Office on January 20th."

#### 2016 is weird – uniqueness doesn’t overwhelm – it’s 50/50.

Young and Clark 6-2-16. [Clifford, president of Ipsos Public Affairs in the US, leads Ipsos' global election and political polling risk practice, Julia, nonpartisan political and election polling expert and a senior vice president with Ipsos Public Affairs "Even Odds for Trump & Clinton: Is Trump a 'Spoiler' or a 'Game-Changer'?" Real Clear Politics -- www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2016/06/02/is\_trump\_a\_spoiler\_or\_a\_game-changer\_130737.html]

It’s now inevitable that Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump will meet in the general election this fall. Who will win? This, of course, is the million-dollar question. To begin, let’s be wary of pundits or forecasters making definitive predictions at this point in time. Regardless of their experience or expertise, they are seriously understating the uncertainty of this electoral cycle. We believe a healthy dose of skepticism is fundamental right now. As election forecasters, we at Ipsos typically analyze two key pieces of information when assessing election odds: (1) a “base-rate model,” which is an aggregation of past election outcomes paired with simple variables; and (2) a model based on polls. We do of course utilize other pieces of information, but these two are central to our thinking about an election (for a further explanation, see page 22 here). Base-rate models normally include the aggregation of multiple past elections and give us an idea about outcomes in elections similar to the one at hand; this is our starting point. Poll-based models, in turn, aggregate the existing polls at hand; we also often adjust them by other factors such as the confidence we have in the methodology employed or in the polling firm conducting the survey. Both types of models can be expressed in probabilities. Normally, we start off assessing the relative odds with the base-rate model at the early stages of the electoral cycle with little weight to polls (which are very poor predictors far out from Election Day). And then as we get closer to the election, polls take on a greater weight in our overall assessment. Simply put, our assessment or forecast is a weighted average of the two inputs, which can be adjusted over the course of the election cycle. Elementary, right? Well, it should be, but this year these two key pieces of information are materially at odds with each other. This reduces our confidence in our own or any other prediction. Let us explain. On the one hand, base-rate models, including our own, point towards a Republican victory; so strongly in fact that we wrote a piece in October 2015 titled “Two simple reasons a Republican will likely win in 2016” – and made an earlier point in May 2015 based on similar reasoning. Indeed, ours and other base-rate models suggest, on average, a 70 percent (or more) probability of victory for the party out-of-power (Republicans). Such base-rate models don’t typically consider the specifics of candidates but rather the underlying political and economic fundamentals and focus on the probability of the government-linked candidate winning versus others. It is a very de-personalized look at an election, which normally is a very strong starting point for our assessment of an election outcome. Ipsos’ own base-rate model (which uses just two variables: incumbency and government approval rating) has accurately predicted elections around the globe on dozens of occasions. Conversely, the poll-based models (our own included) show a clear Clinton victory. Indeed, of the 164 polls conducted in May of 2015, just 18 have shown Trump in the lead! In probabilities, the models put a Clinton victory at 80 percent to 90 percent (see table below). This perspective is reinforced by a belief that Trump’s strong negatives and a favorable Electoral College map make Clinton the clear favorite. So how do we reconcile this difference? Normally, we would simply take the average of the two, trusting the base-rate model slightly more than the poll-based model. In our experience, base-rate models outperform the polls. As such, we typically place more weight on the base-rate model because we trust them more than the polls. So this approach lands us somewhere around 50 percent. At first blush, this might seem like a very middling prediction without “teeth.” However, it does fly in the face of most forecaster predictions out there right now, which give Clinton far greater odds of success. Even so, it still seems simple, right? The odds still point to a probable, if closer than anticipated, Clinton victory. Not so fast! In our strong opinion, this is an atypical election cycle that does not follow the normal “rules” or norms of election prediction, and which undermines models reliant on historical data to make predictions. Such a disruptive election means that many of our base assumptions go out the window, and in this case, we believe it yields a situation in which Trump still has a clear path to victory under certain conditions. Let us again explain.

#### Uniqueness doesn’t overwhelm – clear path for Trump.

Bernstein 5-27-16. [David, contributing political analyst at WGBH News in Boston, "How Hillary Loses" Politico -- www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/05/2016-election-hillary-clinton-campaign-loses-defeated-donald-trump-213924]

The reassurance is that the recent polls probably don’t mean much. Trump’s current surge is likely driven by Republican voters coalescing around their nominee, and Clinton will almost certainly get a similar bump when Bernie Sanders lets go and Democratic voters return to the fold. Most pundits believe 2016 is still Clinton’s race to lose. Here’s the bad news: There is now a clear path for her to lose it. If you drill down enough, it’s clear there are at least four paths to a loss, and any one of them poses a real risk for a candidate likely to follow her usual careful, calculating playbook. The cold math of a potential Clinton defeat is not to be found in national polls, but in the Electoral College—and within each state’s unique demographics and culture. Trump won’t dramatically remake the political map, but he doesn’t need to. He just needs to squeeze a little more out of certain voters in certain states, while Clinton draws a little less. If Clinton pushes away some of her potential supporters; fails to energize others to vote; and fires up Trump’s base by pandering to her own—well, she just might be able to make the numbers work out for him. If he does pull off the election of the century, Trump’s path to 270 Electoral College votes will begin with 164 practically in the bank, from 21 solid-red states generally considered sure things for the Republican nominee. And here’s how Clinton could push more than enough additional states onto Trump’s side of the ledger—Florida, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Iowa, Virginia, Colorado, Nevada, Arizona, Wisconsin, Michigan—one mistake at a time.

#### Clinton is leading, but it’s not inevitable – changing political dynamics can turn the tides

Hancock 16 (Peter, Columnist @ Lawrence Journal World, "Vegas oddsmakers now rivaling the best pollsters," 3/27, http://www2.ljworld.com/weblogs/capitol-report/2016/mar/27/vegas-oddsmakers-now-rivaling-the-best-p/)

So, if you're wondering who the odds-on favorite is to win the White House in November, all you have to do is Google the term "presidential prediction markets" and you get your answer: Democrats stand a 71 percent chance of winning the general election, and right now, Hillary Clinton has roughly a 90 percent chance of being the Democratic nominee. Put another way, Donald Trump is viewed as having an 80 percent chance of being the Republican nominee, giving Republicans only a 29 percent chance of winning the White House. That's the current (as of this writing) assessment from the website PredictWise, founded by Microsoft Research economist David Rothschild, which aggregates data from a number of different sites. One of the sites PredictWise uses goes by a similar name, PredictIt, which gives users the chance to buy, sell and trade shares in the outcome of an electoral event, such as the outcome of a primary, a nomination, or the general election. So, for example, 'Candidate A wins the nomination' would be an event, and traders will speculate on what the percentage chance is of a particular outcome of that event, either "yes" or "no." Percentages are then translated into U.S. cents. The sum total of "yes" and "no" bids add up to $1. As of Sunday afternoon, people willing to bet money on a "Clinton-Yes" outcome of the general election were buying at 61 cents. People betting on a "Clinton-No" outcome were selling for 39 cents. To see how accurate that model is, we only have to look back at some recent primaries. Leading up to the March 1 Super Tuesday primaries, PredictIt was forecasting that Trump would win in 10 states and lose only in Texas to that state's favorite son Sen. Ted Cruz. And it showed Florida Sen. Marco Rubio would finish second in the Minnesota caucuses. PredictIt got every one of those right, except Minnesota, where Rubio eked out a win. That kind of information can be fun and entertaining, depending on which side of the race you're on, as long as you take it with a grain of salt. There's still a whole lot of race left, and a scandal here, or a misstep there still could greatly affect the outcome. But these prediction markets are also grabbing serious attention from academic circles. Kansas University political science professor Burdett Loomis called attention to them during a recent talk he gave to the Douglas County Democratic Party. When I emailed him later to get more information, he suggested the Iowa Electronic Markets, one of the oldest prediction markets around, and one originally set up by academics. IEM has been around for a few election cycles now, and in 2008 it outperformed all the major public opinion polls for accurately predicting the outcome of the election. IEM's model, which looks a lot like commodity futures trading, offers two different types of "contracts," or estimates of the outcome: "vote shares," or the percentage of the total popular vote either party will get; and "winner-take-all," which predicts the outcome, regardless of point spread. At last check, contracts for a Democratic popular vote win in November were trading at 59.8 cents, compared with 40.5 cents for a Republican win. In the winner-take-all contracts, Democrats were up 71 cents to 31 cents over Republicans. Prediction markets are essentially a variation on a theme that has been developing in the field of public opinion polling for some time. Originally, pollsters would ask (and still do ask), "Who do you intend to vote for in the upcoming election?" That would give an accurate snapshot in time of where the race stood at that particular moment, but it often had little predictive value because people change their minds. More recently, pollsters have started asking a different question: "Regardless of who you intend to vote for, who do you think will win the race?" That question turns out to have much more predictive value because it acknowledges the tendency of people, in the end, to gravitate toward the norm. In other words, most people want to be on the winning side.

### AT: Too Far Away

#### Now is key and Clinton is linked to Obama.

WSJ 6-3-16. [Wall Street Journal -- "May Jobs Report Could Present Challenge for Hillary Clinton" -- www.wsj.com/articles/may-jobs-report-could-present-challenge-for-hillary-clinton-1464977752]

While one report in June won’t define a long general-election campaign, voters’ perceptions of the election-year economy begin to crystallize around this time of year. On the campaign trail, Mrs. Clinton has closely aligned herself with President Barack Obama on a wide range of issues, including the economy.

#### Voter preferences are shaped early, but are not static

Jennings 15. [William, PhD, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Southampton, “The Timeline of Elections: A Comparative Perspective,” presented at the 2015 Meeting of the American Association for Public Opinion Research, -- http://www.utexas.edu/cola/government/\_files/wlezien/JenningsWlezien\_Timeline.pdf]

Discussion and Conclusion Voter preferences evolve in a systematic way over the election timeline in a wide range of representative democracies. There is structure to preferences well in advance of elections, indeed, years before citizens actually vote. That is, very early polls predict the vote, at least to some extent. This largely reflects differences in the equilibrium support of parties and candidates. Polls do become increasingly informative over time, however, pointing to real evolution of preferences. That this pattern holds across countries is important and points towards 35 a general tendency in the formation of electoral preferences. But the pattern is not precisely the same in all countries. Political institutions structure the evolution of voters’ preferences.23 Government institutions are important. Preferences come into focus later in presidential elections than in parliamentary ones. A year out from Election Day, parliamentary elections are more predictable from the polls than are the outcomes of presidential races. This presumably reflects the greater uncertainties involved in the assessment of presidential candidates and also the time it takes for voters to directly factor in their dispositions toward the political parties (Erikson and Wlezien 2012). In parliamentary systems, by contrast, parties matter more early on. This is important because partisan dispositions, while not fixed, are more durable than those toward candidates. That preferences are in place much later in presidential systems thus comes as little surprise. That there is no real difference between legislative elections in presidential and parliamentary systems may surprise, however. It implies that parties do not matter consistently more to voters in the latter. Electoral institutions also are important. Preferences in legislative elections come into focus more quickly and completely in proportional systems. We find limited evidence of general differences across systems—that proportional representation per se is what matters. We find stronger evidence that the party-centricity of the systems matters most of all. Although closely related to proportionality, there is significant variation in party-centricity within both proportional and plurality systems, and this variation is of consequence for the formation of electoral preferences. The number of parties, meanwhile, appears to have little effect. We have only scratched the surface of the variation in context. To begin with, political institutions differ in ways that we have not considered. Perhaps more importantly, there are other differences in context that we have not even begun to explore. Some of the differences relate to countries themselves. For instance, following Converse (1969), there is reason to think that the age of democracy is important to the formation and evolution of preferences. Other differences relate not to political institutions or the countries themselves, but to characteristics of political parties. There are numerous possibilities here, most notable of which may be whether parties are in government or opposition, as is suggested by the literature on economic voting (e.g. Fiorina 1981; Duch and Stevenson 2008). Another is whether parties are catch-all or niche. The age and size of parties also could matter. Clearly, much research remains to be done, and our methodology can guide the way. That said, we have learned something about the general pattern relating preferences and the vote over the election timeline and the structuring influences of political institutions. We have shown that preferences are often in place far in advance of Election Day and that they evolve slowly over time. Indeed, the final outcome is fairly clear in the polls before the election campaign really begins. This is not to say that the campaign does not matter, as it does, particularly in 37 certain types of countries and elections where candidates are central. Even there, however, it is clear that the “long campaign” between elections matters most of all.

#### Voters are tuned in – now is key

Rodack 6-8-16. [Jeffrey, "Poll: Americans Giving A Lot Of Thought To Election Breaking News at Newsmax.com http://www.newsmax.com/Politics/gallup-poll-elections-thought/2016/06/08/id/732941/#ixzz4BgzXrajk Urgent: Rate Obama on His Job Performance. Vote Here Now!" NewsMax -- www.newsmax.com/Politics/gallup-poll-elections-thought/2016/06/08/id/732941/]

A new Gallup poll reveals Americans are giving a lot of thought to the presidential election. The poll found: Three out of four voters said they are giving quite a lot of thought to the November contest Only 21 percent of those surveyed said they're giving "only a little" thought to it. In a statement on its website, Gallup's Jim Norman said the results are comparable to the 2008 election, which produced the highest voter turnout percentage in 40 years. It noted about 73 percent of Americans, gave a lot of thought to that election. "It is no surprise that a campaign with two heated battles for party nominations, each dominated by a candidate who has been among the nation's best-known public figures for decades, has drawn the attention of most Americans," Norman wrote.

### Ext: Now Key

#### Early impressions key.

Piccoli 15. [Sean, "Dem, GOP Strategists Debate: 2016 Candidates Running Too Early?" NewsMax -- April 16 -- www.newsmax.com/Newsmax-Tv/Matt-McDonald-David-Goodfriend-2016-election/2015/04/16/id/639020/]

With Election Day more than 18 months out — that's 571 days by the campaign clock — a consultant to the last three Republican presidential nominees says it's not too early to run even though most Americans pay the race no mind until the finish line is within sight. Candidates introducing themselves to voters "is a process," veteran GOP strategist Matt McDonald told "MidPoint" host Ed Berliner on Newsmax TV Thursday. "So if you think that you are going to convince a voter to vote for you in kind of the final quarter, that's not a great strategy." McDonald debated how soon is too soon for presidential campaigns with David Goodfriend, a Democratic strategist and former deputy staff secretary to President Bill Clinton. "Those of us in the political sphere … are always amazed to learn how most Americans really tune into an election very, very shortly before Election Day," said Goodfriend. "A lot of the early polling and a lot of the early modeling is irrelevant because people's attention — true attention, focusing on the issues and the candidates — really comes fairly late in the game." McDonald agreed that voters decide "later" who to support. "But they are getting to know the candidates, deciding whether these candidates share their values, what the attributes of these candidates are, how they feel about them, all along the way," he said. "It's like any other relationship where you're making a friend or you're going out on a first date, or anything like that," he said, "and those first impressions that are happening today matter down the road. And it really is a build over time, as people get to know people."

**Actions now shape the conversation and resonate with the electorate---shapes voting patterns**

**York 15** (Byron, - Chief Political Correspondent for the Washington Examiner, “2016: Yes, it's early, but pay attention now,” http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/2016-yes-its-early-but-pay-attention-now/article/2563339)

It's conventional wisdom that the 2016 Republican presidential race is at such an early stage that the polls don't matter. They're just a measurement of name recognition at this point, some observers say, and the only people really paying attention to the campaign are reporters and hard-core party activists. **Maybe that was true in earlier years. But it doesn't seem to be the case now**. "One thing about this election — Republicans are paying attention," says a GOP pollster not affiliated with any campaign. "They are very concerned about who the nominee is going to be, and the idea that what a candidate says now doesn't matter could not be farther from the truth." Look at the new CNN/ORC poll, out Monday morning. First of all, it's a huge field, and no candidate dominates — Jeb Bush is in the lead with just 17 percent. But nearly all the respondents surveyed have picked a candidate to support; add together every candidate's little share of the vote and the total nears 100 percent, with few undecided. There's Bush's 17 percent, followed by Scott Walker with 12 percent; then Rand Paul and Marco Rubio with 11 percent each; Mike Huckabee with nine percent; Ted Cruz with seven percent; Ben Carson and Chris Christie with four percent each; Rick Perry and Rick Santorum with three percent each; and Carly Fiorina, Lindsey Graham, Bobby Jindal, and John Kasich with two percent each. Then there are five percent who say they support some other candidate. MORE FROM THE WASHINGTON EXAMINER What's behind Trump's collapsing Iowa poll numbers? Evangelicals prefer Carson By Daniel Allott • 10/26/15 6:20 PM Add it up, and that's 94 percent of Republicans who say they support a specific candidate now. The rest — a pretty tiny number of undecided — say they can't make a decision or have no opinion. Of course, that's just for now. Many will change their minds, **but they are already taking the race seriously**. At this point, many voters are likely making preliminary decisions based on very little information. They know Scott Walker fought unions in Wisconsin. They know Jeb Bush is George W. Bush's brother and George H.W. Bush's son. They know Ted Cruz was involved in the government shutdown. "That's why these announcements are important," says the pollster, "because it is the first time to associate more facts with each candidate. And you've seen each candidate get a little bump when they announced." Some analysts describe this period as the "pregame." The real game starts at some point in the future, perhaps in August when the first Republican debate takes place in Ohio. But **the pregame**, if that's what it is, **matters** too. Candidates are getting their **only chance** to make a first impression. In the 2012 campaign, the first Republican debate was held May 5, 2011, in Greenville, South Carolina. The participants were Ron Paul, Herman Cain, Rick Santorum, Tim Pawlenty, and Gary Johnson. (Don't remember Johnson? He's the former New Mexico governor who ended up running as a Libertarian.) The big question that night was whether Pawlenty could ascend to the top tier of candidates. (He couldn't.) But the real lesson of the evening, at least in retrospect, was that the GOP field was still remarkably unformed at that stage. This year's field seems much more stable at an earlier time. Yes, Kasich might enter the race — he certainly sounded that way last weekend in New Hampshire — and yes, perhaps another candidate will give it a try, too. But the basic structure of the Republican field seems nearly set. And strong, too. Back in 2011 and 2012, it was common to hear Republicans complain about the weakness of their field. Some complain today — some always do — but the fact is the 2016 GOP field is a pretty impressive group. Governors with solid records, senators who have made their mark in the Senate, plus intriguing figures who come from outside the world of politics. Not all of them will make it even to the Iowa caucuses. And they'll drop off like flies after that. The key thing for the winning candidate is to realize that he will have to be able to assemble a coalition of those voters who support other candidates in the current 14-candidate field. That's what it will take to win. One thing a candidate — or anyone else, for that matter — should not do is dismiss what is going on in the race now as meaningless because it is so early. Plenty can change, **but** it might be that **when** February 2016 comes around, and the voting begins, some **themes** (and **frontrunners**) in the race will look a lot like they look now.

#### Looking like a winner NOW is necessary because elections are determined by momentum---causes voter buy-in, increases campaign contributions and leads to positive media coverage

Holbrook 96. [Thomas, Professor of Political Science @ UW-Milwaukee, Do Campaigns Matter? p. 130-131]

Although they are different from primaries, it is expected that similar but perhaps less pronounced momentum effects exist in general election campaigns. Skalaban (1988) found that paying attention to poll results had a significant influence on voting behavior during the 1980 election. According to Skalaban, those voters who paid attention to the polls in September 1980, when Reagan was ahead in most polls, were more likely to vote for Reagan than those who did not pay attention to the polls. Nadeau, Niemi, and Amato (1994) also found that voter expectations about who would win had a significant influence on party support in British general elections. To date, however, there are no studies of the effect of momentum in U.S. presidential general election campaigns. One basis for expecting significant momentum effects is offered by Nadeau et al.: "... some voters respond to the implicit bonus of being on the winning side" (1994, 378). All else held equal, voting for a winning candidate appears to offer some value for some voters. As poll results are reported in the media, voters incorporate them as one more piece Of information when evaluating the relative merits of the candidates. This, of course, assumes that poll results or information about the likely winner is readily available to voters. Indeed, there is substantial circumstantial evidence to support this proposition. In 1992, for instance, in the period between the end of the conventions and election day, over 100 national trial-heat polls were con- ducted for major national print and television media outlets (The American Enterprise 1992, 100-101). This figure does not include the number of polls taken during the summer of 1992. In addition, during the general election campaign of 1992, 27% of all campaign stories on the ABC, CBS, and NBC evening news programs focused on the "horse race" aspect of the campaign (Stanley and Niemi 1994, 63). Clearly, there are many opportunities for voters to become aware of the competitive nature of the race. Another possible explanation for momentum effects lies not in the value voters place on supporting a winner but in the way political and media elites react to poll numbers. First, it is possible that potential campaign contributors will feel more comfortable if they think they are betting on a winner and be more forthcoming with contributions that might strengthen the campaign. Perhaps more important, however, is the way the media respond to poll results. There is some tendency for the media to treat candidates differently depending on their standing in the polls. Patterson (1989), for instance, found that the amount of favorable media coverage of Bush and Dukakis in 1988 was positively related to their relative standing in the polls during the general election campaign. Positive press coverage translates into positive information being conveyed to the voters, which should lead to more improvement in the polls. Good poll numbers, then, may influence voters directly or indirectly. Whatever the mechanism, it is expected that momentum plays a role in the dynamics Of general election campaigns. In this analysis the effect of mo- mentum is captured with a variable that measures the change in candidate support in public opinion polls over a relatively short period of time. Specifically, for every day in the analysis, the difference between the Republican estimated polling margin (see Appendix A) on the previous day and the Republican polling margin five days earlier is used to measure short-term change in candidate support. If this number is positive, indicating a Republican gain in support, it should translate into more support for the Republican candidate. If the change is negative, indicating a Republican loss in support, it should translate into a further decline in Republican support. One important point to bear in mind is that momentum does not occur in a vacuum. Public opinion changes in response to campaign events or changes in national conditions; momentum then exacerbates these changes.

# \*\*\*Impacts\*\*\*

## === Warming ===

### Warming – 1NC

#### Trump win tanks the Paris accords guarantees extinction via warming – Clinton win solves.

Graves 1-5-16. [Lucia, columnist for the Guardian and a staff correspondent at National Journal, “The Whole World Has a Stake in the Outcome of Our Presidential Election” Pacific Standard Magazine-- <http://www.psmag.com/politics-and-law/2016-presidential-election-does-the-world-have-a-future> \*gender modified]

It would be difficult but not impossible for a Republican president to undo the Paris Agreement. For that reason alone, the 2016 election is about whether the world has a future.¶ Last year, 2015, was easily the hottest year on the books, but you would never know it to hear our presidential candidates talk on the trail. Just days after world leaders forged the Paris climate agreement, the planet's best hope for curbing the catastrophic effects of global warming, Republican presidential candidates assembled for a debate. And nobody, not the nine candidates on the main stage or the three moderators before them, mentioned the Paris Agreement as anything more than a passing jab.¶ "And when I see they have a climate conference over in Paris, they should have been talking about destroying ISIS," Ohio Governor John Kasich said. Donald Trump merely scoffed at how President Obama thinks climate change is even a priority. That was it, in the wake of the historic moment: nada, zip, zilch, zero actual conversation. Just a one-touch dismissal from a guy most people don't know is even running, and a jibe in the deal's general direction from The Donald. It wasn't an oversight—it's standard practice on climate for Republicans.¶ The party's internally incoherent consensus on the matter seems to be that the climate agreement is somewhere between "reckless," "ridiculous," and a "threat" to our sovereignty—and anyway, climate change is not really happening.¶ But how, exactly, would the candidates respond to the landmark deal once in office? Specifically, would they submit an even stronger climate plan by 2020, as the U.S. is now required to do under the international accord? Or would they tear up the document entirely?¶ It might not be easy for a Republican president to destroy the Paris Agreement—but it would be a whole lot easier than what the world pulled off at le Bourget.¶ Where candidates come down on this matter will have tremendous consequences, not just for environmentalists or even for Americans, but for the world.¶ While Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry have done a remarkable job of skirting Republican opposition in Congress—laying the groundwork through intercountry alliances in recent years—experts say a GOP president could legally unravel the deal.¶ Whether it's by rolling back Obama's Clean Power Plan—a lynchpin of the U.S. commitment to reducing greenhouse gas emissions—or by pulling out of the deal directly, a Republican president could single-handedly undo the past decade of progress on climate and propel the world far beyond the warming cap of two degrees Celsius needed to stave off the worst consequences of climate change. The U.S., as the world’s second-largest emitter currently and the biggest emitter cumulatively, has an outsized duty in preserving the planet’s future.¶ Obama seems to be betting that a GOP president wouldn't go through with breaking the global contract; as he told reporters in Paris: “Your credibility and America’s ability to influence events depends on taking seriously what other countries care about.” Now that there's global consensus behind taking action, Obama added, the next president "is going to need to think this is really important."¶ So far, however, that looks like wishful thinking, particularly where Republican frontrunners are concerned.¶ Ted Cruz has already said he would withdraw the U.S. from the Paris accord, telling reporters in a high school classroom in Knoxville, Tennessee: "Barack Obama seems to think the SUV parked in your driveway is a bigger threat to national security than radical Islamic terrorists who want to kill us. That’s just nutty. These are ideologues, they don’t focus on the facts, they won’t address the facts, and what they’re interested [in] instead is more and more government power."¶ Trump, while he hasn't directly addressed the accord, has argued in the past that climate change is a hoax created by the Chinese to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive. Meanwhile Rand Paul thinks granting power to the United Nations would threaten U.S. sovereignty, resulting in "a bunch of two-bit dictators telling America what to do," as he put it recently. Marco Rubio insists the Paris climate deal is an "unfunny joke" that's "hurting the American dream."¶ “Here’s the most outrageous part,” Rubio told Fox News recently. “This is a deal that’s going to require the American taxpayer to send billions of dollars to developing countries. Well, China considers itself a developing country. Does that mean the American taxpayer is going to send billions to China to help them comply with the arrangement here?”¶ Short answer: no. Contrary to Rubio's impressions, China played a leadership role in the Paris talks and was on the giving side of the equation, offering up to $3.1 billion to help actual developing countries.¶ In fact, the only Republican candidate supporting clear actions on climate change, Lindsey Graham, dropped out in late December after failing for months to break the one percent mark in the polls. He never even made it onstage for anything but an undercard debate. The only other Republican contender to express (tepid) support for the deal, George Pataki, dropped out a week later.¶ This, apparently, is what happens when you take a realistic, even semi-honest approach to climate change in the Republican primary: You’re drummed out.¶ There remains no candidate on the Republican side who will commit to upholding the deal, and the majority of candidates have said nothing about the agreement at all. By contrast, all three candidates on the Democratic side have said they'd not just honor the Paris Agreement, but advance it; before the gavel even went down in Paris, Bernie Sanders was lamenting that the deal doesn't go far enough.¶ But denial won't play well in the general election. A recent Pew Research Center survey found 69 percent of Americans favor a multilateral commitment to limit the burning of greenhouse gas emissions; and that such statistics are sharply divided by political affiliation won't work in Republicans’ favor come November. The leading Democratic contender, Hillary Clinton—well aware of her party's edge here—has been increasingly vocal on climate, as when she came out against the Keystone XL pipeline even before president Obama nixed the project ahead of Paris. She's also voiced her support for all the president’s executive actions on climate. Still, many environmental advocates still favor Sanders, who, as movement leader Bill McKibben noted in an aside at Paris climate talks, was against Keystone as early as 2011, when the pipeline first came on the national stage. Given how things looked (say) 18 months ago, environmentalists can perhaps take comfort in watching Democratic candidates argue in prime-time over who hated Keystone first, and most.¶ The world will be presented with two stark choices come the general election. But the White House, for its part, expresses hope that the accord can be upheld regardless. "I think it's going to be incredibly difficult to move back from this position," a senior administration official told reporters post-Paris. "Momentum begets momentum."¶ "We don't want to be naive to the domestic policies here," he added, "but I think with every passing month and with every passing milestone, [the ideals of the Paris Agreement] will get more and more baked in."¶ Of course it's possible that Republicans are just pandering and that, if elected to office, a Republican president might not seek to destroy the deal. Obama has gestured to this possibility, arguing: "Even if somebody from a different party succeeded me, one of the things you find is when you're in this job, you think about it differently than if you're just running for the job."¶ Maybe he's right. But is it worth betting the world?¶ For years the U.S. has had the dubious distinction of being the only country anywhere with a major party that denies the overwhelming scientific consensus that climate change is real, man-made, and accelerating. It was always a denial with far-reaching effects, given the U.S.'s hefty emissions, currently the second largest after China's, but now that pernicious reach is extended farther still. If America elects a Republican in 2016, he (it would almost certainly be a “he”) could undermine the diplomatic efforts of almost 200 countries, offering our global partners a tempting excuse to abandon their climate commitments—and to distrust the U.S. for years to come.¶ Given America’s long history of hypocrisy in climate negotiations and repeated broken promises to world partners, such a reversal could be devastating.¶ In Paris, for the first time ever, the U.S. played the role of a climate leader, hero even, in these talks, a hard-won victory that's been years in the making. That Obama has invested so much in this deal for so long, that he's made it a centerpiece of his administration—and, many expect, the overarching mission of his final year in office—underscores just how difficult it is to achieve the kind of victory we saw in Paris, and just how much these global climate talks depend on the power of the U.S. president.¶ If Obama could make this, the next ~~guy~~ [president] could break it. It might not be easy to destroy the Paris Agreement, but it would be a whole lot easier than what the world pulled off at le Bourget.

#### Global warming causes extinction.

Flournoy 12 -- Citing Feng Hsu, PhD NASA Scientist @ the Goddard Space Flight Center. Don Flournoy is a PhD and MA from the University of Texas, Former Dean of the University College @ Ohio University, Former Associate Dean @ State University of New York and Case Institute of Technology, Project Manager for University/Industry Experiments for the NASA ACTS Satellite, Currently Professor of Telecommunications @ Scripps College of Communications @ Ohio University (Don, "Solar Power Satellites," January, Springer Briefs in Space Development, Book, p. 10-11

In the Online Journal of Space Communication , Dr. Feng Hsu, a  NASA scientist at Goddard Space Flight Center, a research center in the forefront of science of space and Earth, writes, “The evidence of global warming is alarming,” noting the potential for a catastrophic planetary climate change is real and troubling (Hsu 2010 ) . Hsu and his NASA colleagues were engaged in monitoring and analyzing climate changes on a global scale, through which they received first-hand scientific information and data relating to global warming issues, including the dynamics of polar ice cap melting. After discussing this research with colleagues who were world experts on the subject, he wrote: I now have no doubt global temperatures are rising, and that global warming is a serious problem confronting all of humanity. No matter whether these trends are due to human interference or to the cosmic cycling of our solar system, there are two basic facts that are crystal clear: (a) there is overwhelming scientific evidence showing positive correlations between the level of CO2 concentrations in Earth’s atmosphere with respect to the historical fluctuations of global temperature changes; and (b) the overwhelming majority of the world’s scientific community is in agreement about the risks of a potential catastrophic global climate change. That is, if we humans continue to ignore this problem and do nothing, if we continue dumping huge quantities of greenhouse gases into Earth’s biosphere, humanity will be at dire risk (Hsu 2010 ) . As a technology risk assessment expert, Hsu says he can show with some confidence that the planet will face more risk doing nothing to curb its fossil-based energy addictions than it will in making a fundamental shift in its energy supply. “This,” he writes, “is because the risks of a catastrophic anthropogenic climate change can be potentially **the extinction of human species**, a risk that is simply too high for us to take any chances” (Hsu 2010 )

### Ext: Trump Kills Paris Accords

#### Trump will repeal all environmental regulations and tank the Paris accords.

Posner 6-3-16. [Eric, professor at the University of Chicago Law School and a co-author of “The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic" "And if Elected: What President Trump Could or Couldn’t Do" New York Times -- www.nytimes.com/2016/06/04/opinion/campaign-stops/and-if-elected-what-president-trump-could-or-couldnt-do.html]

In May, Mr. Trump vowed to rescind President Obama’s environmental policies. He would be able to do that as well. He could disavow the Paris climate change agreement, just as President Bush “unsigned” a treaty creating an international criminal court in 2002. He could choke off climate regulations that are in development and probably withdraw existing climate regulations. Even if a court blocked him, he could refuse to enforce the regulations, just as Mr. Obama refused to enforce immigration laws.

#### Trump reverses Obama climate policy – undermines our ability to meet Paris obligations

Murray 16. [Bill, editor of Real Clear Energy, "Would Trump Undo Obama's Environmental Legacy?" Real Clear Politics -- May 17 -- http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2016/05/17/would\_trump\_undo\_obamas\_environmental\_legacy\_130583.html]

A simple parsing of his phrases – “opening up energy” or “put the miners back to work” –implies overturning important elements of President Obama’s Clean Power Plan (CPP), which is the main method by which the U.S. plans to meet its emissions obligations promised at the Paris climate change convention in December. “According to the attitude that he has expressed, he would be a major threat to health and the environment” if elected, said David Goldston, the director of government affairs for the Natural Resources Defense Council Action Fund. “He doesn’t believe in climate change, he doesn’t believe in the ozone hole, and he talks about dismantling the EPA.” How is a wholesale rollback of Obama’s environmental regime possible? The quick answer is that the failure of cap-and-trade legislation in 2010 forced the administration to try and achieve its environmental goals via the executive branch. By deciding to go down the executive-action path, the risk existed of a rollback if Republicans regained the White House. The easiest way to undo Obama’s environmental efforts would be for a President Trump to simply order his administration to stop working on a series of environmental rules that are still in draft form or mired in the federal court system. The CPP would qualify, given that federal courts may not decide on its legality until 2017. Other EPA-sponsored energy-related rules that could be quickly undermined by a Trump presidency include a “well-control” methane rule just finalized last week, and a Waters of the United States rule, both of which are struggling to make it through the courts. “He’s going to be an old-school pro-business Republican with a harder edge,” said Mike McKenna, a GOP strategist who deals with energy and environment issues. “He would target the things that underpin the whole structure of the Obama environmental policy. He’ll look at the Clean Power Plan and say, ‘Are we out of our frigging mind?’”

#### GOP win guarantees warming – decks the Paris deal.

Adler 15. [Ben, covers environmental policy and politics for Grist, with a focus on climate change, energy, and cities, “Republicans still hope to throw a wrench in the Paris climate deal,” Grist -- December 16 -- <http://grist.org/climate-energy/republicans-still-hope-to-throw-a-wrench-in-the-paris-climate-deal/>]

Republicans didn’t even wait for a global climate change deal to be struck in Paris to start undermining it. Last month, congressional Republicans were loudly discouraging other nations from signing onto any agreement, arguing that the U.S. won’t keep up its end of the bargain if a Republican wins the 2016 presidential election. And they passed bills that would repeal the Clean Power Plan, the new set of EPA restrictions on carbon pollution from coal-fired power plants, which is the centerpiece of the Obama administration’s strategy for meeting its emissions targets under the Paris Agreement. While U.S. negotiators were hard at work in Paris trying to secure a deal, congressional Republicans kept working hard to make the U.S. look insincere. The House passed an energy bill that would expedite permitting for oil and gas projects such as pipelines and expand liquefied natural gas exports. Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas), who is running for president, held a hearing stuffed with climate science deniers, including one who Greenpeace revealed is on the fossil fuel industry’s payroll. Republicans in Congress have also voted to end the crude oil export ban as part of the budget deal. That policy change would be a giveaway to the oil industry that would increase domestic oil production at the expense of the environment. Once a deal came out of Paris, naturally Republicans started criticizing it. Sen. James Inhofe (R-Okla.), chair of the Environment and Public Works Committee, complained — nonsensically, since he doesn’t even accept climate science in the first place — that the agreement does not hold countries such as China and India to strong enough standards. Anyway, he promises to interfere with any effort to meet our emissions targets or climate finance commitments. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) said President Obama “is ‘making promises he can’t keep’ and should remember that the agreement ‘is subject to being shredded in 13 months,’” according to the Associated Press. As AP explains, “McConnell noted that the presidential election is next year and the agreement could be reversed if the GOP wins the White House.” The U.S. — as the world’s largest economy, largest historic polluter, and second-largest present-day carbon polluter — is an essential player in any functioning global climate agreement. Well aware of this, President Obama made a huge and largely successful effort on climate diplomacy over the last year, crafting bilateral agreements with key nations such as China, India, and Brazil in order to lay the groundwork for an international deal. Republicans, knowing the importance of U.S. cooperation, are eager not only to kneecap any U.S. climate policy, but also to prevent global cooperation on climate change. Perhaps they fear that a future Republican president will face more pressure from allies and trading partners to address climate change now that everyone else in the world has already committed to do so. So over the next five years, until the world comes together again in 2020 to hopefully negotiate a stronger set of national targets, congressional Republicans will be working to destroy the agreement and its future potential by preventing the U.S. from keeping its word. Their game plan will be to undo the Clean Power Plan and revoke U.S. pledges of financing to assist developing nations with expanding clean energy and adapting to climate change. How this plays out will depend on the outcome of the next presidential election. All of the leading Republican presidential candidates are climate science deniers who oppose the Clean Power Plan. On the campaign trail this week, most of them have avoided any discussion of the Paris Agreement. All but one of the top nine GOP campaigns did not respond to a query on the subject from The New York Times. The one Republican candidate who responded, Gov. John Kasich of Ohio, via a spokesman, had a perverse take: “While the governor believes that climate change is real and that human activity contributes to it, he has serious concerns with an agreement that the Obama administration deliberately crafted to avoid having to submit it to the Senate for approval. That’s an obvious indicator that they expect it to result in significant job loss and inflict further damage to our already sluggish economy.” But Senate Republicans have always made it clear that they wouldn’t approve any kind of climate treaty, no matter what the expected economic impacts. That’s why Obama pushed the world to adopt a more flexible agreement that doesn’t require Senate approval. Kasich is blaming Obama for a condition of his own party’s making. In the GOP presidential debate on Tuesday night, Kasich briefly mentioned the Paris negotiations, only to ridicule the idea of discussing climate change instead of how to combat ISIS. That was the only mention of climate change in the entire two-hour debate on foreign policy. Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), another presidential contender, weighed in on the Paris Agreement from the campaign trail, calling it “ridiculous,” and adding, “unilateral disarmament in our economy is reckless, and it is hurting the American Dream.” Republicans, it seems, have settled on the talking point that the Paris Agreement will harm our economy without bothering to produce any evidence of that. Their claim seems to rest on the premise that the Clean Power Plan will raise electricity costs. But in fact, studies have found that the CPP will actually lower electricity bills for the average American family, thanks to the energy-efficiency provisions. Other studies have found that the jobs lost in the coal industry under the CPP will be vastly outweighed by jobs created in renewable energy and productivity gains across the economy from lower electricity costs. And certainly there is nothing “unilateral” about our “disarmament.” The European Union, for example, is cutting emissions more drastically than the U.S. And while developing countries aren’t pledging bigger cuts than the U.S., they already have much lower emissions per capita and smaller economies, so they are offering more significant limits in relative terms. We don’t need to wait for the other Republican candidates to talk about the Paris Agreement to know what they think of it. The League of Conservation Voters compiled a fact sheet with the comments they made about the COP21 negotiations before the deal was inked. All were critical, with many saying that Obama shouldn’t even have gone to Paris to work for an agreement, and that they wouldn’t have were they in the White House. If a Democrat wins the presidency next year, the fight over following through on Paris and ramping up for the next agreement will be between her and Congress. If there is a Republican in the White House, he will get cooperation from the reliably Republican House to repeal the Clean Power Plan and end climate funding for developing nations, and those efforts may or may not be aided by the Senate, depending on whether Democrats take control of it in 2016, or at least have enough votes to mount a filibuster. No matter who becomes the next president, the third branch of government will also have a say. Conservative state attorneys general and corporate fossil fuel interests are challenging the Clean Power Plan in federal court. The presidential election probably won’t determine the court case’s outcome — only a vacancy on the Supreme Court before the case is heard might lead to that — but it will determine how the EPA responds if the rule is overturned. The Supreme Court has already held that EPA has the legal authority to regulate carbon pollution, so if the CPP is overturned, it would mean that the agency could promulgate new regulations on power plants that are more likely to be deemed compliant with the Clean Air Act. But whether their boss wants them to or not will depend on who sits in the White House. The bottom line: The domestic political fight over the Paris Agreement has just begun.

### Ext: GOP Win 🡪 Warming

#### GOP victory risks extinction from climate

Krugman 16. [Paul, professor of Economics and International Affairs at Princeton, “Wind, Sun and Fire” New York Times -- <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/01/opinion/wind-sun-and-fire.html?_r=0>]

So what’s really at stake in this year’s election? Well, among other things, the fate of the planet. Last year was the hottest on record, by a wide margin, which should — but won’t — put an end to climate deniers’ claims that global warming has stopped. The truth is that climate change just keeps getting scarier; it is, by far, the most important policy issue facing America and the world. Still, this election wouldn’t have much bearing on the issue if there were no prospect of effective action against the looming catastrophe. But the situation on that front has changed drastically for the better in recent years, because we’re now achingly close to achieving a renewable-energy revolution. What’s more, getting that energy revolution wouldn’t require a political revolution. All it would take are fairly modest policy changes, some of which have already happened and others of which are already underway. But those changes won’t happen if the wrong people end up in power. To see what I’m talking about, you need to know something about the current state of climate economics, which has changed far more in recent years than most people seem to realize. Most people who think about the issue at all probably imagine that achieving a drastic reduction in greenhouse gas emissions would necessarily involve big economic sacrifices. This view is required orthodoxy on the right, where it forms a sort of second line of defense against action, just in case denial of climate science and witch hunts against climate scientists don’t do the trick. For example, in the last Republican debate Marco Rubio — the last, best hope of the G.O.P. establishment — insisted, as he has before, that a cap-and-trade program would be “devastating for our economy.” To find anything equivalent on the left you have to go far out of the mainstream, to activists who insist that climate change can’t be fought without overthrowing capitalism. Still, my sense is that many Democrats believe that politics as usual isn’t up to the task, that we need a political earthquake to make real action possible. In particular, I keep hearing that the Obama administration’s environmental efforts have been so far short of what’s needed as to be barely worth mentioning. But things are actually much more hopeful than that, thanks to remarkable technological progress in renewable energy. The numbers are really stunning. According to a recent report by the investment firm Lazard, the cost of electricity generation using wind power fell 61 percent from 2009 to 2015, while the cost of solar power fell 82 percent. These numbers — which are in line with other estimates — show progress at rates we normally only expect to see for information technology. And they put the cost of renewable energy into a range where it’s competitive with fossil fuels. Now, there are still some issues special to renewables, in particular problems of intermittency: consumers may want power when the wind doesn’t blow and the sun doesn’t shine. But this issue seems to be of diminishing significance, partly thanks to improving storage technology, partly thanks to the realization that “demand response” — paying consumers to cut energy use during peak periods — can greatly reduce the problem. So what will it take to achieve a large-scale shift from fossil fuels to renewables, a shift to sun and wind instead of fire? Financial incentives, and they don’t have to be all that huge. Tax credits for renewables that were part of the Obama stimulus plan, and were extended under the recent budget deal, have already done a lot to accelerate the energy revolution. The Environmental Protection Agency’s Clean Power Plan, which if implemented will create strong incentives to move away from coal, will do much more. And none of this will require new legislation; we can have an energy revolution even if the crazies retain control of the House. Now, skeptics may point out that even if all these good things happen, they won’t be enough on their own to save the planet. For one thing, we’re only talking about electricity generation, which is a big part of the climate change problem but not the whole thing. For another, we’re only talking about one country when the problem is global. But I’d argue that the kind of progress now within reach could produce a tipping point, in the right direction. Once renewable energy becomes an obvious success and, yes, a powerful interest group, anti-environmentalism will start to lose its political grip. And an energy revolution in America would let us take the lead in global action. Salvation from climate catastrophe is, in short, something we can realistically hope to see happen, with no political miracle necessary. But failure is also a very real possibility. Everything is hanging in the balance.

#### Extinction from warming

Neuhauser 15. [Alan, energy, environment and STEM reporter, “This Climate Change Election,” U.S. News & World Report, August 14, http://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2015/08/14/the-2016-election-is-critical-for-stopping-climate-change ]

Next year, though, may truly – actually, seriously – be different, **if climate scientists are right**. The next candidate Americans send to the Oval Office, experts say, may also be the very last who can avert catastrophe from climate change. "It is urgent and the timeframe is critical and it has to be right now," says Vicki Arroyo, executive director of the Georgetown Climate Center at Georgetown Law. "**We can't lose another four years**, much less eight years." This is not an overnight ice age or a rise of the apes. But global warming is already here, parching the American West, flooding coastal cities, strengthening storms, erasing species and inflaming armed conflict, with a rise of just 0.85 degrees Celsius from pre-industrial levels. And it's going to get worse, experts say. Last year, a U.N. panel of scientists predicted the world had until 2050 to slash emissions by as much as 70 percent to keep temperatures from rising another 1.15 degrees by the end of the century. That's the threshold of an unstoppable cycle of Arctic and Antarctic melting, the release of heat-trapping gases that had been caught in the ice, more warming, more melting, more warming, more melting – until the glaciers and ice caps disappear. But some researchers – including the man who first presented the facts on climate change to Congress in 1988 – say that that tipping point may come even sooner, perhaps as early as 2036: Humans, in short, are having an even greater impact than expected. "Sea level projections and upcoming United Nations meetings in Paris are far too sluggish compared with the magnitude and speed of sea level changes," the scientist, Columbia professor James Hansen, wrote Wednesday in a Q&A on the web forum Reddit, discussing a study he published in July. The needed changes are monumental: Halting climate change and heading off its worst consequences is going to require a wholesale switch from fossil fuels like coal, oil and gas to renewables like wind and solar – potentially upending utilities, energy producers and construction contractors, the sort of change "of the magnitude of the invention of the steam engine or the electrification of society," says Jules Kortenhorst, CEO of the Rocky Mountain Institute, a nonpartisan energy research group. "How quickly can we transform one of the most complex industrial systems – our energy system – across the globe in order to move toward low carbon?" he asks . "There is absolutely no doubt we have to act now." This presents an election – and a choice – with no historical analogues. "**This will be a make-or-break presidency as far as our ability to avert a climate change catastrophe**," says Michael Mann, meteorology professor and director of the Earth System Science Center at Penn State University, whose "hockey-stick" shaped graph warned of sharply rising emissions and temperatures. Pick any issue throughout history, he and others argue, none has shared the three qualities that make climate change stand apart: its threat to the entire planet, the short window to respond, and how sharply it has divided the two parties' candidates. "Republicans and Democrats have argued over issues for years, but I can't think of an example where one party didn't even say that the issue exists," says Katharine Hayhoe, a climate scientist at Texas Tech University who has advised Evangelical and conservative climate action groups, and who has urged policymakers to address warming. ​​ Four of the five Democratic candidates has pledged or supported Obama administration efforts to cut the heat-trapping emissions that cause climate change: Hillary Clinton, Bernie Sanders, Martin O'Malley and Lincoln Chafee. Former Sen. Jim Webb has said he'd expand the use of fossil fuels and once voted to block the Environmental Protection Agency from regulating certain greenhouse gas emissions. Among the Republicans, eight of the 17 candidates have hedged: Jeb Bush, Carly Fiorina, Lindsey Graham, Jim Gilmore, Bobby Jindal, John Kasich, George Pataki and Rand Paul have acknowledged that humans do contribute to global warming, but have questioned or stopped short of saying how much – a position at odds with the findings of a vast majority of scientists. "The climate is changing; I don't think anybody can argue it's not. Human activity has contributed to it," Bush said in an email interview with Bloomberg BNA in July – a statement that notably did not mention how much humans were at fault. During a campaign stop in New Hampshire in June, he had previously told listeners, "The climate is changing, whether men are doing it or not," one month after calling it "arrogant" to say climate science is settled. The rest of **the GOP field** – including three senators who rejected a January amendment tying human activity to climate change – **has dismissed the issue** outright. Paul also voted against the amendment. "As a scientist it's very frustrating to hear politicians basically saying, 'This isn't true,' or, 'They're just making it up to get government money,'" Hayhoe says. "A thermometer is not Democrat or Republican. What observations are telling us is not political – it is what it is." And there are conservative solutions for warming. Some party members, in fact, see it as an inherently Republican issue: Carbon emissions, for example, distort the free market, forcing others to pay the higher and indirect costs of climate change (storm recovery, disaster relief) plus the health costs associated with air pollution. ​​​"We allow the coal industry to socialize its costs, and we conservatives don't like allowing people to socialize anything," says former South Carolina Rep. Bob Inglis, who now explores free-market solutions to climate change as head of the Energy and Enterprise Institute at George Mason University. A revenue-neutral carbon tax, one that does not support other programs and instead goes back to households, could fix that distortion, he and others argue. "The question is not, 'Is there going to be a tax on carbon?' It's, 'Do you want a tax that you have a voice in and control, or do you want to keep writing checks after disasters that you have no control over?'" says retired Rear Admiral David Titley, who has advised some of the GOP presidential candidates and directs the Center for Solutions to Weather and Climate Risk at Penn State University. "That $60 billion relief bill for Hurricane Sandy that passed very quickly through a Republican-led House, did you get a vote on that tax? Because that's a tax." Yet Inglis, himself is a living example of what can happen to conservatives who call for climate action. The recipient of the JFK Profile in Courage Award in April, he was unseated in the Republican primary in 2010 after shifting his position on global warming. "Republicans say, 'Look at what happened to him when he said it was real. Do you want that to happen to you?'" Hayhoe describes. Oil, gas and coal companies, along with billionaire Libertarian industrialists David and Charles Koch, rank among the biggest campaign donors, and often seem as allergic to new taxes as a bubble boy to fresh pollen. But popular sentiment among voters appears to be changing: Most Republican voters say they support climate action, and last week, Shell did not renew its membership in the Koch-backed American Legislative Exchange Council because of the group's opposition to climate action. Even the climate statements by the eight Republicans who have hedged on warming, vague as they were, may signify a kind of progress – especially during the primaries, when candidates play to their parties' more extreme bases. "In the Great Recession in 2010, it was this very atheistic position with regard to climate change: 'We don't believe,'" Inglis says. "Then, in the 2014 cycle, 'I'm not a scientist,' that was an agnostic position. These are data points on a trend line toward a tipping point." Republicans can exploit a distinct advantage on climate action, too, he adds: Voters tend to support the presidents who buck party stereotypes. "Nixon goes to China, Bill Clinton signs welfare reform – the country will trust a conservative to touch climate," Inglis argues. But climate scientists, environmental advocates and Democrats remain deeply skeptical. The most recent Republican president, for one, backpedaled on his 2000 campaign pledge to rein-in carbon emissions. Campaign donations remain hugely influential, and as Republican candidates lambaste the environmental agenda of the Obama administration, stopping climate change will actually require they expand upon Obama initiatives: resist industry pressure to slow the roll-out of tighter fuel standards for cars, push states to reduce emissions from their power sectors and uphold and ratchet-up international commitments to slow carbon emissions. There's also the Supreme Court: with four Supreme Court justices now over the age of 70, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg pushing 80, the next president will likely have the chance to nominate new jurists to the court – **a court that will almost certainly** decide challenges to various environmental actions aimed at slowing global warming. "If we are going to avoid catastrophic, irreversible climate change impacts, we have to be ramping down our carbon emissions dramatically in the years ahead. The current administration has begun that process, but our next president must not only continue but build on that progress," Mann says. It is on the global stage where perhaps the spotlight – and climate scientists' hopes and expectations – will shine brightest. In December, negotiators from nearly 200 nations will meet in **Paris** to hammer-out an international climate accord. It **is expected to include commitments from China and India**, heavy polluters spurred **to rein-in** their **emissions and invest in clean energy** by America's own commitment to slash carbon emissions from its power sector. "**The rest of the world is going to expect the U.S. to live up to its commitment** [made at the Paris meeting], no matter who is in the White House," says Henrik Selin, professor of international relations at the Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University. "If you have a president who comes in and starts rolling back the Obama initiatives, you're going to have international leaders being very unhappy about this – and they are not just countries, they are trading partners. This is not just a domestic issue, it's also very much a foreign policy issue." And so far, he and others argue, **none of the Republican candidates have offered a clear vision on climate**, let alone any plan to slow warming.

#### GOP win will increase emissions and destroy the environment.

Klare 15. [Michael, Professor at Hampshire College, “A Republican Neo-Imperial Vision for 2016” Truth Dig – February 13 -- http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/keystone\_xl\_cold\_war\_20\_and\_the\_gop\_vision\_for\_2016\_20150213]

This approach has been embraced by other senior Republican figures who see increased North American hydrocarbon output as the ideal response to Russian assertiveness. In other words, the two pillars of a new energy North Americanism—enhanced collaboration with the big oil companies across the continent and reinvigorated Cold Warism—are now being folded into a single Republican grand strategy. Nothing will prepare the West better to fight Russia or just about any other hostile power on the planet than the conversion of North America into a bastion of fossil fuel abundance. This strange, chilling vision of an American (and global) future was succinctly described by former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in a remarkable Washington Post op-ed in March 2014. She essentially called for North America to flood the global energy market, causing a plunge in oil prices and bankrupting the Russians. “Putin is playing for the long haul, cleverly exploiting every opening he sees,” she wrote, but “Moscow is not immune from pressure.” Putin and Co. require high oil and gas prices to finance their aggressive activities, “and soon, North America’s bounty of oil and gas will swamp Moscow’s capacity.” By “authorizing the Keystone XL pipeline and championing natural gas exports,” she asserted, Washington would signal “that we intend to do exactly that.” So now you know: approval of the Keystone XL pipeline isn’t actually about jobs and the economy; it’s about battling Vladimir Putin, the Iranian mullahs, and America’s other adversaries. “One of the ways we fight back, one of the ways we push back is we take control of our own energy destiny,” said Senator Hoeven on January 7th, when introducing legislation to authorize construction of that pipeline. And that, it turns out, is just the beginning of the “benefits” that North Americanism will supposedly bring. Ultimately, the goals of this strategy are to perpetuate the dominance of fossil fuels in North America’s energy mix and to enlist Canada and Mexico in a U.S.-led drive to ensure the continued dominance of the West in key regions of the world. Stay tuned: you’ll be hearing a lot more about this ambitious strategy as the Republican presidential hopefuls begin making their campaign rounds. Keep in mind, though, that this is potentially dangerous stuff at every level—from the urge to ratchet up a conflict with Russia to the desire to produce and consume ever more North American fossil fuels (not exactly a surprising impulse given the Republicans’ heavy reliance on campaign contributions from Big Energy). In the coming months, the Obama administration and Hillary Clinton’s camp will, of course, attempt to counter this drive. Their efforts will, however, be undermined by their sympathy for many of its components. Obama, for instance, has boasted more than once of his success in increasing U.S. oil and gas production, while Clinton has repeatedly called for a more combative foreign policy. Nor has either of them yet come up with a grand strategy as seemingly broad and attractive as Republican North Americanism. If that plan is to be taken on seriously as the dangerous contrivance it is, it evidently will fall to others to do so. This Republican vision, after all, rests on the desire of giant oil companies to eliminate government regulation and bring the energy industries of Canada and Mexico under their corporate sway. Were this to happen, it would sabotage efforts to curb carbon emissions from fossil fuels in a major way, while undermining the sovereignty of Canada and Mexico. In the process, the natural environment would suffer horribly as regulatory constraints against hazardous drilling practices would be eroded in all three countries. Stepped-up drilling, hydrofracking, and tar sands production would also result in the increased diversion of water to energy production, reducing supplies for farming while increasing the risk that leaking drilling fluids will contaminate drinking water and aquifers. No less worrisome, the Republican strategy would result in a far more polarized and dangerous international environment, in which hopes for achieving any kind of peace in Ukraine, Syria, or elsewhere would disappear. The urge to convert North America into a unified garrison state under U.S. (energy) command would undoubtedly prompt similar initiatives abroad, with China moving ever closer to Russia and other blocs forming elsewhere. In addition, those who seek to use energy as a tool of coercion should not be surprised to discover that they are inviting its use by hostile parties—and in such conflicts the U.S. and its allies would not emerge unscathed. In other words, the shining Republican vision of a North American energy fortress will, in reality, prove to be a nightmare of environmental degradation and global conflict. Unfortunately, this may not be obvious by election season 2016, so watch out.

### Ext: Paris Accords Solve

#### Paris deal will successfully limit climate change

Jackson 15. [Erwin, deputy CEO of The Climate Institute, “Is the Paris Agreement Toothless?” National Interest – December 18 -- <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-paris-agreement-toothless-14667>]

Is the Paris agreement toothless?

The countries of the world seemed to sigh with collective relief when the Paris climate change agreement was finalized. After years of toil, nearly 200 countries agreed to ratchet up action over time to achieve a net-zero-emissions global economy. Yet, no sooner was the ink dry than discussion began about whether the deal had enough 'teeth' to achieve its goals. The national targets under the agreement aren't legally binding, critics said. In fact, the Paris agreement has been viewed with everything from caution to outright cynicism. To an extent, this is understandable. What governments say is not always matched by their actions. And Australia is a case in point. Take the announcement of our Government joining 'the Coalition for High Ambition' in Paris. Convened by the Marshall Islands, this group includes the United States, EU, Brazil and smaller countries from Africa, Latin America, Asia and other small island states. Among other things, it supports a goal in the Paris agreement to limit global warming to less than 1.5°C by the end of century. For low-lying island nations already battling rising sea levels, like the Marshall Islands, this target is a matter of survival. Yet if other countries adopted Australia's current emissions targets, we would see the world warm by 3-4°C. It is a clear disconnect between words and actions. But Australia is not alone in this. Nearly all countries need to lift targets and policies if we are to achieve a less than 2°C or 1.5°C goal. So, does the criticism that emissions targets aren't legally binding actually matter? If we are to achieve a reduction in the emissions entering the planet's atmosphere, it will be done through countries taking effective domestic action, not by the mere existence of an international agreement. The Paris agreement, firstly, requires that every five years all countries set an emissions reduction target that is stronger than the last (with some exceptions for the world's nations that are poorest and the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change). Importantly, these targets are to be justified against the less than 2ºC or 1.5°C goals that the Marshall Islands and others need for survival. Secondly, the Paris agreement binds countries to implement domestic policies to achieve that target. The point is that legally binding targets don't necessarily equal effectiveness. It is participation in the agreement, through action, that is vital. After all, the most binding agreement is useless if the United States, China, India and other major emitters don't participate. Recent history shows us that, just because a commitment is not binding, it does not necessarily follow that countries won't act or participate. Under the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, for example, it was voluntary for countries to put forward 2020 emissions targets. Yet, since then, the number of domestic laws to control pollution around the world has more than doubled from around 420 to 800. According to the World Bank, about 40 nations have begun to make emitting companies pay for their carbon pollution. And the number of carbon pricing laws across the world has nearly doubled since 2012. Additionally, eight in ten countries now have national renewable energy targets. Renewable energy is now the world's second-largest source of electricity, with investment in renewable electricity increasing by 30 percent since Copenhagen. Over this period, more than $1.12 trillion was invested in renewable capacity. This all happened with just over 10 percent of global emissions being covered by internationally binding emissions commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. It was not driven by fear of sanction from other countries. It was driven by the fact that major economies, national security agencies, central bankers, institutional investors, major global businesses and many others now see climate change, and the global response to it, as a major strategic issue that must be managed. This is not to say we shouldn't hold countries accountable for their actions. The Paris agreement requires that countries regularly review each others' targets and actions towards achieving net-zero emissions. It also contains binding systems to promote transparency (eg. expert international teams will review biannual emissions reports from each country). The Paris agreement is not perfect, but to judge it by whether or not it is legally binding misses the point. Post Paris, the test of any nation's commitment to climate change is now two-fold. First, do its pollution-reduction targets help achieve the net-zero-emissions goals of the Paris agreement? By assessing one another on this every five years, international pressure will result in action. Second and most importantly, do its domestic laws make major emitters responsible for the pollution they cause? If the nations of the world can answer 'yes' to both these questions, it should deliver us, and nations like the Marshall Islands, the climate action we all need.

#### Paris avoids runaway warming that would make the earth uninhabitable

Lewis 15. [Renee, "Historic Paris deal puts globe on path to limit warming to 1.5C," Al Jazeera -- Dec 12 -- america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/12/12/paris-deal-sets-path-to-limit-warming-to-15-c.html]

Climate negotiators in Paris have approved a historic agreement that would put the world on a pathway to keeping the global average temperature rise above pre-industrial levels "well below" 2 degrees Celsius while "pursuing efforts to limit temperature increase to 1.5 C." Nearly 200 nations took part in the COP21 talks in Paris, working for the past two weeks on a deal to mitigate the worst effects of global warming, a process of change which has already begun to impact some of the world's most vulnerable communities through extreme weather, rising seas, and drought. The final draft was presented Saturday by French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius before being subsequently approved Saturday afternoon by 195 nations in a suburb outside the French capital. Before the agreement officially goes into effect, it must be ratified by at least 55 individual countries. It is the first agreement that asks all countries to collectively tackle the problem of global warming, a major shift in U.N. talks that previously included pledges only by rich, not poor, nations. "Our responsibility to history is immense," Fabius told thousands of officials, including President François Hollande and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, in the main hall of the conference venue on the outskirts of Paris. "If we were to fail, how could we rebuild this hope?" he asked. "Our children would not understand or forgive us." "The landmark agreement for the planet, it's now. It's rare in life to have the opportunity to change the world," Hollande tweeted after the agreement was approved. In the Paris agreement, the world agreed to eliminate net human-caused greenhouse gases by the second half of the century – a goal that would be achieved by a combination of reducing emissions and increasing capacity of natural carbon sinks like forests that remove those gases from the atmosphere. Carbon markets, which provide economic incentives for businesses and governments to lower emissions by creating a tangible cost to use of carbon, would also be established as part of the agreement, the accord said. However, the national pledges from each country detailing cuts to emissions and measures to mitigate climate change – which were collected at the beginning of the climate talks — were not ambitious enough to put the world on a pathway of the agreed upon goal of limiting warming to well below 2 C, the final document says. As a result, the accord included the establishment of a timetable for future meetings, including a key United Nations climate conference to be held in 2018, which will be a target by which the constituent countries of the globe are to pledge even more ambitious mechanisms for slashing emissions. Also in 2018, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is to release a report on how to limit global warming to 1.5 C, the draft said. "This is a floor not a ceiling, a beginning and not an end. It gives us a strong foundation but there's hard work ahead," Alden Meyer, director of strategy and policy at the Union of Concerned Scientists, told Al Jazeera from Paris. "We're making progress at the national level but we have to keep fighting for what we want and against what we don't want," Meyer added. Other environmental groups echoed that sentiment, saying that while Saturday’s accord was an important step on the path to drastically reducing carbon emissions, it was not a sufficient milestone absent continued collective action. “Now comes the great task of this century,” said Kumi Naidoo of Greenpeace. “How do we meet this new goal?” Naidoo said that while the cuts to emissions still fell short, the progress was nonetheless important. “This deal alone won’t dig us out the hole we’re in, but it makes the sides less steep.” For nations that face the possibility of forced migration as a result of the effects of climate change, the fact that the accord acknowledges an aim to pursue efforts to limit warming to 1.5 C was something to celebrate. The lower warming limit was largely unheard of a few months ago, with the United Nations and many scientists targeting the more conservative target of 2 C as a sufficient level to avert the very worst effects of climate change. But low-lying coastal countries like the Marshall Islands, an atoll nation in the Pacific Ocean that stands barely six feet higher than sea level and has faced increasingly severe impacts from rising seas and flooding, 2 C is viewed as an existential threat. The world has already warmed by 1 C since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, and is on a pathway to nearly 3 C rise by the end of the century absent major changes. At 3 C, climate and social scientists believe the world is likely to experience massive migration crises, food shortages and increased conflict. For Marshall Islands Foreign Minister Tony De Brum, the pact's identification of a 1.5 C long-term target meant he could go home and tell his people they had a fighting chance to save their atoll nation from a rising ocean. "I think we're done here," De Brum told reporters on Saturday before the final approval, after negotiating well into the night Friday with other officials to finalize the draft. Ahead of the talks, the Marshall Islands was among 42 other nations most susceptible to the effects of climate change in a group called the Climate Vulnerable Forum, who together campaigned for the lower limit which has now been codified in the final agreement. The Climate Vulnerable Forum "brought the discussion of limiting 1.5 degrees C to Paris," Stephen Kretzmann, executive director of Oil Change International, said in a press release Saturday. "Bit by bit, there are indications that the era of fossil fuels is coming to an end." The accord sets out a plan for developed nations to contribute public and private funds totaling U.S. $100 billion per year from 2020 to 2025. The fund will enhance developing nations' ability to mitigate and adapt to global warming. Poor nations have long complained of being forced to pay for the policies of rich nations, whose relatively larger emissions over time have played an outsized role in the quickening pace of climate change and the scope of the problem.

### US Lead Key

#### US lead key on warming – if we bail on Paris global cooperation collapses.

Pascual and Zambetakis 10. [Carlos, US Ambassador to Mexico, Served as VP of foreign policy @ Brookings, Evie , Brookings “The Geopolitics of Energy: From Security to Survival” Energy Security; 26-27]

Among these groups, the United States has the capacity to play a pivotal role. China and India will not move toward more proactive domestic policies if the United States does not set the example. Along with Europe¶ and Japan, the United States has the capacity to demonstrate that green¶ technology and conservation can be compatible with growth and a foreign¶ policy that is more independent of energy suppliers. The United States also stands to benefit from accelerated commercialization of green technologies and the development of global markets in energy-efficient and clean energy technologies. The ability of the United States to lead, however,¶ will depend on domestic action-on whether it will undertake on a national basis a systematic strategy to price carbon and curb emissions. If¶ it does the scale and importance of the U.S. market can be a driver for¶ global change. If it fails to act, then the United States will find that over time the opportunity for leadership to curb climate change will be replaced by the need for crisis management as localized wars, migration, poverty, and humanitarian catastrophes increasingly absorb international attention and resources**.** Eventually, its failure to act will come back to U.S. borders in a way that will make the Katrina disaster seem relatively tame.

### AT: Adaptation

#### Warming causes extinction and the threshold is soon – no adaptation

Roberts 13. [David, staff writer -- citing the World Bank Review’s compilation of climate studies, "If you aren’t alarmed about climate, you aren’t paying attention" Grist -- January 10 -- grist.org/climate-energy/climate-alarmism-the-idea-is-surreal/]

We know we’ve raised global average temperatures around 0.8 degrees C so far. We know that 2 degrees C is where most scientists predict catastrophic and irreversible impacts. And we know that we are currently on a trajectory that will push temperatures up 4 degrees or more by the end of the century. What would 4 degrees look like? A recent [World Bank review of the science](http://climatechange.worldbank.org/) reminds us. First, it’ll get hot: Projections for a 4°C world show a dramatic increase in the intensity and frequency of high-temperature extremes. Recent extreme heat waves such as in Russia in 2010 are likely to become the new normal summer in a 4°C world. Tropical South America, central Africa, and all tropical islands in the Pacific are likely to regularly experience heat waves of unprecedented magnitude and duration. In this new high-temperature climate regime, the coolest months are likely to be substantially warmer than the warmest months at the end of the 20th century. In regions such as the Mediterranean, North Africa, the Middle East, and the Tibetan plateau, almost all summer months are likely to be warmer than the most extreme heat waves presently experienced. For example, the warmest July in the Mediterranean region could be 9°C warmer than today’s warmest July. Extreme heat waves in recent years have had severe impacts, causing heat-related deaths, forest fires, and harvest losses. The impacts of the extreme heat waves projected for a 4°C world have not been evaluated, but they could be expected to vastly exceed the consequences experienced to date and potentially exceed the adaptive capacities of many societies and natural systems. [my emphasis] Warming to 4 degrees would also lead to “an increase of about 150 percent in acidity of the ocean,” leading to levels of acidity “unparalleled in Earth’s history.” That’s bad news for, say, coral reefs: The combination of thermally induced bleaching events, ocean acidification, and sea-level rise threatens large fractions of coral reefs even at 1.5°C global warming. The regional extinction of entire coral reef ecosystems, which could occur well before 4°C is reached, would have profound consequences for their dependent species and for the people who depend on them for food, income, tourism, and shoreline protection. It will also “likely lead to a sea-level rise of 0.5 to 1 meter, and possibly more, by 2100, with several meters more to be realized in the coming centuries.” That rise won’t be spread evenly, even within regions and countries — regions close to the equator will see even higher seas. There are also indications that it would “significantly exacerbate existing water scarcity in many regions, particularly northern and eastern Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, while additional countries in Africa would be newly confronted with water scarcity on a national scale due to population growth.” Also, more extreme weather events: Ecosystems will be affected by more frequent extreme weather events, such as forest loss due to droughts and wildfire exacerbated by land use and agricultural expansion. In Amazonia, forest fires could as much as double by 2050 with warming of approximately 1.5°C to 2°C above preindustrial levels. Changes would be expected to be even more severe in a 4°C world. Also loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services: In a 4°C world, climate change seems likely to become the dominant driver of ecosystem shifts, surpassing habitat destruction as the greatest threat to biodiversity. Recent research suggests that large-scale loss of biodiversity is likely to occur in a 4°C world, with climate change and high CO2 concentration driving a transition of the Earth’s ecosystems into a state unknown in human experience. Ecosystem damage would be expected to dramatically reduce the provision of ecosystem services on which society depends (for example, fisheries and protection of coastline afforded by coral reefs and mangroves.) New research also indicates a “rapidly rising risk of crop yield reductions as the world warms.” So food will be tough. All this will add up to “large-scale displacement of populations and have adverse consequences for human security and economic and trade systems.” Given the uncertainties and long-tail risks involved, “there is no certainty that adaptation to a 4°C world is possible.” There’s a small but non-trivial chance of advanced civilization breaking down entirely. Now ponder the fact that some scenarios show us going up to 6degrees by the end of the century, a level of devastation we have not studied and barely know how to conceive. Ponder the fact that somewhere along the line, though we don’t know exactly where, enough self-reinforcing feedback loops will be running to make climate change unstoppable and irreversible for centuries to come. That would mean handing our grandchildren and their grandchildren not only a burned, chaotic, denuded world, but a world that is inexorably more inhospitable with every passing decade.

### AT: Warming Inevitable

#### Squo solves worst of warming now – only Trump election causes runaway warming which is our impact.

Krugman 16. [Paul, professor of Economics and International Affairs at Princeton, “Wind, Sun and Fire” New York Times -- <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/01/opinion/wind-sun-and-fire.html?_r=0>]

So what’s really at stake in this year’s election? Well, among other things, the fate of the planet. Last year was the hottest on record, by a wide margin, which should — but won’t — put an end to climate deniers’ claims that global warming has stopped. The truth is that climate change just keeps getting scarier; it is, by far, the most important policy issue facing America and the world. Still, this election wouldn’t have much bearing on the issue if there were no prospect of effective action against the looming catastrophe. But the situation on that front has changed drastically for the better in recent years, because we’re now achingly close to achieving a renewable-energy revolution. What’s more, getting that energy revolution wouldn’t require a political revolution. All it would take are fairly modest policy changes, some of which have already happened and others of which are already underway. But those changes won’t happen if the wrong people end up in power. To see what I’m talking about, you need to know something about the current state of climate economics, which has changed far more in recent years than most people seem to realize. Most people who think about the issue at all probably imagine that achieving a drastic reduction in greenhouse gas emissions would necessarily involve big economic sacrifices. This view is required orthodoxy on the right, where it forms a sort of second line of defense against action, just in case denial of climate science and witch hunts against climate scientists don’t do the trick. For example, in the last Republican debate Marco Rubio — the last, best hope of the G.O.P. establishment — insisted, as he has before, that a cap-and-trade program would be “devastating for our economy.” To find anything equivalent on the left you have to go far out of the mainstream, to activists who insist that climate change can’t be fought without overthrowing capitalism. Still, my sense is that many Democrats believe that politics as usual isn’t up to the task, that we need a political earthquake to make real action possible. In particular, I keep hearing that the Obama administration’s environmental efforts have been so far short of what’s needed as to be barely worth mentioning. But things are actually much more hopeful than that, thanks to remarkable technological progress in renewable energy. The numbers are really stunning. According to a recent report by the investment firm Lazard, the cost of electricity generation using wind power fell 61 percent from 2009 to 2015, while the cost of solar power fell 82 percent. These numbers — which are in line with other estimates — show progress at rates we normally only expect to see for information technology. And they put the cost of renewable energy into a range where it’s competitive with fossil fuels. Now, there are still some issues special to renewables, in particular problems of intermittency: consumers may want power when the wind doesn’t blow and the sun doesn’t shine. But this issue seems to be of diminishing significance, partly thanks to improving storage technology, partly thanks to the realization that “demand response” — paying consumers to cut energy use during peak periods — can greatly reduce the problem. So what will it take to achieve a large-scale shift from fossil fuels to renewables, a shift to sun and wind instead of fire? Financial incentives, and they don’t have to be all that huge. Tax credits for renewables that were part of the Obama stimulus plan, and were extended under the recent budget deal, have already done a lot to accelerate the energy revolution. The Environmental Protection Agency’s Clean Power Plan, which if implemented will create strong incentives to move away from coal, will do much more. And none of this will require new legislation; we can have an energy revolution even if the crazies retain control of the House. Now, skeptics may point out that even if all these good things happen, they won’t be enough on their own to save the planet. For one thing, we’re only talking about electricity generation, which is a big part of the climate change problem but not the whole thing. For another, we’re only talking about one country when the problem is global. But I’d argue that the kind of progress now within reach could produce a tipping point, in the right direction. Once renewable energy becomes an obvious success and, yes, a powerful interest group, anti-environmentalism will start to lose its political grip. And an energy revolution in America would let us take the lead in global action. Salvation from climate catastrophe is, in short, something we can realistically hope to see happen, with no political miracle necessary. But failure is also a very real possibility. Everything is hanging in the balance.

#### Passing 2 degree threshold not inevitable – action now key to prevent the impact.

Romm 15. [Joe, Fellow at American Progress and is the Founding Editor of Climate Progress, Romm was acting assistant secretary of energy for energy efficiency and renewable energy, PhD in Physics @ MIT, "James Hansen Spells Out Climate Danger Of The ‘Hyper-Anthropocene’ Age," http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2015/07/27/3684564/james-hansen-climate-danger-hyper-anthropocene/]

James Hansen and 16 leading climate experts have written a must-read discussion paper on what humanity risks if it can’t keep total global warming below 2°C (3.6°F). The greatest risk they identify is “that multi-meter sea level rise would become practically unavoidable.” This is warning everyone should heed — not just because Hansen’s co-authors include some of the world’s top sea-level rise experts, such as Eric Rignot and Isabella Velicogna, but also given Hansen’s prescience on climate change dating back more than three decades. In 1981, Hansen led a team of NASA scientists in a seminal article in Science, “Climate Impact of Increasing Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide.” They warned: “Potential effects on climate in the 21st century include the creation of drought-prone regions in North America and central Asia as part of a shifting of climatic zones, erosion of the West Antarctic ice sheet with a consequent worldwide rise in sea level, and opening of the fabled Northwest Passage.” Wow. A 35-year-old peer-reviewed climate warning that is 100 percent dead on. Is there anyone else on the planet who can has been right for so long about climate change? Hansen and co-authors deftly dismiss those ill-informed Pollyannas who use Orwellian terms like “good Anthropocene.” They explain that we are far past “the era in which humans have contributed to global climate change,” which probably began a thousand years ago, and are now in “a fundamentally different phase, a Hyper-Anthropocene … initiated by explosive 20th century growth of fossil fuel use.” The “Hyper-Anthropocene” is a very good term to describe the unprecedented acceleration in global warming that humanity has set in motion with the explosive growth of fossil fuels and carbon pollution, as the recent science makes clear: Marcott et al. Temperature change over past 11,300 years (in blue, via Science, 2013) plus projected warming this century on humanity’s current emissions path (in red, via recent literature). The fact that warming as high as 2°C should be avoided at all costs is not news to people who pay attention to climate science, though it may be news to people who only follow the popular media. Indeed, 70 leading climate experts made that point crystal clear in a May report to the world’s leading governments that received embarrassingly little coverage from the mainstream media. As an important aside, Hansen and his 16 co-authors continue to be criticized for publicizing this paper prior to peer review. While I probably would have framed the paper’s launch somewhat differently — as an expert opinion and discussion piece coming from one or more major scientific institutions — I think this particular criticism is overblown. The mainstream media has generally failed to explain to the public the dire nature of our climate situation, repeatedly hitting the snooze alarm even as the world’s scientists shout “Wake Up” louder and louder in every peer-reviewed forum you can imagine. Hansen himself has tried every traditional way possible to inform the media and alert the public for 35 years. If this new piece is what it takes to get any non-Trump, non-Kardashian, coverage in our current media environment, I’m not certain how much criticism scientists deserve for playing by a set of rules they did not make, rules made by the very people nit-picking at them. The fact that 2°C total warming locks us in to sea level rise of 10 feet or more has been obvious for a while now. Heck, the National Science Foundation (NSF) issued a news release back in March 2012 on paleoclimate research with the large-type headline, “Global Sea Level Likely to Rise as Much as 70 Feet in Future Generations.” The lead author of that study explained, “The natural state of the Earth with present carbon dioxide levels is one with sea levels about 70 feet higher than now.” And a 2009 paper in Science showed that the last time CO2 levels were this high, it was 5° to 10°F warmer and seas were 75 to 120 feet higher. What has changed is our understanding of just how fast sea levels could rise. In 2014 and 2015, a number of major studies revealed that large parts of the Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets are unstable and headed toward irreversible collapse — and some parts may have already passed the point of no return. Another 2015 study found that global sea level rise since 1990 has been speeding up even faster than we knew. The key question is how fast sea levels rise this century and beyond. Coastal planners — and governments — need to know what the plausible worst-case is. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, in its 2013 Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) reviewing the scientific literature, threw up their hands. They have no idea how quickly the ice sheets can melt and contribute to sea level rise — so they assume it is very little and plead ignorance: “The basis for higher projections of global mean sea level rise in the 21st century has been considered and it has been concluded that there is currently insufficient evidence to evaluate the probability of specific levels above the assessed likely range.” And so the IPCC’s sea level rise range for 2100 is instantly obsolete and useless for governments and planners. A study that integrated expert opinion from 2013 on ice sheet melt with the IPCC findings concluded, “seas will likely rise around 80 cm” [31 inches] by 2100, and that “the worst case [only a 5% chance] is an increase of 180 cm [6 feet].” Since that expert opinion predated all of the bombshell findings of the last 18 months, the authors of that study noted, “We acknowledge that this may have changed since its publication. For example, it is quite possible that the recent series of studies of the Amundsen Sea Sector and West Antarctic ice sheet collapse will alter expert opinion.” Precisely. The main contribution Hansen et al. makes is to warn that “sea level rise of several meters in 50, 100 or 200 years,” which means as early as this century but in any case, sooner than expected. They also warn that even with the less than 1°C of warming we already have, ice sheet melt appears to be putting sea level rise on an exponential growth path that would bring 10 feet of sea level rise sooner, rather than later — even if we stabilize at 2°C total warming. Why does this matter? The authors explain, “The economic and social cost of losing functionality of all coastal cities is practically incalculable.” Heck, even the New York Times reported last year on the news of the accelerating collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet that “The heat-trapping gases could destabilize other parts of Antarctica as well as the Greenland ice sheet, potentially causing enough sea-level rise that many of the world’s coastal cities would eventually have to be abandoned.” Team Hansen just carries the analysis to its next logical phase and exposes the dangers of the IPCC’s willful underestimation of the problem: “Our analysis paints a different picture than IPCC (2013) for how this Hyper-Anthropocene phase is likely to proceed if GHG emissions grow at a rate that continues to pump energy at a high rate into the ocean. We conclude that multi-meter sea level rise would become practically unavoidable.” And what happens in the Hyper-Anthropocene? Social disruption and economic consequences of such large sea level rise could be devastating. It is not difficult to imagine that conflicts arising from forced migrations and economic collapse might make the planet ungovernable, threatening the fabric of civilization. That is especially true when you throw in the other part of Hansen’s prediction from 1981 that has come true — “the creation of drought-prone regions in North America and central Asia as part of a shifting of climatic zones.” Indeed, if this comprehensive new paper has one failing, it is in not discussing the myriad studies and evidence that warming-driven Dust-Bowlification threatens one third of the habited and arable landmass of the planet. I also think Hansen is pushing the speculative possibility of 10 feet of sea level rise this century harder than he needs to. Yes, there are many experts who consider that a real possibility now, so it would be imprudent to ignore the warning. But the fact is, on our current emissions path, we now appear to be headed toward the ballpark of 4-6 feet of sea level rise in 2100 — with seas rising up to one foot per decade after that — which should be more than enough of a “beyond adaptation” catastrophe to warrant strongest of action ASAP.

## === Trump Bad ===

### Trump Bad – 1NC

#### Trump win causes multiple scenarios of nuclear war.

* Proliferation
* CMR
* EU relations
* Protectionism
* Heg

O'Brien 16. [Dan, Chief economist at the Institute of International and European Affairs, columnist with Independent newspapers and senior fellow at UCD, “A Trump victory would mean global chaos” The Independent -- March 6 -- www.independent.ie/opinion/columnists/dan-obrien/a-trump-victory-would-mean-global-chaos-34515014.html]

Donald Trump cannot be taken seriously as a person, as a businessman or as a politician. But the possibility that he could be president of the most powerful country on planet must now be taken very seriously. After his victories in last week's primaries, the 69-year-old property billionaire is now likely to represent the Republican Party in November's presidential election. If his candidacy is confirmed at the Cleveland party convention in July, only Hillary Clinton will stand between him and the White House. That is an alarming prospect, for Ireland, Europe, the world, and for America itself. Although Trump still remains an outside bet for the US presidency, the potential impact is so great that the consequences need to be thought through and considered. It is always worth prefacing any discussion of the role of the US president by saying that the power wielded by the holder of that office is less than most Europeans believe. That is largely because prime ministers and presidents on this side of the Atlantic actually have a lot more influence over their domestic affairs than the US president has over American home affairs. This is particularly important in relation to a matter of great concern to Ireland: American corporation tax rules, which I'll return to presently. One reason for the more limited nature of US presidential power is the federal structure of the US. Many functions which national governments are responsible for in Europe have nothing to do with the president because they are decided by state governors and state parliaments. Another reason is the role of the other branches of the federal government. The US Supreme Court and Congress are much more powerful vis a vis the US president than their European counterparts are vis a vis prime ministers and cabinets. But for all the checks, balances and limitations of the role, a rogue US president would make the world a more dangerous and unstable place, and would almost certainly make it poorer too. Trump is as rogue as anyone in modern times who has got within shouting distance of the White House. The US president is the commander in chief of a military that is by far the most powerful in the world - American defence spending, of almost $600 billion annually, is greater than the next 12 largest national defence budgets combined. Whether people like it or not - in America or elsewhere - the US is the closest thing the world has to a policeman. It is not called the indispensable nation for nothing. Although it has at times misused and abused its enormous clout, America has been the most benign great power in history - as we in Ireland know better than most given how rarely Washington has ever leaned on governments in Dublin to do things that they haven't wanted to do. But if Trump attempted to do even half of the things he has proposed on the campaign trail in his self-proclaimed crusade to "make America great again", the use of US power would become much less benign very quickly. Having Trump in control of the US military would send shock waves around the world. It would deeply unsettle allies who depend on American security guarantees, which includes Ireland and the rest of our continent. It would do much more than unsettle rivals, potentially pushing them into an arms race with Trump's America. The effect of his taking control of America's armed forces would also have very serious repercussions at home. In the current issue of the neo-conservative magazine, the Weekly Standard, two high profile international affairs analysts - both men of the right - talk of a "crisis in civil-military relations" if Trump were in charge. Max Boot and Ben Steil of the Council on Foreign Relations describe what would be an effective mutiny if Trump followed through on his bellicose rhetoric, including the use of torture as a standard operating procedure, the killing of terrorists' families and the carpet-bombing of areas of the Middle East in which civilians live. They write: "Many military personnel would refuse to carry out orders so blatantly at odds with the laws of war; soldiers know that they could face prosecution under a future administration." Of most concern to us in Ireland is Trump's posture towards Europe. Since the 1940s there has been a large American military presence on our continent. It was this presence that preserved European democracy, first against the threat posed by fascism and then by communism. That presence continues to this day in the form of Nato, an entity which, it should be said, has been more important in maintaining peace in Europe than the EU. That presence is more important now than at any time in the past quarter century with what is often described as a "new cold war" between democratic Europe and Vladimir Putin's Russia. Trump, unsurprisingly, is a fan of Putin's autocratic ways. He has said he would get along "fine" with Russia, while frequently railing against allies of the US who benefit from its security guarantees - he has implied that he would extract billions of dollars from countries in which US military forces are stationed. This is doubly worrying for democratic Europe. That Trump feels a natural affinity for the bully in Kremlin is bad. Much worse is his inclination to withdraw from America's commitments to its allies. The merest hint that he would pull US forces out of Europe just after Russia's annexation of part of another sovereign state (Ukraine) would cause panic in central and eastern Europe. An already deteriorating security situation in the region would be made very much worse. Economically, Trump also promises huge change in America's role in the world, guided by the same isolationist instincts. He is an old-style protectionist who says he would bin free trade agreements with Canada and Mexico. Although he has yet to opine on the transatlantic relationship, given his crude views on trade - any country which sells more to America than America sells to it is trading unfairly - he is unlikely to champion openness across the Atlantic. If the painstaking and on-going negotiations to deepen those links, in the context of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), are not completed and ratified by the end of this year, there is very little chance that the deal would ever enter into force if Trump takes office.

### Trump Bad: Prolif – 2NC

#### Trump win causes cascading prolif.

Feith 16. [Douglas, Hudson Institute senior fellow, “Trump, america's word, and the bomb” National Review – March 14 -- www.nationalreview.com/article/432746/donald-trump-nukes-his-recklessness-would-increase-nuclear-threats

The Obama-Clinton team originally promised to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation. It wound up doing the opposite. We now have the prospect of a Donald Trump presidency. That would aggravate the problem. Eight years of left-wing American unreliability would then be followed by four (or eight) years of perceived right-wing unreliability. Faith in American security commitments would plummet — probably irretrievably. In many countries, pressure to “go nuclear” would increase, perhaps irresistibly. Nuclear weapons remain a life-and-death issue, though the candidates and the media are giving them little attention in the campaign. Americans shouldn’t want nuclear weapons spreading around the world. When new states get them — especially rogues such as North Korea and Iran — the risk of nuclear war increases. Even if America could avoid being drawn into such a war, catastrophic harm wouldn’t be confined to the warring parties. Since World War II, efforts to keep nuclear weapons from spreading have been astonishingly successful. When China got the bomb in 1964, it became only the fifth nuclear power, after the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France. No one but an extreme optimist at the time would have predicted that, 50 years hence, the nuclear “club” would have only three (or maybe four) additional members. India, Pakistan, and North Korea have all explosively tested nuclear weapons. Israel is widely believed to have them but hasn’t said so. Why did non-proliferation work so well? First, the United States and the Soviet Union actually shared interests in enforcing the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Neither wanted any other country to obtain nuclear weapons. And most countries understood that they were actually safer if they renounced such weapons in return for a similar renunciation by their neighbors. The second main reason is that our allies trusted U.S. security commitments. They felt confident sheltering under America’s so-called nuclear umbrella. Throughout the Cold War and beyond, U.S. presidents took pains to preserve that trust and confidence. To do so, they exerted leadership, showed loyalty to our allies, safeguarded U.S. credibility, and preserved American military power — in particular, the quality of our nuclear weapons. President Obama did speak passionately about reducing the risks of nuclear war, but his actions undermined his goals. He dithered as North Korea expanded its nuclear arsenal and the range of its missiles. He freed Iran of economic sanctions without requiring dismantlement of its nuclear-weapons facilities. Meanwhile, other policies — “leading from behind,” courtship of Russia’s President Putin, setting and then ignoring that “red line” in Syria, slashing defense spending, and neglecting U.S. nuclear-weapons infrastructure — all communicated to America’s friends abroad a lack of resolution, of loyalty, of understanding, and of power. The bad effects are plain to see. A May 7, 2015, Wall Street Journal headline reads, “Saudi Arabia Considers Nuclear Weapons to Offset Iran.” In South Korea on February 15 this year, Won Yoo-chul, the ruling party’s floor leader, spoke favorably in parliament of “peaceful nuclear and missile programs for the sake of self-defense.” He explained, “We cannot borrow an umbrella from a neighbor whenever it rains.” Similar statements abound elsewhere. Around the world, officials foresee with dread the possibilities of cascading nuclear proliferation. In the Middle East, not only Saudi Arabia but also the other Gulf states in addition to Turkey and Egypt could be candidates for going nuclear. In the Asia–Pacific, it could be Japan, Taiwan, Australia, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore, too. It’s bad enough that President Obama has sapped American credibility. If Republicans now put Donald Trump into the White House, they’ll abandon all hope of recovering it. Which brings us back to Donald Trump, who has had a lot to say about America’s commitments to friends. He scorns NATO. He praises President Putin as NATO quarrels with Russia over Ukraine. In his 2000 book The America We Deserve, Trump wrote that Europe’s conflicts were “not worth American lives,” and he touted the money America could save by “pulling back from Europe.” He scorns Japan. His statements on trade depict Japan as an enemy nation rather than an ally of paramount importance. He scorns Israel. He promises to be “neutral” between the Jewish state and enemies trying to destroy it. He scorns U.S. law-of-war obligations under the Geneva Conventions, as when he boasted he would mistreat detainees and kill civilians. He now recants those boasts, but he can’t erase the picture he has created of himself as intemperate and unprincipled. He has made an electoral strategy of contradicting himself, purposefully devaluing the currency of his words (it’s ironic that he berates the Chinese for devaluing their currency). He scoffs at accuracy and shows no shame when he says false things. His message is that, as a great man, he shouldn’t be held to anything he says. It’s bad enough that President Obama has sapped American credibility. If Republicans now put Donald Trump into the White House, they’ll abandon all hope of recovering it. Friends around the world would have to adjust to an America that’s erratic to the point of recklessness. Their loss of confidence in our reliability would make the world more perilous — and not just for them. Undermining our alliances will spawn various ills, including the spread of nuclear weapons. Even if Americans someday replaced President Trump with a responsible person of sound judgment, the harm would probably be irreversible.

#### Global nuclear war

Taylor 1 (Theodore, Chair – NOVA, Former Nuclear Weapons Designer and Former Deputy Director – Defense Nuclear Agency, “Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking, <http://www-ee.stanf> ord.edu/~hellman/Breakthrough/book/chapters/taylor.html)

Nuclear proliferation - be it among nations or terrorists - greatly increases the chance of nuclear violence on a scale that would be intolerable. Proliferation increases the chance that nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of irrational people, either suicidal or with no concern for the fate of the world. Irrational or outright psychotic leaders of military factions or terrorist groups might decide to use a few nuclear weapons under their control to stimulate a global nuclear war, as an act of vengeance against humanity as a whole. Countless scenarios of this type can be constructed. Limited nuclear wars between countries with small numbers of nuclear weapons could escalate into major nuclear wars between superpowers. For example, a nation in an advanced stage of "latent proliferation," finding itself losing a nonnuclear war, might complete the transition to deliverable nuclear weapons and, in desperation, use them. If that should happen in a region, such as the Middle East, where major superpower interests are at stake, the small nuclear war could easily escalate into a global nuclear war.

### Trump Bad: Heg – 2NC

#### Trump presidency guts US liberal order – tanks the economy and heg.

Wright 16. [Thomas, fellow and director of the Project on International Order and Strategy at Brookings, “Trump’s 19th Century Foreign Policy” Politico – January 20 -- www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/01/donald-trump-foreign-policy-213546?o=2]

One of the most common misconceptions about Donald Trump is that he is opportunistic and makes up his views as he goes along. But a careful reading of some of Trump’s statements over three decades shows that he has a remarkably coherent and consistent worldview, one that is unlikely to change much if he’s elected president. It is also a worldview that makes a great leap backward in history, embracing antiquated notions of power that haven’t been prevalent since prior to World War II. It is easy to poke fun at many of Trump’s foreign-policy notions—the promises to “take” Iraq’s oil, to extract a kind of imperial “tribute” from U.S. military allies like South Korea, his eagerness to emulate the Great Wall of China along the border with Mexico, and his embrace of old-style strongmen like Vladimir Putin. But many of these views would have found favor in pre-World War II—and even, in some cases, 19th century—America. In sum, Trump believes that America gets a raw deal from the liberal international order it helped to create and has led since World War II. He has three key arguments that he returns to time and again over the past 30 years. He is deeply unhappy with America’s military alliances and feels the United States is overcommitted around the world. He feels that America is disadvantaged by the global economy. And he is sympathetic to authoritarian strongmen. Trump seeks nothing less than ending the U.S.-led liberal order and freeing America from its international commitments. Trump has been airing such views on U.S. foreign policy for some time. He even spent $100,000 on a full-page ad in the New York Times in 1987 that had a message remarkably similar to what he is saying today. With his background and personality, Trump is so obviously sui generis that it is tempting to say his views are alien to the American foreign policy tradition. They aren’t; it is just that this strain of thinking has been dormant for some time. There are particular echoes of Sen. Robert Taft, who unsuccessfully ran for the Republican nomination in 1940, 1948 and 1952, and was widely seen as the leader of the conservative wing of the Republican Party. Taft was a staunch isolationist and mercantilist who opposed U.S. aid for Britain before 1941. After the war, he opposed President Harry Truman’s efforts to expand trade. Despite being an anti-communist, he opposed containment of the Soviet Union, believing that the United States had few interests in Western Europe. He opposed the creation of NATO as overly provocative. Taft’s speeches are the last time a major American politician has offered a substantive and comprehensive critique of America’s alliances. Trump’s populism, divisiveness and friendliness toward dictators is also reminiscent of Charles Lindbergh, once an American hero, who led the isolationist America First movement. In some areas, Trump’s views go back even further, to 19th-century high-tariff protectionism and every-country-for-itself mercantilism. He even invokes ancient Chinese history, telling Bill O’Reilly last August that his idea for a wall across the U.S.-Mexican border is feasible because “you know, the Great Wall of China, built a long time ago, is 13,000 miles. I mean, you're talking about big stuff.” \*\*\* Trump’s starting point and defining emotion on foreign policy is anger—not at America’s enemies, but at its friends. In a lengthy interview with Playboy magazine in 1990, Trump was asked what would a President Trump’s foreign policy be like. He answered: “He would believe very strongly in extreme military strength. He wouldn’t trust anyone. He wouldn’t trust the Russians; he wouldn’t trust our allies; he’d have a huge military arsenal, perfect it, understand it. Part of the problem is that we’re defending some of the wealthiest countries in the world for nothing. ... We’re being laughed at around the world, defending Japan.” He then elaborated on his skepticism of allies. “We Americans are laughed at around the world for losing a hundred and fifty billion dollars year after year, for defending wealthy nations for nothing, nations that would be wiped off the face of the earth in about 15 minutes if it weren’t for us. Our ‘allies’ are making billions screwing us.” Trump has long believed the United States is being taken advantage of by its allies. He would prefer that the United States not have to defend other nations, but, if it does, he wants to get paid as much as possible for it. No nation has come in for quite as much criticism from Trump as Japan. “It’s time for us to end our vast deficits by making Japan and others who can afford it pay,” Trump said in an open letter to the American people in 1987. “Our world protection is worth hundreds of billions of dollars to these countries and their stake in their protection is far greater than ours.” In the intervening years, he found new targets but he never let go of his antagonism toward the Japanese. On the campaign trail recently, he took the unusual step of promising to renegotiate the 1960 U.S.-Japan Treaty. “If somebody attacks Japan,” he said, “we have to immediately go and start World War III, OK? If we get attacked, Japan doesn’t have to help us. Somehow, that doesn’t sound so fair. Does that sound good?” He has also criticized other allies. In 2013, he said, “How long will we go on defending South Korea from North Korea without payment? When will they start to pay us?” He has made the point again on the campaign trail. In an interview with NBC, he said, “We have 28,000 soldiers on the line in South Korea between the madman and them. We get practically nothing compared to the cost of this.” Trump doesn’t let Europe off the hook, either. Several years ago, he wrote, “Pulling back from Europe would save this country millions of dollars annually. The cost of stationing NATO troops in Europe is enormous. And these are clearly funds that can be put to better use.” On the campaign trail, he complained that Germany is not carrying more of the burden of NATO and asked why the United States should lead on European security. The truth is very different. America’s allies do pay for a proportion of U.S. bases. But they do not pay the full cost. This is largely because those alliances also work to America’s benefit by providing it with prepositioned forces and regional stability. It would actually cost more to station troops in the United States and have to deploy them overseas in a crisis. But this rings hollow for Trump because he is not convinced that the United States should be doing it at all. So when Trump constantly utters what may be his favorite refrain on the stump—“Our country doesn’t win anymore”—he is referring to a view he’s held for decades. He wants to get paid as much as possible for all the things the United States does to secure the international system (never mind that this same system laid the groundwork for the greatest burst of prosperity in human history, with the United States as the main beneficiary). This includes, but is not limited to, alliances. As the world’s only superpower, one of America’s most important functions has been to ensure open access to what are called the global commons—the oceans, air and space. The U.S. Navy guarantees the openness of sea lanes for civilian trade, for example. But according to Trump, the United States should not do this for free. How much does he want? Well, in 1988, he told Oprah Winfrey that Kuwait should pay the United States 25 percent of their oil profits because the United States “makes it possible for them to sell it.” If he were president, he said, “the United States would make a hell of a lot of money from those nations that have been taking advantage of us.” In his 1987 letter, he wrote, “Tax these wealthy nations, not America.” What he has in mind is not just other nations increasing their defense spending a modest amount or sharing more of the burden. It is excessive tribute in exchange for protection. There’s a name for that. The sense that America is being ripped off by its international relationships also shapes his view on trade, which is probably the aspect of his foreign policy that has received the most attention. Trump says he is in favor of trade, but he has come out against every trade deal in living memory. He calls NAFTA a disaster and is a strident critic of the forthcoming Trans-Pacific Partnership. He wants to slap tariffs on other countries—again harking back to 19th-century protectionism—and negotiate bilateral deals. Most economists believe this would create a downward spiral in the global economy, but Trump does not seem to care. \*\*\* Of course, managing allies and partners is just one part of a foreign policy. The other is dealing with rivals and enemies. Trump has certainly cast himself as a ferocious critic of the Islamic State and Iran, but he has a curious view of two countries—Russia and China—that are not enemies but are perhaps better described as a rival and a competitor, respectively. For most makers of foreign policy, the challenge posed by Russia and China is to U.S. allies and the U.S.-led order, not to the U.S. homeland. But since Trump does not care as much about the allies, it is not surprising that he takes a more lenient view. There is another factor that endears authoritarian leaders to him—his respect for “strong” and “tough” leaders. In 1990, he told Playboy that the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, did not have a firm enough hand. Asked whether that meant he favored China’s crackdown on students, he said, “When the students poured into Tiananmen Square, the Chinese government almost blew it. Then they were vicious, they were horrible, but they put it down with strength. That shows you the power of strength. Our country is right now perceived as weak ... as being spit on by the rest of the world.” In 2015, Americans would find out that he had not changed his mind. In December, Putin was asked for his views on Trump. The Russian leader replied that Trump is “really brilliant and talented person, without any doubt. It’s not our job to judge his qualities, that’s a job for American voters, but he’s the absolute leader in the presidential race. ... He says he wants to move on to a new, more substantial relationship, a deeper relationship with Russia, how can we not welcome that? Of course we welcome that.” For most American politicians, an endorsement by a foreign leader, especially one who is hostile to the United States, is something that could spell political disaster. So when Trump appeared on “Morning Joe” the next day, the news media were expecting him to try to limit the damage, perhaps with a stark denunciation of Putin. Instead the exchange on “Morning Joe” went as follows: Trump: When people call you “brilliant” it’s always good, especially when the person heads up Russia. Joe Scarborough: Well, I mean, also is a person who kills journalists, political opponents and ... Willie Geist: Invades countries. Scarborough: ... and invades countries, obviously that would be a concern, would it not? Trump: He’s running his country, and at least he’s a leader, unlike what we have in this country. Scarborough: But, again: He kills journalists that don’t agree with him. Trump: Well, I think that our country does plenty of killing, too, Joe. It was a revealing exchange that did not end there. In the weeks that followed, Trump would openly say that he thought he would get along “just fine” with Russia. Putin could be a strong ally in the war against ISIL. For Putin, Trump would be a dream come true: an American president who possesses views commensurate with Putin’s own antiquated notion of great-power politics. Putin would no longer have to deal with a president committed to wide-open global trade, NATO and democracy close to his borders—the formula that won the Cold War. Trump and Putin also have a similar interpretation of recent history. In 1990, Trump believed Gorbachev had ruined Russia and destroyed its economy, which is exactly what Putin meant when he referred to the collapse of the Soviet Union as a tragedy. It’s not hard to imagine these two men sitting down to cut a deal, perhaps something like Putin offering to help Trump on ISIL and Iran in exchange for giving Putin a freer hand in Europe. Trump has said less about Chinese president Xi Jinping except to call him very smart. It is clear, though, that to him the main problem with China is not its aggressive actions in the South China Sea, its attempts to blunt U.S. power projection capabilities or its repression at home. Instead, Trump has made the alleged Chinese economic threat a core part of his stump speech. He accused China of devaluing its currency and even went so far as to say it created the issue of climate change to gain an advantage over U.S. manufacturing. He promised to slap tariffs on Chinese goods, although he is vague about how much (he told the New York Times it could be as high as 45 percent but subsequently rolled that back). U.S.-China relations are about more than economics, of course. Given Trump’s worldview, it is easy to see how a deal might be struck. China would offer President Trump an extraordinarily preferential economic deal and in exchange he would leave China alone to do as it wished in the South China Sea and East China Sea. After all, it would help American workers, at least in the short term. America’s allies would be upset, but a President Trump might even see that as a bonus. \*\*\* Thus, beneath the bluster, the ego and the showmanship is the long-considered worldview of a man who has had problems with U.S. foreign policy for decades. Trump has thought long and hard about America’s global role and he knows what he wants to do. There is virtually no chance that he would “tack back to the center” and embrace a conservative internationalist foreign policy. If he did get elected president, he would do his utmost to liquidate the U.S.-led liberal order by ending America’s alliances, closing the open global economy, and cutting deals with Russia and China. He would find this hard to do, not least because the entire U.S. foreign policy establishment would be opposed to him and he needs people to staff his National Security Council, State Department and Defense Department. But there is real power in the presidency, especially if there is clear guidance about the chief executive’s wishes. In any event, the mere fact that the American people would have elected somebody with a mandate to destroy the U.S.-led order might be sufficient to damage it beyond repair. After his election, other countries will immediately hedge against the risk of abandonment. There will be massive uncertainty around America’s commitments. Would Trump defend the Baltics? Would he defend the Senkaku Islands? Or Saudi Arabia? Some nations will give in to China, Russia and Iran. Others, like Japan, will push back, perhaps by acquiring nuclear weapons. Trump may well see such uncertainty as a positive. Putting everything in play would give him great leverage. But by undoing the work of Truman and his secretary of state, Dean Acheson, it would be the end of the American era. Some might think this is overstated. After all, there have been other presidents who broke with America’s allies and renegotiated previous commitments. In his first term, Richard Nixon was unwilling for the United States to bear the cost of upholding the Bretton Woods economic system, so he decided to unilaterally change the rules and make others pay, instead. In 1971, faced with inflation and stagnation, he canceled the convertibility of the dollar to gold without consulting his allies. This brought a dramatic end to Bretton Woods. Nixon and his secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, were also famously comfortable with strongmen and authoritarian regimes. But Trump is no Nixon. Nixon had an acute sense of America’s unique role in the international order, even if he pursued it differently than his predecessors. He strengthened America’s alliances and maintained its commitments. Detente with the Soviet Union and the opening with China were part of a sophisticated strategy to create geopolitical space to gain an advantage over the Soviets. Trump, by contrast, has offered no vision of a U.S.-led order except that he wants to end it. To understand Trump, in the end, we have to go back to Taft and Lindbergh. The difference is that, unlike Trump, Taft was not outside the mainstream of his time. Many people believed America was safe and that it did not matter who ran Europe. Also, unlike Trump, Taft was boring and struggled to break through the noise in several nomination battles. The more bombastic and controversial figure was Lindbergh, the man who became a household name as the first person to fly across the Atlantic. Lindbergh led a national movement that was divisive, xenophobic and sympathetic to Nazi Germany. The Republican primary of 2016 is shaping up to be the most important party primary since 1940. Lindbergh did not run, of course. But Taft was in with a strong chance. Only the fact that the field was badly divided created an unexpected opening for Wendell Willkie, an internationalist, to emerge as the nominee at the convention. Some of Roosevelt’s advisers were so relieved at Willkie’s nomination that they advised their boss he no longer had to run for an unprecedented—and controversial—third term. The reason we must revisit 1940 is that Republicans have struggled to find a new north star after Iraq. Except for Rand Paul—whose own brand of libertarian isolationism, unlike Trump’s, didn’t sit well with voters—the establishment candidates were not sure whether they still supported Bush 43’s strategy or opposed it. Most tried to muddle through with a critique of President Barack Obama. Marco Rubio stuck to the ambitious Bush 43 approach but found a declining market. Some, like Ted Cruz, tried to deal with the shift in sentiment by cozying up to pro-American dictators and abandoning support for democracy promotion. Cruz even used the isolationist term America First to describe his foreign policy. But Cruz seems to have thought little and said even less about America’s global role outside the Middle East. Ironically for someone with the reputation of being exceptionally smart, he lacks Trump’s detail and substance. It is in this vacuum that the long-dormant Taftian foreign policy has made an unexpected comeback in the hands of Trump. What happens next is anybody’s guess. It is hard to see how the Republican foreign policy establishment, which is steeped in American primacy and a U.S.-led international order, endorses an isolationist strain of thinking that has long been presumed dead. A split seems more likely than reconciliation. In any event, if Hillary Clinton secures the Democratic nomination, as expected, and Trump maintains his huge lead over the GOP field, a Clinton-Trump race would present two starkly different views about America’s global role. For the first time since World War II, Americans will be asked to give their view on the most fundamental question of U.S. foreign policy: Do they want a U.S.-led liberal order or not? Internationalists will have to explain all over again why the United States flourishes and benefits from a healthy international system. Taft and Lindbergh lost before, but it would be a mistake to underestimate the messenger this time.

### Trump Bad: Econ – 2NC

#### Trump win causes global economic collapse

Grenoble 16. [Ryan, HuffPo editor, “Donald Trump Poses As Big A Risk To Global Stability As Terrorism, Report Says” Huffington Post – March 17 -- www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/donald-trump-global-threat-economy\_us\_56eac656e4b0b25c91849874]

The rising threat of jihadi terrorism, a military clash over China’s expansionism in the South China Sea, and Donald Trump as president — one of these things is not like the others, and it’s not the one you’d expect. According to a report published by The Economist Intelligence Unit on Thursday, the prospect of conflict in the South China Sea poses a lesser risk to the world’s economic stability than the other two threats. Yes — that means the EIU, a research and analysis group associated with The Economist magazine, believes a Trump presidency would be just as risky as the threat of jihadi terrorism. Both threats are tied at sixth place on a list of the world’s top 10 biggest risks to the global economy. (The possibility of a hard Chinese economic crash ranked first and a renewed cold war ranked second. Meanwhile, a clash in the South China Sea tied for eighth with a U.K. vote to leave the European Union.) The EIU’s report calculates risk intensity on a 25-point scale, taking into account both the probability that an event will occur and the impact it will have if it comes to pass. The prospect of Trump winning the U.S. presidential election and the rising threat of jihadi terrorism destabilizing the global economy are both “high impact” threats that have a “moderate probability” of occurring, according to the EIU. “In the event of a Trump victory, his hostile attitude to free trade, and alienation of Mexico and China in particular, could escalate rapidly into a trade war,” the analysis notes. “His militaristic tendencies towards the Middle East (and ban on all Muslim travel to the US) would be a potent recruitment tool for jihadi groups, increasing their threat both within the region and beyond.” The EIU further condemned the presidential candidate for his “exceptionally right-wing stance on the Middle East and jihadi terrorism, including, among other things, advocating the killing of families of terrorists and launching a land incursion into Syria to wipe out IS (and acquire its oil).” The report says it’s doubtful that Trump will defeat his likely Democratic challenger, Hillary Clinton, but concedes that it isn’t impossible. Should Trump win the presidency, the report predicts that “virulent” opposition from Democrats and the Republican establishment would limit his ability to pass more radical policies, but warns that “such internal bickering will also undermine the coherence of domestic and foreign policymaking.”

#### Economic decline causes global war

Royal 10 (Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction – U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises”, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods ofeconomic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding thatrhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and theoften bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such aseconomic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power(see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances,increasing the risk of miscalculation **(**Feaver, 1995). Alternatively,even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflictas a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that **'**future expectation of trade' is asignificant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states**.** He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However,if the expectations of future trade decline**,** particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources,the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises couldpotentially be thetriggerfor decreased trade expectationseither on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third,others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess(2002)find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly duringperiods ofeconomic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, thepresence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other**. (**Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89)Economic decline hasalsobeen linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism **(**Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government."Diversionary theory" suggests **that,** when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sittinggovernments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag'effect**.** Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest thatthe tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic statesthan autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office dueto lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing thatperiods of weak economic performance in the UnitedStates, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflictat systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

### Ext: Trump Kills Econ

#### Trump Win Devastates Trade, Econ and US leadership –his follow through is real and shreds general resiliency – turns case and decks engagement with China

Schoen, 16 --- Doug Schoen, longtime political strategist, columnist @ forbes, Fox News contributor and author of several books, including the recently published The End of Authority: How a Loss of Legitimacy and Broken Trust are Endangering our Future“General Election Trade-Offs”, Forbes, 5/13, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougschoen/2016/05/13/trade-protectionism-and-the-2016-election/#284f747e26bf>

Clinton’s gaffe epitomizes broader issues with Clinton’s candidacy and messaging. That said, it also means a lot more. It’s part of the debate over trade and protectionism that has become central to the 2016 election thanks to Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders’ economic populism. With Clinton’s most recent loss to Sanders in West Virginia, a state she carried in the 2008 Democratic primary by over 40 points, significant questions remain about the former Secretary of State’s ability to appeal to Rust Belt Americans. Clinton’s struggles are particularly evident among white Americans without college degrees, many of whom have long worked in manufacturing and coal mining industries. Exit polls from the May 10 Democratic contest in West Virginia demonstrate troubling realities for Clinton: among West Virginia Democratic primary voters, over 30% say they would choose Trump in a general election match-up between the businessman and Clinton. Most intriguingly, 44% of Sanders’ supporters report they would vote for Trump in the general election as well, while only 23% said they would vote Clinton. In fact, these patterns are evident across America’s Rust Belt, especially in states like Michigan. Similar to exit polling from West Virginia, data from the Michigan primary more than two months ago also helps identify the shared base of support between Trump and Sanders. The state-wide results clearly showed Trump’s popularity among blue-collar white voters and Clinton’s vulnerabilities with that same group – a foreboding sign for a general election match-up come November. Exit polls found that a majority of all Michigan voters believe trade with other nations “takes away U.S. jobs,” and among Republicans, Trump won 45% of those respondents. On the Democratic side, Sanders won these voters by a margin of 58% to Clinton’s 41% for Clinton. It follows that while Clinton may seem to be a part of the establishment which supported free trade in the past, the shift in the electorate toward Trump and Sanders’ brand protectionism is clear. On the surface, this makes sense. The economy has been improving, but it’s still a weak recovery. Wages are stagnant and Americans aren’t optimistic. Over 60% don’t believe in the American dream anymore. A candidate like Donald Trump, who believes Americans should “no longer surrender this country, or its people, to the false song of globalism,” would succeed in this political environment. Regardless of whether or not the consequences of globalism are real, Trump’s ability to cultivate voters’ deeply seeded economic concerns has elevated him to the position he enjoys today. As the field narrows to a Trump and Clinton general election match-up, it becomes ever more critical to understand the next president’s role in shaping the United States global economic position. For both Clinton and Trump, trade agreements are possibly the most important aspect of this issue. Voters may presume that as Clinton tacks closer to the middle for the general election, she will come around to the TPP. Trump, however, is a larger question. Based on his rhetoric, Trump is hell bent on bringing manufacturing jobs back to the United States and appears willing to turn his back on international economic partnerships formed over recent decades. To this end, a number of economists have come out against Trump warning that his tariffs would hurt Americans greatly. The National Foundation for American Policy writes, “We find that a Trump tariff proposal against all countries would cost U.S. consumers $459 billion annually and $2.29 trillion over five years. Our analysis finds that the Trump tariffs would manifest themselves as a 30.5 percent increase in the price of competing domestic producer goods and therefore, as a cut in real wages.” Furthermore, exports to Mexico, China and Japan – the targets of Trump’s rhetoric – would fall an astounding 78%. The report concludes, “Then the results would be truly catastrophic for the poor,” the report said. “It would be as if the United States imposed a new tax of 53 percent on the lowest 10 percent income decile and a 20 percent tax on the next lowest decile. It would be the equivalent to an 11 percent flat tax on the after-tax income of U.S. workers.” That doesn’t sound like what Trump is promising Americans. Kenneth Rogoff, the former chief economist for the IMF, offers that even though Sanders is more appealing than Trump, his rhetoric is just as dangerous. Case in point: his rallying against TPP and even forcing Clinton, who was a supporter of the deal, to turn against it. The TPP has its flaws, but it does a lot of good including opening up Asian markets to Latin America. He also regularly points out that Clinton supported NAFTA and blames it for killing thousands of jobs. But he never mentions that it forced Mexico to lower its tariffs. Holding strong to the center on trade will be a central task for Clinton in November. I’m not sure how many Trump supporters will care that economists are telling them his plans will hurt the economy and our global standing because “American first” lines of argumentation are doing so well this cycle. But that doesn’t make it any less critical that we get it right on this issue. Trade and protectionism matters as much as tax and foreign policy.

#### Overwhelms any econ link – directly triggers escalating trade wars

Ip 16. [Greg, Chief Economics Commentator, “Powerful Pair: Protectionism and the Presidency” Wall Street Journal – March 9 -- www.wsj.com/articles/powerful-pair-protectionism-and-the-presidency-1457544702]

With an overvalued dollar and a growing trade deficit, the Republican president needed to fulfill an election promise to protect manufacturers from foreign imports. So he stunned the world by imposing a 10% across-the-board tariff on imports. A scene from a future Donald Trump presidency? Actually, it’s what Richard Nixon did in 1971. As Mr. Trump closes in on the Republican presidential nomination by promising voters he’ll crack down on foreign competitors, the rest of the world should take stock of the extraordinary power a president has to take the country in a protectionist direction. Mr. Trump says he’s for free trade and not a protectionist. Nonetheless, he has threatened steep tariffs on imports from China and Mexico and disparages trade pacts, from the North American Free Trade Agreement to the signed but unratified 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership. Many of Mr. Trump’s policy positions are inconsistent, seemingly formed on the fly. But his antipathy to foreign trading partners is deep-rooted. In 1987, he wrote that Japan became wealthy “by screwing the United States with a self-serving trade policy.” In 1999, while flirting with a presidential run, he called Nafta “a disaster.” The Korea-U.S. free trade pact, he said in 2010, was “something that only a moron would sign.” Moreover, unlike his views on torture or banning Muslims from entering the U.S., Mr. Trump’s position on trade is not an outlier. Democratic candidate Bernie Sanders is equally skeptical of free trade, lambasting front-runner Hillary Clinton last Sunday for supporting “virtually every one of the disastrous trade agreements written by corporate America.” Mrs. Clinton and Republicans Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio have all backed away from past support for the TPP. Protectionist actions are on the rise globally, according to a tally compiled by Global Trade Alert, a watchdog group, led by India and Russia. Britons will soon vote on whether to leave the European Union. In short, a protectionist president would suit the temper of the times. The Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930, which sharply raised import tariffs and worsened the Depression’s impact on trade, is often cited as a cautionary tale about protectionism. But in one respect the analogy is flawed. Smoot-Hawley was largely the product of horse trading between individual legislators to protect favored industries. As a result, in 1934, Congress decided to forgo “the business of tariff logrolling,” as trade historian Doug Irwin writes, and delegated most authority over tariff negotiations to the president. This division of power has insulated the world trading system from Congress’s parochial tendencies. By the same token, it puts the world more at the mercy of presidents whose latitude over trade has steadily expanded. Presidential appointees at the Commerce Department adjudicate complaints that foreign imports are being illegally sold at below cost, below home-country price or subsidized. They almost always find in favor of the domestic industry. Whether those findings actually merit penalties is up to the independent International Trade Commission, whose members are nominated by the president and confirmed by Congress. While the candidates haven’t delved into the details of trade enforcement, a president has enormous leverage through several broader powerful tools, such as Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which authorizes the president to take “all appropriate and feasible steps” against any “unjustifiable or unreasonable” discrimination against U.S. exports, and Section 201, under which he can seek to protect industry from surging imports. Mr. Trump has promised to brand China a “currency manipulator.” The relevant legislation specifies no penalty—only consultations with the alleged manipulator. Mr. Trump says that would “bring China to the bargaining table” or “face tough countervailing duties.” There’s precedent for such tactics. Four months after Mr. Nixon imposed his import surcharge, the rest of the world agreed to devalue the dollar. In the 1980s, Ronald Reagan forced Japan to accept voluntary restraints on automobile exports. Mr. Trump claims an import tariff could force Mexico to pay for a border wall. Some have speculated he could seek national-security justification under one of two laws: Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, or the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, previously used to embargo trade with Nicaragua and Iran. The main deterrent to such unilateral trade barriers is the threat of retaliation under one of the many trade treaties to which the U.S. belongs. After George W. Bush slapped tariffs on steel in 2002 under Section 201, the World Trade Organization granted the European Union the right to retaliate. Mexico could drag the U.S. to a Nafta tribunal. The U.S. could stand fast and accept retaliation. Though the law is murky, a president can probably pull the U.S. out of the WTO or Nafta on six months’ notice, says Gary Horlick, a veteran trade lawyer, though that would leave in place many of the laws enacting their provisions, such as on tariff cuts and intellectual-property rights.

### Trump Bad: CMR – 2NC

#### Trump causes a CMR crisis

O’Brien 3-6-16 - economist at the Institute of International and European Affairs, columnist with Independent newspapers and senior fellow at UCD

Dan, A Trump victory would mean global chaos, the Independent, http://www.independent.ie/opinion/columnists/dan-obrien/a-trump-victory-would-mean-global-chaos-34515014.html

The effect of his taking control of America's armed forces would also have very serious repercussions at home. In the current issue of the neo-conservative magazine, the Weekly Standard, two high profile international affairs analysts - both men of the right - talk of a "crisis in civil-military relations" if Trump were in charge.¶ Max Boot and Ben Steil of the Council on Foreign Relations describe what would be an effective mutiny if Trump followed through on his bellicose rhetoric, including the use of torture as a standard operating procedure, the killing of terrorists' families and the carpet-bombing of areas of the Middle East in which civilians live.¶ They write: "Many military personnel would refuse to carry out orders so blatantly at odds with the laws of war; soldiers know that they could face prosecution under a future administration."

#### Extinction.

Fried 12. [Dean’s Teaching Fellow-Johns Hopkins, "Rethinking Civilian Control: Nuclear Weapons, American Constitutionalism and War-Making," For Presentation at the 2012 Millennium Conference, London School of Economics and Political Science, October 21 -- millenniumjournal.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/fried-lse-paper.docx?]

This material contextual dynamic is also illustrated by a novel shift in civil military relations in which the professionalism of the military cannot be relied upon, and rather, the executive must be active and assertive in controlling the very weapons the military would traditionally be entrusted to use. This Assertive Civil-Military Control as defined by Feaver, using Huntington as a foil, is a method that does not presuppose that the military will conform to the values and more importantly the orders of civilian society or that the officer corps will understand civilian leadership. Nor does it place its trust in military professionalism to restrain itself. As it relates to control over nuclear weapons, assertive civilian nuclear control is a means by which the military is restrained in its ability to use the nuclear weapons in its possession, by keeping custody of the ability for launch out of their control. It is an emphasis on the ‘never’ end of the always/never problematique, a means by which the weapons will not be fired unless given the order by the civilian command. While in possession of the military, the weapons themselves cannot be armed or used because of the method of positive control. The need for the control of such weapons outside the bounds of what Huntington called military professionalism, is a corollary of the increased costs of war and a heightened fear of military accidents or unauthorized uses. In the aftermath of a major nuclear exchange, in as little as 500 detonations, the planet becomes uninhabitable. As argued by the astrophysicist Carl Sagan, global nuclear war would not only bring about the physical destruction of the countries launching such weapons, but would very likely **end life on earth** as we know it. As he writes it, “cold, dark, radioactivity, pyrotoxins and ultraviolet light following a nuclear war…would imperil every survivor on the planet.” Sagan raises the specter that even a massive disarming first strike by either superpower at the time might be sufficient to wipe out all life. Therefore, the increasing speed of delivery in conjunction with the rapidly expanding scope of nuclear destruction necessitates further positive control measures to prevent the military from unauthorized use. This in turn reinforces the unchecked power of the president, for it would be only he who can give the order to strike.

### Trump Bad: Multilateralism – 2NC

#### A GOP win decks multilateralism

**Adams 2015** - professor of international relations at American University's School of International Service  
Gordon and Richard Sokolsky, "The GOP Plan to Bring Back a Unipolar World," Dec 30, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/30/rubio-bush-republican-presidential-politics/

Preserving the unipolar moment Republican rhetoric is replete with calls to restore the leadership of the United States, as the most powerful, indispensable, and exceptional nation. Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) captures this view well, though he is not alone. For Rubio, the United States is the natural, inevitable, and indispensable leader. “America plays a part on the world stage for which there is no understudy. When we fail to lead with strength and principle, no other country, friend or foe, is willing or able to take our place. And the result is chaos,” Rubio says on his campaign website. “While America did not intend to become the world’s indispensable power, that is exactly what our economic and political freedoms have made us. The free nations of the world still look to America to champion our shared ideals,” he adds. For Sen. Ted Cruz, this standing gives the United States a dominant position. “It is dangerous to dictators like [Vladimir] Putin when Americans remember their exceptionalism,” Cruz wrote in an opinion piece for CNN. “The unique combination of power and principle that has made the United States the greatest force for good on the planet has historically posed a grave threat to repressive bullies.” The call to restore American leadership and its dominant international role is a consistent theme for Republican presidential candidates. It is a dangerous one, because the world has changed in a fundamental way. The United States is simply no longer a global goliath bestriding a unipolar world. Turkey no longer jumps when America says frog. Putin is unmoved by U.S. demands. China is clearly expanding its own role, creating international economic organizations that include most of its closest allies but not the United States. The raw measures of military and economic power that are typically invoked to rebut the relative change in global power are not easily converted into the currency of diplomatic leverage. In contrast to the Republican message, in today’s world, power is often “situational,” assembled by coalitions of like-minded countries with the capacity, resolve, and resources, to take effective action to advance shared interests. American leadership looks different in this world; it is most effective when the United States helps mobilizes these multilateral partnerships, and allows others to take ownership of the solution. Insisting that the United States take the lead in international events, crises, and conflicts, would be counter-productive. An elusive quest to restore a unipolar world order run from Washington leads to behavior at odds with the requirements of effective diplomacy in a rebalanced, multipolar world. Moreover, asserting U.S. control, as the GOP field suggests, vastly overstates the degree to which we are responsible for or could change global realities and problems. To recognize this reality is not declinism or abandoning the field, as Rubio suggests — it is realism. His view, in addition, is inconsistent with popular opinion: while Americans support a strong military, they are reluctant to incur the risks and costs of being a global cop. Indeed, according to opinion surveys, the public prefers disengagement from or avoidance of arenas of military conflict. And it overlooks the extent to which overreaction and hegemonic overreach over the past 15 years — the invasion of Iraq, CIA renditions to other countries for interrogation, expanded NSA global surveillance, to name but a few — has undermined the willingness of other countries to welcome U.S. leadership. Military power is not the answer The key ingredient of Republican national security policy is the “restoration” of U.S. military power, and its more vigorous assertion abroad. In a March 2015 column he authored with Sen. Tom Cotton, Rubio linked force reductions directly to diminished U.S. leadership. “Our force reductions have been felt throughout the world — by our friends and our enemies. They have presented not just a crisis of readiness for America, but also a perilous strategic weakness. Our adversaries have been emboldened by what they perceive as our diminished military presence.” Similarly, Jeb Bush has argued that any sound plan to defeat IS and other threats hinges on our military strength. “Let that slip away, and what would America be in world affairs, except one more well-intentioned voice at the United Nations? In any effort of ours to overcome violence and secure peace, a winning strategy depends on maintaining unequaled strength, and we can never take it for granted.” Chris Christie offers an argument of pre-emption: “A strong military doesn’t just help us to deal with the threats we face. It helps eliminate them before we even see them.” The argument that U.S. military power has declined and that its revival is the key to restoring our global leadership is false. This is because this idea deliberately understates current U.S. military capabilities. The Republicans conveniently avoid the reality that U.S. defense spending is greater than the combined defense budgets of the next eight countries with the highest levels of defense spending. Today, U.S. defense budgets are $150 billion higher than the Cold War average (in constant dollars). This spending buys an impressive, incomparable military. Unlike any other country, the United States maintains a network of globe-girdling alliances and more than 800 military facilities overseas. The United States is the only country in the world that can deploy troops, fly aircraft, and sail naval ships around the world, supported by a truly global network of communications, logistics, transportation, and intelligence agencies. No other country has such a capability. The Republican argument is also misleading. It substitutes measures of military capability and the assertive use of military force for sound foreign policy judgment. U.S. military power is useful and necessary for many good things: it can help maintain a favorable balance of global power, support freedom of navigation, deter aggression against allies and friends, demonstrate the credibility of U.S. security commitments, respond to humanitarian disasters, provide critical support for American diplomacy, and, embedded in a broader policy context, contribute to the struggle with terrorist organizations.

### AT: Checks and Balances

#### No checks on foreign policy

Drezner 16. [Daniel, American professor of international politics at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, “The awesome destructive power of the next president” Washington Post – March 10 -- https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/03/10/the-awesome-destructive-power-of-the-next-president/]

As Donald Trump marches towards the GOP nomination, it’s worth pointing out two stories from this past week about what the next president can do as the foreign policy leader of the nation. In The Atlantic, Conor Friedersdorf discusses what the president can do on the security front without any congressional constraint… and walks away terrified: Let me put things more starkly: Under current precedent, the commander in chief can give a secret order to kill an American citizen with a drone strike without charges or trial. Should Donald Trump have that power?… Before moving into a new house, parents of small children engage in child-proofing. Before leaving the White House, Obama should engage in tyrant-proofing. For eight years, he has evinced a high opinion of his own ability to exercise power morally, even in situations where Senator Obama thought that the president should be restrained. At this point, better to flatter his ego than to resist it. You’ll be gone soon, Mr. President, and for all our disagreements, I think your successor is highly likely to be less trustworthy and more corruptible than you were. Meanwhile, in the Wall Street Journal, Greg Ip looks at the protectionist powers of a sitting president… and walks away terrified: As Mr. Trump closes in on the Republican presidential nomination by promising voters he’ll crack down on foreign competitors, the rest of the world should take stock of the extraordinary power a president has to take the country in a protectionist direction…. While the candidates haven’t delved into the details of trade enforcement, a president has enormous leverage through several broader powerful tools, such as Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which authorizes the president to take “all appropriate and feasible steps” against any “unjustifiable or unreasonable” discrimination against U.S. exports, and Section 201, under which he can seek to protect industry from surging imports…. Though the law is murky, a president can probably pull the U.S. out of the WTO or Nafta on six months’ notice, says Gary Horlick, a veteran trade lawyer, though that would leave in place many of the laws enacting their provisions, such as on tariff cuts and intellectual-property rights. So, in other words, over time the president has amassed significant levers of power with fewer checks and balances than Americans commonly realize. [To be fair, there have been valid reasons for some of these shifts in power from the legislative to the executive. If you think presidents are bad at foreign economic policy, you haven’t paid attention to legislative history. But still, this is a thing.] As much as Obama decried overreaching executive power as a candidate in 2008, he has become part of the problem as president. This president has concentrated control over foreign policy within the White House to a far greater degree than anyone since Richard Nixon. In response to an actively hostile GOP-controlled Congress, Obama has simply bypassed the legislative branch through executive action. While many of Obama’s supporters embraced this strategy in the face of an implacable Congress, it creates an office ripe for abuse if, say, a vainglorious blowhard were to get elected.

#### Zero effective checks on Trump presidency.

Rubin 5-31-16. [Jennifer, Right Turn blogger for The Post, "Realistic about the damage Trump can do" WaPo -- https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2016/05/31/realistic-about-the-damage-trump-can-do/]

On Sunday, Majority Leader Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) tried to reassure voters about Donald Trump. “[W]what protects us in this country against big mistakes being made is the structure, the Constitution, the institutions,” he said. “No matter how unusual a personality may be who gets elected to office, there are constraints in this country. You don’t get to do anything you want to. So I’m very optimistic about America. I’m not depressed about the nature of the debate.” Then on CBS’s This Morning, McConnell gave some advice to Donald Trump: “I’d like to see a more studious approach.” He continued, “I think that winning the White House is about more than just entertaining a large audience. I think the American people would also like to see him fill in the blanks.” We would like to think McConnell is correct. If Trump studies up on some issues and uses scripted speeches, he’ll be fine. If he gets elected, Congress will stop him from doing anything too nutty. That sounds good, but it’s not remotely true. As for studying, Trump seems neither inclined to read even briefing materials or learn from those more knowledgeable. Even his scripted speeches, most notably his foreign policy remarks (with the Russian ambassador front and center), are incoherent. He does not attract the best and the brightest to read the speeches; and, moreover, they still reflect his dangerous isolationist and protectionist instincts. A scripted Trump is still Trump. McConnell is right about one thing: Trump’s ad-lib interviews are worse, and generally disturbing. His impromptu attacks on fellow Republicans don’t vanish simply because he gave an energy speech a few days earlier. As for the issue of governance, the Constitution does not protect the American people from a commander-in-chief with atrocious judgment or a president who acts unilaterally, eviscerating the limits on the executive. That was the lesson of the Obama years, no? If the president is bent on misusing the executive branch (e.g. the IRS), the remedy is usually after the fact. Former CIA and NSA director Michael Hayden reminds us that Trump’s rhetoric helps the enemy’s recruitment. It can likewise demoralize friends. The president matters, more than any other individual on the planet, when it comes to our safety, security and prosperity and to that of the Free World. Moreover, Trump repeatedly shows contempt for the judiciary, as he did over the Memorial Day holiday in excoriating the judge in the Trump U litigation who ordered documents to be unsealed. He and his spokesman suggest the judge is biased against Trump because she is Hispanic. Does anyone think he would be more inclined to respect courts if he wins? Surely not. Even worse, McConnell’s own troops won’t be all that inclined to stop Trump. If Trump is extracting pledges of support now, imagine what he’ll do when he has the powers of the White House at his disposal. You’ll have Republican senators assisting Trump as he wreaks havoc on the budget, our tax code and more. And, of course, with Trump at the top of the ticket there is a very good chance Sen. Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.), not McConnell, will be majority leader. McConnell has a job to do as majority leader. He has members he wants reelected and who cannot go to war with Trump. To his credit, McConnell is avoiding fawning over Trump, unlike some fellow Republicans who seem bent on destroying their credibility. Nevertheless, the rest of us should take his soothing words with a large grain of salt. A narcissist with an authoritarian streak, one surrounded by shady characters with foreign connections and unable to separate Internet rumor from fact can do great damage to America’s economy, military and assorted institutions. He’s already done untold damage to the political debate, rendering it even more vulgar and nasty than it was before he threw his hat into the ring. It’s why it is critical to keep him out of the White House.

### Ext: Trump 🡪 NW

#### Trump is the greatest risk for conflict-escalation

Boot 16. [Max, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, "Why Trump is a Security Threat" Commentary Magazine -- March 27 -- https://www.commentarymagazine.com/foreign-policy/why-trump-is-a-national-security-threat/]

Trump thinks that lack of predictability is a virtue while ignoring the need for predictability in international affairs. In the Times interview, asked for policy specifics regarding China policy, he said, “There’s such, total predictability of this country, and it’s one of the reasons we do so poorly. You know, I’d rather not say that. I would like to see what they’re doing.” One suspects that his praise of unpredictability is merely a tactic so that he doesn’t have to provide answers that he doesn’t have. But if he’s serious, he is trying to emulate Richard Nixon’s “madman” theory. Nixon thought that by suggesting he was capable of anything, even irrational acts, he would coerce North Vietnam into ending its aggression against South Vietnam. It didn’t work then, and won’t work now. There is, of course, a case to be made for some imprecision in deterrence — to let the enemy wonder what exactly you would do in a crisis. But there is also a strong case to be made for general predictability so as to avoid a catastrophe that could have been averted if the adversary had a better read of your intentions. World War I started in large part because Wilhelmine Germany did not expect Great Britain to come to the defense of Belgium and France. The Korean War started in part because Dean Acheson said that South Korea was outside the U.S. defense perimeter, thereby inviting Kim Il-sung to invade. Trump seems to be unaware of these historical errors and appears bent on repeating them. Trump can’t be trusted on Israel. He gave an OK speech to AIPAC — to be more exact, he read an OK ghost-written speech — but the Times interview showed his heart isn’t in it. At one point he refused to commit to a “two-state solution” to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. “I’m not saying anything. What I’m going to do is, you know, I specifically don’t want to address the issue because I would love to see if a deal could be made.” Trump doesn’t seem to realize that the alternative to a two-state solution is a one-state solution that would mean the end of Israel’s existence as a Jewish state. Presumably, someone clued him in between his first and second conversations with the Times, because the second time around he retreated to his AIPAC stance: “Basically I support a two-state solution on Israel. But the Palestinian Authority has to recognize Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state. Have to do that.” What will he say tomorrow? Who knows? After all, he stresses his unpredictability, which would leave every American ally, including Israel, guessing as to whether he would stand with them in the clutch. In sum, it is hard to come away from his Times interview — which comes just a week after his interview with the Washington Post editorial board, which was just as bizarre — without concluding that Trump is singularly unqualified to be commander-in-chief. Handing him the nuclear codes would be the riskiest and most irresponsible act imaginable. With Trump in command, our enemies would have a field day — Moscow and Beijing must be licking their chops at his desire to abandon U.S. allies in Europe and Asia — and our friends would face mortal threats. If that isn’t the single biggest threat to U.S. security, I don’t know what is.

#### Trump causes global extinction.

Cownie 16. [Richard, BA in Mathematics from Cambridge University and Masters of Science in Computer Systems Engineering @ Edinburgh University, Quora, February 20, “What is the worst thing that could happen if Donald Trump becomes President?,” https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-worst-thing-that-could-happen-if-Donald-Trump-becomes-President#!n=42]

The worst thing would be a major nuclear war, leading to a Nuclear winter with 10 or more years essentially without sunlight, obviously causing total crop failure, exhaustion of food stocks, mass starvation, and mass extinction of maybe 80-90% of all species. Civilization would be destroyed. I can imagine that a few small groups of humans might manage to hide away in favorable locations with enough stocks of canned/dried food until the atmosphere clears up. But I wouldn't want to bet on it - and obviously in addition to the appalling cold and the lack of food, there would also be considerable radiation from fallout in most areas. Given Trump's complete lack of military or foreign policy experience, his apparent desire to appoint other business/financial people with similar background, and his well-known pattern of aggressive attacks against anyone he perceives as an enemy, and disregard for customary (or even legal) constraints on behavior, I have to think that allowing Trump to control nuclear weapons would significantly increase this risk. The risk of nuclear war triggered by an accident or unintentional launch is already way higher than I'm comfortable with.

## === Trump Bad: Alliances ===

### Asia Prolif 2NC

#### Trump collapses the global order and leads to nuclear war

Feith 16. [Douglas, Hudson Institute senior fellow, “Trump, america's word, and the bomb” National Review – March 14 -- www.nationalreview.com/article/432746/donald-trump-nukes-his-recklessness-would-increase-nuclear-threats

The Obama-Clinton team originally promised to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation. It wound up doing the opposite. We now have the prospect of a Donald Trump presidency. That would aggravate the problem. Eight years of left-wing American unreliability would then be followed by four (or eight) years of perceived right-wing unreliability. Faith in American security commitments would plummet — probably irretrievably. In many countries, pressure to “go nuclear” would increase, perhaps irresistibly. Nuclear weapons remain a life-and-death issue, though the candidates and the media are giving them little attention in the campaign. Americans shouldn’t want nuclear weapons spreading around the world. When new states get them — especially rogues such as North Korea and Iran — the risk of nuclear war increases. Even if America could avoid being drawn into such a war, catastrophic harm wouldn’t be confined to the warring parties. Since World War II, efforts to keep nuclear weapons from spreading have been astonishingly successful. When China got the bomb in 1964, it became only the fifth nuclear power, after the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France. No one but an extreme optimist at the time would have predicted that, 50 years hence, the nuclear “club” would have only three (or maybe four) additional members. India, Pakistan, and North Korea have all explosively tested nuclear weapons. Israel is widely believed to have them but hasn’t said so. Why did non-proliferation work so well? First, the United States and the Soviet Union actually shared interests in enforcing the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Neither wanted any other country to obtain nuclear weapons. And most countries understood that they were actually safer if they renounced such weapons in return for a similar renunciation by their neighbors. The second main reason is that our allies trusted U.S. security commitments. They felt confident sheltering under America’s so-called nuclear umbrella. Throughout the Cold War and beyond, U.S. presidents took pains to preserve that trust and confidence. To do so, they exerted leadership, showed loyalty to our allies, safeguarded U.S. credibility, and preserved American military power — in particular, the quality of our nuclear weapons. President Obama did speak passionately about reducing the risks of nuclear war, but his actions undermined his goals. He dithered as North Korea expanded its nuclear arsenal and the range of its missiles. He freed Iran of economic sanctions without requiring dismantlement of its nuclear-weapons facilities. Meanwhile, other policies — “leading from behind,” courtship of Russia’s President Putin, setting and then ignoring that “red line” in Syria, slashing defense spending, and neglecting U.S. nuclear-weapons infrastructure — all communicated to America’s friends abroad a lack of resolution, of loyalty, of understanding, and of power. The bad effects are plain to see. A May 7, 2015, Wall Street Journal headline reads, “Saudi Arabia Considers Nuclear Weapons to Offset Iran.” In South Korea on February 15 this year, Won Yoo-chul, the ruling party’s floor leader, spoke favorably in parliament of “peaceful nuclear and missile programs for the sake of self-defense.” He explained, “We cannot borrow an umbrella from a neighbor whenever it rains.” Similar statements abound elsewhere. Around the world, officials foresee with dread the possibilities of cascading nuclear proliferation. In the Middle East, not only Saudi Arabia but also the other Gulf states in addition to Turkey and Egypt could be candidates for going nuclear. In the Asia–Pacific, it could be Japan, Taiwan, Australia, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore, too. It’s bad enough that President Obama has sapped American credibility. If Republicans now put Donald Trump into the White House, they’ll abandon all hope of recovering it. Which brings us back to Donald Trump, who has had a lot to say about America’s commitments to friends. He scorns NATO. He praises President Putin as NATO quarrels with Russia over Ukraine. In his 2000 book The America We Deserve, Trump wrote that Europe’s conflicts were “not worth American lives,” and he touted the money America could save by “pulling back from Europe.” He scorns Japan. His statements on trade depict Japan as an enemy nation rather than an ally of paramount importance. He scorns Israel. He promises to be “neutral” between the Jewish state and enemies trying to destroy it. He scorns U.S. law-of-war obligations under the Geneva Conventions, as when he boasted he would mistreat detainees and kill civilians. He now recants those boasts, but he can’t erase the picture he has created of himself as intemperate and unprincipled. He has made an electoral strategy of contradicting himself, purposefully devaluing the currency of his words (it’s ironic that he berates the Chinese for devaluing their currency). He scoffs at accuracy and shows no shame when he says false things. His message is that, as a great man, he shouldn’t be held to anything he says. It’s bad enough that President Obama has sapped American credibility. If Republicans now put Donald Trump into the White House, they’ll abandon all hope of recovering it. Friends around the world would have to adjust to an America that’s erratic to the point of recklessness. Their loss of confidence in our reliability would make the world more perilous — and not just for them. Undermining our alliances will spawn various ills, including the spread of nuclear weapons. Even if Americans someday replaced President Trump with a responsible person of sound judgment, the harm would probably be irreversible.

### Ext: Asia Prolif Impacts

#### causes nuclear war

Cimbala 15 – Stephen J. Cimbala, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University Brandywine, The New Nuclear Disorder: Challenges to Deterrence and Strategy, 2015, pp. 59-63

The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia (including those parts of the Middle East with geostrategic proximity or reach into Asia) presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard. States with nuclear forces of variable force structure, operational experience, and command-control systems will be thrown into a matrix of complex political, social and cultural cross-currents contributory to the possibility of war. In addition to the existing nuclear powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatened by regional rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or risk aversion that marked the Cold War: in part, because the military and political discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists, but also because states in Asia have new aspirations for regional or global respect.20¶ The spread of ballistic missiles and other nuclear capable delivery systems in Asia, or in the Middle East with reach into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries live close together and are already engaged in ongoing disputes about territory or other issues. The Cold War Americans and Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one another’s vitals. But short range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another with potentially “strategic” effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India and Pakistan; Russia, with China and North Korea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on.The short flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states means that very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender. Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first use. Fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have first strike vulnerable forces and command-control systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly mistaken, retaliation. This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policy makers and academic theorists. For policy makers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass destruction from a European center of gravity (in the twentieth century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of gravity (in the present century).21 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the effect that wars of mass destruction are now passé, on account of the emergence of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” and its encouragement of information-based warfare.22 Together with this, there has emerged the argument that large scale war between states or coalitions of states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and potentially obsolete.23 The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization of major interstate warfare.

#### Trump will deck our foreign alliances.

O'Brien 16. [Dan, Chief economist at the Institute of International and European Affairs, columnist with Independent newspapers and senior fellow at UCD, “A Trump victory would mean global chaos” The Independent -- March 6 -- www.independent.ie/opinion/columnists/dan-obrien/a-trump-victory-would-mean-global-chaos-34515014.html]

But for all the checks, balances and limitations of the role, a rogue US president would make the world a more dangerous and unstable place, and would almost certainly make it poorer too. Trump is as rogue as anyone in modern times who has got within shouting distance of the White House. The US president is the commander in chief of a military that is by far the most powerful in the world - American defence spending, of almost $600 billion annually, is greater than the next 12 largest national defence budgets combined. Whether people like it or not - in America or elsewhere - the US is the closest thing the world has to a policeman. It is not called the indispensable nation for nothing. Although it has at times misused and abused its enormous clout, America has been the most benign great power in history - as we in Ireland know better than most given how rarely Washington has ever leaned on governments in Dublin to do things that they haven't wanted to do. But if Trump attempted to do even half of the things he has proposed on the campaign trail in his self-proclaimed crusade to "make America great again", the use of US power would become much less benign very quickly. Having Trump in control of the US military would send shock waves around the world. It would deeply unsettle allies who depend on American security guarantees, which includes Ireland and the rest of our continent. It would do much more than unsettle rivals, potentially pushing them into an arms race with Trump's America.

### Asia Alliances 2NC

#### Trump will cut and run on our alliances – even perception triggers the impact.

Wright 16. [Thomas, fellow and director of the Project on International Order and Strategy at Brookings, “Trump’s 19th Century Foreign Policy” Politico – January 20 -- www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/01/donald-trump-foreign-policy-213546?o=2]

Thus, beneath the bluster, the ego and the showmanship is the long-considered worldview of a man who has had problems with U.S. foreign policy for decades. Trump has thought long and hard about America’s global role and he knows what he wants to do. There is virtually no chance that he would “tack back to the center” and embrace a conservative internationalist foreign policy. If he did get elected president, he would do his utmost to liquidate the U.S.-led liberal order by ending America’s alliances, closing the open global economy, and cutting deals with Russia and China. He would find this hard to do, not least because the entire U.S. foreign policy establishment would be opposed to him and he needs people to staff his National Security Council, State Department and Defense Department. But there is real power in the presidency, especially if there is clear guidance about the chief executive’s wishes. In any event, the mere fact that the American people would have elected somebody with a mandate to destroy the U.S.-led order might be sufficient to damage it beyond repair. After his election, other countries will immediately hedge against the risk of abandonment. There will be massive uncertainty around America’s commitments. Would Trump defend the Baltics? Would he defend the Senkaku Islands? Or Saudi Arabia? Some nations will give in to China, Russia and Iran. Others, like Japan, will push back, perhaps by acquiring nuclear weapons. Trump may well see such uncertainty as a positive. Putting everything in play would give him great leverage. But by undoing the work of Truman and his secretary of state, Dean Acheson, it would be the end of the American era.

#### collapse overall U.S. credibility in Asia---nuclear war

Goh, 8 – Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford (Evelyn, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, “Hierarchy and the role of the United States in the East Asian security order,” 2008 8(3):353-377, Oxford Journals Database)

The centrality of these mutual processes of assurance and deference means that the stability of a hierarchical order is fundamentally related to a collective sense of certainty about the leadership and order of the hierarchy. This certainty is rooted in a combination of material calculations – smaller states' assurance that the expected costs of the dominant state conquering them would be higher than the benefits – and ideational convictions – the sense of legitimacy, derived from shared values and norms that accompanies the super-ordinate state's authority in the social order. The empirical analysis in the next section shows that regional stability in East Asia in the post-Second World War years can be correlated to the degree of collective certainty about the US-led regional hierarchy. East Asian stability and instability has been determined by U.S. assurances, self-confidence, and commitment to maintaining its primary position in the regional hierarchy; the perceptions and confidence of regional states about US commitment; and the reactions of subordinate states in the region to the varied challengers to the regional hierarchical order. 4. Hierarchy and the East Asian security order Currently, the regional hierarchy in East Asia is still dominated by the United States. Since the 1970s, China has increasingly claimed the position of second-ranked great power, a claim that is today legitimized by the hierarchical deference shown by smaller subordinate powers such as South Korea and Southeast Asia. Japan and South Korea can, by virtue of their alliance with the United States, be seen to occupy positions in a third layer of regional major powers, while India is ranked next on the strength of its new strategic relationship with Washington. North Korea sits outside the hierarchic order but affects it due to its military prowess and nuclear weapons capability. Apart from making greater sense of recent history, conceiving of the US' role in East Asia as the dominant state in the regional hierarchy helps to clarify three critical puzzles in the contemporary international and East Asian security landscape. First, it contributes to explaining the lack of sustained challenges to American global preponderance after the end of the Cold War. Three of the key potential global challengers to US unipolarity originate in Asia (China, India, and Japan), and their support for or acquiescence to, US dominance have helped to stabilize its global leadership. Through its dominance of the Asian regional hierarchy, the United States has been able to neutralize the potential threats to its position from Japan via an alliance, from India by gradually identifying and pursuing mutual commercial and strategic interests, and from China by encircling and deterring it with allied and friendly states that support American preponderance. Secondly, recognizing US hierarchical preponderance further explains contemporary under-balancing in Asia, both against a rising China, and against incumbent American power. I have argued that one defining characteristic of a hierarchical system is voluntary subordination of lesser states to the dominant state, and that this goes beyond rationalistic bandwagoning because it is manifested in a social contract that comprises the related processes of hierarchical assurance and hierarchical deference. Critically, successful and sustainable hierarchical assurance and deference helps to explain why Japan is not yet a ‘normal’ country. Japan has experienced significant impetus to revise and expand the remit of its security forces in the last 15 years. Yet, these pressures continue to be insufficient to prompt a wholesale revision of its constitution and its remilitarization. The reason is that the United States extends its security umbrella over Japan through their alliance, which has led Tokyo not only to perceive no threat from US dominance, but has in fact helped to forge a security community between them (Nau, 2003). Adjustments in burden sharing in this alliance since the 1990s have arisen not from greater independent Japanese strategic activism, but rather from periods of strategic uncertainty and crises for Japan when it appeared that American hierarchical assurance, along with US' position at the top of the regional hierarchy, was in question. Thus, the Japanese priority in taking on more responsibility for regional security has been to improve its ability to facilitate the US' central position, rather than to challenge it.13 In the face of the security threats from North Korea and China, Tokyo's continued reliance on the security pact with the United States is rational. While there remains debate about Japan's re-militarization and the growing clout of nationalist ‘hawks’ in Tokyo, for regional and domestic political reasons, a sustained ‘normalization’ process cannot take place outside of the restraining framework of the United States–Japan alliance (Samuels, 2007; Pyle, 2007). Abandoning the alliance will entail Japan making a conscience choice not only to remove itself from the US-led hierarchy, but also to challenge the United States dominance directly. The United States–ROK alliance may be understood in a similar way, although South Korea faces different sets of constraints because of its strategic priorities related to North Korea. As J.J. Suh argues, in spite of diminishing North Korean capabilities, which render the US security umbrella less critical, the alliance endures because of mutual identification – in South Korea, the image of the US as ‘the only conceivable protector against aggression from the North,’ and in the United States, an image of itself as protector of an allied nation now vulnerable to an ‘evil’ state suspected of transferring weapons of mass destruction to terrorist networks (Suh, 2004). Kang, in contrast, emphasizes how South Korea has become less enthusiastic about its ties with the United States – as indicated by domestic protests and the rejection of TMD – and points out that Seoul is not arming against a potential land invasion from China but rather maritime threats (Kang, 2003, pp.79–80). These observations are valid, but they can be explained by hierarchical deference toward the United States, rather than China. The ROK's military orientation reflects its identification with and dependence on the United States and its adoption of US' strategic aims. In spite of its primary concern with the North Korean threat, Seoul's formal strategic orientation is toward maritime threats, in line with Washington's regional strategy. Furthermore, recent South Korean Defense White Papers habitually cited a remilitarized Japan as a key threat. The best means of coping with such a threat would be continued reliance on the US security umbrella and on Washington's ability to restrain Japanese remilitarization (Eberstadt et al., 2007). Thus, while the United States–ROK bilateral relationship is not always easy, its durability is based on South Korea's fundamental acceptance of the United States as the region's primary state and reliance on it to defend and keep regional order. It also does not rule out Seoul and other US allies conducting business and engaging diplomatically with China. India has increasingly adopted a similar strategy vis-à-vis China in recent years. Given its history of territorial and political disputes with China and its contemporary economic resurgence, India is seen as the key potential power balancer to a growing China. Yet, India has sought to negotiate settlements about border disputes with China, and has moved significantly toward developing closer strategic relations with the United States. Apart from invigorated defense cooperation in the form of military exchange programs and joint exercises, the key breakthrough was the agreement signed in July 2005 which facilitates renewed bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation (Mohan, 2007). Once again, this is a key regional power that could have balanced more directly and independently against China, but has rather chosen to align itself or bandwagon with the primary power, the United States, partly because of significant bilateral gains, but fundamentally in order to support the latter's regional order-managing function. Recognizing a regional hierarchy and seeing that the lower layers of this hierarchy have become more active since the mid-1970s also allows us to understand why there has been no outright balancing of China by regional states since the 1990s. On the one hand, the US position at the top of the hierarchy has been revived since the mid-1990s, meaning that deterrence against potential Chinese aggression is reliable and in place.14 On the other hand, the aim of regional states is to try to consolidate China's inclusion in the regional hierarchy at the level below that of the United States, not to keep it down or to exclude it. East Asian states recognize that they cannot, without great cost to themselves, contain Chinese growth. But they hope to socialize China by enmeshing it in peaceful regional norms and economic and security institutions. They also know that they can also help to ensure that the capabilities gap between China and the United States remains wide enough to deter a power transition. Because this strategy requires persuading China about the appropriateness of its position in the hierarchy and of the legitimacy of the US position, all East Asian states engage significantly with China, with the small Southeast Asian states refusing openly to ‘choose sides’ between the United States and China. Yet, hierarchical deference continues to explain why regional institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN + 3, and East Asian Summit have made limited progress. While the United State has made room for regional multilateral institutions after the end of the Cold War, its hierarchical preponderance also constitutes the regional order to the extent that it cannot comfortably be excluded from any substantive strategic developments. On the part of some lesser states (particularly Japan and Singapore), hierarchical deference is manifested in inclusionary impulses (or at least impulses not to exclude the United States or US proxies) in regional institutions, such as the East Asia Summit in December 2005. Disagreement on this issue with others, including China and Malaysia, has stymied potential progress in these regional institutions (Malik, 2006). Finally, conceiving of a US-led East Asian hierarchy amplifies our understanding of how and why the United States–China relationship is now the key to regional order. The vital nature of the Sino-American relationship stems from these two states' structural positions. As discussed earlier, China is the primary second-tier power in the regional hierarchy. However, as Chinese power grows and Chinese activism spreads beyond Asia, the United States is less and less able to see China as merely a regional power – witness the growing concerns about Chinese investment and aid in certain African countries. This causes a disjuncture between US global interests and US regional interests. Regional attempts to engage and socialize China are aimed at mediating its intentions. This process, however, cannot stem Chinese growth, which forms the material basis of US threat perceptions. Apprehensions about the growth of China's power culminates in US fears about the region being ‘lost’ to China, echoing Cold War concerns that transcribed regional defeats into systemic setbacks.15 On the other hand, the US security strategy post-Cold War and post-9/11 have regional manifestations that disadvantage China. The strengthening of US alliances with Japan and Australia; and the deployment of US troops to Central, South, and Southeast Asia all cause China to fear a consolidation of US global hegemony that will first threaten Chinese national security in the regional context and then stymie China's global reach. Thus, the key determinants of the East Asian security order relate to two core questions: (i) Can the US be persuaded that China can act as a reliable ‘regional stakeholder’ that will help to buttress regional stability and US global security aims;16 and (ii) can China be convinced that the United States has neither territorial ambitions in Asia nor the desire to encircle China, but will help to promote Chinese development and stability as part of its global security strategy? (Wang, 2005). But, these questions cannot be asked in the abstract, outside the context of negotiation about their relative positions in the regional and global hierarchies. One urgent question for further investigation is how the process of assurance and deference operate at the topmost levels of a hierarchy? When we have two great powers of unequal strength but contesting claims and a closing capabilities gap in the same regional hierarchy, how much scope for negotiation is there, before a reversion to balancing dynamics? This is the main structural dilemma: as long as the United States does not give up its primary position in the Asian regional hierarchy, China is very unlikely to act in a way that will provide comforting answers to the two questions. Yet, the East Asian regional order has been and still is constituted by US hegemony, and to change that could be extremely disruptive and may lead to regional actors acting in highly destabilizing ways. **Rapid Japanese remilitarization, armed conflict across the Taiwan Straits, Indian nuclear brinksmanship directed toward Pakistan, or a highly destabilized Korean peninsula are all illustrative of potential regional disruptions.** 5. Conclusion To construct a coherent account of East Asia's evolving security order, I have suggested that the United States is the central force in constituting regional stability and order. The major patterns of equilibrium and turbulence in the region since 1945 can be explained by the relative stability of the US position at the top of the regional hierarchy, with periods of greatest insecurity being correlated with greatest uncertainty over the American commitment to managing regional order. Furthermore, relationships of hierarchical assurance and hierarchical deference explain the unusual character of regional order in the post-Cold War era. However, the greatest contemporary challenge to East Asian order is the potential conflict between China and the United States over rank ordering in the regional hierarchy, a contest made more potent because of the inter-twining of regional and global security concerns. Ultimately, though, investigating such questions of positionality requires conceptual lenses that go beyond basic material factors because it entails social and normative questions. How can China be brought more into a leadership position, while being persuaded to buy into shared strategic interests and constrain its own in ways that its vision of regional and global security may eventually be reconciled with that of the United States and other regional players? How can Washington be persuaded that its central position in the hierarchy must be ultimately shared in ways yet to be determined? The future of the East Asian security order is tightly bound up with the durability of the United States' global leadership and regional domination. At the regional level, the main scenarios of disruption are an outright Chinese challenge to US leadership, or the defection of key US allies, particularly Japan. Recent history suggests, and the preceding analysis has shown, that challenges to or defections from US leadership will come at junctures where it appears that the US commitment to the region is in doubt, which in turn destabilizes the hierarchical order. At the global level, American geopolitical over-extension will be the key cause of change. This is the one factor that could lead to both greater regional and global turbulence, if only by the attendant strategic uncertainly triggering off regional challenges or defections. However, it is notoriously difficult to gauge thresholds of over-extension. More positively, East Asia is a region that has adjusted to previous periods of uncertainty about US primacy. Arguably, the regional consensus over the United States as primary state in a system of benign hierarchy could accommodate a shifting of the strategic burden to US allies like Japan and Australia as a means of systemic preservation. The alternatives that could surface as a result of not doing so would appear to be much worse.

### Turns Case – China Engagement – 2NC

#### Key to solve China war and make other engagement efforts effective

Christensen 9 (Thomas J. Christensen, Professor of Politics and International Affairs and Director of the China and the World Program, which is a joint venture between Princeton and Harvard Universities, deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 2006-2008, July 2009, “Shaping the Choices of a Rising China: Recent Lessons for the Obama Administration”, <http://www.twq.com/09july/docs/09jul_Christensen.pdf>)

What does China want and what does the United States want from China? There is a broad national consensus within China across diverse segments of society and different intellectual orientations that the nation should increase its power and influence on the international stage. The key question is what mix of policies China should use to increase that influence: economic growth and greater integration with regional and global economies; diplomatic activism designed to reassure China’s nervous neighbors and help solve regional and global problems; and/or military coercion against actors with whom China has been brewing territorial or political disputes? China’s answers to these questions will have enormous repercussions for the region and the world. The United States can best influence these choices by maintaining the current two-pronged strategy: a strong U.S. presence in Asian security and political affairs to discourage the use of coercion by China when resolving its disputes, and active diplomatic engagement to encourage China to seek greater influence through constructive economic and diplomatic policies. First, by maintaining a strong U.S. security presence in Asia in the form of U.S. forces and bases along with a network of strong alliances and non-allied / security partnerships, the United States makes it difficult for experts, advisors, and decisionmakers within China to advocate the use of coercive force against Taiwan or other regional actors as an inexpensive and effective way for Beijing to address its problems. The term ‘‘hedging’’ is often used, even in official government documents, to describe this role of the U.S. security presence. The term has some validity, but it does not fully capture the role that U.S. regional power plays. Hedging implies that the U.S. presence will only be useful if diplomatic engagement fails to convince a rising China to avoid belligerence. In fact, the maintenance of U.S. military superiority in the region, properly considered, is an integral part of that broader engagement strategy and makes diplomatic engagement itself more effective. The military strength of the United States and its allies and security partners in Asia complements positive U.S. diplomacy by channeling China’s competitive energies in more beneficial and peaceful directions.

#### undermines all restraints on China conflict escalation – Deterrence works

Auslin, resident scholar and director of Japan Studies – AEI, 8/28/’14

(Michael, “Preventing a Pacific vacuum”, American Enterprise Institute)

Last week’s incident holds lessons about the importance of America’s military presence in Asia. The absence of effective and credible U.S. force in potentially unstable regions around the globe is encouraging murderous groups (such as ISIS in Iraq) and traditionally aggressive opportunists (like Vladimir Putin ). The specter of growing global disorder is abetted by perceptions that the United States has neither the strength nor will to counter or defeat aggressive actors.

Asia seems relatively stable compared with the rest of the world. Even **China’s aggressiveness** in recent years **has undoubtedly been tempered by** the **U.S. presence** in the waters and skies of the **Pacific**. Just contrast the presence of over 300,000 U.S. troops throughout Asia with the situation in Iraq, where the precipitous withdrawal of U.S. forces led in less than four years to ISIS’s conquests.

So far the Pentagon has remained committed to maintaining and even moderately increasing U.S. force levels in Asia. It has deployed America’s most advanced weapons systems to Asia, such as the F-22, and has promised that the F-35s and Zumwalt DDG-1000 destroyers are coming in future years to bolster the U.S. Pacific Command. This, combined with the rhetoric about the “rebalance” to Asia, has likely deterred some adventurism on Beijing’s part.

Now consider last week’s encounter over the South China Sea. Beijing may or may not choose to continue such dangerous behavior but if it did, then U.S. Navy and Air Force fighters would likely soon begin escorting U.S. military planes over international waters. Eventually the Chinese would get the message that provocative behavior risks a shooting incident. Given Beijing’s relatively risk averse nature, it would almost certainly back down.

Yet what would happen if U.S. forces in Asia gradually thinned out over the next decade, due to demands elsewhere or continued budget cuts that Congress hasn’t repealed? **The** vacuum **that plagues the Middle East and Eastern Europe would begin to emerge in Asia**, too. Based on what the world has witnessed of Chinese behavior, such a vacuum would very likely result in more aggressive acts.

Such actions would aim at intimidating and hindering U.S. forces while more directly confronting Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam and others over disputed territory in the East and South China Seas. Given evidence of America’s diminishing presence in their waters, Asia’s smaller nations would face uncomfortable choices about how much they can protect their interests.

A world of growing disorder would be further shaken by conflict or endemic instability in Asia. The negative impact on the global economy would reverberate in New York, London and Frankfurt as well as in Tokyo, Seoul and Jakarta.

The **lack of effective regional mechanisms** for resolving crises would make it especially difficult to maintain stability amid rising nationalism, resentment and distrust. Even Japan’s goal of acting as a security partner to Southeast Asian nations would crumble under the specter of being drawn into a direct conflict with China.

**The U.S.** thus **remains the** indispensable stabilizing power in Asia. Even as the region’s new normal reflects China’s steady accretion of influence, U.S. forces act as a hedge against Chinese advances beyond accepted norms of international behavior.

U.S. Pacific Command’s presence in Asia offers the **best chance for international law to take root**. Adherents throughout the region can form an undeniable community of interests that even China will be averse to ignoring.

Such an outcome requires continued commitment by U.S. leaders. That means investing more militarily to support democracy’s political goals in the world’s most dynamic region. The alternative is to watch Asia’s new normal become ever more unstable, with America increasingly a bystander.

### Ext: Asia Alliance Internal

#### Trump will end security guarantees in Asia.

Lee 16. [John, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington D.C. and an adjunct associate professor at the Australian National University, “What 'The Donald' would mean for Asia” Nikkei Asian Review – February 17 --asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/Viewpoints/What-The-Donald-would-mean-for-Asia]

Clinton's policies are relatively easy to predict. As secretary of state in President Barack Obama's first administration, from 2008 to 2012, she was the architect and driving force behind the pivot or rebalance to Asia. In her current campaign to be the Democratic candidate, she has reaffirmed her intention to entrench and strengthen America's strategic and military presence in Asia, in effect taking ownership of the Asian pivot and running with it. In short, a Clinton presidency would be warmly welcomed by America's allies and security partners. It would be a continuation of the current pivot to Asia, but with intent and resources in the eyes of those who claim that Obama lost interest in Asia, or else was distracted by the Islamic State militant group, during his second term. It is also more likely that Clinton will want to be seen to be "getting tough" with China when it comes to the latter's increasingly assertive and threatening behavior in the East and South China seas. This means more freedom of navigation patrolling operations by U.S. naval vessels in waters which China has claimed, accompanied by robust language, and an end to any consideration that a broad-ranging compact between China and the U.S. -- or a G-2 -- is the way ahead. Reading Trump's foreign policy is far more difficult, even if it will surely be much more interesting. His comments on external affairs seem more about bombast than policy: in a radio address last November he said "I will also quickly and decisively bomb the hell out of ISIS," for example. Unlike the other candidates, Trump does not seem to have a foreign policy team of advisers. At this hyperbolic stage all one can do is piece together proclamations that may well form the basis of a more elaborate foreign policy, should he enter the White House. One might be tempted to dismiss much of what "The Donald" says as opportunistic hot air by the self-proclaimed anti-establishment candidate. But he has consistently pursued one particular theme over several years that no doubt causes concern among America's friends and allies in Asia. Cutting off support Back in 2000, Trump argued that the U.S. should not expend its blood and/or treasure overseas unless its allies and partners are also willing to do the same. As he said then, "Pulling back from Europe would save this country millions of dollars annually. The cost of stationing NATO troops ... is enormous. And these are clearly funds that can be put to better use." That was 15 years ago. What about more recent times? In 2013, he said this: "How long will we go on defending South Korea from North Korea without payment? When will they start to pay us?" This was no lonely thought bubble. In a CNN interview in January, he repeated the same line, and further argued that the U.S. should force China to take the lead in resolving the North Korean problem. If Beijing refuses, trade sanctions against China will follow. Despite the temptation to ignore these seemingly extreme comments, there is actually an underlying and consistent rationale to them. Like Clinton, the majority of Washington's policy community feel that a redoubling of American leadership is required to solve the world's problems -- even if there is deep disagreement as to what form such leadership ought to take. In contrast, Trump is advocating a foreign policy stance held by many libertarians in America that it is time to end the so-called military welfare by allies and partners, including in Asia. As this line of reasoning goes, the region has become dependent on American stewardship of the post-World War II liberal order and it is time to end their free-riding mentality. In an environment of strained fiscal and other resources, Washington can no longer afford the indulgence of remaining as the indispensable regional power. It is time for Asia to increasingly fend for what it wants and values.

#### Trump’s Asia policy will cause troop kick out.

Lee 16. [John, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington D.C. and an adjunct associate professor at the Australian National University, “What 'The Donald' would mean for Asia” Nikkei Asian Review – February 17 --asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/Viewpoints/What-The-Donald-would-mean-for-Asia]

Even so, one can confidently surmise that the dealings of a President Trump with both friends and foes would be direct, blunt and possibly confrontational. Demanding upfront payment for security guarantees would hardly endear locals to the American presence on foreign soil, making it much more difficult for Asian allies and partners to host more U.S. military assets -- which a more effective pivot would require. Trump's tirades against Muslims, meanwhile, would undoubtedly undermine America's standing in Muslim-dominated countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia, even if such comments have been directed toward refugees from Syria and Islamic extremists.

#### Trump win decks Asia security alliances.

Le 16. [Tom, Assistant Professor of Politics at Pomona College, former Non-Resident Sasakawa Peace Foundation Fellow at CSIS Pacific Forum, "How Trump is already damaging US alliances" The Diplomat -- May 20 -- thediplomat.com/2016/05/how-trump-is-already-damaging-us-alliances/]

The U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK alliances have survived the Cold War, drastic regime change, and global economic turmoil, but can they withstand a full-on assault by U.S. presidential candidate Donald Trump? Trump’s fiery, and even racist, rhetoric has U.S. allies worried about the future direction of U.S. foreign policy and presence in East Asia. When examining alliances, scholars and alliance managers have focused on the importance of credibility and positive signaling. Allies need to know that the United States will help deter regional threats. However, few have called attention to the impact of negative signaling during presidential campaigns. Allies pay attention to election platforms to ascertain domestic support for possible shifts in U.S. foreign policy. Allies not only need reassurance that potential threats can be deterred, but also that the United States will neither entrap them in unnecessary conflict nor take the alliance for granted. Donald Trump’s rhetoric rings alarm bells on both fronts and alliance managers need to reassure Japan and South Korea that business will continue as usual even during regime transition. A leadership transition is a difficult time for alliances. It took President Barack Obama years to assure South Korea and Japan that East Asia mattered in U.S. foreign policy after signaling a shift away from the more proactive Bush Doctrine. Even after the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia,” which included significant economic, political, and military investment, many allies remained dissatisfied with U.S. foreign policy in the region. Trump has sent far worse signals to Japan and South Korea. Beyond the careless love affair with Vladimir Putin and a general lack of foreign policy prowess, Trump has taken tangible actions that have strained the credibility of the alliances. First, Trump has adopted an exceedingly aggressive stance toward China, accusing it of currency manipulation, stealing American jobs, and “cheating.” He has threatened China with a 45 percent tariff if it does not “behave,” an action that is offensive at best and a violation of international norms and laws at worst. After seemingly backing off such fiery rhetoric, Trump has reiterated his negative stance toward China to garner middle America votes. His inconsistent views make it difficult for U.S. allies to predict U.S. foreign policy and increases tension for regional stakeholders. Japan and South Korea must deftly balance their relationships with the United States and China, and increased pressure on China may force them to take unnecessarily bold actions. Chinese state media has already begun to respond to his rhetoric, criticizing U.S. democracy and claiming the United States would be a threat to the world under Trump. Second, Trump’s ire has also fallen on Japan and South Korea. Trump has accused both states of cheating and security freeriding, even proposing that the United States could withdraw its forces from both states. Not only do such positions ignore the complex trade relationships between the countries, but also the major economic contributions that Japan and South Korea have made in hosting U.S. forces. In 2015, Japan renewed its host-nation support agreement, and currently pays $1.6 billion annually to host U.S. forces. In 2014, South Korea renewed the Special Measures Agreement, which was a 5.8 percent increase in South Korea’s payments from the previous agreement, amounting to $866 million annually. These major contributions do not come cheap for alliance managers and government leaders who expend significant political energy, especially when the alliance creates backlash from local populations who question the necessity of such a large American footprint on their soil. With the rise of China, nuclear North Korea, and protests against the Futenma Base in Okinawa, now is not the time to to call into question the status of the alliances. Third, Trump’s ludicrous policy platforms cast doubt on the viability of U.S. foreign policy. The Korean media recently called attention to discontent in Washington, noting that “50 Republican national security leaders, including former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, issued an open letter saying they are united in opposition to a Trump presidency that they said would ‘make America less safe’ and ‘diminish our standing in the world.’” In a recent interview, retired General Mike Hayden stated that the U.S. armed forces would refuse if Trump gives an unlawful order. When such a high-level military member openly questions the judgment of a possible commander-in-chief, doubt is not only cast on the alliances, but the Republic itself.

#### Trump destroys the US-Japan alliance

Schake 16. [Kori, fellow at the Hoover Institution and contributor to Foreign Policy’s Shadow Government blog, “Donald Trump, Barbarian Emperor” Foreign Policy – March 4 -- http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/04/donald-trump-barbarian-emperor-japan-china-defense/]

Many view Donald Trump as simply reckless, saying anything to generate attention. But as Brookings’ Thomas Wright has shown, Donald Trump does actually have a consistent world view: in 1987, he took out a full-page ad in the New York Times criticizing President Reagan’s national security policy and he continues to propagate those same views. He believed then, and says again now, that America’s allies are taking advantage of us and we must force them to do more. Specifically, Trump insists he would renegotiate the U.S.-Japanese defense alliance. The Republican presidential frontrunner sounds indistinguishable from the government of China, demanding tribute from the worried and weak while using power and leverage to the disadvantage of others.¶ Trump says Japan expects us to defend them, but won’t defend us. And it is true that the Japanese Constitution prohibits war as a tool of Japanese foreign policy, something we imposed on them after World War II. But over the past 15 years, Japan has slowly acclimatized a largely pacifist public to take an increasing role contributing to international security. Japanese military forces assisted U.S. operations in Afghanistan, contributed troops to the coalition in Iraq, and participate in anti-piracy operations off the Gulf of Aden. The Shinzo Abe government passed legislation making explicit Japan’s ability to defend allies under attack, including the United States, and is providing training and weapons to other American allies and friendly countries in Asia (a defense agreement with the Philippines will be signed on Monday). None of these things would be possible without the reassuring foundation of the U.S.-Japanese defense alliance. We want Japan’s help in the world and they are increasingly giving it; abandoning them is counterproductive.¶ Japan endures the stationing of more than 50,000 American troops, concentrated on 83 bases and facilities. Some 25,000 Marines rotate through the island of Okinawa; our bases take up 18 percent of the island. But the government of Japan also pays for that privilege; because of the generous contributions the Japanese government makes, the cost of stationing forces forward in Japan is roughly equivalent to stationing them in the United States. Having them in Japan anchors America’s role in Asia and reassures a region that until recently was as worried about aggression from Tokyo as they were from Beijing. Forward stationing also gets American forces much faster into the fight, whether the fight is defense of South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, or any other contingency in Asia.¶ Isolationists like Trump may say we shouldn’t be defending any of those countries. But will they like an international order in which China’s shadow is cast over all of Asia? How will the United States negotiate better trade deals when we do not get credit for protecting countries fearful of Chinese influence? How will we gain cooperation when a China — stronger for stepping into the vacuum we leave behind — penalizes countries for their involvement with us?¶ Japan is the country in Asia considered the most important current and future partner by others (even more so than the United States or China). It is the country considered most reliable by others, and 90 percent of people in ASEAN countries consider Japan’s more active involvement valuable. Alienating Japan will not just be costly in the direct U.S.-Japan context, but also damaging to American standing in other Asian countries.¶ A rising China has unsettled Asia. Calling American security commitments into question will lead countries friendly to us and supportive of our interests to believe they have no choice but to find accommodation with Beijing. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam have all pulled closer to the United States in recent years because of China’s threat. Even Japan and South Korea are not immune to Chinese sway if they feel unmoored from us, as has already been demonstrated by South Korea’s flirtation with a China-first approach to dealing with North Korea until the recent DPRK nuclear test. If you think letting a stable Middle East slip from America’s grasp was expensive, imagine the cost of doing the same in Asia — the region through which passes the majority of world trade and which fuels 60 of global growth.¶ There is some reason in Trump’s frustration with America’s allies. We have allowed the United States to accrue a disproportionate responsibility for others’ security outcomes. The most egregious example may well be in Europe, where our NATO allies spend too little and are much more able than they acknowledge to manage the challenges of a declining but dangerous Russia. Trump’s reason rhymes with the Obama administration’s “leading from behind” in that both foist onto others primary responsibility for outcomes.¶ What they both have wrong is their starting point that allies are a net drain on American strength. In fact, it is allied contributions that make the American order sustainable. They share the burden and validate the outcomes of our rules, making us stronger over time. President Obama’s policy in the Middle East has demonstrated that when the United States does not set the rules, other states will, and those states will grow stronger by doing so.¶ The U.S.-Japan alliance is a model of the benefits of steady American engagement in the world. Forged in the aftermath of a war even more brutal in the Pacific than it was in the European theater and that ended with the only use of nuclear weapons, the U.S.-Japanese alliance not only provided for the rehabilitation of relations between the two countries, it has become essential to peace and to prosperity in all of Asia. Donald Trump envisions a very different set of U.S. relationships in Asia; he postures himself as a great dealmaker who would use other countries’ reliance on us to induce them to turn a profit for us. But his approach would instead sow insecurity and dramatically raise the costs to the United States.

### Ext: Asia Alliance Impact – Asia War

#### causes Asian prolif, Chinese aggression, miscalc and war – forces re-intervention turns case

Thomas Berger 14, Professor of International Relations at Boston University’s Pardee School of Global Studies, PhD from MIT, “Re: Richard Samuel's NY Times quote,” 3 Jul 2014, https://japanforum.nbr.org/scripts/wa.exe?A2=ind1407&L=LIST&F=&S=&P=19341

At this point in time, however, it would be premature to base policy on the expectation of inevitable American decline. The military balance continues to favor the US and its allies, and if they work together they should be able to avoid a too dramatic shift for a considerable time to come. Taiwan is not eager to reunify with China - data provided by Shelly Rigger and others show large majorities would prefer to remain independant, and while the Koreans feel they have to work with China, they remain deeply suspicious of China as well. A recent ASAN poll shows that 66% of South Koreans view China as a threat (down from 73% last year.) See figure 5 in the survey available athttp://en.asaninst.org/south-korean-attitudes-on-china/. A recent CSIS elite opinion survey shows likewise large majority of Korean elites would prefer a US led order. See http://csis.org/files/publication/140605\_Green\_PowerandOrder\_WEB.pdf. And the United States continues to have considerable sources of strength that may endure over time. Since the end of the Second World war there have been periodic waves of predictions that the United States is in a state of inevitable decline - the current wave is probably the 4th - and it is far from clear that the current pessimists are more likely to be correct now than they were in the past.¶ At the same time, it should be remembered that there are real risks to leaving balancing to regional powers. Japan, for instance, would be forced into taking much more aggressive actions than it is now if it were forced to rely on its resources. South Korea might be as well. Both countries would have to reopen the nuclear option, as might Taiwan, Australia and others. Perhaps not a bad thing, if you believe like Kenneth Waltz that the acquisition of nuclear weapons and the prospect of national incineration makes for more sober decision making - "more nukes less Kooks." China, in response might become more assertive as well, and the risk would go up of disastrous miscalculations leading to conflicts that inevitably would drag the United States back in. To paraphrase Lenin, the United States may not be interested in international politics, but international politics is definitely interested in the United States. ¶ The US experience in Europe in the 1990s was not very encouraging in this regard. When the Yugoslav crisis broke out, the United States tried to sit back and let the Europeans handle the problem. They failed - miserably. The conflict threatened to spread, cracks appeared within NATO and between NATO and Russia, and the US was pulled back in. Leaving it to the Europeans was, as Richard Haas warned at the time, a recipe for disaster. Would the Asians do much better? (And lets not even talk about the Middle East!)

### Ext – Asia Alliance Impact – Japan

#### key to restrain *aggressive* and *independent* Japanese foreign policy that triggers regional war and arms races– turns case

Curtis 13 - Burgess Professor of Political Science at Columbia University   
Gerald l. “Japan's Cautious Hawks”, Foreign Affairs, March/April, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2013-03-01/japans-cautious-hawks

That quest for survival remains the hallmark of Japanese foreign policy today. Tokyo has sought to advance its interests not by defining the international agenda, propagating a particular ideology, or promoting its own vision of world order, the way the United States and other great powers have. Its approach has instead been to take its external environment as a given and then make pragmatic adjustments to keep in step with what the Japanese sometimes refer to as "the trends of the time." Ever since World War II, that pragmatism has kept Japan in an alliance with the United States, enabling it to limit its military's role to self-defense. Now, however, as China grows ever stronger, as North Korea continues to build its nuclear weapons capability, and as the United States' economic woes have called into question the sustainability of American primacy in East Asia, the Japanese are revisiting their previous calculations. In particular, a growing chorus of voices on the right are advocating a more autonomous and assertive foreign policy, posing a serious challenge to the centrists, who have until recently shaped Japanese strategy. In parliamentary elections this past December, the Liberal Democratic Party and its leader, Shinzo Abe, who had previously served as prime minister in 2006–7, returned to power with a comfortable majority. Along with its coalition partner, the New Komeito Party, the LDP secured the two-thirds of seats needed to pass legislation rejected by the House of Councilors, the Japanese Diet's upper house. Abe's victory was the result not of his or his party's popularity but rather of the voters' loss of confidence in the rival Democratic Party of Japan. Whatever the public's motivations, however, the election has given Japan a right-leaning government and a prime minister whose goals include scrapping the con­stitutional constraints on Japan's military, revising the educational system to instill a stronger sense of patriotism in the country's youth, and securing for Tokyo a larger leadership role in regional and world affairs. To many observers, Japan seems to be on the cusp of a sharp rightward shift. But such a change is unlikely. The Japanese public remains risk averse, and its leaders cautious. Since taking office, Abe has focused his attention on reviving Japan's stagnant economy. He has pushed his hawkish and revisionist views to the sidelines, in part to avoid having to deal with divisive foreign policy issues until after this summer's elections for the House of Councilors. If his party can secure a majority of seats in that chamber, which it does not currently have, Abe may then try to press his revisionist views. But any provocative actions would have consequences. If, for example, he were to rescind statements by previous governments that apologized for Japan's actions in World War II, as he has repeatedly said he would like to do, he not only would invite a crisis in relations with China and South Korea but would face strong criticism from the United States as well. The domestic political consequences are easy to predict: Abe would be flayed in the mass media, lose support among the Japanese public, and encounter opposition from others in his own party. In short, chances are that those who expect a dramatic change in Japanese strategy will be proved wrong. Still, much depends on what Washington does. The key is whether the United States continues to maintain a dominant position in East Asia. If it does, and if the Japanese believe that the United States' commitment to protect Japan remains credible, then Tokyo's foreign policy will not likely veer off its current track. If, however, Japan begins to doubt the United States' resolve, it will be tempted to strike out on its own. The United States has an interest in Japan's strengthening its defensive capabilities in the context of a close U.S.-Japanese alliance. But Americans who want Japan to abandon the constitutional restraints on its military and take on a greater role in regional security should be careful what they wish for. A major Japanese rearmament would spur an arms race in Asia, heighten regional tensions (including between Japan and South Korea, another key U.S. ally), and threaten to draw Washington into conflicts that do not affect vital U.S. interests. The United States needs a policy that encourages Japan to do more in its own defense but does not undermine the credibility of U.S. commitments to the country or the region.

## === Iran Deal ===

### Iran Deal 1NC

#### Trump win guts the Iran deal.

Moore 6-15-16. [Jack, foreign affairs journalist, "IRAN’S SUPREME LEADER TAKES AIM AT TRUMP IN PLEDGE TO BURN NUCLEAR DEAL" Newsweek -- www.newsweek.com/iran-supreme-leader-takes-aim-trump-pledge-burn-nuclear-deal-470628]

Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, appeared to take aim at presumptive Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump in comments he made on Tuesday, pledging to burn the landmark nuclear deal signed with world powers in if the next U.S. president ripped it up. Khamenei alluded to the U.S. presidential candidate planning to tear up the agreement signed in July 2015. “The Islamic Republic won't be the first to violate the nuclear deal. Staying faithful to a promise is a Koranic order,” Khamenei said, according to state media. “But if the threat from the American presidential candidates to tear up the deal becomes operational then the Islamic Republic will set fire to the deal.” Trump has threatened to completely remove the agreement if he comes to power in the U.S. presidential election in November. In a speech to the lobby group American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) in March, he said that his “number-one priority is to dismantle the disastrous deal with Iran.” He has said that if the deal remains, he would “police that contract so tough they don’t have a chance.” If a Republican president enters office, U.S.-Iranian relations would likely become more tense than they have been under the stewardship of incumbent President Barack Obama, who has sought a conciliatory tone when dealing with the Iranian regime.

#### Guarantees nuclear war.

Hobson 15. [Art, professor of physics at University of Arkansas “Commentary: Absent agreement, Iran, U.S., Israel on path to war,”March 31 -- http://www.nwaonline.com/news/2015/mar/31/commentary-absent-agreement-iran-u-s-is/?opinion]

One of history's greatest tragedies was the nuclear bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, in August 1945, a calamity compounded three days later by a second bomb exploded over Nagasaki. It was, like most tragedy, made virtually inevitable by foregoing blunders: revengeful treatment of Germany following World War I, U.S. failure to join World War II when it began in 1939, thoughtless responses to Japanese aggression in Asia during the 1930s, and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Since 1945, nuclear weapons have remained humankind's greatest single immediate threat.∂ If we don't want to repeat the mistakes that led to Hiroshima, we had better treat the Iranian nuclear question rationally, realistically, and without childish bravado. U.S. Sen. Tom Cotton's recent letter to Iran, and Prime Minister Netanyahu's recent speech to Congress, were not serious. Netanyahu argued that a nuclear agreement with Iran would be a bad deal and should be rejected. Cotton suggested to Iran that a future U.S. president could revoke the agreement.∂ None of the agreement's opponents appear to have thought through the consequences of following their leads. Iran, having no further reason for restraint and every incentive for aggression, will move quickly toward a bomb; Israel will urge action to prevent a bomb and will pressure the U.S. to join it in threatening Iran; and we could easily be drawn into war -- a blunder that would dwarf even our foolish adventure into Iraq beginning in 2003.∂ The realistic fact is that, absent an agreement, the United States, Iran and Israel are on the road to war, possibly a nuclear war.

### Ext: Trump 🡪 Kills Iran Deal

#### GOP victory rolls back the Iran deal.

Toosi 15. [Nahal, foreign affairs correspondent “How a Republican president could kill the Iran deal” Politico -- http://www.politico.com/story/2015/07/gop-president-iran-deal-kill-120077]

If the next president hates the nuclear deal with Iran, he (or she) can undo it after taking office. The dilemma: Use blunt force? Or go for a soft kill? Story Continued Below The accord reached this week in Vienna promises broad sanctions relief to Iran in exchange for significant curbs on its nuclear program. The agreement has taken years to negotiate, involves seven countries as well as the European Union and the United Nations, and relies upon the expertise of scientists as well as diplomats. But at the end of the day, the “deal” is at most a political arrangement — not a treaty or other form of signed legal document. That means that the presidential candidates who have threatened to cancel the deal — so far all of them Republicans — can keep their promise by using the presidency’s executive authority to reimpose suspended U.S. sanctions on Iran and withdrawing from panels involved in implementing the accord. That abrupt approach may be quick, but it also carries risks. For one thing, a sudden U.S. withdrawal could anger the European and Asian countries also involved in the deal, making them less inclined to reimpose their own sanctions on a country they consider an alluring trading partner. The international business community may resist efforts to once again seal off a youthful, well-educated nation with vast energy reserves. And Iran could respond to the U.S. move by resuming elements of its nuclear program, which the West has long suspected is aimed at making weapons. “If we try to reimpose sanctions on Iran and no one follows, then we have the worst of all worlds,” said Robert Einhorn, a former Iran nuclear negotiator at the State Department. Instead, even the deal’s most ardent critics say, a new president might be better off taking a more subtle, longer-term approach, one that involves laying the groundwork to ultimately convince the world that Iran — through perceived violations, intransigence, foot-dragging or whatever a president chooses to highlight — has left the U.S. no choice but to quit the deal. “You say it’s a bad deal, but you don’t just rip up the deal,” said Mark Dubowitz, executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. The first step for a newly inaugurated president would be to order a review of the accord, which will already have been in effect for roughly a year and a half. It’s possible the Iranians will have been accused of violating the deal by the time a new president takes office, so a review could tally those transgressions to sow doubts in the minds of the American public about the soundness of the agreement. Depending on how major the violations are, the U.S. might also be able to convince other nations that the deal isn’t working. Even if the Iranians haven’t committed any or many notable violations, there are other factors a president could point to. Take the regional situation: If Iran, either directly or through proxies, has escalated its interference in other countries in the Middle East, a president could blame the nuclear deal by saying it has given Tehran economic leverage to pursue mischief outside its borders. America’s Arab allies, who have watched Iran make inroads everywhere from Syria to Lebanon to Iraq, have long argued that the Iranian government will take advantage of sanctions relief to funnel more money toward its regional aggression. Here, a U.S. president — and a hawkish Congress — also has the option of leveling new sanctions on Iran that aren’t necessarily tied to its nuclear program but rather to its support for terrorist groups. (Existing sanctions that target Iran over its support for terrorism and its abuses of human rights won’t be lifted under the nuclear deal.) At the very least, the new sanctions will increase the tension between the U.S. and Iran, possibly even leading to a backlash from Tehran that boosts the U.S. president’s standing.

#### GOP win will wreck diplomacy and nuclear deal with Iran that checks crisis escalation

Shaer 16. [Susan, Executive Director of WAND, Women's Action for New Directions, “Despite Iran Deal Success, Beware of Attempts to Undermine It” Huffington Post -- February 1 -- <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/susan-shaer/despite-iran-deal-success_b_9134416.html>]

In a timeline of events that could have been lifted from an episode of The West Wing, on January 12, ten sailors in the U.S. Navy were taken into Iranian custody just hours before President Obama's State of the Union address. A U.S. Naval vessel had malfunctioned and drifted into Iranian waters where the U.S. sailors were taken captive by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. On January 13, those same ten sailors were released, less than 24 hours later. Consider that nine years ago in a similar incident, 15 British Royal Navy sailors spent 13 days in Iranian captivity. One of the differences between these two events was that by 2016, the West had opened up diplomatic channels with Iran resulting from the Iran nuclear deal. The agreement, concluded after careful and painstaking diplomacy, allowed the United States and Iran to keep a ship's malfunction from escalating to an international crisis. Not only has that agreement -- the Iran nuclear deal -- provided new ways to communicate and resolve incidents with a sometimes hostile adversary, it has also **strengthened global peace and security by preventing Iran from building a nuclear weapon** -- without firing a shot. As a result of the deal, Iran has gone from being two to three months away from enough material for one bomb to one year away. Four days after the U.S. Navy incident in Iranian waters, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that "Implementation Day" had arrived; that is that Iran had taken the necessary steps under the Iran nuclear deal to receive sanctions relief from the EU and United States. Under the deal, Iran has dismantled or converted its nuclear facilities, shipped out large stores of enriched uranium, and provided the IAEA with wide-ranging access to its facilities. Additionally, it has cooperated with IAEA investigations into its past behavior (in December 2015, the IAEA found that Iran had ceased nuclear weapons work after 2009). Make no mistake, though it received less fanfare, Implementation Day is as significant an historic achievement as the day the Iran deal was signed. As Secretary of State John Kerry put it, "[Implementation Day] marks the moment that the Iran nuclear agreement transitions from an ambitious set of promises on paper to measurable action in progress." On the same day, Iran released five Americans being held as political prisoners in Iran for various lengths of time. The release was well timed, and though it happened through an apparent second diplomatic channel, the communication that occurred was fostered by the nuclear diplomacy efforts. Despite its success, some members of Congress continue to look for ways to void the deal. They are fixated on Iran's ballistic missile program, its sponsorship of various terror groups, and its human rights abuses. On February 2, House Republicans will vote a second time on the Iran Terror Financing Transparency Act, a bill with a tough name but a counterproductive purpose. If enacted, the legislation would tie Iran's non-nuclear-related behavior to U.S. sanctions relief, which would have the effect of killing the deal. But killing the deal would isolate the United States, as the rest of the world has begun normalizing business ties with Iran. While President Obama has the votes to sustain a certain veto should the bill reach his desk, deal opponents persist in sending a message that they will stop at nothing to undermine this signature foreign policy achievement. Safe though the nuclear deal may be for now, supporters of diplomacy with Iran must remain ever vigilant. As its detractors like to point out, the Iran deal is not a treaty. **Future presidents can disregard its provisions if they see fit.** The diplomatic channel that helped with the safe release of our sailors and the release of five American prisoners **can easily dry up with different leadership**. As voters make their way to the polls they should remember that only the Democratic candidates have endorsed the Iran deal. While foreign policy doesn't always loom large in elections, this issue should rise to the top of voters' minds. In the end, it is about nothing less than war and peace.

### AT: Trump Will Renegotiate the Deal

#### First, any attempt to meddle with the deal triggers Iran backlash.

#### Second, it is legally impossible to renegotiate.

Ritter 6-2-16. [Karl, AP reporter, "IRAN: Donald Trump can't renegotiate the nuclear deal" Business Insider -- www.businessinsider.com/iran-says-donald-trump-cant-renegotiate-nuclear-deal-2016-6]

Iran's foreign minister says the nuclear deal reached last year with world powers can't be renegotiated despite Republican presidential contender Donald Trump's pledge to do so if elected. After a lecture in Stockholm on Wednesday, Mohammad Javad Zarif said the deal "is not an Iran-U.S. agreement for the Republican front-runner or anybody else to renegotiate. It's an international understanding annexed to a Security Council resolution." Trump has denounced the deal and said he'd seek to renegotiate it if elected president. Democratic front-runner Hillary Clinton has said she supports the agreement to rein in Iran's nuclear program, which was endorsed by the U.N. Security Council. It's not possible "to renegotiate a text that is annexed" to such a resolution, Zarif said.

### Internal: Deal Collapse = Iran Backlash

#### Deal collapse triggers Iran prolif and escalating war.

Costello 15. [Ryan, Policy Fellow @ NIAC, former Program Associate at the Connect US Fund on nuclear nonproliferaiton policy, "Stakes are high for Iran nuclear negotiations" National Iranian Council – March 30 -- www.niacouncil.org/stakes-are-high-for-iran-nuclear-negotiations/]

This week, the U.S. has a chance to lead an international coalition into an agreement that would guard against any attempt by Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon. However, the decades since the Iranian Revolution in 1979 are littered with missed opportunities to resolve differences between the U.S. and Iran, including on the nuclear issue. With political capital expended to keep the negotiations afloat, particularly in Washington, and the list of issues to be resolved shrinking, these negotiations have steadily risen in importance. As a result, failure or the rash rejection of a breakthrough by Congress or Iranian hardliners could result in irreparable damage to the diplomatic track, with profound consequences for an already chaotic region.∂ We may never see a pair of U.S. and Iranian Presidents more willing to expend the political capital necessary to reach a nuclear deal. President Obama famously distinguished himself on the campaign trail in 2008 by vowing to sit down with any world leader without preconditions, including Iran, and has turned an Iran nuclear deal into what could be the chief foreign policy goal of his second term. Secretary of State John Kerry and other top U.S. diplomats have also spent countless hours doggedly pursuing a deal that balances between the political imperatives of Washington and Tehran.∂ In Iran, President Rouhani campaigned on a platform of moderation and outreach to the West. Rouhani was the lead nuclear negotiator for Iran between 2003-2005, which resulted in Iran freezing its enrichment and implementing the IAEA’s Additional Protocol. Rouhani’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, also has a successful track record of negotiating with the West, playing a critical role in the effort to form a new government for Afghanistan at the Bonn conference in 2001. Over the past year and a half of intense negotiations, Rouhani and Zarif have kept Iran’s skeptical Supreme Leader united behind their efforts to reach a deal, preventing counterproductive divides in Iran’s political elite.∂ Now, with the political scales tilted heavily in favor of diplomacy, failure could eliminate diplomatic prospects for the foreseeable future. Escalation will be the name of the game if negotiations fail, as lead U.S. negotiator Wendy Sherman articulated in October. Congress would pass sanctions and President Obama might not put up much of a fight. Iran would expand its nuclear program and limit the access of international inspectors. The sanctions regime would fray or potentially collapse, diminishing U.S. leverage over Iran. Tacit cooperation in Iraq to counter ISIS militants could end, with dangerous consequences.∂ If diplomacy fails, President Obama would likely resist the reinvigorated calls from neoconservative circles to attack Iran, but he has less than two years remaining in office. Prominent Republicans weighing Presidential runs have already staked out a hardline position by warning Iran that they would undo any potential multilateral nuclear agreement “with the stroke of a pen.” Democrats, as well, could be scarred by failure and rush toward a hawkish position. Whereas a multilateral agreement would constrain the next President from returning to the escalation route, an advancing Iranian nuclear program and the lack of diplomatic prospects would tempt many of Obama’s potential successors to consider the military option, regardless of the consequences. Those who have dreamed of attacking Tehran ever since the fall of Baghdad are banking on such an opportunity to renew their case for yet another disastrous war.∂ It has been ten years since the European 3 (the United Kingdom, France and Germany) had a golden opportunity to constrain Iran’s nuclear program. Those talks fell apart largely due to the George W. Bush administration’s insistence that any agreement result in Iran eliminating its entire centrifuge program. As a result, Iran went from hundreds to 20,000 centrifuges as economic pressure escalated but failed to achieve any strategic goal. Now, diplomacy has once again halted the Iranian program’s advance and could lead to a historic breakthrough that reshapes the U.S.-Iran relationship, cuts off Iran’s pathways to a nuclear weapon and averts a disastrous war. If an agreement falls through, however, getting through another ten years without a war, an Iranian nuclear weapon, or both would likely prove more challenging than reaching the diplomatic inflection point that the parties now face in Lausanne.

#### US abandoning the deal causes Iran war.

Beauchamp 14. [Zack, B.A.s in Philosophy and Political Science from Brown University and an M.Sc in International Relations from the London School of Economics, former editor of TP Ideas and a reporter for ThinkProgress.org, "How the new GOP majority could destroy Obama's nuclear deal with Iran" VOX -- November 6 -- www.vox.com/2014/11/6/7164283/iran-nuclear-deal-congress]

And make no mistake — imposing new sanctions or limiting Obama's authority to waive the current ones would kill any deal. If Iran can't expect Obama to follow through on his promises to relax sanctions, it has zero incentive to limit its nuclear program. "If Congress adopts sanctions," Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif told Time last December, "the entire deal is dead."∂ Moreover, it could fracture the international movement to sanction Iran. The United States is far from Iran's biggest trading partner, so it depends on international cooperation in order to ensure the sanctions bite. If it looks like the US won't abide by the terms of a deal, the broad-based international sanctions regime could collapse. Europe, particularly, might decide that going along with the sanctions is no longer worthwhile.∂ "Our ability to coerce Iran is largely based on whether or not the international community thinks that we are the ones that are being constructive and [Iranians] are the ones that being obstructive," Sofer says. "If they don't believe that, then the international sanctions regime falls apart."∂ This could be one of the biggest fights of Obama's last term∂ It's true that Obama could veto any Congressional efforts to blow up an Iran deal with sanctions. lobbying effort that Democrats might prefer to spend pushing on other issues.∂ "I'm not really sure they're going to be willing to take on a fight about an Iran sanctions bill," Sofer concludes. "I'm not really sure that the Democrats who support [a deal] are really fully behind it enough that they'll be willing to give up leverage on, you know, unemployment insurance or immigration status — these bigger issues for most Democrats."∂ So if the new Republican Senate prioritizes destroying an Iran deal, Obama will have to fight very hard to keep it — without necessarily being able to count on his own party for support. And the stakes are enormous: if Iran's nuclear program isn't stopped peacefully, then the most likely outcomes are either Iran going nuclear, or war with Iran.∂ The administration believes a deal with Iran is their only way to avoid this horrible choice. That's why it's been one of the administration's top priorities since day one. It's also why this could become one of the biggest legislative fights of Obama's last two years.

### Internal: Deal Solves – 2NC

#### Consensus of experts agree – the deal solves.

Corn 15. [David, Washington Bureau chief, "The Iranian Nuclear Deal: What the Experts Are Saying" Mother Jones -- April 3 -- www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/04/iran-nuclear-deal-nonproliferation-experts]

Shortly after the participants in the Iranian nuclear talks announced that a double-overtime framework had been crafted, I was on television with Rabbi Shmuley Boteach, who is something of a celebrity rabbi, a failed congressional candidate, and an arch-neoconservative hawk who has been howling about a potential deal with Iran for months. Not surprisingly, he was not pleased by the news of the day. He declared that under these parameters, Iran would give up nothing and would "maintain their entire nuclear apparatus." Elsewhere, a more serious critic, Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.), who last month had organized the letter to Iran's leaders signed by 47 GOP senators opposed to a deal, groused that the framework was "only a list of dangerous US concessions that will put Iran on the path to nuclear weapons."∂ These criticisms were rhetorical bombs, not statements of fact. Under the framework, Iran would give up two-thirds of its centrifuges used to enrich uranium and would reduce its stockpile of low-enriched uranium (which is the raw material used to develop bomb-quality highly-enriched uranium) from 10,000 kilograms to 300 kilograms. These two developments alone—and the framework has many other provisions—would diminish Tehran's ability to produce a nuclear weapon. Its nuclear apparatus would be smaller, and under these guidelines, Iran's pathway to nuclear weapons, while certainly not impossible, would be much more difficult. Yet because politics dominates the debate over this deal—as it does so often with important policy matters—foes of the framework could hurl fact-free charges with impunity.∂ It is perhaps easier to do so when the subject is a highly technical matter. Nuclear nonproliferation is a subject that depends upon science. (Do you know how many centrifuges it takes to spin enough material for a bomb?) And it is difficult for nonexperts to assess any nonproliferation agreement. But it is rather easy to decry Tehran's leaders as evil tyrants who support terrorism, despise Israel, and cannot be trusted. Little of that sort of attack has any bearing on evaluating this framework, which may or may not lead to a concrete accord. Trust is not at issue, for example. What counts is whether the technical means of inspection agreed upon are deemed sufficient to monitor the nuclear program, materials, supply chain, and facilities that remain. Yet who can tell?∂ Well, there are nonproliferation experts. A fair number, in fact. These are scientists and policy mavens who are trained to study and answer the questions posed by this framework. They are not infallible. They may disagree among themselves. But if there ever were a policy debate that should be shaped by scientific expertise, this is it. The politicians, pundits, and, yes, rabbis (or, at least, one rabbi) ought to give due deference to the guys and gals who know this stuff. So I've collected a few initial takes from arms control policy experts who are mostly keen on the possible deal, and here they are:∂ Anthony Cordesman, the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a former national security aide to Sen. John McCain, and a former director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense: "[T]he proposed parameters and framework in the Proposed Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action has the potential to meet every test in creating a valid agreement over time…It can block both an Iranian nuclear threat and a nuclear arms race in the region, and it is a powerful beginning to creating a full agreement, and creating the prospect for broader stability in other areas. Verification will take at least several years, but some form of trust may come with time. This proposal should not be a subject for partisan wrangling or outside political exploitation. It should be the subject of objective analysis of the agreement, our intelligence and future capabilities to detect Iran's actions, the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) capabilities to verify, and enforcement provisions if Iran should cheat. No perfect agreement was ever possible and it is hard to believe a better option was negotiable. In fact, it may be a real victory for all sides: A better future for Iran, and greater security for the United States, its Arab partners, Israel, and all its other allies."∂ William Burns, president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, former deputy secretary of state, and former career ambassador in the Foreign Service: "In a perfect world, there would be no nuclear enrichment in Iran, and its existing enrichment facilities would be dismantled. But we don't live in a perfect world. We can't wish or bomb away the basic know-how and enrichment capability that Iran has developed. What we can do is sharply constrain it over a long duration, monitor it with unprecedented intrusiveness, and prevent the Iranian leadership from enriching material to weapons grade and building a bomb…The history of the Iranian nuclear issue is littered with missed opportunities. It is a history in which fixation on the perfect crowded out the good, and in whose rearview mirror we can see deals that look a lot better now than they seemed then. With all its inevitable imperfections, we can't afford to miss this one."∂ Matthew Bunn, professor at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government and coprincipal investigator at the Project on Managing the Atom: In a PowerPoint presentation he notes, "The proposed deal is the best chance to stop an Iranian Bomb. Deal would impose technical barriers that would take overt breakout off the table as a plausible option, and make sneakout more difficult. Political effects of the deal would undermine Iranian bomb advocates, reduce the chance of an Iranian decision to build the bomb. The credible alternatives—a return to sanctions or military strikes—pose significantly higher risks to US and world security. The deal is highly imperfect—but better [than] the other options realistically available."∂ Dan Joyner, University of Alabama School of Law professor, author of International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and contributor to ArmsControlLaw.com: "Overall I think the framework of agreement is a very good one. Iran definitely made some very significant concessions. In fact, one might be forgiven for thinking that, with all of the specificity placed on Iranian concessions, and really only fairly vague wording on the lifting of unilateral and multilateral sanctions (i.e., regarding timing) in the joint statement, Iran showed the most diplomatic courage in agreeing to this framework. I'm sure there is much that was agreed to that we don't know about, and I have no doubt that [Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad] Zarif and his team reached a satisfactory understanding with their negotiating partners on the sanctions question from their perspective. But I suppose I just wanted to highlight that Iran is the party that made the most obvious significant concessions in this framework agreement."∂ Gary Samore and Olli Heinonen of Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government and members of a group called United Against Nuclear Iran: The New York Times reports, "Mr. Samore…said in an email that the deal was a 'very satisfactory resolution of Fordo [enrichment facility] and Arak [plutonium reactor] issues for the 15-year term' of the accord. He had more questions about operations at Natanz [enrichment facility] and said there was 'much detail to be negotiated, but I think it's enough to be called a political framework.' Mr. Heinonen, the former chief inspector of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said, 'It appears to be a fairly comprehensive deal with most important parameters.' But he cautioned that 'Iran maintains enrichment capacity which will be beyond its near-term needs.'"∂ Joseph Cirincione, president of of Ploughshares Fund, a global security foundation, and former director for nonproliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: "The agreement does three things. It blocks all of Iran's pathways to a nuclear bomb. It imposes tough inspections to catch Iran should it try to break out, sneak out, or creep out of the deal. And it keeps our coalition united to enforce the deal. Under this deal, Iran has agreed to rip out two-thirds of its centrifuges and cut its stockpile of uranium gas by 97 percent. It will not be able to make any uranium or plutonium for a bomb. Many of the restrictions in the agreement continue for 25 years and some—like the inspections and the ban on building nuclear weapons—last forever."∂ Frank von Hippel, an expert with Princeton's Science and International Security Program: According to the McClatchy Washington Bureau, "Frank von Hippel said he was surprised that Iran had accepted an enrichment level of 3.67 percent and hadn't insisted on 5 percent. 'There are still details to be filled in, but I like it a lot,' von Hippel said on the framework…'On transparency, it looks like they really are doing a lot.'"∂ As many have noted in the past day, a framework is only a framework. There are plenty of tough and complicated details to sort out. The deal may fall apart, especially with conservatives in both Washington and Tehran—and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his crew—sniping away and looking to subvert any agreement. But as the heated debate continues, it will be important that nonproliferation experts play a critical role in the discourse. Science-based statements, not snarky sound bites, should be the weapons of choice.

Here are the qualifications for everyone cited:

* Anthony Cordesman, the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a former national security aide to Sen. John McCain, and a former director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
* William Burns, president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, former deputy secretary of state, and former career ambassador in the Foreign Service
* Matthew Bunn, professor at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government and coprincipal investigator at the Project on Managing the Atom
* Dan Joyner, University of Alabama School of Law professor, author of International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and contributor to ArmsControlLaw.com
* Gary Samore and Olli Heinonen of Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government and members of a group called United Against Nuclear Iran
* Joseph Cirincione, president of Ploughshares Fund, a global security foundation, and former director for nonproliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
* Frank von Hippel, an expert with Princeton's Science and International Security Program

#### Aff ev just a bunch of biased conservative misinformation – scrutinize their evidence – the deal solves.

Kaplan 15. [Fred, foreign policy journalist and author, "The Deal of a Lifetime" Slate – April 2 -- www.slate.com/articles/news\_and\_politics/war\_stories/2015/04/iranian\_nuclear\_deal\_is\_a\_breakthrough\_why\_the\_agreement\_is\_the\_best\_option.html]

The Iranian nuclear deal reached in Switzerland on Thursday is a significant breakthrough. Uncertainties remain, inherently so, as it’s merely a “political framework” for a formal deal to be completed and signed by June 30. But this framework turns out to be far more detailed, quantitative, and restrictive than anyone had expected.∂ It might not lead to a deal as good as the outline suggests; it might not lead to a deal at all. But anyone who denounces this framework—anyone who argues that we should pull out of the talks, impose more sanctions, or bomb Iran because it’s better to have no deal than to have this one—is not a serious person or is pursuing a parochial agenda.

### Prolif Impact – 2NC

#### Iran deal collapse causes mass proliferation.

Borger 14. [Julian, Guardian's diplomatic editor, “A nuclear deal with Iran would mean a less volatile world” The Guardian -- December 31 -- http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/31/nuclear-deal-iran-cuba-proliferation]

There will be no greater diplomatic prize in 2015 than a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran. In its global significance, it would dwarf the US detente with Cuba, and not just because there are seven times more Iranians than Cubans. This deal will not be about cash machines in the Caribbean, but about nuclear proliferation in the most volatile region on Earth.∂ An agreement was supposed to have been reached by 24 November, but Iran and the west were too far apart to make the final leap. After nine months of bargaining, the intricate, multidimensional negotiation boiled down to two main obstacles: Iran’s long-term capacity to enrich uranium, and the speed and scale of sanctions relief.∂ Iran wants international recognition of its right not just to enrich, but to do so on an industrial scale. It wants to maintain its existing infrastructure of 10,000 centrifuges in operation and another 9,000 on standby, and it wants to be able to scale that capacity up many times.∂ The US and its allies say Tehran has no need for so much enriched uranium. Its one existing reactor is Russian-built, as are its planned reactors, so all of them come with Russian-supplied fuel as part of the contract. The fear is that industrial enrichment capacity would allow Iran to make a bomb’s-worth of weapons-grade uranium very quickly, if it decided it needed one – faster than the international community could react.∂ However, the west is currently not offering large-scale, immediate sanctions relief in return for such curbs on Iran’s activity. President Barack Obama can only temporarily suspend US congressional sanctions, and western states are prepared to reverse only some elements of UN security council sanctions. The best the west can offer upfront is a lifting of the EU oil embargo.∂ These gaps remain substantial, but none of the parties involved can walk away from the table. A collapse of talks would lead to a slide back to the edge of conflict between Iran and Israel; the latter has vowed to launch military strikes rather than allow the former to build a bomb. It could also trigger a wave of proliferation across the region and beyond as other countries hedge their bets.∂ So the parties to the talks have given themselves more time – until 1 March 2015 – to agree a framework deal for bridging them and until 1 July to work out all of the details. They have resumed meetings in Geneva, with an emphasis on sessions between the two most important countries, the US and Iran. The trouble is that, while the diplomats inside the chamber sense that they are still making progress in closing the gaps, the sceptics back home just see deceit and playing for time by the other side.∂ This is particularly true of the US Congress. A new Republican-controlled Senate will convene on 6 January. From that date, the White House can no longer rely on a Democratic majority leader to keep new sanctions legislation off the Senate floor. The legislation now under discussion could take the form of triggered sanctions, which would come into effect if there was no deal by a target date. That would add urgency to the negotiations, undoubtedly a good thing, but it would also provoke counter-measures from Iran’s parliament, the Majlis, and a very volatile environment.

#### Iran prolif causes extinction – outweighs on magnitude.

Kroenig 15. [Matthew, Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair, Department of Government, Georgetown University and Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, The Atlantic Council, “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?” Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 38, Issue 1-2, 2015, pp. 98-125, Taylor & Francis]

Nuclear War **The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is** nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, **the greater the probability that somewhere**, someday, **there will be a** catastrophic nuclear war**.** To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to the 65-plus-year tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, **but it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again** simply **because they have not been used for some time**. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the Great Depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dot-com bubble bursting later in the decade and the Great Recession of the late 2000s.48 This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used again sometime in his lifetime.Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure-second strike capability. In this context, one or both states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first. For example, **if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor** its nuclear-armed rival, **Israel, will have a secure, second-strike capability**. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, **Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike**. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preventive nuclear strike to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, **might feel** use them or lose them pressures. That is, in a crisis, **Iran might decide to** strike first **rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed**. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, nuclear war could result **due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack**.49 If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second. Fortunately, there is no historic evidence of this dynamic occurring in a nuclear context, but it is still possible. In an Israeli–Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but **decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack** from an opponent. Even in a world of MAD, however, when both sides have secure, second-strike capabilities, there is still a risk of nuclear war. Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational leaders who would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but **there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future**. Iran’s theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who hold millenarian religious worldviews and could one day ascend to power. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, some leader somewhere will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As was discussed above, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries. Leaders might, therefore, choose to launch a limited nuclear war.50 This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly to the nuclear level. During the Cold War, the United States planned to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATO’s conventional inferiority.51 As Russia’s conventional power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons in its military doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a US superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. Second, as was also discussed above, leaders can make a ‘threat that leaves something to chance’.52 They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can **increase the risk of nuclear war** in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close. And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents nearly led to war.53 **When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads**, such as Iran and Israel, **with fewer sources of stability than** existed during **the Cold War, we can see that there is a** real risk **that a** future crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange**.**

### Turns Heg/Leadership

#### Prolif destroys US leadership.

Sechser 8. [Todd , prof. at the University of Virginia, “Nuclear Weapons,” 12/30/2008, <http://faculty.virginia.edu/tsechser/Sechser-Haas-2009.pdf> ]

What are the implications of the preceding argument for U.S. foreign policy? There are two separate policy questions to consider: first, whether the United States should try to prevent its adversaries from acquiring nuclear weapons; and second, whether it should continue to adhere to a doctrine of universal nonproliferation. The answer to the first question is unequivocally affirmative. The arguments in this chapter **do not imply** that the United States should stop trying to pre-vent its adversaries from acquiring nuclear weapons. **Even if** **nuclear weapons are stabilizing** **overall**, **they could nevertheless permit hostile states to counter the power and influence of the United States, potentially threatening U.S. interests**. A nuclear Iran, for example, might seek to deter, resist, or blackmail the United States. Stopping proliferation to U.S. adversaries will therefore remain an essential pillar of U.S. foreign policy **even if** the proliferation optimists are correct. On this, the optimists and pessimists can probably agree.

### Turns Terrorism

#### Iran prolif turns terrorism.

**Brookes**, National security affairs senior fellow, **07**

(Peter, 4-2-07, “Iran Emboldened: Tehran Seeks to Dominate Middle East Politics”, DOA: 10-10-13, <http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2007/04/iran-emboldened-tehran-seeks-to-dominate-middle-east-politics>, llc)

According to the U.S. State Department, **Iran continues to be the world's most active state sponsor of terrorism**. At the request of senior Iranian leadership, Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) support Palestinian terrorist groups such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command with funding, training and weapons. Hezbollah - a Lebanese Shiite terrorist group - is a particular favorite. In fact, Iran established Hezbollah to parry Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Tehran may fund Hezbollah to the tune of $100 million per year. Last summer, Tehran's military support for Hezbollah was evident. Iran likely gave Hezbollah the green light to ambush an Israeli patrol and kidnap soldiers, which ultimately kicked off the monthlong conflict. In the ensuing days, Hezbollah indiscriminately fired as many as 10,000 Iran-supplied rockets and missiles into Israel. In addition, many were stunned when a C-802 cruise missile struck an Israeli naval vessel off the coast of Lebanon. While the shooter was never identified, the Chinese C-802 is in Iran's inventory. It could have been fired by either Hezbollah or the IRGC. Today, Hezbollah, with Iranian and Syrian support, is threatening to topple Lebanon's democratically elected government unless it is given additional cabinet seats - potentially giving it veto power over Beirut's decisions. Iran would love to add Lebanon to Syria as a client state in its effort to form an arc of Iranian influence across the region. Iran has made a number of not-so-veiled threats that it would deploy its irregular forces and terrorist allies against the U.S. and American interests, if necessary. This is likely not an idle threat. American blood is already on the hands of Iran and its terrorist proxies as a result of the 1983 Beirut Marine barracks attack and the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, and in Iraq today. It is almost without question that Tehran sees its ability to hold U.S. interests at risk across the globe - including in the U.S. - as leverage against American military action over its nuclear program or meddling in Iraq. Perhaps the most frightening scenario is that Iran might transfer weapons of mass destruction capability to a terrorist ally. While this is risky behavior, it is a possibility. Iran could transfer nuclear capability to a Hezbollah-dominated government in Lebanon, or a Hamas-led Palestinian Authority, significantly increasing the threat to Israeli security. Osama bin Laden has not been shy about his desire for WMD or al-Qaida's readiness to use them. The insurgency's recent use of chlorine gas in Iraq is evidence of a terrorist group's willingness to employ WMD.

### ISIS Impact – 2NC

#### Sanctions ensure ISIS aggression – diplomacy with Iran key to containment.

Parsi 1-15. [Trita, President of the National Iranian American Council, author of A Single Roll of the Dice - Obama's Diplomacy with Iran, "THe Senate's gift to ISIS: Sanctions on Iran" Foreign Policy Forum -- www.foreignpolicyforum.com/guest.php]

The Islamic State has many enemies and very few friends. But sometimes, even declared enemies of the Caliphate (or ISIS) can lend it a helping hand. That is essentially what is happening now as Senators Mark Kirk and Bob Menendez push to undermine the nuclear talks with Iran -- a key adversary of ISIS. If nuclear diplomacy breaks down, the US and Iran will once again find themselves on a path towards war. ISIS will be the greatest winner in that scenario. After all, who wouldn't want to see its enemies turn against each other?∂ Senators Kirk and Menendez are not intending to aid ISIS. They may not realize that this will be one of the consequences of their push to impose more sanctions on Iran in the midst of ongoing diplomacy. They may not care. Perhaps they think aiding ISIS is a price worth paying in order to block President Barack Obama's nuclear deal with Iran.∂ After all, Senator Tom Cotton (R-AK) has clarified that the aim of imposing additional sanctions is to kill the talks, not strengthen the deal. "The end of these negotiations isn't an unintended consequence of Congressional action, it is very much an intended consequence," he said yesterday.∂ The White House believes these new sanctions will "blow up" the negotiations and President Obama has vowed to veto the bill. The Republican leadership has scheduled to mark up the bill next week and then move it to a vote shortly thereafter.∂ But the opponents of diplomacy are out of sync with the American public. The public's focus is on ISIS, whereas the Senate remains fixated on Iran. According to a CNN poll , 90 percent of the public views ISIS as a threat to the United States. Another poll by Brookings Institute shows that 70 percent of the American public view ISIS as the main threat to the US in the Middle East. Only 12 percent view Iran as America's main threat in the Middle East. Moreover, 61 percent of Americans would like to see the US collaborate with Iran to defeat ISIS.∂ Even though Iran is not a formal member in the US coalition against ISIS -- and both Washington and Tehran deny they coordinate their efforts -- Iran has played a crucial role in pushing back the terrorist organization. The Christian Science Monitor reported that when ISIS forces swept across the Syrian border into Iraq, "Shiite Iran was the first to provide guns, ammunition, and military advisers."∂ Tehran's swift and muscular response to ISIS has won it a lot of praise from Iraqi officials. "When Baghdad was threatened, the Iranians did not hesitate to help us, and did not hesitate to help the Kurds when Erbil was threatened," Iraq's prime minister, Haider al-Abadi, recently said. Some Iraqi politicians even believe that Baghdad would have fallen to ISIS had it not been for the military support provided by Iran.∂ US officials grudgingly agree. It is extremely rare that US or Iranian officials speak positively about each other in public, but when it comes to Iran's role in battling IS, even American officials have acknowledged it. General John Allen, the Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, has welcomed "Iran's constructive role" in Iraq. Secretary of State John Kerry has said that the net effect of Iran's role and involvement in Iraq is positive.∂ Iran's resolute opposition against ISIS is largely explained by the threat it itself sees from the terror organization. But it is also partly a result of the reduced tensions between Washington and Tehran due to the ongoing nuclear diplomacy, which has enabled the Iranians to see regional challenges through a new lens. In the past, when Washington and Tehran were embroiled in an intense regional rivalry, both sides used every given opportunity to undermine each other, even when they actually shared common interests. In Afghanistan, both opposed the Taliban and sought its defeat, but they regularly used the Taliban to weaken the other.∂ Had diplomacy over the nuclear program not begun, chances are that the two sides would have approached ISIS similarly. They would have opposed the organization, but at the same time sought ways to use ISIS to undermine the other. Consequently, ISIS would have benefitted from the US and Iran's inability to set aside their differences in order to fully focus on the jihadi terrorist organization.∂ But that is exactly the scenario that likely will come about if Senators Kirk and Menendez succeed in torpedoing the negotiations and bring Iran and United States back on a path towards confrontation.∂ Understandably, the Obama administration doesn't want to conflate the nuclear issue and the ISIS challenge. And it is sensitive to the charge that it would soften its nuclear demands issue in order to win Iranian support against ISIS. There is nothing that suggests any such trade-off even has been contemplated or that Obama has pursued a soft line on Iran. On the contrary, after more than 12 months of negotiations and two extended deadlines, everything points to the opposite -- both sides are negotiating too hard and showing too little flexibility.∂ Rather than worrying about the ISIS challenge softening the US's position on the nuclear portfolio, the real worry should be that Senators Kirk and Menendez will blow up diplomacy with Iran, and in doing so, eliminate the chance of preventing an Iranian nuclear bomb, restart the march towards war with Iran, and on top of that, enable ISIS to benefit from the reignited US-Iran rivalry.

#### Unrestrained ISIS causes WMD terrorism.

Crabtree, 9/17(Susan, Washington Examiner, http://washingtonexaminer.com/us-hones-in-on-homegrown-isis-threat/article/2553515

Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Tuesday, characterized the risk of Americans coming back to the United States after fighting for Islamic State in Syria or Iraq and launching an attack as “significant.” “Given what they’ve already demonstrated in terms of brutality and utter disregard for human life, other than those who adhere to their ideology, whatever weapons system they would have in their possession – there’s no doubt that they would use it, including weapons of mass destruction,” he said. Noting that military officials have been in close contact with both the U.S. intelligence communities and U.S. law enforcement, he said the risk of those in the U.S. becoming radicalized would increase until ISIS’ “momentum is reversed” and U.S. authorities are able to counter their ability to recruit and put out propaganda on social media and the Internet. Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., who chairs the Senate Intelligence Committee, said the threat to the U.S. homeland is real even though our intelligence community has yet to identify an active terrorist plot to take place on U.S. soil “If you go back to the year before 9/11, there were no specifics on a threat that year,” she told the Examiner. “It’s the same as this year, but there was this sense that something was going to happen, and you have a much more sophisticated group that is a fighting force and rapidly growing with equipment and continued funding and committing atrocity after atrocity.” “Before 9/11 we didn’t really see what al Qaeda could do,” she added. “We’ve seen it with this organization.” U.S. authorities have identified more than a dozen of the 100 Americans believe to have joined ISIS as coming from the Minneapolis-St. Paul area. The twin cities have a large Somali population, the largest concentration in the U.S., but the Islamic State recruits are not limited to Somalis. Two Americans who were killed fighting for ISIS were raised in the United States. Douglas McCain and Troy Kastigar attended the same high school the Minneapolis suburb of New Hope and were good friends. McCain later lived in San Diego before traveling to Syria to fight for ISIS. The Minneapolis Star-Tribune in early September reported that a federal grand jury is investigating an attempt to convince 20 to 30 Somali men to leave Minnesota and join forces with ISIS. Sen. Al Franken, D-Minn., penned a letter dated Sept. 4 to Attorney General Eric Holder asking him to address ISIS recruitment in the state. Holder on Monday announced a new series of pilot programs in cities across the country that aim to counter the rise of violent extremism with the United States by better connecting the FBI with local communities. Rep. John Kline, R-Minn., said Tuesday that the Minneapolis Homeland Security Department office has recently briefed on the threat emanating from the twin cities and its efforts to stop it. Minnesota has a history of their residents traveling overseas to join the ranks of terrorist groups. Last year, U.S. authorities said the city has lost some 25 to 40 men to al-Shabab, the Somalia-based terrorist group responsible for the attack on the mall in Nairobi, Kenya, in 2013. “This is not a new for us,” Kline said in an interview. "We have a very large Somali community. … We have mosques and we clearly have had some indication that one or more of the imams has been talking some pretty strong language. We have had the example of some who have been radicalized and gone to the fight.” “We also know there are many of these Somali Muslims who are great neighbors so it’s always the case, you have to be careful, you have to make sure you are going after those who have been radicalized who are Islamist terrorists,” he said. Kline, who sits on the Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities, is worried that ISIS recruitment in Minneapolis is picking up speed after the extreme terrorist group’s advance across Iraq over the summer. “Because they have been registering these big military success they have been recruiting — people like to go to a winner,” he continued. “The homegrown threat is a danger everywhere — not just in Minnesota, but throughout the country and in other Western countries.”

#### Causes extinction---even without retaliation

Toon 7- chair of the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at CU-Boulder, et al.

Owen B., April 19, 2007, “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism,” online: <http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf>

To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At the same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We demonstrate here that a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities approaching one million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million. Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international economic consequences. Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and terrorists would be most likely to strike there. Accordingly, an organized attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists supported by such a state, could generate casualties comparable to those once predicted for a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a superpower conflict. Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to significant global climate perturbations (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.

### ISIS: Iraq Stability Impact

#### ISIS causes iraq instability—draws in great powers

-advanced weapons in the Middle East

-Iranian nuclear weapons

-Israel conflicts

Oded Eran and Yoel Guzansky 6-25-14 “The Collapse of Iraq: Strategic Implications”, The Scoop, 06/25/2014, http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL1406/S00099/the-collapse-of-iraq-strategic-implications.htm

While the United States will need to take the leading role, it must first take some decisions regarding the logic of providing the Iraqi army with advanced weaponry, given the collapse of Iraqi army units that were facing forces equipped with inferior weapons. The risk that advanced weapons will fall into the hands of irregular forces and be used immediately against the central government in Baghdad cannot be ignored. A different but no less difficult question concerns Iran and the new situation in Iraq. Iran could attempt to sabotage a joint effort if it is not involved in any way and sees itself as deserving compensation in the nuclear realm, or at least an easing of the sanctions. Yet involving Iran, regardless of its conduct in Syria and its close cooperation with Hizbollah, appears impossible, and instead, dealing with Iran solely in the context of Iraq is highly problematic. An interesting question is whether this issue arose in the recent bilateral talks between the United States and Iran or whether these talks dwelled only on the nuclear issue. The attitude of the Gulf states on this issue is also unclear, even though they may see the Iraqi issue as another opportunity to test the possibility of turning over a new leaf in their relations with Iran. The achievements by ISIS are a milestone in the history of the Middle East, even though they are not completely unprecedented. Hizbollah’s success in becoming a leading political force in Lebanon and the Hamas takeover in the Gaza Strip are important forerunners. The danger that this will become a permanent situation is clear to all of those directly involved, including the United States. Therefore, ISIS may see its achievements become something of a Pyrrhic victory: If the states in the region, under the leadership of the United States, mobilize for the fight against ISIS, even its most zealous fighters will have difficulty withstanding what they will face in the campaign, both in the quality of the weapons and the steps that will be used to cut off the organization’s supply routes. Israel naturally has great interest in the success of the struggle against ISIS entrenchment in any area whatsoever in the Middle East. Even if the group’s efforts are not directed against Israel at this point, there is no doubt of the ISIS strategic objectives, and any territorial or other entrenchment by ISIS is a potential security threat to Israel.

#### Iraq instability causes global nuclear wars

Corsi, PhD in political science from Harvard, ‘7

(Jerome R. Corsi, staff writer for World Net Daily and has a, "War with Iran is imminent,” 1/8/2007, http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE\_ID=53669)

If a broader war breaks out in Iraq, Olmert will certainly face pressure to send the Israel military into the Gaza after Hamas and into Lebanon after Hezbollah. If that happens, it will only be a matter of time before Israel and the U.S. have no choice but to invade Syria. The Iraq war could quickly spin into a regional war, with Israel waiting on the sidelines ready to launch an air and missile strike on Iran that could include tactical nuclear weapons. With Russia ready to deliver the $1 billion TOR M-1 surface-to-air missile defense system to Iran, military leaders are unwilling to wait too long to attack Iran. Now that Russia and China have invited Iran to join their Shanghai Cooperation Pact, will Russia and China sit by idly should the U.S. look like we are winning a wider regional war in the Middle East? If we get more deeply involved in Iraq, China may have their moment to go after Taiwan once and for all. A broader regional war could easily lead into a **third world war**, much as World Wars I and II began.

### Impact Calc – Iran Relations – 2NC

#### Iran-US relations are a conflict dampener- prevent global wars

Adib-Moghaddam 14.[Arshin, London Middle East Institute Centre for Iranian Studies chair, MPhil and PhD, Reader in Comparative Politics and International Relations at SOAS, University of London, interviewed by Firouzeh Mirrazavi, " Renewed Iranian-American Relations Stabilize World Politics – Interview," Eurasia Review, 2-16-14, www.eurasiareview.com/16022014-renewed-iranian-american-relations-stabilize-world-politics-interview/,]

I am in no doubt that **renewed Iran**ian-**American relations will have a stabilizing effect on world politics in general**. The two countries have merging interests and ultimately they are actors that can deliver. One of the reasons why the foreign policy of both countries was not effective in the different strategic theatres that you have mentioned is exactly because there was no dialogue to align them where necessary. This region needs peace and stability. The human suffering of the last decades is unbearable. The threat of al-Qaeda continues to be real and urgent. Iran and the United States must sit on the same table in order to deliberate about how to bring about a security architecture that will outlaw, once and for all, the use of force in the region. It is central that this is not pursued in exclusion of other regional actors. Iran and the United States will continue to disagree on a range of issues, certainly Palestine, Hezbollah, Bahrain etc., but I do not see any reason why these differences could not be negotiated within a diplomatic context. Certainly, they are not more serious than the differences that the United States has with China.

## === Turns Case ===

### Turns Case – Trump

#### Trump win collapses china relations and all foreign policy effectiveness

Grenoble 16. [Ryan, HuffPo editor, “Donald Trump Poses As Big A Risk To Global Stability As Terrorism, Report Says” Huffington Post – March 17 -- www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/donald-trump-global-threat-economy\_us\_56eac656e4b0b25c91849874]

The rising threat of jihadi terrorism, a military clash over China’s expansionism in the South China Sea, and Donald Trump as president — one of these things is not like the others, and it’s not the one you’d expect. According to a report published by The Economist Intelligence Unit on Thursday, the prospect of conflict in the South China Sea poses a lesser risk to the world’s economic stability than the other two threats. Yes — that means the EIU, a research and analysis group associated with The Economist magazine, believes a Trump presidency would be just as risky as the threat of jihadi terrorism. Both threats are tied at sixth place on a list of the world’s top 10 biggest risks to the global economy. (The possibility of a hard Chinese economic crash ranked first and a renewed cold war ranked second. Meanwhile, a clash in the South China Sea tied for eighth with a U.K. vote to leave the European Union.) The EIU’s report calculates risk intensity on a 25-point scale, taking into account both the probability that an event will occur and the impact it will have if it comes to pass. The prospect of Trump winning the U.S. presidential election and the rising threat of jihadi terrorism destabilizing the global economy are both “high impact” threats that have a “moderate probability” of occurring, according to the EIU. “In the event of a Trump victory, his hostile attitude to free trade, and alienation of Mexico and China in particular, could escalate rapidly into a trade war,” the analysis notes. “His militaristic tendencies towards the Middle East (and ban on all Muslim travel to the US) would be a potent recruitment tool for jihadi groups, increasing their threat both within the region and beyond.” The EIU further condemned the presidential candidate for his “exceptionally right-wing stance on the Middle East and jihadi terrorism, including, among other things, advocating the killing of families of terrorists and launching a land incursion into Syria to wipe out IS (and acquire its oil).” The report says it’s doubtful that Trump will defeat his likely Democratic challenger, Hillary Clinton, but concedes that it isn’t impossible. Should Trump win the presidency, the report predicts that “virulent” opposition from Democrats and the Republican establishment would limit his ability to pass more radical policies, but warns that “such internal bickering will also undermine the coherence of domestic and foreign policymaking.”

### Turns Case – Link

#### The link turns the aff – electoral backlash causes misunderstandings that deck bilateral cooperation

Wang 3/24/16 (Zheng, Director of the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies and an Associate Professor in the School of Diplomacy and International Relations at Seton Hall University, "How the Chinese See U.S. Elections: Three Myths," https://www.newamerica.org/weekly/116/how-the-chinese-see-us-elections-three-myths/)

China, long a hot topic in U.S. presidential elections, is one of the few countries frequently mentioned in American presidential candidates’ speeches and debates, very often as the target of attack. And, although electoral issues have changed many times over the past two or three decades, the China topic has remained resolute. Different candidates from different times blame China for the exact same things: the trade deficit, currency manipulation, job losses, and human rights and foreign policy problems. Current candidates have, not unlike their predecessors, taken to criticizing the present president for being soft on China and for being overrun by the Chinese. On the other side of the Pacific, people in China have been watching the U.S. elections with great interest. However, U.S. opinions of the way the Chinese themselves perceive these accusations against China are often misguided. Here are three major myths in the U.S. regarding how the Chinese see themselves and the U.S. elections. Myth 1: The Chinese agree China is the winner in terms of trade. Reality: Many Chinese consider trade with the U.S. to be unequal, unfair, and even harmful to their country. Though U.S. candidates talk about the trade deficit with China, many Chinese actually believe that China is the victim of trade with the U.S., as China’s exports to the U.S. are mainly cheap products and raw materials that produce low profits, and its imports from the U.S. are normally expensive high-tech products that generate huge profits for American corporations. For example, to buy a Boeing aircraft, China has to export hundreds of millions of shirts. And an Apple phone that is manufactured in China results in only 4 US dollars in profit for the factory in China, while Apple reaps huge financial benefits from the Chinese market. Amidst all of China’s manufacturing focus, the country pays a high price for environmental pollution. China also pays a high societal price. According to Chinese government statistics from 2014, 168 million migrant workers moved from the countryside in Central and Western China to coastal areas to find factory jobs. As these migrant workers cannot afford to have their families living together in the coastal areas, they end up leaving 61 million children at home. Families are forced to separate, causing many social problems. Many Chinese citizens and economists alike agree that trade and globalization have brought China some profits, but that American corporations are the ones taking home the majority of the earnings while China is left to suffer the negative environmental and societal consequences that accompany this trade. A popular opinion in China is that the low income and middle class societies in the U.S. are only able to maintain their living standards due to trade with China, and that China’s low wages, low human rights, and sparse environmental regulations have made the low prices of these products possible. Additionally, China’s trade surplus and the world’s highest reserves of foreign currency have also provided the government with huge resources to buy the loyalty of elites and to control and suppress any internal opposition. Myth 2: The Chinese also see China as an aggressor in the foreign policy arena. Reality: Many Chinese see China as a victim and believe their government is not tough enough on foreign policy. Where people outside China tend to see China’s recent foreign policy behavior as that of an aggressive bully, most Chinese actually see themselves as the victims. Consider the case of the South China Sea: Outsiders often disagree with China’s maritime claims, but the Chinese genuinely believe that their claims are based on history and are valid. In fact, generations of Chinese students have been taught this position in their history and geography textbooks. Because of this, many believe that China’s neighbors have long been violating China’s sovereignty, rights, and interests in the South China Sea. To some extent, the government’s aggressiveness is a response to the rise of popular nationalism at home, which is heavily influenced by education and social discourse. Myth 3: The Chinese admire the U.S. electoral system. Reality: Not exactly. Many Chinese people actually consider U.S. elections to be rather unsophisticated and ineffective. Many Chinese are not very impressed with the U.S. democratic election process. Though they do not really have the opportunity to watch the debates or listen to political discourse, they often hear about the negative aspects of the elections, such as the hostilities exchanged between candidates and the political rumors that encircle the race, from state-sponsored media. There are two popular ideas commonly found in Chinese narratives regarding the U.S. elections. First, many Chinese people believe that a few politically connected families and business tycoons manipulate the elections. As it turns out, this year’s discussion about establishments and the emergence of Donald Trump are actually supporting this assumption. Many Chinese think that the U.S. democratic system only offers Americans choices between a few candidates, and that most of those candidates are representatives of the establishment. They feel, in other words, that America’s is not a true democracy. The second idea is that the U.S. system selects candidates with good public speaking skills and personal appeal, rather than those with experience and capability. Some Chinese scholars openly publish articles describing how the Chinese system of selecting state leaders is more advanced and effective than its American counterpart. China’s current leader, Xi Jinping, is often held up as an example. Before he became president, Xi experienced a full range of political positions, including county chief, mayor, governor of a province, and chief of Shanghai (China’s largest city). The five years he spent as China’s vice president served as the final stage of his training. Over this period of time, he gained intensive training in foreign policy and operation of the party and central government. Not only does Xi possess this expertise, but so did each of his predecessors in the past three decades, as do most members of the top leadership echelon. So for many people in China, it is unthinkable that someone like Barack Obama, who had only one term in the U.S. Senate under his belt and had no foreign policy experience, was chosen to run an entire country and become president of the world’s leading nation. It should be noted, however, that while people are proud of the Chinese system, they forget that, in recent decades, almost every time China's top leadership has gone through a power transition, it actually caused fierce internal power struggles, the consequences of which always took lengthy periods of time to overcome. The reality, then, is this: U.S.-China relations have become arguably the most important bilateral relationship in the international system, so it is critical for people from both sides to better understand each other, including their political systems. If individuals always use their own institutional and cultural experiences to interpret the other side, misunderstandings and misjudgments will become inevitable. When U.S. presidential candidates blame China for many issues, it often signifies an oversimplification of complicated trade and foreign policy issues. When they attempt to use China as a scapegoat, they create obstacles that make it more difficult for people to identify the real problems that face the country. At the same time, the Chinese should also avoid using their own institutional and cultural experiences to interpret the other side, otherwise misunderstandings will become inevitable.

#### China-bashing in elections hurts bilateral cooperation

Carpenter 15 (Ted Galen, senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and is the author of nine books in addition to more than 550 articles and policy studies on international issues, 8/31, "China: The Mishandled Issue in the U.S. Presidential Election Campaign," http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/china-mishandled-issue-us-presidential-election-campaign)

What we are witnessing is a repetition of the usual quadrennial spectacle regarding relations with China. In presidential campaign after presidential campaign, candidates (especially those representing the party not controlling the White House) either neglect the issue or play the role of demagogue. In the 1980 campaign, Ronald Reagan criticized Jimmy Carter’s administration for “abandoning” Taiwan and establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing. Twelve years later, candidates Bill Clinton and Ross Perot vied with each other to accuse President George H. W. Bush of being too soft on China. Repeatedly citing the Tiananmen Square bloodshed, Clinton referred to Chinese leaders as “the butchers of Beijing.” During the 2000 campaign, George W. Bush viewed China as a worrisome “strategic competitor,” rather than an economic partner of the United States. The good news is that once in office the new presidents continued the responsible, pragmatic policies toward China first developed by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. The inflammatory campaign rhetoric was quickly discarded. That will likely be the case this time as well. The bilateral economic relationship is simply too valuable to jeopardize by imprudent White House actions. But campaign posturing, even if not meant seriously, creates needless suspicions and resentment in U.S.-China relations. Presidential candidates need to remember that preserving a cordial relationship with China must be a top U.S. foreign policy priority. Bilateral cooperation enables China and the United States to foster global strategic stability and economic prosperity. Conversely, a breakdown of the relationship would lead to unpleasant and possibly catastrophic global consequences. Policy toward China is far too important for candidates either to ignore or demagogue. Unfortunately, the current crop of presidential aspirants seems determined to do one or the other.

### Turns Case – A2: Trump Bluffing/Checks and Balances

#### Trumps not bluffing – his rhetoric on China creates political audience costs and erodes checks by shaping congressional politics and election outcomes

Stokes, 16 --- Bruce, senior fellow @ council foreign relations, director of global economic attitudes at Pew Research Center, where he assesses public views about economic conditions, foreign policy and values, non-resident fellow at the German Marshall Fund and an associate fellow at Chatham House, former international economics correspondent for the National Journal, a former senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund. Stokes is a graduate of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and Johns Hopkins University’s School for Advanced International Studies. He has appeared on numerous television and radio programs including CNN, BBC, NPR, NBC, CBS and ABC and is a frequent speaker at major conferences around the world. “Choices by US Voters Will Influence the World”, YaleGlobal, 3/17, <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/choices-us-voters-will-influence-world>

The US primary season has slowly winnowed down the field of presidential candidates. “To date, the campaign debate has been dominated by multiple themes that could ultimately impact people outside the United States – trade, immigration and terrorism, to name just a few,” explains Bruce Stokes, director of global economic attitudes at the Pew Research Center. Hillary Clinton, former US secretary of state is Democratic Party’s front-runner after winning contests in five states on March 15. Donald Trump, real estate developer and television reality-show celebrity, leads among Republicans. A sharp divide between parties is reflected in public-opinion surveys: 31 percent of those polled cite trade as a top priority while 58 percent regard trade as beneficial for the country; half cite immigration as a priority while majorities of Democrats and Republicans support allowing undocumented immigrants to remain in the country. Terrorism shifted as a top priority, from 1 percent of respondents in 2014 to 75 percent early this year. Republicans and Democrats represent just over half of the US electorate, and independents, about 40 percent, will help decide which candidate has the strength and skills to handle a range of global issues. – YaleGlobal

Choices by US Voters Will Influence the World

The US presidential campaign is dominated by global issues including trade, immigration and terrorism – and voters have mixed feelings

The US political primary election season is in full swing as Americans choose candidates for the presidency of their nation and, arguably, the job of de facto leader of the world. In the wake of recent primaries in vote-rich states such as Florida and Ohio, Republican candidate Donald Trump has a commanding lead over his rivals Senator Ted Cruz and Governor John Kasich. Democratic front-runner Hillary Clinton has an even larger advantage over her challenger Senator Bernie Sanders. To quote the American baseball player Yogi Berra, “it ain’t over ‘til it’s over,” but the field finally seems to be sorting itself out.

To date, the campaign debate has been dominated by multiple themes that could ultimately impact people outside the United States – trade, immigration and terrorism, to name just a few. Americans’ attitudes on these issues could well influence the outcome in November. And the positions the candidates take on these issues may foreshadow, or constrain, what policies the next US president will pursue. Moreover, the mood of the electorate may influence votes in Congressional elections for both the US House of Representatives and Senate, reinforcing foreign-policy choices made by the new president.

Trade is a recurrent campaign theme, despite the fact that global trade ranks low overall on the American public’s list of concerns, as registered by a Pew Research Center survey: 31 percent rate it as a top priority. Candidates in both parties have repeatedly tied the issue to jobs and the economy and promised to be tougher on trade, especially with regard to China.

Real estate developer and television celebrity Trump has promised to impose a 45 percent tariff on imports from China. Clinton has pledged to crack down on Chinese currency manipulation that gives Chinese products an unfair competitive advantage. Sanders, Trump and Clinton have repeatedly attacked the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement.

Such trade criticism strikes a chord with many Americans, despite the fact that they are, in principle, free traders. According to Pew Research Center, Americans suggest that free trade is good for the nation by a margin of 25 percentage points – 58 percent versus 33 percent – a sentiment broadly shared across gender, race, age, income, education and party divisions.

But the public is divided on the overall economic impact of Washington signing free trade deals, like the Trans-Pacific Partnership: 31 percent suggest such agreements make the economy grow, 34 percent say they slow the economy down.

Moreover, on the politically potent issues of jobs and wages, 46 percent of Americans voice the view that trade deals lead to job losses in the United States, while the same percentage says they lower US wages. Only 11 percent think trade raises wages and just 17 percent suggest it generates jobs.

Americans are critical of trade with Beijing: 52 percent describe the US trade deficit with China – the largest U.S. merchandise trade deficit – as a very serious problem.

# \*\*\*AFF\*\*\*

## === Uniqueness ===

### 2ac: trump wins

#### Trump will win – GOP unity, messaging, Clinton missteps.

Boychuk 6-3-16. [Ben, associate editor of the Manhattan Institute’s City Journal, "Why Trump will win the White House" The Sacramento Bee -- www.sacbee.com/opinion/op-ed/ben-boychuk/article81455472.html]

Donald Trump will win the 2016 presidential election. Not “might” win. Not “could win under the following circumstances.” He’s going to win as surely as the sun rises in the east, as certainly as high tide follows low, and as definitively as Steph Curry laid waste to the Oklahoma Thunder’s defense. What am I, clairvoyant? Of course not. Just as it’s wise to never say “never” – except maybe #NeverTrump – it’s never a good idea for somebody to make unqualified predictions in print about unknowable future events. Bold claims had better be backed by solid reasons. Although Trump is running nearly even with Hillary Clinton in national polls, the Vegas bookmakers remain optimistic about Clinton’s chances. The online betting site PaddyPower.com currently puts the odds of Clinton winning at 1 in 2, with Trump at 7 to 4. Bernie Sanders is a 20-to-1 long shot. Would I be willing to put my money where my mouth is? Don’t be ridiculous. Gambling is a sin! But I wouldn’t bet against a Trump victory. Here are five reasons why: His rhetoric resonates. (Even as it appalls.) Everyone knows that Trump is an outrage machine. What few people appreciate is that Trump is a well-calibrated outrage machine. He has fastened on to issues that other candidates couldn’t discuss without sounding like pandering flip-floppers. Trump has departed from Republican orthodoxy on health care, taxes, free trade and immigration. Often he seems to contradict himself. He has said everything is negotiable – especially the outrageous things he’s said. Will he build a wall on the southern U.S. border and make Mexico pay for it? Maybe, maybe not. But he’s opened up the discussion like no one has before. “Trump’s selection of issues is part of his persuasion talents,” writes Scott Adams, the creator of “Dilbert” who has been blogging for months about the Trump phenomenon. “He was smart enough to pick the topics with the most emotional power. It was intentional.” “Keep in mind,” Adams adds, “that every candidate had the same options that Trump did, but only Trump chose correctly.” Adams says that is no accident: “The public just thinks it is.” By the way, Adams thinks Trump will win “in a landslide.” Most Republicans are falling in line. I’m a die-hard #NeverTrump guy, but I know I’m among a minority. Although some prominent Republican leaders have withheld their support, it’s clear that the GOP rank-and-file is rallying to the presumptive nominee. On Thursday, Speaker of the House Paul Ryan, R-Wis., ended weeks of speculation and endorsed Trump, saying “the reality is, on the issues that make up our agenda, we have more common ground than disagreement.” A unified Republican Party is far more likely now. Democrats, meantime, are divided among dedicated Clinton supporters and Sanders’ cadres of bitter-enders. The Bernie voters tend to be millennials. Clinton may not be able to count on their support in November. Gotcha journalism doesn’t faze Trump. Oh, that Trump is such a thin-skinned baby! Did you see his “epic meltdown” during his news conference at Trump Tower last week? He kept berating the reporters for not doing their jobs. What a buffoon! At least, that’s what The New York Times, The Washington Post, the Chicago Tribune and the crew on “Morning Joe” said. What my friends in the media fail to understand is the great mass of would-be readers and viewers really, really don’t like us. They certainly don’t trust us. And so when Trump calls ABC News reporter Tom Llamas “a sleaze” and Llamas responds with pained indignation, who do you suppose wins that confrontation? “Why am I a sleaze?” Llamas protested. “You’re a sleaze because you know the facts and you know the facts well,” Trump replied. Trump never apologizes and never backs down. The media may despise him, but voters despise the media more. That’s why he’s winning. Hillary follows his lead – badly. Trump has run a non-traditional campaign and defied all expectations and expert predictions so far. Meantime, Clinton has rebooted her campaign four or five times since April. Clinton doesn’t know how to respond to Trump. The campaign is peddling the catchphrase, “Love Trumps Hate.” But as Adams points out, that’s a terrible slogan. “Humans put greater cognitive weight on the first part of a sentence than the last part,” he writes. “This is a well-understood phenomenon. And the first part literally pairs LOVE and TRUMP.”

#### Trump will win – turn out and Clinton missteps.

Al-Gharbi 5-29-16. [Musa, Paul F. Lazarsfeld Fellow in Sociology at Columbia University, "We may be just this screwed: Donald Trump has an easier path to victory than you think" Salon -- www.salon.com/2016/05/29/we\_may\_be\_just\_this\_screwed\_donald\_trump\_has\_an\_easier\_path\_to\_victory\_than\_you\_think/]

In short, contrary to prevailing narratives, the deck seems to be stacked against Hillary Clinton in 2016. Of course, there’s always the hope that Trump could implode. But so far he has demonstrated an amazing ability to lean into gaffes and controversies, and to control the terms of debate. And with his primary buttoned up, Trump is softening and moderating his “suggestions” for the general electorate—and again, he is empowered to make radical shifts in a way his opponent is not. More broadly, it would be a strategic blunder for Clinton to make her campaign a referendum on Trump: negative partisanship elections tend to favor Republicans. This is because Democrats are heavily dependent on high turnout from irregular voters in order to win national contests. However, when these voters are asked to choose between the “lesser of two evils,” they tend to just stay home. If this happens in November, Clinton loses. That is, anti-Trump animus is unlikely to win Hillary Clinton the White House. Instead, she will need to present a positive alternative vision–one that does not alienate or condescend “traditional” constituents, but which nonetheless manages to drive large numbers of irregular voters to the polls; one which can appeal across the aisle, while simultaneously invigorating her base. There is virtually no room for error–and unfortunately, Clinton hasn’t demonstrated herself to be the kind of candidate who can pull it off.

### Yes Trump – Turn Out

#### Dems will lose – turn out gap.

Goldmacher 5-17-16. [Shane, senior political correspondent for the National Journal, "Donald Trump Is Not Expanding the GOP" Politico -- www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/05/donald-trump-2016-polling-turnout-early-voting-data-213897]

Any way it’s sliced, the historic primary turnout of 2016 is good news for the GOP. It is a sign, as it was for Democrats in 2008 when the Clinton-Obama contest shattered old turnout records, of energy and enthusiasm that can often be translated into volunteer hours and campaign cash. And Democrats this year, despite the surprisingly close contest between Clinton and Bernie Sanders, are far below their previous turnout highs—raising the specter of a problematic enthusiasm gap this fall. “The Republicans have tremendous energy. The Democrats don’t,” Trump bragged at Mar-a-Lago as the primary results rolled in on March 1, Super Tuesday. “They don’t have any energy. Their numbers are down. Our numbers are through the roof.”

### Yes Trump – Media Bias

#### Trump will win – prefer our ev – media and polls consistently underestimate his strengths.

MacLeod 5-27. [Andrew, visiting professor in the Policy Institute at Kings College London, "Donald Trump will win the US presidency by a landslide – don't underestimate him yet again" The Independent -- www.independent.co.uk/voices/donald-trump-will-win-the-us-presidency-by-a-landslide-dont-underestimate-him-yet-again-a7051686.html]

Right from Trump’s first days on the campaign trail, those opposing Trump have radically underestimated the threat. The Huffington Post even put him on its entertainment page. It did not analyse the opposition accurately, and the threat grew. Over the past few months, the media moved from treating him like a joke to assuming that he would “fall after Super Tuesday”. He didn’t. Then they claimed that his comments on abortion would put a stop to him. They didn’t. Later, losing Wisconsin was supposed to be a turning point – but it certainly wasn’t. Eventually it was assumed that Cruz and Kasich would team up and force a brokered Convention. They didn't, and Trump has won the Republican nomination. Now the media, having failed to learn its lesson, says Trump will be caught out by his tax affairs, or will fail to “get out the vote”, or that the polls show that both Sanders or Clinton could beat him. The underestimation continues, and ignores the fact that this November, Americans aren’t just voting on the president. They are voting for the Senate, the House, many local governors, judges, prosecutors, sheriffs. Even though dog-catchers are no longer elected, many municipal positions are. Republicans will turn out to vote for all the other offices. While there, they will be faced with the choice of holding their nose and voting for Trump, or, one presumes, Hillary Clinton. Democrats are kidding themselves if they think Republicans opposed to his candidacy won’t vote for Trump when it comes down to the wire. Consider this: in the 2008 North Carolina Democratic primaries, 38 per cent of Clinton’s supporters said they’d vote for John McCain over Barack Obama and 12 per cent said they would not vote at all. When election day came around, most shifted their view and voted for Obama. The same shift is happening within the GOP now. Trump’s approval rating is rising. Republican anti-Trump forces are retreating like Napoleon from Moscow, leaving bodies in their wake. Opponents such as Paul Ryan are casting around to find reasons to support Trump. Winning and losing elections in America is not about pinching votes from the other team. It is getting your team out to vote. In the US, voter turnout hasn’t exceeded 60 per cent for nearly 50 years. In 1968, 60.7 per cent of eligible voters actually managed to drag themselves out of bed and exercise a right that people had fought and died for. In 1996, less than 50 per cent bothered turning up. Getting out your own voters is far easier, and far more important, than pinching votes from the other side. In both 2008 and 2012, Obama ran a massive “get out the vote” campaign, inspiring many first time voters with the promise of hope, change and making history by electing the first black man to the White House. Voter turnout in 2008 was the highest since 1968. Clinton, on the other hand, does not inspire that level of emotion. The so called “woman card” that she plays is not motivating women either. In the Iowa caucus, only 14 per cent of women under 30 voted for Hillary; in New Hampshire it was around 10 per cent. Young women went for the 'old white guy' – Bernie Sanders. Trump is accused of having a “woman problem”, but so does Clinton. Both Clinton and Trump are widely unpopular, but Trump has one advantage: he is inspiring first-time voters to turn out on polling day. Trump is gaining votes in the "rust belt" from people who would not normally vote Republican, or even vote at all. A recent poll even had Trump him behind Clinton, by only 0.3 per cent. His momentum is upward. Do you see where this is heading? Clinton will get fewer votes than Obama. Trump will get out far more first-time voters than the Republicans have ever achieved before, while regular Republican voters will hold their noses and punt for Trump. Unless the left stop dreaming up reasons for Trump to lose, and start campaigning like he might win, the 2016 election will be the landslide for Trump.

### Yes Trump– Hills Weaknesses

#### Trump will win – Hillary’s weaknesses outweigh.

Al-Gharbi 5-29-16. [Musa, Paul F. Lazarsfeld Fellow in Sociology at Columbia University, "We may be just this screwed: Donald Trump has an easier path to victory than you think" Salon -- www.salon.com/2016/05/29/we\_may\_be\_just\_this\_screwed\_donald\_trump\_has\_an\_easier\_path\_to\_victory\_than\_you\_think/]

As the 2016 presidential primaries got underway, there seemed to be several incontrovertible truths: Hillary Clinton’s nomination was inevitable, and Donald Trump stood no chance. Yet, here we are six months before the election, and Trump has seized the Republican nomination while Clinton is still working to box out Bernie Sanders’ insurgency (without losing his voters, who it turns out, may peel off after all). Nonetheless, the prevailing narrative is that while there is now a chance that Trump could actually win in November, it’s basically Hillary Clinton’s election to lose. Pundits focus on “fundamentals,” like Hillary’s superior fundraising, analytics, or ground game; however, these haven’t proven terribly predictive this cycle. And by focusing on conventional elements, analysts seem to be overlooking novel dynamics which are likely more important—specifically, the public’s persistent and negative perception of Hillary Clinton, the incumbency handicap, and a phenomenon I call “negative intersectionality.” Change You Can Believe In Both Trump and Clinton hold historically unprecedented unfavorable ratings among likely voters. Of the two, Clinton has held a slight edge—however, the gap between them has been rapidly closing. And here’s the kicker: While it is true that the public is very familiar with both Trump and Clinton due to their decades-long careers in public life, Trump has been in the limelight primarily as a businessman and entertainer. People are just now discovering “Trump the politician”—and as a result, their views on Trump as a politician are malleable. The Clinton team views this as an opportunity, and are attempting to define him before he gets a chance to define himself. However, the flip side is that while Trump’s numbers are currently low, there is a real opportunity for him to radically change public perception for the better. And he has tasked Paul Manafort with this responsibility—a man who, after orchestrating Ronald Reagan’s landslide victories, went on to build a highly successful career rehabilitating the image of dictators and strongmen. He’s made for this job. Expect Trump’s numbers to rise. Hillary’s numbers are unlikely to follow the same trajectory—because not only do people know her well, but they know her specifically as a politician. It is precisely her perceived cynicism and duplicity as a politician that drive her unfavorable rating. Public opinion of Clinton has been on a steady decline since December 2012, and a brutal, negative campaign is unlikely to shift the numbers in her favor. In other words, Clinton will have a much harder time turning around her bad image than Trump. As an example, consider Trump’s “policy surrealism”: by the normal rules of the game, it should hurt him that he is constantly changing his mind, that he insists anything he says prior to the election should just be thought of as a “suggestion” rather than a position, etc. Why doesn’t this bother voters? Because his primary rival is Hillary Clinton. Clinton has been known to “evolve” frequently and dramatically as well. But the difference between them is that Hillary has very successfully framed herself as a policy wonk, and with the assistance of her large team of professional advisors, each new position she strikes is accompanied by a host of highly polished (if often unrealistic) policy proposals. However, this professionalism often proves as much of a curse as an asset: When Trump flip-flops, it seems like he is genuinely trying to work through these issues—he straightforwardly tells you what he feels at the moment, and changes his mind as he learns more, thinks more, etc. Clinton, on the other hand, is a veteran politician—as she herself constantly underscores—with a tightly controlled message. As a result, her position shifts seem more like cynical pandering. That is, in a sense, Trump’s evolutions actually make him seem more honest, while Clinton’s have the opposite effect. It’s somewhat unfair, because of course there is a clear element of pandering in Trump’s evolutions, and at least some of Clinton’s policy shifts may be the product of sincere changes in perspective, new information, more life-experience, changing circumstances, etc. But fair or not, this does seem to be the emerging dynamic of the race. Worse still, this avowed expertise, when paired with her modest and highly technical proposals, positions her as the consummate insider in an election cycle where people across the political spectrum seem hungry for an anti-establishment revolutionary. And while the Clinton campaign is still trying to figure out how to best define Trump (most recently insisting that he is not a “normal” candidate, failing to understand that many voters will see this as a positive), her interlocutor has no such problems: “Crooked Hillary” is simple but effective, hitting her right where she’s weakest.

### Yes Trump – AT: Demographics

#### Demographics don’t doom Trump.

Al-Gharbi 5-29-16. [Musa, Paul F. Lazarsfeld Fellow in Sociology at Columbia University, "We may be just this screwed: Donald Trump has an easier path to victory than you think" Salon -- www.salon.com/2016/05/29/we\_may\_be\_just\_this\_screwed\_donald\_trump\_has\_an\_easier\_path\_to\_victory\_than\_you\_think/]

Exacerbating this trend is something I call “negative intersectionality”: progressives have done a great job framing racial inequality, feminism and LGBTQ rights as part of the same basic struggle. However, this association works both ways. Accusations of misogyny, for instance, are often heard in the context of a fundamentally anti-white, anti-Christian culture war—a zero-sum campaign waged against ordinary hard-working Americans by condescending and politically correct liberal elites. As a result, many conservative white women who may be disturbed by Trump’s remarks would simultaneously feel antipathy toward liberals when they encounter a pro-Clinton ad that highlights those comments. Some may even come to view Trump more sympathetically if Democrats attempt to paint him as anti-woman or anti-minority. If Clinton thinks she can criticize Trump as a sexist without stirring up this broader resentment against liberals, she is in for a rude awakening. If she thinks there’s an alternative path to victory by largely writing off the white vote and leaning more heavily on the support of minorities, she’s probably wrong about that too: Clinton would simultaneously need massive turnout and near-unanimous support from minority groups to compensate for decreased support among white Americans. However, turnout has been low among Democrats in the primary. Moreover, Trump seems to be performing surprisingly well among minorities: Mitt Romney only garnered 6 percent of the black vote in 2012. However, this election is shaping up to be more competitive: nearly one-tenth of African-Americans view the Donald positively, with another 15 percent undecided. If even half of the latter group ultimately sides with Trump, or simply stays home on Election Day, Clinton loses. For her to win, African-American participation needs to at least match 2012 turnout, and Clinton must win roughly 90 percent of the black vote. Right now, it’s looking like she might fail on both counts. Perhaps more shocking: despite his anti-immigrant rhetoric, nearly one-quarter of Hispanics support Trump, with another 15 percent undecided—putting him on pace to possibly exceed Romney’s 2012 share (27 percent). One reason to suspect these dynamics might hold: positive intersectionality. Trump’s ambivalence on gay marriage, his opposition to the so-called “Bathroom Bills” in North Carolina and elsewhere, his consistent praise for Planned Parenthood, his commitment to loosening the Republican platform on abortion, and his openness to legalizing marijuana (which would have a huge and positive impact on people of color)—these will counteract depictions of him as a xenophobe or bigot among those who view these struggles as interconnected. In fact, Trump’s unorthodox positions, when paired with the public’s record distrust of mainstream media, may lead many to believe he is being unfairly maligned in the press.

## === Link Defense ===

**Clinton Not Blamed**

#### Clinton isn’t tied to the plan AND the GOP can’t spin against her

Golan 15 (Shahar, Henry M. Jackson School of Int’l Studies at University of Washington – Chaired by Sorenson - Director Center for Korea Studies, Building a Pragmatic Coalition in American Politics, Rethinking United States Military Bases in East Asia, University of Washington, The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Task Force - Winter 2015, <https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/33275/Task%20Force%20E%202015.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>)

As a recent Washington Post op-ed bluntly pointed out, “If Hillary Clinton wants the nomination — and there’s no indication to the contrary — she can have it” (Robinson, 2015, n.p.). Hillary’s nomination will make it very difficult for the Republican Party to attack the Democrats for going soft on China by spinning the rethink of the military bases to seem that way. The former First Lady’s reputation in foreign policy circles is difficult to challenge. She recently distanced herself from Obama’s foreign policy generally, from Asia policy specifically, and is perceived as a foreign policy hawk. In the New York Times review of her book Hard Choices, Michiko Kakutani (2014) stated that “Mrs. Clinton’s views are perceived as often more hawkish than Mr. Obama’s” (n.p.). Another book review in The Guardian also articulated opinions attuned with the New York Times article and public perception, stating “she comes across as consistently hawkish, pushing Obama to take stronger action” (Runicman, 2014, n.p.). Many in the defense establishment including former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates have praised Clinton for her diplomatic skills. Her experience in foreign relations and her perception as a foreign policy hawk will challenge Republicans as they look ahead towards the upcoming presidential elections. Accusations of a foreign policy rethink favoring soft policies on the PRC and the DPRK will most likely fall flat for the Republican Party against this seasoned diplomat.

#### GOP can’t cast Clinton as soft on China

Sanger 15 (David, Staff @ NYT, "China’s Vulnerability Is a Test for U.S. Presidential Candidates," 8/28, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/29/us/politics/chinas-vulnerability-is-a-test-for-us-presidential-candidates.html)

Rightly or wrongly, Mrs. Clinton is considered to be more confrontational with the Chinese than Mr. Obama, after a famous flare-up with her Chinese counterpart over the country’s territorial claims. As a result, the Republicans know that if Mrs. Clinton emerges as the Democratic nominee, it will be difficult to cast her as soft on China. A bigger problem may be in their own party. The American opening to China was a Republican president’s project. It is considered one of the greatest accomplishments of Richard M. Nixon’s checkered presidency, and today’s mainline Republican foreign policy establishment takes a very nuanced view of balancing Chinese power. Whoever emerges from the scrum of 17 Republican candidates will seek the wisdom — and the endorsement — of Henry A. Kissinger, Mr. Nixon’s national security adviser and secretary of state, and at 92 still the party’s greatest foreign policy mind. The architect of the American relationship with Beijing, who four years ago published a book on America’s dealings with China, is not one to call for cutting off relationships with Beijing.

**China Not Key**

#### China policy not key and link is inevitable

He, 16 --- He Yafei is former vice minister of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, and former vice minister at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China US Focus, “U.S. Election and Its Impact on China”, 1/25, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/u-s-election-and-its-impact-on-china/

Here comes China, whose economic growth and military modernization in recent years represents, to American people, a world that undergoes rapid changes and evolves to a multipolar one where the US is no longer being able to call shot on everything. The resentment against globalization is on the rise. Overall strategic retrenchment and an emphatic shift to focus more on China are taking place simultaneously. “Scapegoating” China is inevitable. “China has taken jobs away from American workers”. “China is manipulating its currency to gain advantage in trade”. “China is being aggressive in the South China Sea and trying to drive the US out of the Western Pacific”. The list of complaints can go on and on. It doesn’t matter whether those accusations and complaints are true or not to American politicians and voters as long as they have “election value”. For instance, the renminbi has appreciated against the US dollar to the tune of 30% since 2008, but voices are still strong in America calling for the RMB to appreciate further. We all know from experience that China-bashing is common and “cost-free” in US elections. This time around is no different. What is different is that while without agreeing to the concept of “G2”, there is a broad recognition that the US and China are the two major powers in today’s world. It is no hyperbole to say that nothing gets done without close cooperation between the two nations, be it climate change, energy security, non-proliferation of WMD, etc. In this connection the US election does have an impact on China and US-China relations as noted by Robert Manning, who said the US-China relationship enters “dangerous waters” in 2016. What can be done to counteract the negative spillover from the US election this year? On the one hand, there need to be more cooperative actions from both sides to reinforce the relationship. Climate change is one, cooperation in the Middle East is another. To quicken the pace of negotiation on BIT is definitely useful with emphasis on shortening the “negative list”. The US-China relationship is simply too important for both nations not to make extra efforts in election years to make it stronger in the face of increased headwind. On the other hand, we ought to stay calm and ready to meet any possible frictions and challenges in close coordination and consultation to minimize damage to the bilateral relations. We have to understand that “China-bashing” is more words than actions. Any new administration once in the White House will be more realistic and down-to-earth in its China policy as determined by shared interests of both nations worldwide.In reality, China has not been the key issue in the election so far despite some rhetoric by candidates from both parties. To prioritize the issues that voters care about most, the threat posed by terrorist organizations such as IS ranks at the top of the list. Next comes illegal immigration because as of now there are between 12 million to 20 million illegals residing in the US depending on how you estimate them. Further down the list is tax policy. As is often quoted, “There are two things certain in life. One is death and the other is taxes”. Another concern that comes before China is the dangerous situation in the Middle East. So you can see clearly that China figures rather low on this “worry list” in the minds of American voters.

#### China policy irrelevant – no one cares, including prez candidates

Carpenter 15 (Ted Galen, senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and is the author of nine books in addition to more than 550 articles and policy studies on international issues, 8/31, "China: The Mishandled Issue in the U.S. Presidential Election Campaign," http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/china-mishandled-issue-us-presidential-election-campaign)

U.S. presidential election campaigns are supposed to include sober discussions of the most crucial issues facing the country. Unfortunately, the reality rarely corresponds to that ideal, and the current conduct of candidates seeking their party’s nomination for the 2016 election is no exception. One issue that should be front and center in the campaign is U.S. policy toward China. Instead, that topic receives surprisingly little attention—especially compared to the obsession over every aspect of Middle East policy. When it is not ignored, candidates too often take shrill positions merely to score cheap political points with disgruntled constituencies. Given the great importance of the bilateral relationship, such posturing is unfortunate and could become dangerous. The lack of attention to China policy was evident in the first debate among the 10 leading GOP candidates. Most of them did not even mention the country, and those who did clearly adopted a hostile attitude. Donald Trump scorned U.S. leaders for not being better negotiators in their dealings with Beijing. Senator Rand Paul mentioned that China holds an enormous amount of U.S. governmental debt, making it clear that he believed such dependence was unhealthy and a national vulnerability. A few of the other candidates on the stage implied that China was among the “enemies” that supposedly no longer respected the United States because of Barack Obama’s lack of effective leadership. That behavior has been typical of the campaign thus far. Carly Fiorina, the fastest rising star in the Republican field, has devoted time to discussing China, but Chinese leaders almost certainly do not welcome the attention. Both in the debate and on other occasions, Fiorina has taken an extremely confrontational stance regarding such issues as the South China Sea territorial disputes and cyber security. In an interview with CBS News, she recommended that the United States increase its flyover aerial surveillance of the South China Sea. And it is clear that she has no sympathy for Beijing’s territorial claims. “We cannot permit China to control a trade route through which passes $5 trillion worth of goods and services every year,” she stated bluntly. Fiorina was mild on the South China Sea controversy compared to her stance regarding recent cyber attacks—which she blithely assumed originated in China. She contended that such attacks were an act of aggression against the United States, implying that an especially stern, confrontational response was warranted. Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker, another top tier GOP candidate, has likewise adopted a hardline policy toward China. In a July interview with The National Interest, Walker accused Beijing of mounting a “serious challenge to American interests.” He stated that Washington needed to beef-up U.S. military capabilities in East Asia, strengthen its alliances with Beijing’s neighbors, and develop a robust cyber capability “that punishes China for its hacking.” And as if those positions would not be enough to poison the bilateral relationship, Walker stressed that the United States needed to “speak out against the abysmal lack of freedoms in China.” On the Democratic campaign trail, Hillary Clinton has not said much about policy toward China. But there is little doubt about her attitude. As Secretary of State, Clinton noticeably toughened the U.S. position on the South China Sea issue. It was Clinton who made the speech to ASEAN in 2010 that underscored Washington’s hostility to Beijing’s territorial claims. And she went out of her way on other occasions to emphasize U.S. solidarity with the Philippines regarding its territorial spat with China. Clinton’s few comments on China policy during the current campaign offer no hint of a softening of such positions.

**Econ Key**

#### Econ outweighs all other issues.

Lizza 16. [Ryan, "Eight Questions for the New Year in Politics" The New Yorker – Jan 1 -- www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/eight-questions-for-the-new-year-in-politics]

7. Will Barack Obama help or hurt the Democratic nominee? The single most important factor in next year’s election will be the state of the economy. If the economy is continuing to improve and growth is strong and unemployment low, the Democrats will have a modest edge. But dragging them down will be the natural exhaustion the electorate generally feels after eight years of seeing the same party in power. Obama’s own popularity is closely tied to the economy, but he can help the Democrat nominee by making steady progress on a popular domestic agenda, combatting ISIS, and proving that his more unpopular policies (like the Affordable Care Act) are working and that his legacy initiatives should be continued and improved upon, as Clinton promises, rather than overturned, as the G.O.P. promises.

#### State of the economy determines the election – also its too far away for predictions.

**Pitney 14.** [Jack, Decoder contributor, "Election 2016: why today's confident predictions could look silly in two years" Christian Science Monitor -- www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/Politics-Voices/2014/1114/Election-2016-why-today-s-confident-predictions-could-look-silly-in-two-years]

Usually, **the most powerful influence on elections is the state of the economy**. If average voters feel more money in their pockets, then the incumbent party should do well. If they are getting worse off, then they will throw the bums out. In this year’s election, gross domestic product was rising and unemployment was falling, but stagnant wages contributed to the sense that the economy was still in the doldrums.∂ So what kind of economy will voters see in 2016? Maybe prosperity lurks just around the corner. Maybe the sluggish expansion will curdle into a toxic recession. Nobody can say. Not even the most sophisticated economic models can reliably forecast the global economy two years in advance.

#### Econ is key

Long 5-26-16. [Heather, CNNMoney's senior markets and economy writer, "Clinton predicted to beat Trump...due to economics" CNN Money -- money.cnn.com/2016/05/26/news/economy/hillary-clinton-beat-donald-trump-moodys/]

The reason a Democrat will win isn't about polling or personalities, it's about economics, says Moody's. The economy is the top issue in just about every election. When the economy is doing well, the party currently in office usually wins again. When the economy is tanking, Americans vote for change. So far, the U.S. economy is chugging along. It's growing. Millions of people are getting jobs, home prices are rising and gas is cheap. All of this favors Democrats.

**Single Issues Not Key**

#### Single issues can’t change votes – opinions are crystallized.

**Sabato 3-26**. [Larry, UVA Center for Politics Director, "Why htis scandal won't hurt Hillary" Sabato's Crystal Ball -- www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/]

Nevertheless, there is good reason to think that scandal has a much less pronounced effect at the presidential level. For one thing, most elections for the White House revolve around macro-issues such as the economy and war, and voters instinctively realize that personal peccadilloes fade in importance. For another, most top-tier contenders are reasonably well known and have been vetted to some degree by the press and opponents in prior elections. When voters already have a clearly formed view of a candidate and his or her strengths and weaknesses, it naturally becomes more difficult to alter impressions.∂ For no one is this more true than Hillary Clinton, who has been in the national spotlight, center stage, for 23 years. HuffPost Pollster data show over 90% of the public has already formed an opinion of Clinton, the most of any potential 2016 candidate. Other than the very youngest voters, is there really anyone left who doesn’t have a mostly fixed view of her?∂ You can argue that, to a lesser degree, the same is true for Jeb Bush. Americans outside of Florida may not know Jeb well, but they are very familiar with the Bush family. While Jeb doesn’t like it and is already struggling against it, voters attribute many of his family’s traits to him.∂ Jeb is insisting he’s his own man, yet it will be nearly impossible to insulate him from the deep recessions and Middle East wars of his father and brother. With the good that derives directly from being a Bush (instant name recognition, establishment support, tons of campaign cash) comes the unavoidable bad of the Iraq War, the response to Hurricane Katrina, and economic near-collapse.∂ Think of it this way: Both Clinton and Bush enter the campaign cycle with a million pixel image in the voters’ minds. If you add a couple thousand new pixels to the picture, the overall image doesn’t change much. A garden-variety scandal — and maybe an entire campaign full of them — won’t transform the projection on the screen.

#### Single issues aren't key to the election

Stokes 16. [Bruce, director of global economic attitudes at Pew Research Center, "How A Terror Attack Could Affect US Polls" Outlook – March 22 -- http://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/how-a-terror-attack-could-affect-us-polls/296758]

US presidential elections are decided on a number of issues, often the state of the economy. But this year, a number of international concerns about negative consequences of globalization including trade, immigration and terrorism are prominent in the political debate. History suggests that the US election will not turn on any of these issues alone, but they may well influence the outcome. And it is people outside the United States who then must also deal with the consequences.

### Too Far Away

#### Too far off – too many variables make predictions and the plan irrelevant (also the economy is key)

Rasmussen 12-31. [Scott, polling analyst, "2016 forecast: The experts will be wrong" New Boston Post -- newbostonpost.com/2015/12/31/2016-forecast-the-experts-will-be-wrong/]

So, as you listen to what all the experts predict for 2016, retain a healthy skepticism. The reason is not because the experts are stupid. It’s just that in a nation of more than 300 million people, there are far too many variables for any one person to predict. Consider the 2016 presidential race as a great example. Nobody really has any idea who will win at this point. Political experts weigh all the things that they believe are important — demographics, money, connections, etc. A year ago, these same things led many to believe Jeb Bush was the clear frontrunner for the Republican nomination. In truth, the state of the economy will matter more than all theTru variables the political pundits are obsessing about. So will the level of terrorist activity and public perceptions of Obamacare. The reason we can’t be sure who will win the election is because we can’t be sure how any of these fundamentals will play out.

#### History proves we’re still too far out to make accurate predictions.

Berenson 1-18. [Tessa, reporter, "History Shows It’s Still Too Early for Polls to Matter" Time -- time.com/4184449/iowa-caucus-election-polls/]

With just 13 days to go until the Iowa caucuses, it’s tempting to look to the polls for predictions about how it is going to play out. Donald Trump certainly treats his frontrunner status as gospel, often simply reciting favorable poll numbers to his crowds. But an analysis of polling data from previous elections shows that, even with less than two weeks until the first votes are cast, it is still too early for polls to be predictive. In four of the five previous presidential elections, the leaders in national polls 13 days out from the Iowa caucuses failed to capture the nomination. And in three of the five, the polls weren’t even predictive of the winner in Iowa. This could spell trouble for Trump and Hillary Clinton, who have both been seated comfortably atop the polls for months. At this point, it is still anyone’s game.

#### We are too far away for polling to be accurate – ignore the neg cards.

Azari 4-1. [Julia, assistant professor of political science at Marquette University, "Money and Legacy Matter More Than Polls" US News and World Report -- www.usnews.com/debate-club/how-much-do-2016-polls-matter-right-now/money-and-legacy-matter-more-than-polls]

Polls have a seductive democratic appeal. They seem as if they should enlighten us about the real thoughts of the populace – for example, revealing our collective judgment about whether we think Gov. Scott Walker, Sen. Ted Cruz or Sen. Elizabeth Warren has what it takes to be president, or whether we’d prefer Hillary Clinton to Jeb Bush. But although the science of polling has improved, the mysteries of measuring public mood itself still abound, at least when it comes to elections that are more than a year away.∂ When it comes to how much polls for 2016 matter right now, my fellow political scientist Brendan Nyhan provided some interesting data. Looking at polls from the 1990s, he finds that Bill Clinton looked relatively weak in 1991, but went on to defeat the incumbent president in the general election. In contrast, Bob Dole looked strong in 1995, with 73 percent of respondents having a favorable impression of the Kansas senator. But he still lost the 1996 election.∂ [SEE: Editorial Cartoons on Hillary Clinton]∂ What explains this phenomenon? Basically, the political environment – especially, but not only, **the economy** – shapes how people perceive candidates. Over the course of a campaign, voters learn more about the candidates and about what is at stake. And their evaluations of the incumbent party heavily reflect the state of the economy.

### AT: Approval Ratings Links

#### Approval ratings don’t determine the election – their models suck – they have to win that the plan TANKS Obama.

Silver and Enten 11-3. [Silver, editor in chief, genius, Harry, senior political writer, "The Election Is A Year Away — Is Either Party Winning?" Five Thirty Eight -- fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/the-election-is-a-year-away-is-either-party-winning/]

harry: Well, I think it gives us a general idea of the political environment overall. And it reflects the president’s approval rating as well. The rough line of when a president’s approval rating helps or hurts a candidate from his own party is about 48 percent. Obama’s approval rating right now is 45 or 46 percent. Both of those numbers indicate to me that the environment is probably a little more favorable to the GOP than the Dems. Not greatly so, but a little bit so. natesilver: I’m not sure I’d say that 45 or 46 percent is meaningfully different from 48 percent. Not a year out, anyway. If you run the numbers with Obama’s favorability ratings instead, for instance, you get a different answer. harry: Let me ask you this: Is the difference between a 55 percent chance of the GOP winning meaningfully different than a 50 percent chance? natesilver: Do you want me to get existential here? micah: YES! natesilver: Sure, it’s meaningful if it really were a difference between 55 percent and 50 percent. Something that made a 5 percentage point difference in the likelihood of Democrats or Republicans winning would be way more meaningful than 99 percent of the stuff that pundits call “game-changers.” However. These fundamentals-based presidential models kind of suck. They’re not nearly as precise or as accurate as they claim to be. harry: Most of those fundamental models are based off economic measures. I don’t think I put any economic numbers in this so far. natesilver: I guess I look at it more like this. My prior is that elections with a term-limited incumbent are 50-50. I’m looking for evidence that persuasively overcomes that prior. An extremely popular or extremely unpopular incumbent would clearly matter. But Obama’s popularity is about average. micah: But this was one of my questions: Obama isn’t running; how much of an effect will he have on the race? Positive or negative — is Obama’s popularity really a big factor? natesilver: He’ll have a fairly neutral effect, given his current popularity level. harry: We only have approval rating data at this point in a campaign (September/October the year before) for six instances when an incumbent president didn’t run for re-election. Now, I took those and plugged them into a simple little regression. With Obama’s approval at 46 percent, the GOP is expected to win by about 2 percentage points. Again, there’s a huge margin of error, but signs point to a slight GOP edge. natesilver: Dude. It’s not even six examples really. It’s four. harry: Who are your four? natesilver: Dwight Eisenhower, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush are the only presidents in American history to be term-limited. Obama will be the fifth. And I don’t care if you get the same regression results with four. harry: And did you know that Obama’s approval rating is below the average approval rating for those four? And it’s not particularly close either. natesilver: The problem is that running a regression model based on an n of four is inherently kind of ridiculous. NERD FIGHT! harry: The average approval rating of those four is 59 percent. Obama’s is 45 or 46 percent. I’m not saying this is anything close to a be-all end-all predictor. But the evidence we do have suggests something slightly on the GOP side of 50-50. natesilver: OK, but there’s other evidence that possibly points toward Democrats having a slight edge. harry: Such as what? The blue wall? Your favorite blue wall? micah: PERMANENT DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY! natesilver: No, the blue wall is bullshit. Or, at least, mostly bullshit. But if you’re talking about minutia on the order of a 46 percent vs. 48 percent approval rating, then maybe there’s a very very small Democratic Electoral College advantage. harry: Why do you think that advantage exists? natesilver: Because they did have an advantage in 2012 and 2008, if you look at where the tipping point state was relative to the national popular vote. natesilver: Those advantages are NOT very sticky from election to election. But, again, if we’re talking about shit that moves the probabilities by 5 percentage points one way or the other, then maybe? harry: Now, let me state a point of agreement here: I concur that those advantages are not very sticky from election to election. natesilver: It’s all minutia, and I don’t think we should be concerned about a minutia a year out. harry: This site should be about arguing over the small stuff sometimes! micah: All right, somewhat related question: We’ve already heard pundits and politicians say, “It’s very hard for a party to win the White House three elections in row.” I guarantee that will be said millions of times from now to November 2016. Is it true? natesilver: The White House is not a metronome. micah: So no? harry: Small sample size on that one. I don’t agree with the concept that winning a third term is inherently more difficult. And, moreover, looking at the generic presidential ballot and Obama’s approval, this looks more like a close election than one that is clearly one-sided from start to end, a la 1952 or 2008. natesilver: You have four examples of term-limited presidents. If you look for examples before the 22nd amendment was adopted (which I guess you have to do when you have a sample size of four): Elections with retiring incumbents seem to be about 50-50. micah: Of course, who the parties nominate could change those numbers. It seems like this could be an election where the candidates make a huge difference, right? Let’s say Hillary Clinton wins, whether she faces Donald Trump or Ted Cruz or Marco Rubio will have a big effect on the odds. natesilver: Yes. That’s the proverbial and maybe literal elephant in the room. micah: What order of magnitude are we talking about? harry: Yes, this is the question. This is one where I could find myself in agreement with Mr. Silver on whether it’s a 50-50. Cruz, for example, would be a historically conservative candidate. If he’s the GOP nominee, that could be worth a few percentage points and harm the Republicans. natesilver: Which, in an election that otherwise looks about 50-50, could make a lot of difference. If Clinton has a 75 percent chance of facing a 50-50 election, and a 25 percent chance of facing a 75-25 election (e.g., against Cruz, Carson, Trump, or a GOP electorate that gets all screwed up because one of those guys runs as a third party), then her overall chances of winning are 56 percent. natesilver: Now, I think you can argue that Clinton would be a slight underdog against Rubio, for instance. micah: What about vs. Jeb! Bush or John Kasich or Chris Christie? natesilver: Sure, Kasich, in particular. I’m less sure about Jeb or Christie, just because their personal ratings have been pretty bad for a long time. But Clinton’s not very popular either, obviously. micah: OK, let me see if I have this right … One year out, the election is probably about 50-50 (maybe 55-45 Republican, according to Harry), but that could be tipped toward the Democrats if the Republicans nominate Trump/Carson/Cruz or toward the Republicans if they nominate Rubio or Kasich. Moreover! Obama, with middling-but-not-horrible approval ratings, won’t have a huge effect on the race (also, the “it’s hard to win the White House three times in a row” maxim is bullshit).

## === Impact Defense ===

## --- AT: Trump Bad ---

### General

#### Trump’s agenda will go nowhere – Congress checks.

Ferguson 5-8-16. [Niall, professor of history at Harvard and a senior fellow of the Hoover Institution at Stanford, "Keep calm — the Constitution will constrain Trump" Boston Globe -- https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2016/05/08/keep-calm-constitution-will-constrain-trump/vb06y2Q2O5khvkZKdHl7pI/story.html]

The only half-decent argument for keeping calm is that the Constitution was purpose-built to constrain a man like Trump. To see why the separation of powers still matters, just consider what Trump says he is going to do if he wins. By the end of his first 100 days as president, Trump assured The New York Times recently, his wall along the Mexican border would be designed and his blanket ban on Muslim immigration would be in place. On Day 1, those American companies that have the temerity to employ people abroad would be threatened with punitive fines. Finally, Trump would impose an across-the-board tariff on Chinese imports. “We can’t continue to allow China to rape our country,” he declared at a rally last weekend. Now for the good news. He can do almost none of this if Congress opposes him. According to the Constitution (Article I, Section 8), it is not the president but Congress that has the power to regulate immigration, taxation, and trade. The president’s principal power lies in his being commander in chief of the armed forces. Even his right to make treaties is conditional on “the advice and consent” of the Senate. In short, the Donald’s antiglobalization program depends on his being able to muster majorities in Congress. How easy is that going to be when the speaker of the House — a Republican — can’t bring himself to endorse Trump and the Democrats stand a good chance of retaking the Senate?

#### Trump will moderate – numerous checks.

Paletta 6-8-16. [Damian, reporter, "Trump Will Consult Congress, Agencies On Iran Deal and Muslim Ban, Adviser Says" Wall Street Journal -- blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2016/06/08/trump-will-consult-congress-agencies-on-iran-deal-and-muslim-ban-adviser-says/]

Presumptive Republican White House nominee Donald Trump would consult with Congress and federal agencies on a number of his signature foreign policy initiatives, including reworking a nuclear deal with Iran and a proposed ban on the entry of Muslims into the U.S., a top adviser said Wednesday. Walid Phares, one of Mr. Trump’s senior foreign policy advisers, said the candidate would seek domestic and international “consensus” on a range of foreign policy initiatives. During an hour-long interview with Wall Street Journal reporters and editors, Mr. Phares offered nuance to a number of Mr. Trump’s foreign policy ideas, suggesting some aren’t set in stone and could be modified as the campaign progresses. For example, Mr. Trump has called a recent nuclear deal with Iran “terrible” and “horrible” but Mr. Phares said Mr. Trump wouldn’t immediately attempt to negate it once in office. “He is going to be revising, reviewing, and maybe trying to modify the Iran deal,” Mr. Phares said. One option, he said, would be to resubmit the deal – or something like it – to Congress for a vote, a process whose outcome would depend on the makeup of Congress next year. Many bankers are watching the U.S. election closely and waiting for a clearer understanding of future U.S. policy towards Iran before doing business with the country. Mr. Phares’s suggestion Mr. Trump would revise the agreement instead of completely voiding it could influence the way some financial institutions deal with companies in Iran seeking access to global markets. Similarly, Mr. Phares said Mr. Trump would consult with immigration, national security, law enforcement, and other officials before proceeding with his proposed temporary ban on the entry of Muslims into the U.S. “His position which was strong – in terms of the ban – was based on the fact that the Obama administration — the Obama-Clinton administration — for the last seven to eight years was not able to equip us with systems by which we were able to identify the jihadists,” he said. Mr. Trump has faced criticism for his foreign policy platform, which breaks from GOP orthodoxy. Mr. Phares said Mr. Trump’s worldview doesn’t fit neatly into traditional labels of “isolationalist” or “interventionalist.” Rather, he described Mr. Trump as a “functionalist” who would work with allies when necessary but not overextend the U.S. in matters in which there isn’t an American interest. He also said that many of Mr. Trump’s proposals so far have only been offered as single ideas, which he compared to pieces of a puzzle. Once more proposals are set forward, something Mr. Phares predicted would happen soon, a broader approach to foreign policy would become clear, he said. “The expectation is the more she’s going to attack, the more he’s going to respond, and if he’s going to respond, he most likely he will address these issues,” Mr. Phares said, referring to Hillary Clinton, the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee. One key challenge for any Trump administration would be building bridges with Arab countries, many of which have been alarmed by some of Mr. Trump’s proposals so far. Mr. Phares said he is interviewed by Arab media outlets at least once a day, and works to explain Mr. Trump’s approach to the region. He predicted that numerous countries would be relieved to have a fresh start with the White House next year following several years of frosty relations with the Obama administration. Mr. Phares dismissed the caricature of Mr. Trump that Mrs. Clinton has worked hard to describe, suggesting, for instance, that he would rush into a nuclear conflict if his feelings get hurt or if another country insults him. “I don’t see an unusual Trump presidency as Madame Clinton is explaining where he’s going to go crazy and start pressing buttons right away,” Mr. Phares said, tapping on the table. “That’s not going to happen. We have a rational institution here.”

#### Structural factors constrain Trump

Liptak 6-3-16. [Adam, Supreme Court correspondent, "Donald Trump Could Threaten U.S. Rule of Law, Scholars Say" New York Times -- www.nytimes.com/2016/06/04/us/politics/donald-trump-constitution-power.html?\_r=0]

Republican leaders say they are confident that Mr. Trump would respect the rule of law if elected. “He’ll have a White House counsel,” Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, the majority leader, told Hugh Hewitt, the radio host, on Monday. “There will be others who point out there’s certain things you can do and you can’t do.” Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona, who has become a reluctant supporter of Mr. Trump, said he did not believe that the nation would be in danger under his presidency. “I still believe we have the institutions of government that would restrain someone who seeks to exceed their constitutional obligations,” Mr. McCain said. “We have a Congress. We have the Supreme Court. We’re not Romania.” “Our institutions, including the press, are still strong enough to prevent” unconstitutional acts, he said.

#### No impact to Trump – institutional mechanisms check

Cooper 3/16/16 (Matthew, Columnist @ Newsweek, "WHAT THE WORLD WILL LOOK LIKE UNDER PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP," http://www.newsweek.com/2016/03/25/world-under-president-donald-trump-437158.html)

All of which is nuts. Trump isn’t Hitler. He isn’t a fascist either—although he has, despite a career of deal-making, the my-way-or-the-highway proclivities of a Latin American strongman, which would be worrisome if America were Bolivia and not an enduring democracy. (Trump was the inspiration, by the way, for the Back to the Future bully, Biff Tannen.) He’s also not a savior. Due to his solipsistic personality and vague, unworkable policies, he could never be what he promises to be if elected. But that doesn’t make him the sum of all fears. The unspectacular truth is that a Trump presidency would probably be marked by the quotidian work of so many other presidents—trying to sell Congress and the public on proposals while fighting off not only a culture of protest but also the usual swarm of lobbyists who kill any interesting idea with ads and donations. Trump has a rarefied confidence in his abilities and, as we recently learned, in his, um, manhood. But what he doesn’t have is a magic wand (insert wand-penis joke here). Remember Schoolhouse Rock ? Trump is no match for the American political system, with its three branches of government. The president, as famed political scientist Richard Neustadt once said, has to take an inherently weak position and use the powers of persuasion to get others to do what he wants.

#### Can’t accurately predict presidencies – Reagan and Bush prove

Cooper 3/16/16 (Matthew, Columnist @ Newsweek, "WHAT THE WORLD WILL LOOK LIKE UNDER PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP," http://www.newsweek.com/2016/03/25/world-under-president-donald-trump-437158.html)

Ouija Bored The history of predicting how presidencies will play out isn’t pretty. Many worried Reagan would be a warmonger. Instead, he signed the biggest arms reduction deals with the Soviets ever and responded to the slaughter of U.S. Marines in Beirut in 1983 by pulling out instead of digging in. In Texas, George W. Bush was a popular governor known for bipartisanship. In Washington, less so. Forecasting the Trump years seems equally perilous. Critics should allow that he could be like Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger—a political novice and ideologically flexible Republican whom some California voters feared, yet who turned out to be way more tepid than the Terminator.

### AT: Alliances Impact

#### Squo triggers the impact – Trump campaigning.

Le 16. [Tom, Assistant Professor of Politics at Pomona College, former Non-Resident Sasakawa Peace Foundation Fellow at CSIS Pacific Forum, "How Trump is already damaging US alliances" The Diplomat -- May 20 -- thediplomat.com/2016/05/how-trump-is-already-damaging-us-alliances/]

Ben Carson recently gave a ringing endorsement of Trump, stating that “even if Donald Trump turns out not to be a great president…we’re only looking at four years.” Unfortunately, Trump has already done significant damage to the alliances that will take years to repair — even before the general election. As one Japanese security manager recently stated, “Trump exemplifies the worst in American stereotypes, loud, brash, and arrogant.” Even if Trump does not win, he has revealed an ugly underbelly of U.S. popular sentiment that does not care for its allies. True, the United States pays high costs for having to defend Japan and Korea, but it gains the priceless ability to project power in Asia. By spilling blood on the battlefield with the Koreans and promoting democracy and regional stability with the Japanese, Americans have been allowed to maintain tens of thousands of troops on its allies’ sovereign territory. These are allowances that should not be taken for granted.

### AT: Alliances Impact – US Regional Cred

#### No link – cred theory wrong

Beauchamp 3-10 – Zack Beauchamp, Masters in International Relations from the London School of Economics, Editor of TP Ideas and Reporter/Blogger for ThinkProgress.org, “Obama is Right: Washington's Obsession with "Credibility" is Wrongheaded and Dangerous”, Vox, 2016, http://www.vox.com/2016/3/10/11195340/obama-credibility-syria

"Credibility" is one of the most popular ideas in the Washington foreign policy community. Basically, the theory goes, the United States keeps the peace in the world through reputation — because foreign states know that when the US threatens the use of force to protect the status quo order, we mean it. Foreign countries know not to test us, so everyone stays in line.

In this theory, if the US fails to act, especially when it's said it will, America's enemies abroad will be, in the common parlance, "emboldened," believing they can now get away with more aggression and other forms of bad behavior.¶ "Credibility" has been central, to name one example, in the debate over US policy on Syria; some argue that the US, having drawn its "red line" over Bashar al-Assad's use of chemical weapons, must intervene to win back its credibility in the eyes of a wary and suspicious world.¶ But there's at least one person who thinks the concept of credibility is total bullshit: President Barack Obama.¶ "This theory is so easily disposed of that I’m always puzzled by how people make the argument," Obama tells the Atlantic's Jeffrey Goldberg in a just-out profile in the magazine.¶ "Dropping bombs on someone to prove that you’re willing to drop bombs on someone is just about the worst reason to use force."¶ To demonstrate his point, Obama cites Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia — which came when George W. Bush was in the White House:¶ "I don’t think anybody thought that George W. Bush was overly rational or cautious in his use of military force. And as I recall, because apparently nobody in this town does, Putin went into Georgia on Bush’s watch, right smack dab in the middle of us having over 100,000 troops deployed in Iraq."¶ Obama went back to the Reagan administration, pointing out that Reagan was perfectly willing to withdraw from countries militarily (as he did from Lebanon in 1983) if it wasn't in America's interests.¶ Moreover, Obama cites Reagan's military adventure in tiny Grenada, saying it's "hard to argue" that the 1983 war "helped our ability to shape world events." Reagan also presided over "the Iran-Contra affair, in which we supported right-wing paramilitaries and did nothing to enhance our image in Central America, and it wasn’t successful at all."¶ "Apparently all these things really helped us gain credibility with the Russians and the Chinese," Obama added sarcastically. "That’s the narrative that is told."¶ He continued:¶ Now, I actually think that Ronald Reagan had a great success in foreign policy, which was to recognize the opportunity that Gorbachev presented and to engage in extensive diplomacy—which was roundly criticized by some of the same people who now use Ronald Reagan to promote the notion that we should go around bombing people.¶ Clearly, Obama thinks the theory — so popular in Washington — is bunk.¶ And he has a point.¶ Obama is right, and it really matters¶ Political science research into this question suggests that Obama may be correct that if America backs away from one crisis in one part of the world, it does not tempt countries elsewhere in the world to test American "credibility."¶ "Do leaders assume that other leaders who have been irresolute in the past will be irresolute in the future and that, therefore, their threats are not credible? No," the University of Washington's Jonathan Mercer concludes flatly in a Foreign Affairs piece. "Broad and deep evidence dispels that notion."

#### No impact to resolve

Dennis 7 – Michael Dennis, Ph.D. Candidate in Government at the University of Texas-Austin, and Vaughn P. Shannon, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Northern Iowa and Director of UNI’s Center for International Peace and Security Studies, April 2007, “Militant Islam and the Futile Fight for Reputation,” Security Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2, p. 287-317

Next, looking at cases of firmness as well, we find that there is no reward for resolve in the perceptions of militant Islamists. Acts of firmness are discounted, reinterpreted, or situationally attributed to preserve the paper tiger image of the superpowers in the minds of the militants. Thus there is little value in fighting for reputation if the goal is to deter militants by the firmness of their adversary. The implications for a war on terror are significant if a war for reputation is pointless, or if exiting wars has reputational consequences for how the United States and others are perceived.

#### All recent evidence is Aff

Farley 3-12 – Dr. Robert Farley, Associate Professor for the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky, “Did Obama's 'Red Line' Fib Matter in the End?”, The Diplomat, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/did-obamas-red-line-fib-matter-in-the-end/

How much did U.S. President Barack Obama’s “red line” mistake matter? According to the New York Times Magazine‘s Julia Ioffe, the Russians don’t seem to think it mattered much at all.

In the wake of Obama’s wide-ranging interview with Jeffrey Goldberg, much attention has focused on the president’s approach to Middle Eastern affairs, and particularly the war in Syria. The most interesting part of the interview, however, may have involved his general views on foreign policy, and especially the question of “resolve.”

Ioffe zeroes in on the question of how the president views “credibility,” and perhaps more importantly, how the Russians view Obama’s credibility. This question continues to come up, because critics of the president have consistently, and hotly, argued that Obama fatally undermined U.S. credibility when he failed to attack Syria after declaring a “red line” regarding chemical weapons use. According to critics, this has enabled aggression from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, who no longer fear the assertive use of U.S. power.

But as Ioffe points out, that idea that the “red line” in Syria mattered a great deal to Russian decision-making appears to be news to actual Russians who make decisions. Instead of carefully calibrating their foreign policy based on close analysis of Obama’s rhetoric, Russian policymakers appear to have scrutinized their own national interests and capabilities. In short, Ioffe finds no evidence whatsoever that Russia viewed Obama’s Syria decisions as a green light for invading Ukraine. This finding accords with nearly all the relevant research on the topic in the field of international relations.

But perhaps it mattered a great deal in East Asia? Some have suggested that Obama’s lack of toughness in Syria has opened the door for Chinese aggression in the South China Sea. However, no evidence yet exists for this proposition. Like the Russians, the Chinese see themselves as manifestly different than the Syrians; a great power that can take care of itself, rather than a client state that suffers what it must. And the Chinese fully understand that the Obama administration sees relations with China as happening on a fundamentally different level than relations with Syria. Indeed, in the interview (and in other places) Obama has made clear that disengagement from the Middle East is an essential precondition for rebalancing towards the Pacific.

Diplomats lie; indeed, it’s part of their job description, not to mention their charm. What Russian diplomats say to a journalist about Russian deliberation should never serve as the final word for analysis. Yet, given that advocates of “credibility” and “resolve” have struggled to provide any evidence that Russia, China, or Iran have changed their behavior because of the decisions Obama took in Syria, it’s perhaps time for some additional doses of skepticism.

#### Their link is nonsense – allies see US policy as distinct

Beinart 14 “The U.S. Doesn't Need to Prove Itself in Ukraine” Peter Beinart - contributing editor at The Atlantic and National Journal, an associate professor of journalism and political science at the City University of New York, and a senior fellow at the New America Foundation, MAY 5, 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/05/us-credibility-fallacy-ukraine-russia-syria-china/361695/

The American people may not much care, but among the foreign-policy elite, public opinion is undergoing its sharpest shift since the Iraq War went south. Fears of overstretch are out; fears of vacillation are in. Russia’s shrewd and thuggish behavior in Ukraine has alarmed not just the Dick Cheney-Bill Kristol crowd, for which every American adversary is Nazi Germany and every contested space is the Sudetenland, but many in the sensible center as well. The clearest evidence yet comes courtesy of that tribune of worldly prudence, The Economist, which declares in this week’s cover essay that “America is no longer as alarming to its foes or reassuring to its friends.” The Obama administration’s “retreats,” warns the magazine’s accompanying editorial, have sparked “a nagging suspicion among friends and foes that on the big day America simply might not turn up.” This is bunk. There are legitimate criticisms of Obama’s individual policies. In Syria, he may have missed an opportunity to arm, and shape, the anti-Assad opposition before jihadists took over, and calling Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons a “red line” was clearly a mistake. In Ukraine, it’s conceivable that harsher immediate retaliation in Crimea might have stopped Vladimir Putin there, although such a response might also have fractured Western unity. Where The Economist, and other newly hawkish critics of Obama’s foreign policy, go wrong is in asserting that Obama’s policies in one corner of the globe have emboldened adversaries and demoralized allies elsewhere. That’s an old and costly illusion. Call it the “credibility fallacy.” Since the dawn of the Cold War, American policymakers and commentators have repeatedly insisted that the U.S. defend allies in one part of the world to show allies in others that America’s promises enjoy “credibility.” And again and again, the result has been to silence discussion of whether the country in question actually merits the expenditure of American money and the spilling of American blood. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, George Kennan urged his superiors in the Truman administration to distinguish between those areas of the globe that were important enough to defend against Soviet advance and those that were not. But by the Korean War, Kennan’s more limited strategy was overtaken by Paul Nitze’s NSC-68, which insisted that, “any substantial further extension of the area under the domination of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled [anywhere else].” Whether the country under Soviet threat mattered in its own right was now irrelevant. Every country mattered because if the U.S. acquiesced to Soviet domination anywhere, it would lose credibility everywhere. “The effect,” writes John Lewis Gaddis, “was to vastly increase the number and variety of interests deemed relevant to [American] national security, and to blur distinctions between them.” But the real disaster came in Vietnam. As a general rule, the men who led America into war did not see Vietnam itself as of great value. What haunted them was the fear that if America did not uphold its commitments there, it would demoralize America’s allies, and embolden the Soviets, in places that really mattered, like Central Europe. “Around the globe, from Berlin to Thailand,” declared Lyndon Johnson in April 1965, “are people whose well-being rests, in part, on the belief that they can count on us if they are attacked. To leave Vietnam to its fate would shake the confidence of all these people in the value of an American commitment and in the value of America’s word.” If the United States did not uphold its guarantees to Saigon, added Secretary of State Dean Rusk, its “guarantees with regard to Berlin would lose their credibility.” Ironically, the very European leaders whose morale Johnson and Rusk feared undermining if America abandoned South Vietnam—men like British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and French President Charles de Gaulle—privately urged the U.S. not to escalate the war. In the end, after tens of thousands of Americans and millions of Vietnamese had died, the United States did abandon South Vietnam. And the world shrugged. Yes, communists racked up victories in some other corners of the developing world in the 1970s. But they lost ground in others. And in the heart of Europe, the place American policymakers really cared about, NATO held together and the Soviets stayed on their side of the Iron Curtain. So dramatic was the contrast between the importance America’s leaders ascribed to global credibility and the results on the ground that academics began studying the concept. In his 1994 book, Peripheral Visions, which tested whether between 1965 and 1990 American weakness in one region of the world had emboldened Moscow in others, Ted Hopf, then of the University of Michigan, concluded that the “Soviets continued to attribute high credibility to the United States in strategic areas of the globe because they saw no logical connection between US behavior in areas of negligible interest and its future conduct in places with critical stakes.” In his 2005 book, Calculating Credibility, Dartmouth’s Daryl Press tested the same hypothesis—that weakness somewhere emboldens aggression elsewhere—using different twentieth-century case studies. He too found that, “A country’s credibility, at least during crises, is driven not by its past behavior but rather by its power and interests. If a country makes threats that it has the power to carry out—and an interest in doing so—those threats will be believed even if the country has bluffed in the past…. Tragically, those countries that have fought wars to build a reputation for resolve have wasted vast sums of money and, much worse, thousands of lives.” Sadly, it is precisely this hoary fiction that The Economist now perpetuates when it declares that Obama’s “failure to enforce his own ‘red line’ over chemical weapons in Syria gravely damaged his credibility.” In fact, The Economist presents no evidence that Obama’s Syria policy played a role in Putin’s aggression in Ukraine. (Which makes sense when you consider that the Russian president did something similar in Georgia in 2008 even after George W. Bush had enforced his “red line” in Iraq with hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops). “Credibility is also easily lost and hard to rebuild,” adds the magazine, gravely. It’s the kind of statement that sounds sober and authoritative. But it happens to be untrue. “Establishing a reputation as a nation able and willing to defend its interests,” concludes Hopf, “is a much easier task than deterrence theorists and Munich analogists [and British magazine editors] have maintained.” The grim developments in Ukraine fit Hopf and Press’s theory quite well. In assessing America’s likely response to aggression in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin looked not at what America had done in Syria, or anywhere else, but at how much America cared about Ukraine. The evidence was clear: Ukraine was not a country the United States was willing to risk war over. The decision not to include it in NATO had made that abundantly clear. Putin’s assessment turned out to be right. Similarly, in assessing America’s likely response to attacks on the Senkaku (Diaoyu in Chinese) islands, China will likely draw on what it knows—from America’s public statements, private messages, past actions, and military deployments—about how much the United States cares about islands in the East China Sea. Believing that Beijing will determine Washington’s willingness to defend the Senkakus based on American policy in Syria or Ukraine makes about as much sense as believing that America will assess China’s likelihood of attacking the Senkakus based on China’s policies in Syria or Ukraine.

#### No empirical ev for their argument

Glaser 14 – John Glaser, Editor at Antiwar, Reporter for the Washington Times, “Putting the ‘Weakness’ Argument to Rest”, 3-10, http://antiwar.com/blog/2014/03/10/putting-the-weakness-argument-to-rest/

Last week, I argued in a piece at Reason that Russia did not decide to intervene militarily in Ukraine because of alleged “weakness” on the part of U.S. foreign policy, despite what hawks would have us believe. The talking point, especially but not exclusively from Republicans, is that Putin saw the Obama administration’s reluctance to use military force in, for example, Syria, and therefore calculated that he could get away with it, without risking a harsh U.S. reaction. One counter argument that I pointed to is the fact that Russia took comparable actions in Georgia in 2008, when George W. Bush was president. No conservatives ever suggested that Bush’s reluctance to go to war drove Moscow to take military action in that case. On Sunday, my argument was repeated by an unlikely source: former secretary of defense under Bush and Obama, Robert Gates. “Putin invaded Georgia, I didn’t hear anybody accusing Bush of being weak or unwilling to use force,” Gates said. “Putin is very opportunistic in these arenas. Even if we had launched attacks in Syria, even if we weren’t cutting our defense budget — Putin saw an opportunity here in Crimea, and he has seized it.” Plenty of informed voices have slipped in to dispel this myth, but it lingers on. At the National Interest, Paul Pillar critiques the “toughness” argument “that Russia’s moves in Ukraine should be attributed to a supposed pusillanimous ‘retreat’ of American power and to adversaries responding by becoming more aggressive.” If anything, Pillar points out (as do I in the Reason piece), Washington’s lawlessness and aggression on the world stage give regimes like the one in Moscow license to act out. The “act of U.S. aggression [in Iraq],” Pillar notes, “is recent enough that it still is a prominent detriment to U.S. credibility whenever the United States tries to complain about someone else’s use of military force against another sovereign state, including Putin’s use of force in Crimea.” At The American Conservative, Daniel Larison chips in, pointing out that supposed U.S. “weakness” is perceived very differently by our geo-political rivals: What [hawks] perceive as “inaction” in Syria, Russia and Iran likely perceive as ongoing interference and hostility to their interests. The crisis in Ukraine also looks very different to Moscow than it does to the Westerners that have been agitating for an even larger and more active U.S. role. Western hawks were frustrated by how slow their governments were to throw their full support behind the protesters, and as usual wanted the U.S. and EU to take a much more adversarial and combative approach with Russia because they see Western governments as being far more passive than they want. However, Moscow doesn’t perceive the U.S. role in Ukraine to be a limited or benign one, and the toppling of Yanukovych has been fitted into their view that the protests were a Western-backed plot from the beginning. The idea that Russia would have responded less aggressively to the change in government if the U.S. had been giving the opposition even more encouragement and support is dangerously delusional, but that is what one has to believe in order to argue that the U.S. “emboldened” Moscow in Ukraine. To keep that logic going, over all U.S. policy toward Russia has been anything but “inactive” in the eyes of Moscow. “From the moment the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991,” writes Stephen Kinzer, “the United States has relentlessly pursued a strategy of encircling Russia,” bringing “12 countries in central Europe, all of them formerly allied with Moscow, into the NATO alliance,” placing U.S. military power “directly on Russia’s borders.” Moscow could hardly see this as accommodative. Finally, what hawks making this argument seem to ignore is that the American people vehemently opposed going to war in Syria and overwhelmingly oppose any direct intervention in the Ukraine crisis. They don’t care. According to their worldview, America must at all times be bombing practically every state that does not obey the demands of politicians in Washington, otherwise we will invite more disobedience. The argument that U.S. “weakness” leads other governments to take bold military action that they otherwise might have abstained from is lacking in substance and evidence. Yet, it persists. It’s time to put it to bed.

#### They dramatically oversimplify IR signaling

Larison 14 – Dr. Daniel Larison, Ph.D. from the University of Chicago and Senior Editor at the American Conservative, “The “Emboldening” Fantasy”, The American Conservative, 3-10, http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/the-emboldening-fantasy/

Condoleeza Rice rehearses some boilerplate rhetoric: These global developments have not happened in response to a muscular U.S. foreign policy: Countries are not trying to “balance” American power. They have come due to signals that we are exhausted and disinterested. The events in Ukraine should be a wake-up call to those on both sides of the aisle who believe that the United States should eschew the responsibilities of leadership. If it is not heeded, dictators and extremists across the globe will be emboldened. Rice’s op-ed incorporates every stale, hawkish cliche that has been used in connection with recent events, and in so doing serves to remind us how mistaken or meaningless these arguments are. One of the most common and annoying claims in every hawkish argument regardless of subject is the warning that a lack of “leadership” will “embolden” other actors. No one ever has to prove that such “emboldening” has occurred, and there is no attempt to account for the agency and priorities of other governments. If another state does something Washington opposes, it is simply taken for granted that this is because the U.S. somehow encouraged it by not being activist and aggressive enough. If this claim is put under any scrutiny, it quickly falls apart. The first error that hawks make is to pretend that foreign governments perceive U.S. actions in the same way that they do. If the U.S. falls short of their maximalist preferences in one or two places, they conclude that the U.S. appears “weak,” but this is usually not how everyone else see things. If they believe that the U.S. has been insufficiently “active” in Syria, for example, they assume that adversaries and rivals perceive the U.S. role in the same way, but that isn’t the case. If anything, Russia and Iran tend to imagine an American hand behind events whether it is there or not, and they usually overstate or invent the American role in developments that they oppose. What Rice et al. perceive as “inaction” in Syria, Russia and Iran likely perceive as ongoing interference and hostility to their interests. The crisis in Ukraine also looks very different to Moscow than it does to the Westerners that have been agitating for an even larger and more active U.S. role. Western hawks were frustrated by how slow their governments were to throw their full support behind the protesters, and as usual wanted the U.S. and EU to take a much more adversarial and combative approach with Russia because they see Western governments as being far more passive than they want. However, Moscow doesn’t perceive the U.S. role in Ukraine to be a limited or benign one, and the toppling of Yanukovych has been fitted into their view that the protests were a Western-backed plot from the beginning. The idea that Russia would have responded less aggressively to the change in government if the U.S. had been giving the opposition even more encouragement and support is dangerously delusional, but that is what one has to believe in order to argue that the U.S. “emboldened” Moscow in Ukraine.

### AT: Alliances Impact– Asia Prolif

#### \*No prolif from US actions

- It’s highly unlikely and exaggerated by media

- Strong political constituency against ANY prolif EVER

- No tech basis for claim it would only take 6 months

- Won’t go nuclear based on US actions – too tied to the alliance

Lewis 14 [Jeffrey Lewis is director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies 6-26-2014 http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/26/if-japan-wanted-to-build-a-nuclear-bomb-itd-be-awesome-at-it/]

I am a critic of Japan’s policy of separating and reusing the plutonium inevitably created in the country’s nuclear power plants. Japan’s stockpile of plutonium sets a terrible example for other states like, say, Iran. Still, we should not lose sight of the fact that Japan is not going to build nuclear weapons. Much of the concern expressed by Japan’s neighbors is simply a convenient opportunity to give Prime Minister Abe a kick in the shins. And, frankly, he probably deserves more than a few kicks in areas north of the shins for stunts like visiting the Yasukuni shrine and throwing shade at the women raped by the Imperial Japanese Army. Yet the notion of Japanese nuclear weapons keeps turning up. The idea has gotten some attention in light of the general combativeness of the most recent International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Shangri-La Dialogue (I am trademarking "The Brou-ha-ha in Shang-ri-la"), where Chinese participants acted boorishly, as well as an interesting debate between my friends David Santoro and Elbridge Colby about whether the United States should ditch Asian allies that leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in search of the bomb. These are important discussions, but they give the wrong impression. Focusing on the unlikely possibility of a nuclear-armed Japan distracts from more important policy challenges that threaten the shared interests of the United States and Japan in arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. Don’t get me wrong, there will always be a certain constituency within Japan for extremist views. Shintaro Ishihara, the former governor of Tokyo, has made a career out of saying impolitic things, including his infamous book, The Japan That Can Say No — say "no" to the United States, that is. Ishihara says "yes" to nuclear weapons and a bunch of other terrible ideas, from purchasing the islands at the center of the maritime dispute with China to suggesting that sexual enslavement was "a very good way of making a living" for a young woman in wartime. There have always been extremists in Japan who aren’t one bit sorry about the war. Take Ishihara’s buddy, the late Yukio Mishima. Three times nominated for the Nobel Prize in literature, Mishima was also an actor who later in life got into extremist right-wing causes, body-building, and so on. In 1970, he and some of his young acolytes in a student militia called the Tatenokai entered the military base in Ichigaya and exhorted the soldiers to launch a coup to restore the emperor. The soldiers looked on, sort of baffled — some accounts say they even heckled him — and then Mishima retired to an office to commit seppuku, or ritual suicide. The plan was that Mishima would stab himself in the stomach and then one of the students, alleged to be his lover, would behead the well-known author. The lop job didn’t go exactly as anticipated: The poor fool botched it a couple of times, leaving another student to finish off Misihima. Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, who knew Mishima socially, said, "I can only think he went out of his mind." So, yes, there are weirdos in Japan. (And elsewhere: Someone pinned Mishima’s severed head on Pinterest.) As an American, I can tell you that it’s not fair to judge a country by its nut-jobs. As an American, I can tell you that it’s not fair to judge a country by its nut-jobs. A far larger and more important constituency in Japan are the people who categorize the devastation of World War II as a catastrophe, the post-war reconstruction as a miracle, and the existence of nuclear weapons as abhorrent. This is the Japan of Yellow Magic Orchestra and Hello Kitty. (Oops.) It’s easy to talk about Japan building nuclear weapons, but the real policy debates reflect Japan’s nuclear allergy, not enthusiasm. In late 1969, a few months before Mishima killed himself, the United States agreed to return Okinawa to Japanese control. The sticking point between Tokyo and Washington was whether U.S. bases would continue to host American nuclear weapons or not. Ultimately, the United States relented to Japan’s demand for an Okinawa without nuclear weapons, although Prime Minister Sato agreed to consult with the United States in the event of a crisis. (Sato is Abe’s maternal great-uncle, by the way.) Even that agreement, however, had to be signed in secret. After signing the official memorandum to return Okinawa to Japan, then-National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and his Japanese counterpart actually contrived for U.S. President Richard Nixon to invite Sato into the president’s study to look at some objets d’art so they could sign the secret agreement without anyone present. This is hardly ancient history. In 2010, when the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) finally took sole control of the government for the first time in post-war Japan, it ordered an inquiry into secret agreements like the one Sato signed. (The Japanese copy was found by Sato’s son, who would be Abe’s first cousin once-removed, if you are keeping score.) The DPJ calculated, correctly, that secret agreements to allow U.S. nuclear weapons to enter Japan would outrage a good portion of the public. The result was an ugly spat between the Obama administration and the DPJ government. The Japanese public, by and large, thinks what happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki was a terrible thing. I am a member (that’s my head!) of the Governor of Hiroshima’s roundtable on disarmament. Let me tell you, nuclear weapons are not a vote winner in Japan. Nor, I hasten to add, is Japan "six months away" from a bomb, even if you hear that all the time. Recently some senior U.S. officials repeated the "six month" claim to NBC reporter Robert Windrem. There is no technical basis for such a statement. I once actually tried to trace the heritage of that irksome claim. As far as I could tell, it dates to a conversation with a "Japanese strategic thinker" in 1976 that is cited in Richard Halloran’s 1991 book, Chrysanthemum and Sword Revisited: Is Japanese Militarism Resurgent? The claim is made in passing, not as a formal assessment of Japan’s technological capability or plans. "Six months" in context is like the biblical "40" — that is to say, it means "fairly soon" just like "40 days and 40 nights" means it rained a long, long time. Other than one bit of yellow journalism in the Sunday Times, no one has attempted to document a technical basis for the "six-month" claim. There have been several Japanese and American assessments, from academic studies to declassified intelligence reports, on the possibility that Japan might build nuclear weapons. All of them conclude that a nuclear deterrent would cost Japan a few billion dollars and would take several years to build. That’s because the Japanese would not jury-rig a tiny arsenal out of civil plutonium. They could do it, sure, but why? Why completely alter the structure of Japanese security policy for a handful of makeshift bombs that might not work? If Japan goes nuclear, it will do so only as part of a fundamental change in how the Japanese look at their security environment. In that case, Japan would build nuclear weapons like they do everything else, down to the beer machine at Narita — with meticulous care. Japan would construct dedicated plutonium production reactors and facilities to separate weapons-grade plutonium, probably conduct nuclear tests, and deploy modern delivery systems, such as missiles. This is, I would argue, the most important point to understanding U.S.-Japan relations, and extended deterrence. We often talk about nuclear weapons in Japan like a thermostat — if U.S. credibility declines in Tokyo, Japan will build a nuclear arsenal to compensate. It’s almost as if we cut 10 bombs, the Japanese will want 10 of their own to make up the difference. That’s not right at all. For Japan, becoming a nuclear weapons power would require a dramatic break in a foreign and security policy that has historically centered on the U.S. alliance. So would unarmed neutrality. It is Japan’s lack of such strategic options that account for the most interesting Japanese behaviors in foreign and security policy. As one Japanese observer pointed out to me, neither alternative — nuclear-armed independence nor unarmed neutrality — has a mainstream constituency in Japan. That means the only practical approach for Japanese policymakers is an alliance with the United States. Tokyo has little choice but to accept whatever level of security Washington can provide at the moment. Another colleague compared it to riding on the back of a motorcycle — you can see the bumps and twists in the road, but you can’t do anything about it. That’s scary. The result, of course, is a lot of whining from Japan about the credibility of the U.S. guarantee. What else can they do? And it accounts for the tendency of the country’s politicos to fixate on symbols of Washington’s commitment, just as Max Weber observed that Protestants tended to obsess about material success as a sign of predestination.

#### No impact to allied prolif – strong democracy, stable regime, democratic institutions, civilian control of the military, no history of armed conflict with allies, risk adverse

Sapolsky 14 [Harvey M. Sapolsky is Professor Emeritus and the Former Director of The MIT Security Studies Program. Christine M. Leah is a Stanton Fellow at the MIT Security Studies Program. 4-14-2014 http://nationalinterest.org/feature/let-asia-go-nuclear-10259]

Tailored proliferation would not likely be destabilizing. Asia is not the Middle East. Japan, South Korea, Australia, and even Taiwan are strong democracies. They have stable political regimes. Government leaders are accountable to democratic institutions. Civilian control of the military is strong. And they don’t have a history of lobbing missiles at each other—they are much more risk-averse than Egypt, Syria or Iran. America’s allies would be responsible nuclear weapon states. A number of Asian nations have at one time or another considered going nuclear, Australia for example, with tacit U.S. Defense Department encouragement in the 1960s. They chose what for them was the cheaper alternative of living under the US nuclear umbrella. Free nuclear guarantees provided by the United States, coupled with the US Navy patrolling offshore, have allowed our allies to grow prosperous without having to invest much in their own defense. Confident that the United States protects them, our allies have even begun to squabble with China over strings of uninhabited islands in the hope that there is oil out there. It is time to give them a dose of fiscal and military reality. And the way to do that is to stop standing between them and their nuclear-armed neighbors. It will not be long before they realize the value of having their own nuclear weapons. The waters of the Pacific under those arrangements will stay calm, and we will save a fortune.

### AT: Econ Impact

#### Economic decline doesn’t cause war

Drezner 12 (Daniel, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” <http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf>)

The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggest otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007."43 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis, as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 The secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected."43.”40¶ None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis levels, primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard “V”-shaped recovery was unreasonable. One financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as in a state of “contained depression.”41 The key word is “contained,” however. Given the severity, reach and depth of the 2008 financial crisis, the proper comparison is with Great Depression. And by that standard, the outcome variables look impressive. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff concluded in This Time is Different: “that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global recession since World War II – and not even worse – must be regarded as fortunate.”42

### AT: Turns Case

#### Doesn’t turn case – plan shields from election backlash and Trump hardline is all talk

He, 16 --- He Yafei is former vice minister of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, and former vice minister at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China US Focus, “U.S. Election and Its Impact on China”, 1/25, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/u-s-election-and-its-impact-on-china/

Here comes China, whose economic growth and military modernization in recent years represents, to American people, a world that undergoes rapid changes and evolves to a multipolar one where the US is no longer being able to call shot on everything. The resentment against globalization is on the rise. Overall strategic retrenchment and an emphatic shift to focus more on China are taking place simultaneously. “Scapegoating” China is inevitable. “China has taken jobs away from American workers”. “China is manipulating its currency to gain advantage in trade”. “China is being aggressive in the South China Sea and trying to drive the US out of the Western Pacific”. The list of complaints can go on and on. It doesn’t matter whether those accusations and complaints are true or not to American politicians and voters as long as they have “election value”. For instance, the renminbi has appreciated against the US dollar to the tune of 30% since 2008, but voices are still strong in America calling for the RMB to appreciate further. We all know from experience that China-bashing is common and “cost-free” in US elections. This time around is no different. What is different is that while without agreeing to the concept of “G2”, there is a broad recognition that the US and China are the two major powers in today’s world. It is no hyperbole to say that nothing gets done without close cooperation between the two nations, be it climate change, energy security, non-proliferation of WMD, etc. In this connection the US election does have an impact on China and US-China relations as noted by Robert Manning, who said the US-China relationship enters “dangerous waters” in 2016. What can be done to counteract the negative spillover from the US election this year? On the one hand, there need to be more cooperative actions from both sides to reinforce the relationship. Climate change is one, cooperation in the Middle East is another. To quicken the pace of negotiation on BIT is definitely useful with emphasis on shortening the “negative list”. The US-China relationship is simply too important for both nations not to make extra efforts in election years to make it stronger in the face of increased headwind. On the other hand, we ought to stay calm and ready to meet any possible frictions and challenges in close coordination and consultation to minimize damage to the bilateral relations. We have to understand that “China-bashing” is more words than actions. Any new administration once in the White House will be more realistic and down-to-earth in its China policy as determined by shared interests of both nations worldwide.

## --- AT: Warming ---

### AT: Warming Impact

#### GOP President will tackle warming.

Neuhauser 15. [Alan, energy, environment and STEM reporter, "The Climate Change Election" US N ews and World Report -- www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2015/08/14/the-2016-election-is-critical-for-stopping-climate-change]

And there are conservative solutions for warming. Some party members, in fact, see it as an inherently Republican issue: Carbon emissions, for example, distort the free market, forcing others to pay the higher and indirect costs of climate change (storm recovery, disaster relief) plus the health costs associated with air pollution. ​​ ​​​"We allow the coal industry to socialize its costs, and we conservatives don't like allowing people to socialize anything," says former South Carolina Rep. Bob Inglis, who now explores free-market solutions to climate change as head of the Energy and Enterprise Institute at George Mason University. A revenue-neutral carbon tax, one that does not support other programs and instead goes back to households, could fix that distortion, he and others argue. "The question is not, 'Is there going to be a tax on carbon?' It's, 'Do you want a tax that you have a voice in and control, or do you want to keep writing checks after disasters that you have no control over?'" says retired Rear Admiral David Titley, who has advised some of the GOP presidential candidates and directs the Center for Solutions to Weather and Climate Risk at Penn State University. "That $60 billion relief bill for Hurricane Sandy that passed very quickly through a Republican-led House, did you get a vote on that tax? Because that's a tax." Yet Inglis, himself is a living example of what can happen to conservatives who call for climate action. The recipient of the JFK Profile in Courage Award in April, he was unseated in the Republican primary in 2010 after shifting his position on global warming. "Republicans say, 'Look at what happened to him when he said it was real. Do you want that to happen to you?'" Hayhoe describes. Oil, gas and coal companies, along with billionaire Libertarian industrialists David and Charles Koch, rank among the biggest campaign donors, and often seem as allergic to new taxes as a bubble boy to fresh pollen. But popular sentiment among voters appears to be changing: Most Republican voters say they support climate action, and last week, Shell did not renew its membership in the Koch-backed American Legislative Exchange Council because of the group's opposition to climate action. Even the climate statements by the eight Republicans who have hedged on warming, vague as they were, may signify a kind of progress – especially during the primaries, when candidates play to their parties' more extreme bases. [MORE: Hillary Clinton's Solar Pledge: 'Ambitious but Realistic,' Experts Say] "In the Great Recession in 2010, it was this very atheistic position with regard to climate change: 'We don't believe,'" Inglis says. "Then, in the 2014 cycle, 'I'm not a scientist,' that was an agnostic position. These are data points on a trend line toward a tipping point." Republicans can exploit a distinct advantage on climate action, too, he adds: Voters tend to support the presidents who buck party stereotypes. "Nixon goes to China, Bill Clinton signs welfare reform – the country will trust a conservative to touch climate," Inglis argues.

#### Long timeframe for warming impacts and adaptation solves

Mendelsohn 9 (Robert, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf)

The heart of the debate about climate change comes from a number of warnings from scientists and others that give the impression that human-induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006). Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b), crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20–30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta et al. 2009). Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and well‐being may be at risk (Stern 2006). These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.

#### Warming doesn’t cause extinction – no consensus for catastrophic scenarios

Kopits et al 14 -- National Center for Environmental Economics, US Environmental Protection Agency; Alex Marten, Ann Wolverton (Elizabeth, 9/1/2014, "Incorporating ‘catastrophic’ climate change into policy analysis," Climate Policy 14(5), Galileo)

It is common within the academic and public discourse on climate change for the term ‘catastrophe’ to be invoked when describing possible outcomes of a changing climate and in justifying particular responses to the problem. It has been suggested that the potential for abrupt, large-scale ‘catastrophic impacts’ due to climate change is the most important aspect for determining the optimal level of response (Pindyck & Wang, 2012; Weitzman, 2009) and that ‘the economic case for a stringent GHG abatement policy, if it is to be made at all, must be based on the possibility of a catastrophic outcome’ (Pindyck, 2012). Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that analyses of GHG mitigation benefits are often criticized for failing to adequately capture catastrophic impacts (e.g. National Academy of Sciences, 2010; Tol, 2009). However, despite the seeming importance of such potential climate change-related events, there has been little progress in defensibly integrating catastrophic impacts into analyses of the benefits of climate policy. One obstacle that has impeded progress on this front is the inconsistent and sometimes nebulous way in which the expression ‘catastrophic impacts’ has been used (Hulme, 2003). The term often refers to any climate-induced impact that exhibits one or more characteristics: relatively sudden occurrence, irreversible transition to a new state after crossing a threshold, and relatively large physical or welfare impacts. In addition, some researchers consider catastrophic impacts to necessarily result from low-probability events. For this reason the types of impacts covered under the catastrophic label are often numerous and heterogeneous, everything from dieback of Amazon rainforests over the coming decades to the potential massive release of methane emissions from the sea floor over the next thousand years (Lenton et al., 2008). Some have even argued for establishing a global threshold for climate change, below which there is negligible risk of violating ‘planetary boundaries’ that ‘define the safe operating space for humanity’ ... [and] avoid crossing threshold levels of key variables ‘with deleterious or potentially even disastrous consequences for humans’ scales’ (Rockstrom et al., 2009, p. 472).1 In public discourse, catastrophic impacts are often invoked as a seemingly monolithic occurrence,2 a tendency that is also often present in economic analyses of such events. By assuming uniformity, researchers have severely limited their ability to substantively inform policy discussions. This tendency may arise from an absence of literature that summarizes significant differences between potential large-scale climate events and what that means for incorporating them into economic analysis. In addition, many economic modelling efforts fall substantially short in incorporating scientific evidence regarding the causes, likelihood, and potential physical impacts of such climate change-induced events. While one expects a natural lag in the incorporation of new scientific findings into economic models, this shortcoming appears to stem more from fundamental differences between disciplines as to what constitutes relatively rapid or large changes (the scientific literature does not even use the term catastrophe, instead relying on the phrase ‘abrupt climate change’) and the appropriate end points to measure in policy analysis. Both of these concerns have been observed by natural scientists (e.g. Hulme, 2003), and calls are increasing across the scientific community for more research on welfare impacts, with better links to the scientific evidence on how physical processes are likely to unfold (e.g. Lenton, 2011; Lenton & Ciscar, 2013).

### No Impact: Paris Fails

#### Paris fails – cuts too small and non-binding.

Lomborg 16. (Bjorn, directs the Copenhagen Consensus Center, "The Paris climate deal won’t even dent global warming" New York Post – February 22 -- <http://nypost.com/2016/02/22/the-paris-climate-deal-wont-even-dent-global-warming/>)

\*\*edited for ableist language\*\*

Two months after the Paris climate-treaty negotiations concluded with fanfare, the world is figuring out it was sold a lemon. In December, global leaders patted each other on the back and declared a job well done. The treaty will come into force later this year after it has been signed by representatives of at least 55 nations representing 55 percent of global greenhouse-gas emissions. This will provide “a turning point for the world,” according to President Obama. “Our children and grandchildren will see that we did our duty,” says UK Prime Minister David Cameron. Climate activists have been quick to declare success. This marks “the end of the era of fossil fuels,” said activist group 350.org. Jeffrey Sachs, director of the Earth Institute, called the Paris agreement a “diplomatic triumph.” A diplomatic triumph? More like a p.r. coup. The Paris Treaty is rich in rhetoric, but it’ll make little change in actual temperature rises. Increasingly, that fact is being recognized, even by some of the biggest proponents of climate action. Jim Hansen, a former NASA scientist and advisor to Al Gore who was the first to put global warming on the public radar in 1988, wasn’t fooled. “It’s a fraud really, a fake,” he said in December. “It’s just worthless words.” And this month, 11 climate scientists signed a declaration stating that the Paris treaty is ~~crippled~~ hindered by “deadly flaws.” The problem with the deal is simple, and was obvious from before it was even signed. The Paris agreement talks a big game. It doesn’t just commit to capping the global temperature increase at the much-discussed level of 2°C above pre-industrial levels. It says that leaders commit to keeping the increase “well below 2°C,” with an effort to cap it at 1.5°C. But this is all talk. My own peer-reviewed research, published in the journal Global Policy, shows that all of the treaty’s 2016-2030 promises on cutting carbon-dioxide emissions will reduce temperatures by the year 2100 by just 0.05°C. Even if the promised emissions cuts continued unabated throughout the century, the Paris agreement would cut global temperature increases by just 0.17°C. Scientists from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology reach a similar conclusion. And that’s assuming countries actually live up to their promises: The treaty’s nonbinding. This is reminiscent of another non-binding pact also signed in Paris. The Kellogg-Briand Pact was drafted in 1928 and signatories included the United Kingdom, United States, France, Germany, Japan and Italy. Leaders agreed to outlaw war. The treaty scored its architect, Secretary of State Frank Kellogg, a Nobel Peace Prize. But after barely a decade, global war broke out. By the United Nations’ own reckoning, the treaty will only achieve less than 1 percent of the emission cuts needed to meet target temperatures. So instead, signatories point to the fact that beginning in 2020, countries will be asked to lay out more ambitious targets every five years. In other words, 99 percent of the problem is left for tomorrow’s leaders to deal with. Paris won’t solve global warming. What will? In the Copenhagen Consensus on Climate project, 28 climate economists and a panel of experts including three Nobel laureates found that the best long-term climate strategy is to dramatically increase investment in green R&D, with every dollar spent on green R&D avoiding 100 times more climate change than money spent on inefficient wind and solar. For 20 years, we’ve insisted on trying to solve climate change by mainly supporting solar and wind power. This approach puts the cart in front of the horse: Green technologies aren’t competitive yet. Instead of production subsidies, governments should focus on making renewable energy cheaper and competitive through research and development. Drive down prices through innovation, and everyone will switch. And we need to acknowledge that much-maligned fracking must be a part of our shorter-term solution to climate change. Natural gas is far more environmentally friendly than coal. Gas emits less than half the CO2, and it emits much lower amounts of other pollutants. Though it doesn’t provide the ultimate answer to global warming, shale gas is greener than the alternatives. After the self-congratulatory party in Paris has come an awakening: This deal isn’t going to solve climate change. It’s time to focus on what will.

## --- AT: Iran Deal ---

### Trump Won’t Tank Iran Deal

#### Trump might modify the Iran deal but he won’t tank it.

Neidig 6-9-16. [Harper, "Adviser: Trump could 'modify,' not throw out Iran deal" The HIll -- thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidential-races/282843-adviser-says-trump-would-consult-congress-on-muslim-ban]

A foreign policy adviser to Donald Trump on Thursday said the presumptive GOP presidential nominee might modify the controversial Iran nuclear deal rather than throw it out. “He is going to be revising, reviewing and maybe trying to modify the Iran deal,” Walid Phares told The Wall Street Journal. He added that Trump would be open to resubmitting an altered version of the agreement to Congress. Trump previously has ripped the Iran deal as “terrible.” The agreement lifted U.S. and international sanctions on Iran in return for concessions from that country on its nuclear program. President Obama has placed the Iran deal as a centerpiece of his foreign policy agenda, but it was opposed by Republicans and many Democrats. Phares also said Trump would consult with Congress and federal officials about issues such as imposing a ban on Muslims entering the United States. “His position which was strong — in terms of the ban — was based on the fact that the Obama administration — the Obama-Clinton administration — for the last seven to eight years was not able to equip us with systems by which we were able to identify the jihadists.” Phares also pushed back against attacks from presumptive Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton, who called Trump “temperamentally unfit” to be president and suggested that he would be prone to using nuclear weapons on a whim. “I don’t see an unusual Trump presidency as Madame Clinton is explaining where he’s going to go crazy and start pressing buttons right away,” he said. “That’s not going to happen. We have a rational institution here.”

#### Trump won’t abandon the Iran deal – it’s bluster.

Wilner 6-6-16. [Michael, "Greenblatt: "Many options," including renegotiation of Iran deal" Jerusalem Post -- www.jpost.com/Diaspora/No-Trump-plan-yet-to-prevent-a-nuclear-Iran-senior-aide-says-456085]

Republican nominee Donald Trump does not yet have a detailed plan for preventing a nuclear-armed Iran, but plans as president to strictly enforce an international deal that he hates designed for that purpose, one of his senior advisers told The Jerusalem Post last week. Trump “would definitely enforce it [the Iran deal] very strongly,” said Jason Greenblatt, the GOP candidate’s top adviser on Israel and Jewish- world issues, of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Trump, a New York real estate icon, has characterized the JCPOA as one of the worst deals he has ever seen. The candidate considers himself an exceptional “dealmaker”– a key tenet of his campaign for president. “[Texas Senator Ted] Cruz famously kept saying during the debates that he would rip it up on day one,” Greenblatt said of the deal. “It’s a lot more complicated than that.” While he would “police the hell” out of the agreement as president, Trump also does not believe the JCPOA will prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons – or a nuclear infrastructure large enough to constitute Iran as a nuclear-threshold state. What Trump would do to prevent Iran from acquiring this capability has not yet been determined, Greenblatt said. “It’s a little bit premature to get into the weeds at that level, but his ultimate goal is to try to ensure that Iran does not have nuclear weapons,” Greenblatt said, asked whether Trump would support renewing US sanctions laws or passing new sanctions targeting Iran in non-nuclear spheres. “How we get there – whether creatively, or renegotiating, there are so many options – is what his focus will be.” The Obama administration says the JCPOA is the best deal possible to ensure that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon – a deal that shuts down all of the country’s pathways to the bomb, governed by a strict verification regime. In exchange, international powers have relieved sanctions targeting Iran’s nuclear program, which will be allowed to grow over time for non-military purposes. Critics argue that the growth of that nuclear program will effectively turn Iran into a nuclear power – that its program will be allowed to grow legitimately to industrial strength, and that Tehran’s “breakout” time, should it choose to build a weapon, will ultimately reach no time at all. Greenblatt seemed to dismiss scrapping the deal in part because Iran has already received significant sanctions relief – billions of dollars have already been released, and businesses are already investing in the country, he noted.

**No Impact: Deal Doesn’t Solve**

#### Deal doesn’t get rid of Iran’s nuclear program – only delays it.

Marcus 15. [Jonathan, BBC diplomatic correspondent, "Iran nuclear deal: Time to celebrate a breakthrough?" BBC – 4-2 -- www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32172256]

This, it must be stressed, is not yet a complete deal. Difficult weeks of detailed drafting lie ahead. But it's a framework on which all parties are agreed. That in itself is an important outcome. Yet this is not a moment for euphoria.∂ Nobody should be under any illusions that Iran has significantly changed its attitude towards its nuclear programme or its longer-term nuclear ambitions.∂ Crisis delayed?∂ This agreement, if codified and implemented in full, will constrain Iran's nuclear programme for some 10 to 15 years. It appears to contain some new and important verification provisions to allow international inspectors greater oversight of what Iran is actually doing.∂ But the agreement falls far short of the initial western goal of rolling back Iran's nuclear programme. This may be a question of a crisis delayed rather than averted. What it does is buy time - during which a lot can happen.∂ If all goes well, the nuclear deal will reduce a key source of friction between Iran and the West.∂ World representatives at the end of talks in Switzerland∂ A deal seems to have suited all sides∂ There will still be many other areas of disagreement. Indeed, Iran remains the rising regional power and its influence in many Arab capitals ranging from Damascus and Baghdad to Beirut and Sana - let alone its human rights record and alleged support for terrorism - all suggest many other avenues for continuing tensions with Washington.∂ Negotiations have not been easy and they will only get harder. But a deal seems to have suited all sides.∂ Iran gets vital sanctions relief. Tehran's critics get significant constraints on its nuclear activities. And with so much else going on in this crisis-ridden region - the struggle against Islamic State in which the US and Iran are objectively on the same side and the fighting in Yemen where they are clearly not - means that taking the nuclear problem off the chess-board for a period of time is probably a helpful development.∂ Impressive detail∂ What was expected from these talks was a fairly bland announcement that a framework agreement had been reached. In contrast the US State Department has been quick to publish a lengthy list of what it calls the "Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action" regarding Iran's nuclear programme.∂ They make interesting reading and represent a clear effort to sell the deal to a sceptical Congress. Too much detail though may make it harder for Iranian diplomats to sell the deal at home in the face of scepticism from political hard-liners. On the face of it Iran has made some significant concessions.∂ Iran will be allowed to have some 6,104 centrifuges installed out of its current 19,000 and only a little over 5,000 of them will actually be enriching uranium. All the working centrifuges are to be early, less advanced models. And everything else is to be stored under supervision of IAEA inspectors∂ Iran will reduce its stockpile of low-enriched uranium - the vital feedstock that would be needed to enrich further to get bomb-making material∂ There will be no enrichment at the underground Fordow site for some 15 years∂ Inspectors will have access not just to key nuclear facilities but to the supply chain supporting Iran's nuclear programme and to uranium mines and mills∂ Iran will be required to grant access to IAEA inspectors to investigate suspicious sites or suspected clandestine activities anywhere in the country∂ The heavy water reactor at Arak that many feared would provide Iran with a plutonium route to a potential bomb is to be re-built so as not to produce weapons grade plutonium.∂ Many of these constraints will be in place for 10 years and some will last for 15.∂ In return∂ Iran will see US and EU nuclear-related sanctions suspended, though no clear timetable has been given for exactly how this will proceed∂ It will not actually have to close any nuclear facility altogether∂ It emerges, once the restrictions expire, with the basis for a significant nuclear industry.∂ Nonetheless, the level of detail is impressive and appears to have convinced nuclear experts that it does indeed provide the year-long warning of a potential Iranian break-out that has been the diplomats' goal. That is seen as sufficient time for any Iranian effort to throw aside the deal and push towards enriching sufficient material for a bomb to be quickly spotted and action taken.∂ File photo of heavy water plant at Arak, Iran, 2006∂ A heavy water reactor at Arak is to be rebuilt, according to details published by the US∂ Strong verification provisions, along with continued intelligence efforts should also be sufficient to prevent an Iranian "sneak-out" - a clandestine effort to do the same thing.∂ This may not convince many of the critics. An Israeli government spokesman described any agreement stemming from this framework as "a historic mistake". Huge questions remain. How will any Iranian infringements be responded to? Can sanctions once suspended really be re-imposed? And what level of transgression is required to provoke this?∂ But if it all works then Iran too only gains. It retains a significant nuclear infrastructure which it can expand once the agreement expires. And it gets vital relief from sanctions that have crippled its economy.∂ For now this could be a diplomatic win-win. But it is not a resolution to the fundamental questions posed by Iran's nuclear programme which relate as much to its foreign policy and military ambitions as to its proclaimed desire for nuclear power.

**AT: Iran Proliferation Impact**

#### Deal can’t solve prolif

**CNN, 11-11**-2013 <http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/11/opinion/frum-iran-deal/>

1) Iran remains intensely committed to achieving a nuclear weapon.¶ Iran's new president, Hassan Rouhani, promised his countrymen relief from international sanctions. Since coming into office this summer, he has made various conciliatory noises. Was he readying Iran for a real deal?¶ Iran's red line at Geneva, the thing it would not trade away, was a capacity to continue and resume nuclear bomb development at any time. Iran's offer at Geneva amounted to a six-month delay of its nuclear program that will not in any way impair its ability to get back to bomb-making at any time.¶ Iran won't neutralize or surrender any of its fissile material; that is, material used to fuel reactors—or nuclear bombs. It won't disable any of its nuclear facilities. It will only pause. Economists use the phrase "revealed preference" to describe the way in which our actions indicate our priorities. Iran's priority remains gaining a weapon; post-Geneva, there can be no doubt about that.

#### No prolif

**Kahl, 12** (Colin H. Kahl – Associate Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, March/April, “Not Time to Attack Iran: Why War Should Be a Last Resort”, Foreign Affairs, ProQuest)

Bad timing

Kroenig argues that there is an urgent need to attack Iran's nuclear infrastructure soon, since Tehran could "produce its first nuclear weapon within six months of deciding to do so." Yet that last phrase is crucial. The International Atomic Energy Agency (iaea) has documented Iranian efforts to achieve the capacity to develop nuclear weapons at some point, but there is no hard evidence that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has yet made the final decision to develop them.

In arguing for a six-month horizon, Kroenig also misleadingly conflates hypothetical timelines to produce weaponsgrade uranium with the time actually required to construct a bomb. According to 2010 Senate testimony by James Cartwright, then vice chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staa, and recent statements by the former heads of Israel's national intelligence and defense intelligence agencies, even if Iran could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a bomb in six months, it would take it at least a year to produce a testable nuclear device and considerably longer to make a deliverable weapon. And David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security (and the source of Kroenig's six-month estimate), recently told Agence France-Presse that there is a "low probability" that the Iranians would actually develop a bomb over the next year even if they had the capability to do so. Because there is no evidence that Iran has built additional covert enrichment plants since the Natanz and Qom sites were outed in 2002 and 2009, respectively, any near-term move by Tehran to produce weapons-grade uranium would have to rely on its declared facilities. The iaea would thus detect such activity with su/cient time for the international community to mount a forceful response. As a result, the Iranians are unlikely to commit to building nuclear weapons until they can do so much more quickly or out of sight, which could be years oa.

Kroenig is also inconsistent about the timetable for an attack. In some places, he suggests that strikes should begin now, whereas in others, he argues that the United States should attack only if Iran takes certain actions-such as expelling iaea inspectors, beginning the enrichment of weapons-grade uranium, or installing large numbers of advanced centrifuges, any one of which would signal that it had decided to build a bomb. Kroenig is likely right that these developments-and perhaps others, such as the discovery of new covert enrichment sites-would create a decision point for the use of force. But the Iranians have not taken these steps yet, and as Kroenig acknowledges, "Washington has a very good chance" of detecting them if they do.

**AT: Iran Relations/Mid East Stability Impact**

#### Deal doesn’t solve stability or relations.

Randolph 15. [Eric, AFP reporter, “Even full deal with Iran could fail to stabilise Mideast: analysts” Yahoo News – April 3 -- http://news.yahoo.com/even-full-deal-iran-could-fail-stabilise-mideast-223412754.html]

Negotiators hope a nuclear deal will bring Iran back into the diplomatic fold, but experts are divided on whether it will douse the many fires of the Middle East. Iran and six world powers agreed Thursday on the outline of a potentially historic deal to curtail its nuclear programme in return for the lifting of economic sanctions on the Islamic republic.¶ Even while struggling under sanctions and in diplomatic isolation, Iran's influence has been on the rise and it is deeply involved across the region.¶ On top of its long-standing ties to the Syrian regime and Hezbollah militants in Lebanon, it has been leading the fight against the Islamic State group in Iraq and is the chief backer of the surging Huthi rebellion in Yemen.¶ When negotiations over Iran's nuclear programme began in 2013, there were hopes a deal could pave the way for greater cooperation on these security issues, but some analysts say the moment may have passed.¶ "Things have changed so much in the last few months, even weeks. The nuclear issue used to be the paramount issue in the region, but the security debate has moved on," said David Hartwell, managing director of Middle East Insider magazine based in London. ¶ Some still hope the agreement will encourage Iran and its Middle Eastern rivals to sit down together.¶ "Up to now Iran intervenes without being asked in regional issues and that leads to war. An agreement means Iran must start playing a more diplomatic game," said Bernard Hourcade, of the National Centre for Scientific Research in Paris.¶ Hasni Abidi, director of the Geneva-based Study and Research Centre for the Arab and Mediterranean World, said one possible result of sanctions being dropped is that Iran will become more interventionist using weapons bought with the funds released from unfrozen accounts.¶ "On the other hand, will the international recognition make it less aggressive, will it make Iran drop its pressure (on its regional rivals)?," Abidi said.¶ UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said Thursday the nuclear deal "will contribute to peace and stability in the region".¶ But the last week has seen Iran's chief rival Saudi Arabia set up a 10-country Arab military coalition to check the Iran-backed Huthis in Yemen, launching air strikes across the country.¶ Many fear the region is on the verge of full-blown war rather than reconciliation, with the leading powers unlikely to cooperate even on areas of common interest.¶ "There is precious little evidence that the Saudis or anyone else is happy with Iran's involvement in the fight against (the Islamic State group), or willing to cooperate with Iran on anything at all," said Hartwell.